Repression of the federalist revolts marked the beginning of the Terror in revolutionary France. The severity of repression varied from department to department, just as the revolutionary tribunals, in the long term, dispensed their cruel justice in selective fashion. In Lyon, where resistance to the Convention continued until October, the representatives on mission Jean Marie Collot d'Herbois and Joseph Fouché oversaw the execution of nearly 2,000 people between November, 1793, and April, 1794. The Revolutionary Commission in Toulon sentenced 282 people to death from December, 1793, through January, 1794, and roughly 800 people were shot without trial after the royalist revolt in that city collapsed. Repression also struck hard in the Finistère (destination of the Girondin deputies who fled Caen in late July), with departmental administrators the principal victims of the guillotine. For the most part, however, the repression was moderate, and few federalists paid for their mistakes with their lives. In Bordeaux, despite the Military Commission's reputation for vindictiveness, reprisals for federalist actions proved restrained. Just over 300 people died on the guillotine, and while many of these were wealthy lawyers, merchants, and professionals, the Military Commission did not single out leaders of the revolt for vengeance. Even fewer were executed in Marseille, where local Jacobins spared a number of wealthy merchants eventually brought to justice by representatives on mission. The Revolutionary Tribunal in Marseille sentenced...
286 people to death between August, 1793, and April, 1794. Nowhere, however, did the repression of federalism adopt as mild a tone as in Caen. Only two federalists were executed, neither of them solely for his role in the revolt, and most escaped even the imprisonment suffered by a number of Calvados officials.\footnote{See Donald Greer, The Incidence of the Terror during the French Revolution (Cambridge, 1935); R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled: The Year of the Terror in the French Revolution (New York, 1966); Richard M. Brace, Bordeaux and the Gironde, 1789–1794 (Ithaca, 1947); Alan Forrest, Society and Politics in Revolutionary Bordeaux (Oxford, 1975); Aurélien Vivie, Histoire de la Terreur à Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1877); C. Riffatterre, Le Mouvement anti-jacobin et antiparisien à Lyon et dans le Rhône-et-Loire en 1793 (Lyon, 1912); and William Scott, Terror and Repression in Revolutionary Marseille (London, 1973).}

In the late summer and fall of 1793, the necessity of rallying the protesting departments to the National Convention was as important a task as punishing those who had rebelled. For this reason, the Committee of Public Safety adopted the attitude that the citizenry was largely blameless for its reluctant participation in the revolt: administrators had intentionally misled those who joined departmental forces in Caen, Bordeaux, and Marseille. The new constitution would demonstrate to all Frenchmen that the Convention continued to deliberate freely, no longer plagued by the factionalism and bickering that had troubled its sessions before May 31. Punishment would be reserved for those administrators who had neglected their responsibilities and exceeded their authority by calling for revolt. The Convention gave even those officials an opportunity to retract their insurrectionary declarations, and those who did so at an early date were often allowed to retain their positions. Representatives on mission dismissed others and ordered the arrest of some. But very few came to trial before revolutionary tribunals.

Punishment and replacement of individual officials soon gave way to more fundamental reorganization. Nationwide, roughly two-thirds of the departmental administrations had protested by letter the proscriptions of June 2, and in those areas where significant resistance had developed, departmental officials had taken the lead. On November 18, 1793 (28 Brumaire II), in order to prevent a recurrence of provincial opposition to the Convention, Jean Nicolas Billaud-Varenne called for a limitation of the powers and political influence of departmental councils. The Convention incorporated this proposal in the law of 14 Frimaire II (December 4, 1793), which suppressed the general councils, presidents, and procureurs-généraux-syndics. Only the departmental directories remained intact, with their functions now explic-
itly restricted to administrative matters. The new law also suspended local elections, with vacancies to be filled by appointments made by representatives on mission. This same law increased the responsibilities of district councils, which had in general shown themselves to be less "moderate" than departmental administrations and more steadfast in their loyalty to the National Convention. These councils now assumed responsibility for the enactment of all new laws and would report directly to the Committee of Public Safety through appointed *agents nationaux*, not to the departmental directory, as before.¹

It is the first phase of this reorganization that primarily concerns us here—the dismissal of suspect officials and their replacement by men thought to be more republican in their political convictions. In Calvados, this process extended to virtually the entire departmental administration and the Caen district and municipal councils. Those officials most active in the revolt went to prison, where they remained for periods ranging from four months to nearly a year. The purge of officials in the Haute-Vienne, on the other hand, was much more selective. The representative on mission Jacques Brival left the Limoges district and municipal councils nearly intact and dismissed only a handful of departmental administrators.

