Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-1997
Publication Title
Philosophy of Science
First Page
605
Last Page
626
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392574
Abstract
In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offer an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connect capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercise capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes three features of capacities: 1) Capacities belong to individuals; 2) Capacities are typically not metaphysically fundamental properties of individuals, but can be explained by referring to structural properties of individuals; and 3) Laws are best understood as ascriptions of capacities.
Rights
This article was archived with permission from University of Chicago Press, all rights reserved. Document also available from Philosophy of Science.
Recommended Citation
Glennan, Stuart M., "Capacities, universality and singularity" Philosophy of Science / (1997): 605-626.
Available at https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers/623
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