NOTES

Preface

1. "Critical Epilogue," p. 289. See Note on References for bibliographic details. Cohen also wrote these words in the first edition of his essay (1896). All my references are to the third edition of 1914. The second edition was published in 1902.

Chapter I


2. This view is supported by the fact that, both in Lectures on Ethics and in Pure Reason, from which comes the next section that I will discuss, Kant argues that there is no necessary link between virtue and happiness, thus anticipating the antinomy of practical reason in the second Critique. See Lectures on Ethics, translated by Louis Infield (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), p. 82, and Pure Reason, section 2 of "The Canon of Pure Reason."


4. That Plato did not hold this view is indicated by the fact that he said that the rulers of the perfect city may lie for its benefit, whereas citizens who lied would be punished (Republic, 389b–d).


6. I will return to this issue in Chapter IV, section 2, and argue that Kant's later view is the less plausible one.

7. Kant expressed this sympathy in On the Old Saw, p. 81 (VI: 397). Cf. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 131, who discusses the proposal of the Abbot of St. Pierre. For Kant's claim that we have a duty to seek the republican state and international peace, see, for example, the closing sections of Justice and On the Old Saw.

8. Practical Reason, p. 124 (V: 130). The methodological aspect of this doctrine will be my concern in Chapter II, section 2. It might be objected that the primacy of praxis as a move from ontology to ethics and history "undermines the autonomy of man's existential queries," as Yirmiahu
Yovel puts it in *Kant and the Philosophy of History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 292. For Kant, however, dogmatic metaphysics cannot answer such queries; only the moral law (and, hence, moral action) "allows us a view into the realm of the supersensuous, though only a glimpse" (*Practical Reason*, p. 153; V: 160). That it is only a glimpse is not a shortcoming of Kant's doctrine of moral faith; rather, therein lies its strength and profundity. See further Chapter II, section 3, below.

12. Cf. Yovel, "The Highest Good and History in Kant's Thought," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 54 (1972): 238–283, p. 252. See also his *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, pp. 46ff. Yovel argues that there are two stages in Kant's ethics. The first stage investigates the good will and the universal-law formula of the categorical imperative, whereas the second stage deals with the duty to promote the highest good as "a more complete and comprehensive imperative than the basic categorical one" (*ibid.*, p. 33). Arguing that most Kant interpretations have limited his ethics to the first stage alone, Yovel concludes that they have limited his ethics to an "internal morality" which is passive and politically conservative. Yovel arrives at this conclusion by claiming that Kant's ethics of the first stage presents us with a "pure, empty moral will" (44). This is a questionable premise, even from the perspective of the private-ethics interpretation of Kant, but the real problem is that it leads Yovel to argue that "there is a lack of direct or intrinsic transition from the concept of the pure will [and its law] to that of the highest good" (*ibid.*). I will defend the opposite view in the next section; i.e., the duty to promote this good is grounded in the moral law. An interesting aspect of the two-stage theory, however, is that we may see the process from testing personal maxims to the duty to promote the highest good as one that will gradually emerge in the moral life of the individual. Cf. note 45 below.
16. See also Chapter III, section 3, below.
17. For an exploration along these lines, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, *Kant: The Philosophy of Right* (London: Macmillan, 1970). Arguing against Murphy, Pippin maintains in "On the Moral Foundations of Kant's *Rechtslehre*," that the duty to promote the highest good is indispensable for showing that we have a duty to seek the republican state and international peace. This is doubtful. My analysis of the categorical imperative will show that this imperative demands that we seek external freedom for all human beings,
and on this basis we can derive these political duties. I will, however, not stress this point at present for reasons which are explained below.


22. See also Chapter V, section 2, below.

23. Judgment, pp. 219–20 (§65; V: 451). My analysis of Kant's concept of an organism has benefited from J. D. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), Ch. V.

24. Ibid., p. 221n (§65; V: 453n). The translator says that Kant probably alludes here to the organization of the United States of America. That Kant had the French Revolution in mind is pointed out by Carl J. Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 181. The latter view is more plausible considering the publication date of Judgment (1790) and the great impact that the French Revolution had on the German public (not to speak of Kant's own enthusiasm for this event). Cf. Vorländer, Immanuel Kant, Der Mann und das Werk, Part II, p. 219. See also his "Kant und der Sozialismus," Kant-Studien 4 (1900): 361–412, p. 365.

25. Judgment, p. 222 (§66; V: 454); the first addition [read: person] is mine, the second one is made by the translator of Judgment. Cf. Thomas Aucter, "The Teleology of Kant's Ectypal World," Actes du Congrès d'Ottawa sur Kant, Volume 5 of Collection & Philosophica (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1976), pp. 489 ff. Kant's Lectures on Philosophical Theology, translated by Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1978), supports my analysis. Kant said that the moral perfection of the world is a system in which "every rational creature is combined with every other as reciprocal end and means" (p. 143).

26. We will see in Chapter VI that Cohen does not use the teleological model, but that nonetheless his specific interpretation of the categori-
cal imperative leads to the conclusion that it is the duty of humanity to seek a moral order of universal cooperation. Moreover, Kant's claim that the different formulas express one and the same law sheds doubt on the need for this model.

27. See Virtue, pp. 84ff (VII : 232ff). Another example of Kant's uncritical use of the teleological model is his claim that the principle of equality of married persons is not violated when the wife obeys her husband as her master, because the man is by nature superior. See Metaphysik der Sitten, Cassirer edition, Volume VII, p. 83. Physical force seems to become here the measure of moral force. Susan Moller Okin rightly observes that Kant's reasoning here is "inconsistent with the fundamentals of [his] entire moral philosophy." See her "Women and the Making of the Sentimental Family," Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982): 65--88, p. 80.


30. Virtue, p. 85 (VII : 234). In order to apply this moral rule one must know which ends are arbitrary and which are not. Kant raises this issue indirectly in his casuistical questions. See ibid., p. 86. The argument against suicide constitutes a prima facie claim against capital punishment. Kant fails to draw this inference in his endorsement of capital punishment, whereas Cohen uses the argument to come to a rejection of this type of punishment. See Pure Will, p. 380. Cf. his "Vernichtung der sittlichen Person," in Cohen, Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, Volume II, edited by Albert Görland and Ernst Cassirer (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1928). See also Steven S. Schwarzchild, "Kantianism on the Death Penalty (and Related Social Problems)," Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 71 (1985): 343--372.


35. Ibid. At first sight, it may seem that the sovereign of the realm of ends is the earthly ruler, not the divine one. This interpretation is, for example, offered by Pierre Hassner, "Immanuel Kant," in History of Political Philosophy, edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963, 1972), p. 565. What counts against this interpretation is that
the earthly ruler is not "a completely independent being without need and with power adequate to his will" and that Kant holds that this ruler has no business interfering in the ethical commonwealth. See Chapter IV, section 3, below. Cf. Paton, The Categorical Imperative, p. 188.


37. One other example of the political relevance of Pure Reason may be mentioned here, as it concerns totalitarianism in its fascist variant. The third analogy of experience formulates the principle of coexistence, in accordance with the law of reciprocity or community. Kant argues that the real community (reale Gemeinschaft; commercium) is the objective ground for the subjective community (communio). See Pure Reason, pp. 235-36 (III: 191-92). Kant, then, stipulates the priority of the society of legal reciprocity (Gesellschaft) above the community (Gemeinschaft). In totalitarian thought in its fascist variant the priority is reversed—that is, the latter is upheld as a model for the former—and the naturalistic foundation of the community is emphasized (Blut und Boden ideology). Cf. Henning Günther, Philosophie des Fortschritts: Hermann Cohens Rechtfertigung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Munich: Wilhelm Goldman, 1972): "Die Gemeinschaft, zentrale Parole des Faschismus" (p. 19). We will see that Cohen also rejects the naturalistic Gemeinschaft notion.

38. Kant's claim that we must transform the church (and all other religious institutions) in light of the moral ideal may seem to contradict this statement, but, as we will see in Chapter IV, section 3, he contends that the church is to be changed into an "inner" unification of good wills. This unification is subject to precisely the problem I am discussing here.

39. Allen E. Buchanan, in his "The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 55-78, pp. 70ff, gives a good example of the limits of beneficence. He argues that rational altruistic agents will opt for state-regulated health-care programs because such regulation is required in order to deal with these two problems: the uncertainty whether one's individual contribution to large-scale projects will be effective at all, and the diversity in the expressions of beneficence. Similar remarks apply, of course, to other important human goods.


41. The importance of communication for morality is stressed in the work of Jürgen Habermas, but Habermas distorts Kant's ethics by describing it as a mere monological private ethics. See, for example, his Legitimation Crisis, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 87ff.

42. See "An Old Question," pp. 147 and 150 (VII: 400 and 404). At times, Kant even suggests that rule by one individual is to be preferred to representative democracy. See Justice, §51 and Peace, p. 97 (VI: 438). His
argument for this view is that it makes it possible that the greatest number of people will be represented. His main reason for ultimately rejecting the notion of a single ruler is that there is no guarantee that this ruler will not act along the lines of his own will (despotism) rather than represent the people.

43. See Foundations, p. 20 (IV: 260), where Kant states that “common human reason . . . knows . . . what is consistent or inconsistent with duty” and that the task of moral theory is only to draw attention to the moral principle embedded in “common human reason,” not to argue for new moral duties. We may grant this claim for certain individual duties, but it seems definitely mistaken when the concern is active social duties. See also Practical Reason, p. 8n (V: 8n). Cf. Beck, Commentary, p. 154, note 56.


45. Foundations, p. 48 (IV: 289). The two ways of grounding this duty may be interpreted as reflecting different stages in the moral life of the individual. We may speculate that the broader concern typically emerges at a later stage of moral development.

Chapter II


3. Virtue, p. 59 (VII: 209). The translation of Lust and Unlust as pleasure and pain is not accurate, although widely used. Lust has a more general meaning than pleasure, and, as will soon become clear, Kant explicates the Lust associated with moral feeling in terms of self-contentment and inner peace—a state of moral well-being which seems to have little to do with pleasure as such. Obviously, similar remarks apply to the translation of Unlust as pain. Cf. George Schrader, “The Status of Feeling in Kant’s Philosophy,” in Actes du Congrès d’Ottawa sur Kant, Volume 5 of Collection & Philosophica (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1976), pp. 146ff.


8. P. 38 (VII: 190). Kant states here that "the notion that I am under obligation to take as my end something that lies in the concepts of practical reason, and so to have a material ground of choice beyond the formal one that Law contains, would be the concept of an end which is in itself a duty." Kant is here drawing a distinction between the doctrine of law and the doctrine of virtue.

9. The "politicians" are, for example, attacked in the first Appendix of *Peace* and in the second section of "An Old Question." Kant's trust in simple and ordinary persons is discussed in Beck's *Commentary*, p. 235.


12. Ibid., p. 145 (399). Kant adds the qualification that enthusiasm cannot "be wholly esteemed, since passion as such deserves censure." In *Judgment* (p. 112; § 29; V: 344) Kant explains that enthusiasm as an affection "makes it impossible to exercise a free deliberation about fundamental propositions so as to determine ourselves thereby." This remark seems mistaken with regard to moral enthusiasm. What may be noted in this context, though, is that moral enthusiasm may be accompanied by a lack of critical assessment of those historical events which inspire this enthusiasm. In other words, the danger that must be guarded against is that, in one's enthusiasm for a progressive historical event, one lose sight of the less "promising" aspects of this event. We will see in Chapter V, section 1, below, that Kant did not succumb to this danger in his enthusiasm for the French Revolution—he criticized the regime of terror—and thus his own example belies his remark on enthusiasm as in need of censure.


15. It might be objected that the existence of poverty and crime cannot be explained on the basis of political factors alone, but we will see in our discussion of Kant's philosophy of history that he was not unaware of the fact that economic factors also directly cause such societal evils. Nonetheless, we will also note that his solution for such problems is too much politically focused, this at the cost of required economic change.

International from falling into Bakuninist hands, Marx successfully arranged at the Hague Congress for the transfer of this Council to New York. This meant, in effect, that the First International came to an end. See further David Fernbach’s Introduction to Karl Marx, *The First International and After*, edited by Fernbach (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 49–50.


18. *Religion*, p. 92 (VI: 245). That Kant’s primary concern is not with what will happen “in the end” is even more clear from the following passage (ibid., p. 130; 287):

The idea of the highest good . . . cannot be realized by man himself. . . . And now there opens up before him the abyss of a mystery regarding what God may do, whether indeed anything at all, and if so, what in particular should be ascribed to God. Meanwhile man knows . . . nothing but what he must himself do in order to be worthy of that supplement, unknown, or at least incomprehensible, to him. (Translation altered.)

Kant, however, somewhat overstates his point here, for, as we will see in our discussion of the postulate of the existence of God, he holds that we may in regulative manner ascribe properties to God on the basis of how we conceive His “supplementary efforts.”


21. See *Foundations*, pp. 35–36 (IV: 275–76). Kant mentions these ends in the context of his argument that our conception of happiness is so indefinite that we do not really know what we want and are inconsistent in our willing when we wish to attain happiness. He overstates his case here, his point being that the precepts of prudence, because of their variability, cannot function as practical laws. After all, taking Kant too seriously here would undermine his concept of the highest good. Moreover, a certain degree of surprise, spontaneity, and creativity is not incompatible with happiness, but is rather an element of it. I will soon argue that Kant tended to neglect this aspect of human happiness.

22. To the extent that Kant is correct that we do not really know what we want when we desire happiness (see note 21 above), this formulation of the duty to promote the highest good is to be preferred. Moreover, it seems that this formulation better conveys what is really at stake: a tremendous amount of suffering in the world that can, and ought to be, alleviated or prevented.

23. Thomas Auxter draws a somewhat similar distinction, namely,
between the ectypal world (the realm of ends), which he calls the “highest good,” and the highest good as the perfect (consummatum) condition in which virtue and happiness exactly correlate, which he calls the “highest good.” See his “The Unimportance of Kant’s Highest Good,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 (1979): 121–134, p. 127. See also his “The Teleology of Kant’s Ectypal World,” p. 491. One important difference between our respective analyses is that Auxter views the highest good, as a mere “otherworldly conception,” thus, I think, drawing the wrong inference that the two conceptions of the highest good do not partly overlap in Kant’s work. Auxter makes the same mistake in his Kant’s Moral Teleology (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1982). This book came too late to my attention to be discussed in the text. It offers some criticisms of Kant’s highest good doctrine that accord with the view defended here. In contrast to the present study, Auxter does not seek to explore the social (and historical) dimensions of Kant’s moral teleology, although he promises us a future book on this topic. See ibid., pp. xi and 182. That the highest good, and not the highest good , is the final end of the moral law, seems also to have been the view of Hermann Cohen. In Kants Begründung der Ethik (p. 350), he says that “the community of autonomous beings is the only highest good.” Cf. Reason and Hope, p. 82.

24. Cf. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 63. It may be conceded that the highest good, sets a deontic “ought” for an omnipotent rational being, but this does not mean that it is our duty to bring about this end. Moreover, Kant’s claim that such a being would bring about the highest good, raises the suspicion of circularity: in order even to make intelligible the view that this good sets a deontic “ought,” Kant already assumes in the antinomy what he still needs to show on the basis of the antinomy, to wit, the existence of a being that can harmonize nature with the moral intention.

25. Cf. John R. Silber, “Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent,” Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 469–492, pp. 483 ff. Silber’s notion of the highest good as transcendent has a similar function to that which I ascribe to the highest good, although, as we will soon see, he gives an altogether different interpretation of the duty to promote this good.


27. Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, “The Highest Good as Content for Kant’s Ethical Formalism,” Kant-Studien 56 (1965): 102–110, p. 106. In “The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant’s Ethics” (p. 195), Silber seeks to avoid this problem by claiming that the pursuit of virtue conditions the balancing of virtue and happiness; but, as Murphy notes, it is difficult to see how Silber can consistently argue for this on his own terms.

28. See, for example, Foundations, p. 9 (IV: 249). See also note 31 below.
29. Kant makes an exception to this rule in his discussion of capital punishment, maintaining that in certain cases the death sentence is better than penal servitude because it guarantees that criminals are punished "in proportion to their inner viciousness" (Justice, p. 103; VII: 141). This is just one of the many ways in which Kant's defense of capital punishment conflicts with the basic premises of his practical philosophy. Cf. Chapter I, note 30, above. See also Schwarzschild, "Kantianism on the Death Penalty . . . ," pp. 348-49.


31. The first of these statements may seem to be contradicted by Kant's claim in Practical Reason (p. 63; V: 68) that someone who annoys "peace-loving folk" should not complain when he gets a "good beating," because "justice has been done to him . . . the proportion between welfare and well-doing is here put into practice." But notice that Kant does not say that we ought to bring unhappiness to the immoral person; rather, he adopts the standpoint of the impartial observer and approves or disapproves the distribution of virtue and happiness in the universe. Cf. Foundations, p. 9 (IV: 249). Such an evaluative judgment does not commit one to action in accordance with it. Cf. "On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies," p. 288n (VI: 127n.). Another consideration is that the above example is extremely banal. Should we take Kant seriously here? The second of these statements may seem to be contradicted by Kant's "Fragments of a Moral Catechism" (Virtue, § 52). I think, however, that a careful reading of the text makes clear that Kant's main concern here is to show that the virtuous deserve to be happy, not to argue that the duty of beneficence must be limited to the virtuous.


33. In Immanuel Kant on Hope (pp. 62ff. and 160ff.) Peters offers an interesting criticism of Kant in this respect, although his criticism loses some of its force by equating the principle of justice to the jus taliones.


35. Cf. Silber, "Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent," pp. 474-75. To further illustrate the above inconsistency, it may be noted that Kant claims in (c) that the highest good is to be thought of as "to be made real by our will," although he claims in conclusion (m) that it is "our duty to promote the highest good."

36. This succinct formulation is given by Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 294.

37. See "On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies."


39. Cf. Cohen, Kants Begründung der Ethik, p. 368. Cohen argues here that the issue of our time is not whether we have more sunshine than rain, but rather the suffering that human beings inflict upon one another. He adds that it is the merit of socialist thought that it poses precisely this latter question.
Chapter III

1. Kant added the question mark. Its purpose is not explained.
2. The distinction here between the natural and the moral end of humanity corresponds to the distinction Kant draws in *Judgment* between the ultimate end of nature and the final end of creation. The purpose of culture as our natural end is the highest political good, whereas the community of colegislators is our moral end. See further Chapter IV, section 1, below.
3. In his attempt to detect a progressive development within history, the Kantian philosophical historian may come to suggest new empirical links or fields of inquiry. Thus a reflective history may have some theoretical heuristic value for empirical history. Cf. Burleigh T. Wilkins, “Teleology in Kant’s Philosophy of History,” *History and Theory* 5 (1966): 172–185. We should, however, not infer from this that Kant seeks to sit in the chair of the historian proper; rather, we may say that he looks critically over the shoulder of the empirical historian, emphasizing the emancipatory significance of historical research. Kant himself explicitly states in “Universal History” (p. 25; IV: 165–66) that he does not attempt to play the role of the historian proper: “That I would want to displace the work of practicing empirical historians with this Idea of world history . . . would be a misinterpretation of my intention. It is only a suggestion of what a philosophical mind (which would have to be well versed in history) could essay from another point of view.” Cf. Goldmann, *Immanuel Kant*, p. 212 n. 54.
8. In altering the translations of Kant’s historical essays, I have benefited from *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, translated by Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), and *Kant’s Political Writings*, translated by H. B. Nisbet and edited by Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
10. Here, and elsewhere, I have departed from Beck in not capitalizing the word ‘nature,’ since I find that the capitals needlessly strengthen the impression of personification.
12. The phrase ‘the cunning of nature’ is coined after Hegel’s “cunning of reason” (*List der Vernunft*), and is used by Yovel, who bases him-
self on Eric Wiil. See Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, p. 140n. The fact that nature, and not reason, is the artist of deception suffices to demarcate Kant’s philosophy of history from Hegel’s. I will discuss some major differences between their respective views on history in section 3, below.


14. Cf. *Foundations*, p. 11 (IV: 251). In “What Is Orientation in Thinking?” Kant discusses romantic and intuitionist attacks on reason, which were increasing in his own time as a reaction to the Enlightenment, and warns us that such attacks threaten civil liberties. Goldmann, in his *Immanuel Kant*, p. 122, perceptively observes that the rise of fascism in our century has “shown us how penetrating Kant’s vision was.”

15. “Conjectural Beginning,” p. 63 (IV: 336). Fackenheim’s translation here is rather liberal: the term ‘second nature’ is not Kant’s, although it captures his meaning. Kant said: “... bis vollkommene Kunst wieder Natur wird ...”

16. In *Anthropology* (p. 188; VIII: 221), Kant puts the dilemma in even broader terms, arguing that human beings need moral education in order to become virtuous and that those who provide this education are themselves in need of moral education.


18. Cf. Galston, *Kant and the Problem of History*, p. 241. See also Hassner, “Immanuel Kant,” pp. 588–89. The passage just cited from “Universal History” is, for example, contradicted by the following statement from *Peace* (pp. 112–13; VI: 453): “A good constitution is not to be expected from morality, but, conversely, a good moral condition of a people is to be expected only under a good constitution.”


21. “Universal History” p. 23 (IV: 163). Beck translates Staatskörper as “international government.” This is a bit misleading; for Kant argues that, temporarily at least, it is better to work toward a federation of states, because an international government carries with it the danger of universal despotism. See *Peace*, pp. 101–02 and 113 (VI: 442 and 453). See also On the Old Saw, p. 79 (VI: 395). Cf. Riley, *Kant’s Political Philosophy*, p. 116. See also Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace*, p. 46.

22. See also Chapter IV, section 3, below. I will later also argue (in particular in Chapter VI, section 1, below) that Kant’s proposal for peace within the state suffers from a similar defect.


24. See, for example, *Kant and the Problem of History*, pp. 88ff.

25. Thus Galston states in *Kant and the Problem of History*: “[T]he
introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of History bears a startling (though entirely unacknowledged) resemblance to the 'Idea for a Universal History.' Yet in Hegel's thought all the Kantian hesitation, ambiguity, and perplexity has vanished" (p. 262). That Galston ascribes such doubt and ambiguity to Kant is not surprising, for he maintains that for Kant "[h]istory is the attempt to show that the world is just and benevolently ordered" (p. 230).

26. Again, this is implied by Kant's doctrine of the reflective judgment, which leads to a critical teleology, not a dogmatic one. Note, moreover, that even if we accept Kant's contention that the postulate of the existence of God can be derived from the moral law, it does not follow that a higher cause is at work within human history; for the major objective function of this postulate is to provide a ground for the belief that there is an ontic possibility in nature which makes feasible human action toward the highest good. The minor objective function of the postulate points to the same conclusion: we may hope for divine assistance—that is, the bridging of the gap between the highest good, and the highest good, only at the end of history.


29. Hegel uses the term 'wirklich' to refer to those aspects of reality in which existence and essence are synthesized [i.e., where the Spirit is at work (wirken)], whereas he uses the term 'real' to denote those aspects of reality which have mere existence.

30. The first two of these objections can be found in the Preface to Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 4 ff. They are discussed in some detail in Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 123 ff. Hegel's critique of the French Revolution can be found in The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 599 ff ("Absolute Freedom and Terror"). Although this critique is often specifically directed toward Rousseau, it seems that the broader target is the Kantian heritage as such, in which, following Hegel, an "abstract" ideal is counterposed to historical reality, with the result that the desire emerges to violently change this reality.

31. Philosophy of Right, pp. 12–13. Avineri, in his at times far-fetched attempt to portray Hegel as a progressive thinker, maintains that this passage, though "seemingly quietistic," contains the hidden critical message that "philosophy cannot change the world, only interpret it; but by its very act of interpretation it changes it, it tells the world that its time is up" (Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, p. 130). This argument is plainly mistaken: Hegel's political thought becomes praxis-oriented only after the fact (i.e., the demise of his own time) to which it did not seek to contribute. After all, Avineri himself claims that "Hegel saw his own time as the apotheosis of history, as the reconciliation of the actual and the rational"
32. See, respectively, Philosophy of Right, p. 216, and The Philosophy of History, p. 457.


35. Philosophy of Right, p. 11. It may be noted that Michael Oakeshott views enjoyment of the present as one of the basic features of conservatism. See Chapter I, section 2, above.

36. In accordance with this, Hegel says of the German nations of his day: “Freedom has found the means of realizing its Ideal—its true existence. This is the ultimate result which the process of History is intended to accomplish” (The Philosophy of History, pp. 109–110). It is true that Hegel at some points in his work seems to suggest that the future is open—e.g., his famous remark about America as the land of the future (see ibid., p. 86)—but it is difficult to see how on his own terms he could have meant to say anything other than that the political principles embedded in the German nations of his own time (notably, the Prussian state) would in the future be extended to other nations. Thus Hegel’s philosophy of history, as contrasted to Kant’s, remains within the political horizon of his own society.

37. Both Arendt and Beiner neglect to tell us what they mean by the “universal,” but considering the fact that Arendt argues that Kant’s notion of dignity conflicts with his idea of (infinite) progress, we must assume that she (and Beiner) had Kant’s meaning in mind. At any rate, what matters here is not so much Arendt’s view per se, as an explication and discussion of important objections to Kant’s philosophy of history.

38. To avoid possible misunderstanding, let me note that my claim here is not that on Kant’s account only morally committed persons should be treated as having unconditional worth. For Kant, it is our duty to treat all human beings as ends in themselves. The issue at stake, however, is whether those persons who have displayed dignity vis-à-vis history are robbed of their dignity by Kant’s notion of (infinite) progress. The very fact that many human agents have not displayed dignity in the historical drama is, of course, not something we can in some sense see as the fault of Kant’s ethics, and, as we have just noted in our discussion of Galston’s objection, Kant does not approve of the fact that history uses many human agents as means only. Kant himself seems to emphasize this point: that his philosophy of history does not make individuals (or even whole peoples), who are subject to the cunning of nature, into mere means, by noting that these persons unintentionally bring about progress and that “they would set little store by it if they did know it” (“Universal History,” p. 12; IV: 151). Finally, it may be noted that Kant’s ethics also recognizes that dignity can be displayed through the fulfillment of individual duties.


40. Cited in Timothy R. Keck, Kant and Socialism: The Marburg School
in Wilhelminian Germany (Dissertation, University of Wisconsin/Madison, 1975), p. 421. It must nonetheless be said that Toller had unrealistic expectations about the changes that the Munich Revolution could effect, and it seems fair to say that with the murder of Kurt Eisner the Kantian road came to an end. I will return to Eisner in the Appendix, below.

41. The qualification must be added that Kant was also sharply critical of the moral terrorism that accompanied the Revolution in its later stages, but this issue will be our concern in Chapter V, section I, below.

42. My description here of the moral society is influenced by Habermas's notion of the ideal speech community. My counterfactual "move" is also indebted to his work. See note 44 below.


48. Cf. Peukert, Wissensc haftstheorie, p. 284n. Peukert reformulates Kant's famous question "What may I hope?" in a manner similar to mine, but he fails to observe that this reformulation is actually in accord with Kant's meaning. Cf. my earlier observations in Chapter II, section 3, above.

Chapter IV


2. See also Judgment, § 59, where Kant argues that beauty is the symbol of morality. That science makes us susceptible to morality follows from Kant's claim that there are structural affinities between the natural order and the moral order. See "Of the Typic of Pure Practical Reason" in the second Critique.

3. Ibid., p. 285 (515). Yovel maintains that Kant "must be [here] referring to other creatures that in his belief inhabit the universe" (Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 176 n20). Yovel misses Kant's philosophical point: he refers to other rational creatures to emphasize that it is not a mere biological fact which makes us into the final end of creation—this would be an instance of what Peter Singer calls "speciesism"—but our moral nature. Thus Kant also stresses that the supreme condition of humanity is not a given but a task.

4. I assume here that Kant is best understood as a nonhedonist, a viewpoint which I have defended in my discussion of his notion of happiness in Chapter II, section 2, above.

5. The more logical inference seems to be that such devils would opt for a world government, i.e., an international coercive agency, but, for a
reason that will be explained in section 3, point (g), below, Kant holds that a league of nations is a more prudential choice.


7. Kant does not mention all these liberties and restricts the right to vote to economically independent male citizens. See further Chapter VI, section 1, below. That he is in general a fierce defender of civil liberties is clear from my earlier discussion in Chapter I of his view of the importance of the freedom of public expression of one's thought. See also Chapter III, note 14, above.

8. I will later criticize Kant's view on this issue. For a rebuttal of Rawls's arguments in this regard, see Norman Daniels, "Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty," in Reading Rawls, edited by Daniels (New York: Basic Books, n.d.).


11. There are, of course, situations in which intelligent devils most likely would not opt for such restrictions on liberty. To give one example, the ethnic majority is an ethnic minority in an adjacent country. Fear that their repressive measures will be met by similar measures in the other country might prevent the ethnic majority from placing restrictions on liberty. Such "happy" coincidences are significant behind the veil of ignorance, assuming that most people are conservative gamblers, but, in the absence of this veil, they are nothing other than "happy" coincidences and therein lies the problem.

12. Kant and the Philosophy of History, p. 189. Yovel's view is criticized in Riley, Kant's Political Thought, pp. 80ff.

13. More specifically, Kant argues that religious wars, accusations of heresy, expulsion, and the like, emerge because the different faiths proclaim that their nonrational dimension is universally valid. Kant views the Catholic church as the proto-example of this, but notes that the Protestant church would often gladly follow suit were it not for the fact that part of its identity is to reject the claim to universality of the Catholic church. Thus Kant says that examples of "arch-catholic Protestants" abound. See Religion, pp. 99–100 (VI: 253–54).


15. Justice, p. 35 (VII: 32). A little further on (p. 39; 35) Kant adds that justice here is to be understood in a narrow sense, involving the "authorization to use coercion." Justice may also be thought of in a wider sense, as denoting equity, but, Kant argues, this kind of justice "admits a right without coercion," i.e., it is not a form of legal justice. To illustrate this point, Kant says that it is a duty of justice (equity) to compensate one's servant for inflation, but, if this clause is not added to the labor contract, the master cannot be coerced to do so.

16. The distinction between wide and narrow duties is discussed in Virtue, pp. 49 ff. (VII: 199 ff.). In a word, wide duties leave it a matter of
individual choice how much and in precisely what manner one wishes to contribute toward the realization of an obligatory end, whereas narrow duties do not leave such room, but specify how one should act. Kant holds that the duties of virtue are of wide obligation, whereas juridical duties are of narrow obligation.

17. The rationale for this view is that it seems that in the moral society education and information can fulfill all the rational purposes of punishment proper, such as prevention of rule violations and encouragement of law-abidingness. Cf. Tom Campbell, The Left and Rights (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 79 ff., where Campbell argues in some detail that socialist society can be based on a noncoercive legal order. It falls outside the scope of my study to address the question whether the regulative idea of the end of all punishment, as sketched here, is compatible with Kant's retributive theory of punishment. The issue receives some attention in Schwarzschild, "Kantianism on the Death Penalty . . . ," pp. 369–70.

18. For references, see Chapter III, note 21, above.

19. Although Kant recognizes that such threats do not guarantee total compliance (see Religion, p. 87; VI: 240), it seems that he, like many other legal theorists, overestimates their efficacy (see "Universal History," p. 16; IV: 157; and Justice, p. 19; VII: 19). Cf. Campbell, The Left and Rights, p. 69. For obvious reasons, sociological evidence is limited. Relying on this evidence and common sense, a recent report comes to the cautious conclusion that "[t]he threat and imposition of punishment is called for in order to secure compliance—not full compliance, but more compliance than there might be were there no legal penalties at all." See Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice (New York: Hill & Wang, 1976), p. 44. Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration.


Chapter V

1. Robert E. Anchor, the translator of "An Old Question," adds the explanatory note that Wieland's Die Geschichte der Abderiten (1774) must have made the term 'abderitism' readily understandable to Kant's readers. This popular novel described ancient Abdera as a city of human foolishness.

2. See Lewis White Beck's Introduction to Kant, On History, p. xii, where he says that Kant was "almost the last and certainly the greatest of the 'Jacobins' in Germany." Beck draws from G. P. Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution (London, 1920).

3. See Justice, p. 140 (VII: 180). See also Peace, Second Supplement, and Lectures on Ethics, p. 253. Contra Nicholson, it may be noted that Kant typically views such a reform as also resulting from a growing public enlightenment. But this does not invalidate the main point that change through "legal" means is one aspect of Kant's thesis of progress.
4. See, for example, Religion (pp. 176-77n.; VI: 338-39), where Kant states that he will raise no protest against the ruling powers when they, constrained by the prevailing circumstances, postpone very far into the future the granting of civil freedom to all, provided that they at least acknowledge that this must eventually occur.

5. See further Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, Chapter V. Yovel also argues in detail that the noumenal status of practical reason is inconsistent with this idea that moral reason arises within history, stating that Kant, “unlike Hegel, . . . cannot allow for the temporalization of reason” (p. 271). Placing the problem in the broader context of Kant’s distinction between noumenal and phenomenal reality in general, Yovel views the difficulty at hand—that is, no mediation is possible between rational and empirical history—as so serious that he concludes his book with the following words: “Between the Kantian failure and Hegel’s over-achievement, the idea of history must be questioned anew.” In response, a few brief remarks are in order. First, we can accept Kant’s thesis that we are both moral beings and beings with inclinations, without committing ourselves to the view that we are members, as it were, of two worlds, i.e., the world of noumena and that of phenomena. Cf. W. David Ross, Kant’s Ethical Theory (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 85. Likewise, we can accept Kant’s description of practical freedom as our ability to act independently of our lower desires and be guided by the moral law without committing ourselves to his particular account of transcendental freedom as the nontemporal power to begin causal series in time. This procedure I have followed. (My occasional use of the terms ‘noumenal’ and ‘phenomenal’ in reference to the ideal self and the self of the inclinations should not be interpreted as implying these commitments.) Second, once we accept, however, Kant’s noumenon-phenomenon distinction as it relates to reason and human action, and interpret it as an ontological distinction, not only the problem of the historical evolution of practical reason emerges, but a variety of other problems as well, each contradicting Kant’s moral beliefs. For example, the idea of moral progress becomes self-contradictory, and we can no longer claim that the enthusiasm of the spectators of the French Revolution signifies a good will, because all our observable actions must be seen as resulting from prior causal series. For a further explication of these types of problem, see Allen W. Wood (ed.), Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). Third, a step toward a solution is to replace the “two-world theory” by a “two-standpoint theory”—that is, the scientist proceeds in terms of causal language, whereas the moral actor proceeds in terms of the language of freedom, but no claim is made that one of these languages is privileged in an ontological sense. The ramifications of this view for Kant’s epistemology cannot be addressed here, but Beck, who proposes a similar view, briefly discusses some of them in his Commentary (p. 193). (He also claims—perhaps too hesitantly—that this view is intimated in Kant.) The gain is that there is no longer an overriding reason for placing our moral agency in a timeless realm “beyond” the world of phenomena.
Fourth, we can now consistently argue that moral reason evolves within history and has expressed itself (no matter how imperfectly) in some historical events. Moreover, we can still give meaning to the idea of non-temporal reason; it must be seen as a regulative notion, referring to post-historical reason as the complete elucidation of the moral law (an infinite task), the postulated focus of historical and temporal forms of reason. Cf. Steven S. Schwarzschild, "Authority & Reason," Studies in Jewish Philosophy (1982): 45-63, pp. 48-49. Finally, it is along these latter lines that I approach in the present study Kant's thesis of the progress of pure practical reason (as one aspect of moral progress as such).


8. The issue is not further explained. Earlier in Justice (pp. 41-42; 36-37) Kant had argued that the right of necessity is really an imaginary right. This underlines that Kant is here far from offering a justification for revolution, even under life-threatening circumstances.

9. This suggestion is mentioned in Beck, "Kant and the Right of Revolution," p. 172, and rejected as "incredible."

10. This suggestion is mentioned in Beck, "Kant and the Right of Revolution," p. 180, and it too is rejected. A similar proposal is made by Dieter Henrich, "Kant über die Revolution," in Zwi Batscha (ed.), Materialien zu Kants Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 360-61. Henrich claims that Kant's rejection of the right to revolution may be seen as directed against the British attempt to overthrow the French state. Preliminary article 5 of Peace—"No State Shall by Force Interfere with the Constitution or Government of Another State"—suffices, however, for this purpose. Henrich's main solution is (f).

11. The solution is offered as a partial one by Goldmann, Immanuel Kant, p. 213n.

12. An anonymous reader of the present study suggested this solution. It resembles Beck's initial solution, but after a further explication of this proposal Beck himself concludes that "some inconsistency remains." See "Kant and the Right of Revolution," pp. 181 and 187.


15. This solution is proposed by Henrich, "Kant über die Revolution," pp. 363-64. It is also discussed in Beck, "Kant and the Right of Revolution," pp. 179-80. My refutation of this solution is indebted to Beck's discussion.

16. See Vorländer, Immanuel Kant, Der Mann und das Werk, Part II, pp. 213 and 310. Vorländer also offers a detailed account of Kant's undying
enthusiasm for the French Revolution (see pp. 220 ff.). That the French Revolution rather than the American Revolution receives all the attention in Kant's work is not surprising. The American Revolution took place before Kant's major practical writings; moreover, the French Revolution was at the time much more important in political terms, certainly for Germany.

17. It is also difficult to reconcile with Kant's claim in "Universal History" that we may hope that perpetual peace will emerge after "many reformative revolutions" (Revolutionen der Umbildung) [p. 23; IV: 163].

18. Cited in Justice, p. 138 (178–79). The critical review appeared in the Göttingen Journal (February 18, 1797). The reviewer was presumably Friedrich Bouterwerk of the University of Göttingen. See Justice, p. 130n.


22. To avoid possible misunderstanding, it is to be noted that, strictly speaking, the categorical imperative is concerned with the universalization of maxims, not of actions. The civil resister cannot rationally will that everyone follow his example in a given situation, but this does not mean that he cannot rationally will that everyone adopt the maxim of civil disobedience. Comparable remarks hold with regard to such maxims as freedom of movement and freedom of choosing one's occupation. The basic point here is that, in testing such maxims, we should not assume that everyone will act on them at the same time and in the same manner; rather, we should assess whether we can rationally will that all human agents adopt these maxims and then act on them in accordance with their particular needs and circumstances. Now there might be situations in which our acting on such morally permissible maxims as the right to civil disobedience and freedom of movement would lead to unintentional conflicts or immoral results. What this shows is that these maxims express prima facie rights, which means that, before acting on them in a given situation, we should see whether other moral considerations come into play. Alternatively, we can approach this type of problem by further specification and determination of our maxims, taking into account how other people are most likely to act or choose in a given situation. Cf. note 23, below. See also my remarks at the end of this section.

23. Cf. Richard A. Wasserstrom, "The Obligation to Obey the Law," in Civil Disobedience p. 258; Wasserstrom also analyzes problems similar to those raised in note 22, above.

24. Cf. Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 60. Arendt, however, seems to overstate her case by arguing that Kant could conceive of action by the governed only in terms of conspiratorial activity. After all, Kant was familiar with the French Revolution.


27. What makes the “prima facie” approach ultimately to be preferred, I think, is that it conveys more clearly that there is something profoundly wrong with a situation in which we have to break certain moral rules for the sake of duty. In other words, this approach keeps the moral ideal in the foreground, whereas it tends to get lost in the approach of further specification and determination of one’s maxims.

28. For Kant’s denial that we have a right to lie in certain circumstances, see his (in)famous “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives,” in *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*.

29. Cf. Howard Williams, *Kant’s Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 204. This book became available to me too late to be discussed in the text. It offers the most extensive critical exposition of Kant’s political philosophy currently available in the English language.

30. Cf. my earlier observations on the anger of oppressed human nature in Chapter II, section 1, above.


32. Broadly speaking, the work of Jürgen Habermas may serve here as an example. Additionally, Kant’s philosophy of history is helpful for studying the moral evolution of the individual, for there are structural affinities between this evolution and the evolution of the stages of historical development interpreted as stages of social evolution. Rex P. Stevens approaches Kant’s philosophy of history from this angle in *Kant on Moral Practice* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1981), Chapter V.

33. See *Lectures on Ethics*, pp. 252–53. Cf. my discussion in Chapter I, section 1, above. In his later work, however, Kant was more doubtful in this regard, arguing that emancipation through education is not to be expected as long as the state itself is not emancipated. See “An Old Question,” section 10. A good analysis of the importance of education (in the broad sense of the word) for the evolution and effective functioning of democratic institutions can be found in A. P. Simonds, “On Being Informed,” *Theory and Society* 11 (1982): 587–616. Simonds also shows that the overcoming of illiteracy—the enemy of democracy—was possible only thanks to the development of the printing press, thus illustrating my thesis that processes on the different levels of progress are best understood as feedback processes.

34. Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* is discussed from this angle in Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace*. Vorländer undertook a similar effort with respect to the League of Nations in his *Kant und der Gedanke des Völkerbundes* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1919). A more recent discussion of the historical accuracy of Kant’s peace analysis and prediction is offered by Michael Doyle, “Kant,
Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983): 205–35 and 323–53. Doyle defends with much historical detail two theses that resemble two of Kant’s “cunning” roads toward peace: (a) even though liberal democracies have many times fought with nonliberal states, secure liberal democracies have not yet engaged in war with one another; and (b), periods in the last two centuries that show the greatest number and/or intensity of wars also display the greatest increase in the number of liberal democracies (see, respectively, pp. 213 and 352). Projecting this pattern toward the future, Doyle concludes that liberal foreign policy is essentially sound and provides the most promising road toward international peace. (It is also a slow road, because Doyle offers the remarkable prediction that global liberal peace is not to be expected before the year 2113. See p. 352.) A major weakness of this analysis is that it views economic imperialism, covert intervention, war with Third World nations, and so on, as mere abuses of liberal foreign policy rather than as expressions of its capitalist core. The mistaken over-all result is that a fair international economic order is not seen as a necessary and even first step toward international peace. Cf. my observations in Chapter IV, section 3, above.


Chapter VI

1. In Chapter III, section 2, above, I have discussed two such criticisms: Kant condemned the commercial nations of his time for their colonial conquests, and he saw the international credit system as contributing to the war effort. I will not analyze Kant’s more technical economic views. They are discussed in Susan Meld Shell, The Rights of Reason: A Study of Kant’s Philosophy and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 147–150.

2. This view is already displayed in the passage just cited from On the Old Saw, but see also Justice, p. 79 (VII: 120–21). Although Kant had in mind primarily, of course, domestic servants, apprentices of artisans, and farm laborers, his view concerning the economic dependence of the worker can be extended to the industrial worker.


5. Cf. Daniels, “Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty,” pp. 258–59; Daniels raises objections against Rawls which are similar to mine against Kant. To avoid misunderstanding, it should be noted that my arguments here do not assume that the wealthy always deliberately pursue their own self-interest; ideological distortion must also be taken into account.


10. This latter point is manifest in *Justice*, § 2, where Kant argues that the possibility of legal private property is a “juridical postulate of practical reason,” because without this possibility “freedom would be robbing itself of the use of its will in relation to an object of the same will inasmuch as it would be placing usable objects outside all possibility of being used.” This view is plausible with regard to some forms of personal property, but mistaken with regard to most forms of productive property.

11. In other words, my aim is not to argue that Kantian socialism constitutes the *only* logical reconstruction of Kant's practical philosophy; rather, I seek to show that it constitutes a possible and convincing reconstruction. See further the Preface. And, of course, the ultimate concern is the merits of Kantian socialism itself.


14. The three commentaries are *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* (1871, 1885, 1918), *Kants Begründung der Ethik* (1877, 1910), and *Kants Begründung der Ästhetik* (1889).

15. This is the only major work of Cohen that has been translated into English, which reflects the fact that in the English-speaking world only his philosophical interpretation of Judaism has received ample philosophical attention. The situation is different in the German-speaking world, as is exemplified by such recent studies on Cohen's epistemology as Geert Edel's *Von der Vernunftkritik zur Erkenntnistheorie* (Dissertation, Bonn, 1986) and Helmut Holzhey's *Cohen und Natorp*, 2 vols. (Basel: Schwabe,
Cohen's practical philosophy is analyzed in Günther's *Philosophie des Fortschritts* (1972) and in Eggert Winter's *Ethik und Rechtswissenschaft: Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zur Ethik-Konzeption des Marburger Neukantianismus im Werke Hermann Cohens* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980). Moreover, a new edition of the works of Cohen is in process of being published by the Hermann Cohen Archives at the University of Zurich. Finally, Cohen and the Marburg School have received adequate historical analysis in Keck, *Kant and Socialism*, and in Thomas E. Willey, *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860–1914* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978).

16. My reason for this focus is that Cohen's socialism is most clearly developed in this period. This is not to say that I hold that there is some break between the Cohen of the second period and the Cohen of the third period. That there is such a break, in particular with regard to Cohen's conception of God, is often argued by scholars who are concerned mainly with his philosophical interpretation of Judaism. The practical effect has been that one limits one's attention to the Cohen of the third period and neglects the socialist dimension in his ethics and philosophy of religion. Cf. note 15, above. Cohen himself, however, saw a clear link between his socialist and moral-religious commitments. See *Pure Will*, p. 559, and "Critical Epilogue," pp. 279–80. The issue is further discussed in Schwarzchild's forthcoming Introduction to Cohen's *Religion of Reason*, as part of Cohen, *Werke*, published by the Hermann Cohen Archives (and Georg Olms Verlag). See also Schwarzchild's "‘Germanism and Judaism’—Hermann Cohen’s Normative Paradigm of the German-Jewish Symbiosis," in David Bronsen (ed.), *Jews and Germans from 1860 to 1933* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1979).

17. Cohen italicizes excessively throughout the *Pure Will*. Whenever no loss in meaning would be the result I have left out the italics.

18. The term ‘community’ (*Gemeinschaft*) has naturalistic overtones that are absent both in Cohen's use of this term and in his work as a whole. Like Kant, Cohen places society (*Gesellschaft*) above *Gemeinschaft*. Cf. Chapter I, note 37, above.

19. The phrase ‘possessive individualism’ is coined by C. B. Macpherson to characterize the liberal tradition rooted in Hobbes and Locke. Macpherson argues that, within this tradition, political society is seen as “a calculated device for the protection of [individual] property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange.” See *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 3. Cohen also criticizes the liberal tradition for viewing history merely as the product of “powerful” individuals and argues that the result is that the real heroes of history—the “poor and tired”—are neglected. See *Pure Will*, p. 33. A similar moral motive can be detected behind the Marxian materialist conception of history and its critique of “liberal” history.

20. See "Critical Epilogue," pp. 298–302. It may be noted that Cohen wrote these pages in 1914. His (infamous) support of Germany during the First World War receives a balanced discussion in Keck, *Kant and Socialism,*
Chapter VIII, as well as in Schwarzschild, "'Germanism and Judaism' . . .," pp. 134 ff.


22. See L. Roeloffs, De Cooperatie, Maatschappelijk en Fiscaal Beschouwd (The Cooperative from a Social and Fiscal Point of View) (Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Samson, 1971), pp. 15 and 27, where Roeloffs points out that this conception of the cooperative is dominant in the American school as represented by J. V. Emelianoff and that Emelianoff criticizes such socialists as Franz Staudinger (one of Cohen’s pupils) and W. Sombart for characterizing the cooperative instead as a union of persons. A synoptic history of the cooperative idea in socialist thought can be found in Winter, Ethik und Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 295–96n.

23. Such a contractarian understanding of Kant can also be found in Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515–72. It would be a worthwhile project, beyond the scope of my study, to compare Rawls’s Kantianism with Cohen’s. One striking difference, though, may be noted: only Rawls is explicitly concerned with distributive justice, but only Cohen comes to the conclusion that a socialization of the means of production is necessary. (For Rawls such a socialization is a mere possibility.) This difference reflects a broader one: socialists typically focus on the conditions of production, whereas (welfare) liberals typically focus on the conditions of distribution.

24. Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, Volume II, p. 332. This essay on the right to vote is Cohen’s reply to a questionnaire of the bi-weekly Ethische Kultur (1904). Cohen defends a similar view in Pure Will, p. 519.

25. In contrast to the Prussian lower chamber, the federal lower chamber (the Reichstag) was directly elected by all males over twenty-five years of age. The members of the federal upper house (Bundesrat) were appointed by the rulers of the different German states, although here, as elsewhere, the Prussian state had the decisive voice. The real political power resided in the king of Prussia (the Emperor of Germany) and in his appointed chancellor. See further John E. Rodes, The Quest for Unity: Modern Germany 1848–1970 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), pp. 44–45 and 85–86. The role of the German Social Democratic Party in the struggle for democracy is discussed in Willey, Back to Kant, Chapter I. Willey also links this struggle to Kantian socialism.

26. See Pure Will, p. 588. This ranking is also suggested by the fact that Cohen calls the family a “relative community.”

27. Pure Will, p. 584. Cohen does not explicitly mention that Plato prescribed the end of the institution of marriage only for warriors and philosopher kings, and it is precisely this fact that weakens somewhat his criticism of Plato. After all, the philosopher kings are the state, as it were, and, hence, they do not need a mediating institution. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say, as Cohen suggests, that Plato’s ideal city has totalitarian
overtones. The classical source for this view is K. R. Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Volume I (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945). In general, however, Cohen admires Plato, praising his ethical idealism and his method of moving from the collective ideal subject (the state) to the individual ideal subject. See *Pure Will*, pp. 7 and 14. See also *Reason and Hope*, pp. 66 ff.


30. The importance of the family as a transmitter of radical values is discussed in Kenneth Keniston, *Young Radicals* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968). Too many socialists tend to dismiss the family as a bourgeois institution. They fail to see that Marx attacked the bourgeois family rather than the family as such. Cf. Paul Corrigan and Peter Leonard, *Social Work Practice under Capitalism* (London: Macmillan, 1978), Chapter XI. Although Cohen recognizes the moral significance of the family, his view of the family is not altogether satisfactory. Cohen argues that it is instructive that the family is never defined as a legal person, adding the rhetorical question, "Would it have been the natural character of the family that has scared away the legal person?" See *Pure Will*, p. 78. This is by now a familiar point—the moral subject should not be constructed on a naturalistic basis—but one would expect Cohen to continue to argue that the family should move in the direction of the notion of the legal person, both morally and legally, thus overcoming its mere natural character. It is along these lines, I think, that a socialist conception of the family is to be developed, eliminating the patriarchal notion of the family (as in Kant), while sustaining the family as a source of moral commitment and value development in general.


32. This demand was already set forth by F. A. Lange in the early 1860s. See Willey, *Back to Kant*, p. 94. The impact of Lange on the Marburg School is discussed by Willey as well as by Keck, *Kant and Socialism*, Chapter II. See also the Appendix, below.

33. "On Closing the Borders," in *Reason and Hope*, pp. 189–90. It is interesting to note that this essay was written during the First World War. Cf. note 20, above.


37. Yet Goldmann criticizes Cohen for taking the critical angle out of Kant. See ibid., pp. 112 ff. Goldmann’s otherwise excellent study becomes at this point surprisingly superficial. He rightly notes that Cohen rejects Kant’s highest good, but fails to understand the reason for this (i.e., the privatistic and religious dimensions of the sumnum bonum). Goldmann also fails to see that Cohen puts socialism in the place of the highest good, and arrives at the absurd conclusions that Cohen brings Kant close to Stoicism and that an “apologetic spirit” lies at the basis of his work. A similar, albeit less pronounced, misunderstanding of Cohen can be found in Yovel’s Kant and the Philosophy of History; Yovel maintains that his own “substantive” reading of Kant could evolve only after he had freed himself of the “formalistic” neo-Kantian influence “originating in Hermann Cohen’s Marburg School” (p. ix).


41. My claim is not that moral responsibility always can and should be linked with legal liability, but rather, that we should create social conditions that make this link as close as possible. Strict liability for (consumer) goods may seem to be a notable exception. Yet even here it seems that fairness demands that the burden be shared by society at large. Certainly, this was Marx’s view. In Critique of the Gotha Program, he argues that within socialist society all workers must contribute equally to “a reserve or insurance fund [for] accidents, disruptions caused by natural calamities, etc.” See The First International and After, p. 344.

42. A recent powerful condemnation of American capitalism along these lines can be found in Harold Freeman, Toward Socialism in America (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkmans, 1982?).

43. Cf. Schwa rzschild’s Introduction to Pure Will, p. viii. Cohen emphasizes this “methodic” link rather than the practical link that I discuss below. My reason for reversing the emphasis is that the practical link has more critical potential. The “methodic” link receives extensive discussion in Holzhey, Cohen und Natorp, Volume I, pp. 318 ff.


47. That Cohen held such a view follows from his condemnation of the division of labor as destroying the "unity of culture." His claim that we must all become concerned with science points in the same direction (*Wissenschaft* includes both natural and humanistic sciences). For Cohen's view of the importance of art for full human development, see Günther, *Philosophie des Fortschritts*, pp. 63 ff. For Marx's plea for the all-round individual, see, for example, *The German Ideology*, p. 53.


49. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 60 ff., where Marcuse argues that the environment created by modern capitalism stimulates aggression and obstructs esthetic experiences, and the like. The deeper problem with Weisskopf's analysis is that he puts too much emphasis on attitudinal change as the road toward a more humane economy. Weisskopf concludes his book by stating that we all must take "seriously the Kantian maxim that men should never be used as means but always as 'ends.'" I fully agree, but I also hope to have shown that this implies a more "structural" approach toward social change.


52. See *ibid.*, p. 96. Goldmann specifically mentions the Yugoslavian "social experiment" and says that it "may perhaps lay the foundations of a synthesis of the socialist-historical consciousness with individual freedom and toleration." Some shortcomings of the Yugoslavian market socialism are discussed in Schweickart's *Capitalism or Worker Control?*


54. Cf. Marcel van Herpen, *Marx en de Mensenrechten* (Marx and Human Rights) (Weesp, Netherlands: Het Wereldvenster, 1983), p. 166. It would be a mistake, however, to argue that Marx's social critique applies only to a capitalist market economy. I will soon point out that there are significant problems embedded in the market system as such, and it is clear that at least part of Marx's social critique of capitalism applies to these problems. The issue is further discussed in Allen Buchanan, *Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), pp. 106 ff.


57. Schweickart hardly offers a moral theory that supports his model of market socialism, but rather attempts to show, as he himself says, that this model is superior to capitalism in terms of a “set of widely shared values” (ibid., p. ix). The strength of his approach is clear. A weakness, however, is that it seems to make Schweickart—notwithstanding his acknowledgment of various problems inherent to his model—toow confident about how far “economistic” solutions can lead us toward a truly cooperative socialist society. See ibid., pp. 219–20. I will argue in the next chapter that Marx made a similar mistake.

Chapter VII

1. See “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy,” in Early Writings, pp. 260 ff.

2. See Chapter VI, note 16, above.

3. It is, of course, true that Kant also postulated God in order to bridge the gap between universal virtue and universal happiness, but, as I have argued in Chapter II, section 2, above, the main systematic function of this postulate in his work is to bridge the gap between the natural order and the moral order in general. For Cohen’s view, see, for example, Pure Will, pp. 440 ff., and Religion of Reason, pp. 410 ff. A brief discussion of Cohen’s view can be found in Nathan Rotenstreich, Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), Chapter IV.


5. Not too much meaning should be given to Marx’s use of the term ‘categorical imperative’. What is more significant is that Marx condemns here any situation in which human beings are treated as means only, i.e., as less than a dog.

6. See my discussion of the essays of Atwell and Hill, Chapter I, section 3, above.

7. Thus Marx contends that the worker under capitalism is alienated from his fellow beings, his product, his labor activity, the state, etc. Marx also held that the capitalist is alienated, although that issue receives little systematic attention in his work. See Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in Early Writings, p. 366. See also Bertell Ollman, Alienation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 1976), Chapter 23.

8. Andrew Levine also argues that there are some links between Kant’s notions of autonomy and heteronomy and Marx’s concepts of self-determination and alienation, although Levine stresses the heteronomy-alienation link. See his “Alienation as Heteronomy,” Philosophical Forum 8 (1978): 256–268. One difference between our analyses is that Levine argues that “in Marx’s hands, the Kantian notions of autonomy and heteronomy are not primarily ascribed to actions nor even persons, but to societies. Even in his early writings, while still a Kantian, Marx breaks with the
extreme individualism of Kantian moral philosophy” (ibid., p. 259). To say the least, this view of Kant is debatable. Cf. Konstantin Kolenda, “Kant and Racism,” Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, where Kolenda observes that “[t]he locus of moral phenomena for Kant is the human soul or mind, [but] [t]his inner dialogue is obviously metaphorical, [and] there seems to be no reason why Kant's analysis of the moral situation could not be broadened to include interpersonal dialogue or debate” (ibid., p. 363). On my account, however, we not only can but should make this “extension.” In addition, I have argued in Chapter I above that we should see Kant's social critique as concerned with heteronomous societies.

9. Robert Nozick makes this point in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 253. In contrast to some other critics, however, such as Milton Friedman, Nozick also seriously considers the possibility that the issue at stake is control over the means of production. For Friedman’s view, see Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1982), p. 167. For some other examples of critics who assume that exploitation for Marx is primarily a distributive notion, see Allen E. Buchanan, Marx and Justice (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1982), p. 44. My rebuttal of this view is indebted to Buchanan’s analysis. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the assumption is not only made by opponents of Marx, but also guides to various degrees some of his sympathizers. One example is G. A. Cohen’s “The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation,” in Marx, Justice, and History, edited by M. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980). Buchanan’s book and Cohen’s paper are reviewed in my “Marx and Morality: An Impossible Synthesis?,” Theory and Society 13 (1984): 119-135, from which I draw some of my arguments in the present chapter.


12. Marx, Justice, and History, p. 59. Husami also cites several passages from Marx's work that show that Marx held that capitalism is unjust. Cf. note 47 below.


14. Cf. Tucker, “Marx and Distributive Justice,” pp. 310ff, where Tucker discusses Proudhon and Lassalle's view of economic justice. Tucker fails to note, however, that Marx not only criticized their view but also accepted it in modified form.

15. Thus Cohen typically argues that, although it is misguided to criticize socialism as being concerned with the Magenfrage (the question of the stomach), it must also be said that “from the very beginning this
question must be related to the issue of spiritual development and, hence, to the issue of moral freedom” (Pure Will, p. 311; cf. p. 295).

16. In “Scientific Socialism and the Question of Socialist Values,” in Marx and Morality, Supplementary Volume VII of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1981), edited by K. Nielsen and Steven C. Patten, Andrew Collier argues that humanist (ethical) socialism contains within it the danger of repression designed to bring about truly human capacities, whereas scientific socialism has the merit of avoiding this pitfall because it orients itself toward the actual desires and values of the working class. Although Collier’s contention is partly based on terminological abuse—he detects, for example, “humanistic” arguments in Gorky’s defense of Stalin’s oppression of homosexuals, as well as in Austrian Marxism, Gramsci, and the Khmer Rouge—I do not wish to dismiss his contention altogether. What it shows is that the socialist struggle must reflect on the means by which the ideal can be reached. Typically, humanist socialism (in the proper sense of the word) has performed this task, and, certainly, Hermann Cohen’s ethical socialism excludes repression for the sake of the ideal, because it holds that socialism can be reached only through autonomy. (Forced autonomy is a contradiction in terms.) Collier’s essay is discussed in more detail in my “Marx and Morality: An Impossible Synthesis?”

17. This view is developed in Part I of The German Ideology. My interpretation here is indebted to Buchanan’s, Marx and Justice, pp. 27 ff.


19. See Capital, Volume I (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 10, where Marx states that although he “paint[s] the capitalist and the landlord in no sense couleur de rose,” it is also the case that: “My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural [!] history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.”

20. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Marxism and Retribution,” in Marx, Justice, and History.


22. In Critique of the Gotha Program, p. 345, Marx states that “[w]ithin the cooperative society based on common ownership of the means of production the producers do not exchange their products.” For Marx’s view that the political and legal state will wither away, see “After the Revolution: Marx Debates Bakunin,” in The Marx-Engels Reader. Here Marx claims that the state will keep some administrative functions, but at other places in his work he even suggests that the state will disappear altogether in the communist society. See Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 347. For a more detailed discussion, see Bertell Ollman, Social and Sexual Revolution (Boston: South End Press, 1979), Essay 3, “Marx’s Vision of Communism.” See also Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume I, p. 360.
23. Two such conflicting suggestions are an economy with a plan versus an economy without any regulation (i.e., spontaneous exchange of goods in a society of abundance), and material production as a realm of necessity versus material production as the total embodiment of our species nature. See also note 22 above.


25. Both Tucker and Wood (see note 10, above) use this passage to support their view that Marx did not see capitalism as unjust, failing to recognize the Hegel-rooted optimism in Marx.

26. Marx said these words in a speech in London in 1852. The speech was published in the Chartist *People’s Paper*. See *The Marx-Engels Reader*, p. 578.

27. Marx continues to state that Bauer will be surprised “when the infamous ‘masses’ will shout ça ira, ça ira and suspend ‘self-consciousness’ by means of the lamp-post.” Like the *Marseillaise* and *Carmagnole*, Ça ira was a popular song during the French Revolution; its refrain was: “Ah! ça ira, ça ira, ça ira. Les aristocrates à la lanterne!” See ibid., pp. 638–39.


29. Cf. Kate Currie, “The Asiatic Mode of Production: Problems of Conceptualising State and Economy,” *Dialectical Anthropology* 8 (1984): 251–268, p. 257. Currie also notes that Marx’s view of India before the British colonization as a despotic, unchangeable, and simplistic society rooted in small agricultural communities is similar to Hegel’s view in *The Philosophy of History*. Cf. Victor Kiernan, “Marx and India,” *The Socialist Register* 1967 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. 162. Kiernan also makes the interesting observation (p. 160) that Marx in response to the Indian Mutiny wrote that “[t]here is something in human history like retribution; and it is a rule of historical retribution that its instrument be forged not by the offended, but by the offender himself.” We have seen that this “rule” is also manifest in the capitalist mode of production, in that Marx argues that the capitalists create the weapons of their own destruction, besides creating their own executioner, the proletarian.


32. We may see Cohen commenting here on Marx’s statement, cited earlier, that “once the lightning of thought has struck deeply into [the]
virgin soul of the [German] people, emancipation will transform the Germans into men.” This dialectical schema of sudden enlightenment is rooted in Platonic mysticism, although liberation is transposed from the individual to the collective level. Hegel’s system was strongly influenced by this mysticism. See further Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume I, Chapter I, “The Origins of Dialectic.”

33. See “Critical Epilogue,” pp. 293ff. See also the Appendix, below.


36. In light of this, and the Kantian elements in Habermas in general, it is ironical that he states in Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), p. 97, that “the melodies of ethical socialism have played through without result.” These melodies are the songs of Kantian socialism; for Habermas refers to Hans Jörg Sandkühler and Rafael de la Vega, editors, Marxismus und Ethik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970, 1974), to substantiate his claim, and this reader contains selections from the works of the Marburg socialists and their critics. In general, Habermas is “out of tune” in downplaying the Kantian elements in his own work. For a brief discussion of these elements, see Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 325ff. and 379ff.

37. One such opponent is Sandkühler. See his “Kant, neukantianischer Sozialismus, Revisionismus,” in Marxismus und Ethik. We will soon see that Cohen holds a plea for a “steady [permanent] revolution.” Curiously enough, in citing Cohen, Sandkühler changes “stetigen [steady] Revolution” into “stetigen Evolution.” See ibid., p. 30. Sandkühler’s view may be summed up in his approvingly quoting Plekhanov, who maintained that the bourgeoisie had an interest in promoting Kant’s philosophy and hence, Kantian socialist ethics, because “they hoped to find in it an opiate to put the proletariat to sleep.” See ibid., p. 29. Some Cohen sympathizers who wrongly claim that he rejected revolution as such are Keck, Kant and Socialism, pp. 179 and 291; Lübbe, Politische Philosophie in Deutschland, pp. 109-11; and, Willey, Back to Kant, p. 103.

38. Contra Cohen, it must be said that this motto alone does not establish that Hegel was conservative; for Hegel claims that the rational is wirklich (and vice versa), not real. Cohen’s view, however, can be defended on other grounds (see Chapter III, note 36, above), and the main point here is that Hegel does not offer an evaluative perspective that is logically independent of the course of history.

39. The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 577. Cf. note 26 above. Armand Barbès (1809-70) was a religious socialist who participated in French revolutionary politics from 1830 to 1848. At the time when Marx gave his speech Barbès was in jail (where he spent almost two decades of his life). François
Vincent Raspail (1794–1878) participated in revolutionary politics during the same period, wrote medical guides for the Paris working class, and engaged in jail reform (which he knew from the inside). The workers from Paris called him “father Raspail,” reflecting the warm esteem he received. A brief portrait of their lives can be found in H.P.G. Quack, De Socialisten, Volume III (Amsterdam: P. N. van Kampen & Zoon, 1922*), pp. 237–42 and 488–89. The life of Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805–81) and his impact on Marxist thought is briefly sketched in Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume I, pp. 214ff.

40. “Anamnestic Solidarity,” Telos 25 (1975): 133–54, p. 147. The statements from The Eighteenth Brumaire can be found in The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 597. Lenhardt also rightly notes that, with the exception of the writings of the Frankfurt School, issues of intergenerational solidarity “have remained blank spots in the Marxian literature” (p. 152).

41. The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 5. This view might even imply that emancipatory praxis must be suppressed; for improvements in the economic and social position of the working class may lead to less surplus extraction, slowing down the development of the productive forces. Cf. A. Anthony Smith, “Two Theories of Historical Materialism,” Theory and Society 13 (1984): 513–40, pp. 523–24; Smith launches a similar criticism against G. A. Cohen’s defense of historical materialism. Marx also suggests that social action may hasten the inevitable downfall of capitalism (see note 42, below), but he does not explain how this can be squared with the statement just cited.

42. See Capital I, p. 10, where Marx maintains that his study seeks to discover the economic law of modern society and that, once this law is known, society cannot suddenly realize a new society, but “can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs.”

43. Buchanan also considers the possibility that rational behavior is the maximization of class interest, and argues that in this case the public-goods objection holds as well. He pays, however, much less attention to this case than to that in which rational behavior is the maximization of self-interest, and for a good reason: only the latter case seems to fit with Marx’s view, or, at least, an aspect thereof.

44. We must, of course, be careful, as Buchanan is, in ascribing descriptive validity to a normative model. The conclusion here stated assumes that utilitarian considerations play an important role in our lives. On the whole, this seems a reasonable assumption.

45. Cf. Gregory S. Kavka, “Two Solutions to the Paradox of Revolution,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume VII, edited by P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). My two reasons parallel Kavka’s two solutions for revolutionary action as a public-goods problem, and, accordingly, my discussion contains an implicit critique of his view. It is to be noted, however, that Kavka is concerned not with the socialist revolution but rather with explaining how revolution in general can occur once we make such assump-
tions as that human agents are utility maximizers. Thus Kavka views special benefits to the revolutionary group as an aspect of solving the "paradox of revolution," whereas this aspect must be discounted if the concern is the socialist revolution.

46. Marx expressed these doubts in a personal letter to Ludwig Kugelmann, dated April 12, 1871. See Letter 204, in *The Letters of Karl Marx*, translated and introduced by Saul K. Padover (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979). Cf. Fernbach’s Introduction to *The First International and After*, p. 33. *The Civil War in France* was written during the later days of the Commune and printed almost immediately after its defeat. I will quote from both the final and first drafts as printed in *The First International and After.*

47. This passage, I think, shows that Marx viewed capitalism as a system both of economic injustice and of servitude, and that the emphasis is on the latter aspect. Cf. my analysis in section 1, above.

48. Yet Marx states on the same page that the workers of Paris “have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.” Now insofar as Marx simply makes the point here that mediation is important, there is nothing wrong with his statement. It seems, however, that here again the Hegelian dimension in his work is manifest. One way of explaining this is that Marx in this statement is reflecting on his practice of inquiry, and, as I will argue in section 4 below, his philosophical self-understanding is Hegelian in nature, though his practice of inquiry contains Kantian elements as well.


50. The contention that the notion of “duty-versus-interest” reflects a bourgeois moral psychology is made by Anthony Skillen, “Workers’ Interest and the Proletarian Ethic: Conflicting Strains in Marxian Antimoralism,” *Marx and Morality*, p. 162. Skillen offers a good analysis of the first strain of anti-moralism in Marx, which roughly corresponds to the Hegelian dimension in Marx. Skillen’s discussion of this strain brought to my attention the two passages cited in note 30 above. The second strain Skillen detects concerns a “materialist ethics”—that is, ethics as a way of life, rooted in the passions, suffering, and joys of the proletariat. See *ibid.*, p. 166. Skillen’s rather synoptic reconstruction of this strain brings him much closer to prescriptive ethics than he thinks, for he wrongly assumes that prescriptive ethics by its very nature is individualistic, not concerned with mediation, etc. Once these mistakes are eliminated, the second strain somewhat resembles the Kantian dimension in Marx, even though Skillen tends to romanticize proletarian values and feelings.

51. The notion of a class morality fails to satisfy this claim and is therefore to be rejected. Engels defended the idea of a class morality, arguing that that morality is correct “which, in the present, represents the overthrow of the present, represents the future, and therefore [this moral-
ity is] the proletarian morality." See Anti-Dühring (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), p. 117. This is a backhanded way of justifying a moral viewpoint, and Engels here makes the error I point out below in the text.

52. It is tempting to include within this Marxian regulative idea concerning progress Marx's claim that socialism is possible through peaceful means. I can, however, detect no moral concern here on Marx's side; rather, his proposal seems to be motivated by purely instrumentalistic considerations. See "The Curtain Raised," The First International and After, p. 395. In this interview by a reporter from New York's World (July 18, 1871), Marx states with respect to the English condition: "Insurrection would be madness where peaceful agitation would more swiftly and surely do the work." Cf. Marx's speech in Amsterdam, on September 8, 1872, in which he said that there are countries, "such as America, England, and if I were more familiar with your institutions, I would perhaps add Holland, where the workers can attain their goal by peaceful means." See The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 523. Again, there is no indication that Marx held that this possibility was morally desirable.


Notes: Appendix

3. Die neue Zeit was the traditional SPD organ; the revisionists started the Sozialistische Monatshefte.
5. Austro-Marxism, pp. 51-52. Cf. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume II, pp. 275-76. Bauer's suggestion that Kantians such as Eisner contributed to weakening the revolutionary impulse of the working class is misplaced and insensitive, considering Eisner's role and fate in the Munich Revolution, especially since Bauer wrote these words in 1938 after the defeat of the working class by fascism.
6. Cf. Holzhey, Cohen und Natorp, Volume I, pp. 49-53; Holzhey offers a similar but more detailed description of the "connecting element of the Marburg School." Dimitry Gawronski sketches a fine portrait of Cohen as teacher and central figure in the Marburg School in his "Ernst Cassirer: His Life and His Work," The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (Evanston, Ill.: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949), pp. 7-12. (Gawronski studied with Cohen in the early 1900's and was one
of the first who criticized the Bolshevik state from an ethical socialist perspective. See Schwarzschild, "'Germanism and Judaism' . . .," p. 141.)

7. See Keck, *Kant and Socialism*, p. 70.

8. Cohen had earlier expressed his socialist commitment in *Kants Begründung der Ethik* (1877) as well as in several other works, but in a rather passing manner. Vorländer states in *Kant und Marx* (p. 179) that Bernstein wrote him in a personal letter that Cohen's Epilogue had influenced his interest in Kant. Cf. Keck, *Kant and Socialism*, p. 260. Mehring was also familiar with Cohen's Epilogue. See note 33, below.


11. "*Kant und der Sozialismus*," p. 370. The two differences between Lange and the Marburgers are set forth in *Kant und Marx*, p. 120.


15. See Keck, *Kant and Socialism*, p. 218. Keck provides what may be the only existing extensive bibliography of Vorländer's writings, covering 87 works.

16. See *ibid.*, p. 219. Vorländer expressed this desire in a personal letter to Bernstein in 1899. Vorländer was active in party politics in the 1920's and was elected to the Westphalian Diet. See Willey, *Back to Kant*, p. 175.

17. *Marxismus und Ethik*, p. 317. This reader contains a complete version of the systematic conclusion added to the second edition of *Kant und Marx*.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 319. Although Vorländer does not give a precise reference, we may assume that he is directing our attention to Engels's famous letters on historical materialism, written to Bloch, Mehring, and Starkenburg. Vorländer discusses these letters in *Karl Marx* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1929), pp. 288–90, and defends here his Kant-Marx synthesis along the same lines as in the second edition of *Kant und Marx*.

19. See Keck, *Kant and Socialism*, p. 273


22. Bernstein was one of Engels's closest friends and one of the executors of his will. Moreover, Engels entrusted his unpublished writings to
Bernstein and August Bebel. See ibid., p. 68. Thus it is not surprising (although there are other reasons) that Bernstein frequently argued that his revisionism was in accord with a main tenet of Engels and Marx's social theory. This issue cannot be addressed here, but in view of my analysis of Chapter VII above of the Kantian elements in Marxian thought, it seems that Bernstein's contention has a prima facie plausibility.


26. Cf. my analysis in Chapter V, section 2. For Bernstein's view on the political mass strike, see Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, pp. 237 ff. Considering the conditions under which Bernstein held that the mass strike is justified, he rightly called it "an economic weapon with an ethical object." See ibid., p. 240.

27. See Evolutionary Socialism, p. 166. Also, the Marburgers could not but have applauded Bernstein's claim that "with respect to liberalism as a great historical movement, socialism is its legitimate heir" (ibid., p. 149).

28. See ibid., Chapter III, section (d). This section shows that Bernstein was influenced not only by Lange but also by the British cooperative movement and Fabian Socialism.

29. See ibid., pp. xxix and 204. The critics of Bernstein interpreted his slogan literally and thus saw it as an instance of opportunism. Bernstein addresses this misunderstanding on the pages just cited.

30. See Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, p. 244.


32. Cf. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume II, p. 35, where he maintains that "[a] striking feature of Kautsky's work is the complete lack of understanding of philosophical problems. This harsh judgment is not without justification: Kautsky argued, for example, that Kant's view that the moral law is independent of experience is flawed because this law "assumes not only men outside of me, but also the wish that these fellow men should behave themselves in a particular manner." See Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History, p. 54. Although Mehring was better philosophically schooled, his Kant critique never reaches great depth.


34. See "Immanuel Kant," p. 75; "Kant und der Sozialismus," p. 270; and, "Kant, Dietzgen, Mach und der historische Materialismus" (1909/10), in ibid., p. 291.


36. Cf. Keck, Kant and Socialism, p. 274. Mehring displayed in his
early work such a reductionistic understanding of historical materialism (cf. below) that Engels felt obliged to correct him, writing him one of the well-known letters on historical materialism. See note 18, above. Cf. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Volume II, p. 58.

37. See Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History, Chapter V, sections 4 and 5.

38. “Kant und der Sozialismus,” pp. 273–74. It characterizes the communist viewpoint of the editors of Aufsätze zur Geschichte der Philosophie that they add the note that “Mehring falters here—and elsewhere—in his judgment of the revisionist supporters of neo-Kantianism. He underestimates partly the damaging effect of neo-Kantian philosophical revisionism.” See ibid., p. 396n.


40. See Keck, Kant and Socialism, p. 257.

41. See Vorländer, Kant und Marx, pp. 219–21. Cf. Willey, Back to Kant, pp. 177–78. Natorp expressed his approval of Eisner’s articles in a letter to Görland, calling Eisner “our student.” Natorp had earlier expressed his pleasure with the fact that Eisner as a “schooled Kantian” was offered a position at Vorwärts (see below). See, respectively, letters 84 and 45 in Holzhey, Cohen und Natorp, Volume II.


43. Eisner had incensed Kautsky by publicly defying his view that the class struggle would be more intense in a republic than in a monarchy and that therefore a republic is to be preferred. Their conflict came to a climax when Vorwärts did not fully support a mass strike in solidarity with the Russian Revolution of 1905. Under pressure Eisner and some revisionists resigned. Thus is is often concluded that Eisner was a pure revisionist. This conclusion is drawn, for example, by Steenson (see note 42, above) and by George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 293–95. Reprint of the Praeger edition of 1969. Mitchell convincingly shows that this interpretation is mistaken. See Revolution in Bavaria 1918–1919, pp. 49 ff. Mitchell’s view accords with Vorländer, Kant und Marx, p. 221. We will soon see that Eisner did not in principle object to the political mass strike.

44. See Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria 1918–1919, p. 120. My sketch of the Munich Revolution is based primarily on this study and on Grunberger’s Red Rising in Bavaria.


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