The details of the repression are important not only as a means to identify the federalist administrators and their replacements but also—through interrogations, statements, and letters—as a means to examine further the character of the revolt. In their interrogation statements and petitions for clemency, many of those arrested in Caen presented extensive defenses of their actions and outlined what they considered the reasons for the revolt. Most stressed the good intentions of the people of Caen and the misinformation that had led them astray. Also illuminating are the orders issued by the minister of the interior and the Committee of Public Safety and the reports of their agents sent out into the departments.

As with our chronicle of the revolt itself, we begin by examining Limoges, where only a few administrators were purged from office. Representatives on mission arrived in Limoges with little fanfare or advance notice, but as elsewhere in France, they made an impact on the shape of local politics. The National Convention sent Jacques Brival to the Haute-Vienne, specifically

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ordering him to Châteauponsac, le Dorat, Saint-Yrieix, and Limoges but granting him broad discretion with regard to other towns he chose to visit and measures he found necessary to employ. Brival made brief stops in Châteauponsac and Lussac, replacing the entire municipal council in the first and only a few officials in the second. At le Dorat, he replaced two members of the district administration and suspended Jacques Lesterpt (brother of an Haute-Vienne conventionnel, Benoist Lesterpt-Beauvais, who had come under suspicion) from his position on the district tribunal.

On August 28, Brival reported to the Committee of Public Safety from Saint-Yrieix, in many respects the primary target of his mission. The Saint-Yrieix district council’s letter of June 7, calling for the election of new deputies to the Convention and the dispatch of departmental delegations to Paris, had elicited the disapproval of the departmental administration and earned a denunciation on the floor of the Convention. Now those officials would pay the price for having spoken so freely. Brival suspended the entire district and municipal councils, with the exception of three individuals, as well as the district judges and the municipal juges de paix. In consultation with the local Jacobin club, he replaced these officials with more reputable republicans.

From Saint-Yrieix, Brival went directly to Limoges, where he again faced the need for a selective purging of the administrative and judicial corps. The departmental administration, though it had never actively supported the federalist movement, had wavered briefly, and that weakness required a remedy. Accordingly, Brival dismissed four departmental officials: Joseph Durand de Richemont, president of the administration; Jean Hugonneau-Sauvot, a member of the directory; Charles Cantillon-Tramont; and Pierre Mourier.3 Of the four, only Durand can be said to have been dismissed because of his conduct in June and July. The Limoges comité de surveillance described his conduct during that period thus: “he did not show himself to be a partisan of the Mountain, and his weakness very nearly proved disastrous for the department.”4 In addition to his indecision in June, Durand one year earlier had signed the departmental letter protesting the June 20, 1792, attack on the Tuileries. This apparent sympathy for the king now re-

3. A. N., AF II 168, dossier 1383. This file contains several letters from Brival to the Committee of Public Safety written during August and September, 1793.
turned to haunt him, and it seems to have been this offense for which the Committee of General Security ordered Durand's arrest and transfer to Paris on March 31, 1794 (11 Germinal II). Durand never came to trial, but he remained in La Force prison until after Thermidor.5

Hugonneau-Sauvot had also been implicated in the affair of the June, 1792, departmental letter but at that time had managed to exonerate himself. It seems likely that this affair was once again the source of his problems, for within three months Brival restored Hugonneau to his previous position. There is little evidence to suggest reasons for the dismissal of Cantillon-Tramont and Mourier. Brival gave no explanation for their suspension from office. Cantillon-Tramont's attendance at council meetings had been sporadic, but this was hardly exceptional. In May, 1793, he had led a contingent of volunteers to the Vendée, a demonstration of patriotism that scarcely could justify Brival's action. As for Mourier, his responsibilities for supplying wood to the naval shipyards may have conflicted with his duties as an administrator. It is also possible that personal animosities between these two men and Limoges Jacobins led to their dismissal.

To fill the vacated positions, Brival named Jean Baptiste Gay-Vernon president of the administration and promoted François Hilaire Jevardat-Grandchamp to the directory, thereby rewarding two of the staunchest Montagnard supporters on the departmental council. Beyond this, Brival made few changes. He named replacements for the district administrators Jean Boyer and Alexis Villedivaud, having previously appointed those men to replace dismissed judges. Three new faces soon appeared on the municipal council, but these substitutions were due to the transfer or retirement of councillors. The National Convention directly ordered an additional change in the Haute-Vienne administration—the suspension and arrest of François Mathieu-Lachassagne for impeding recruitment and criminally corresponding with émigrés. Lachassagne spent several months in a Paris prison but returned as a departmental official after Thermidor.6

In mid-September, Antoine Joseph Lanot joined Brival on mission to the Haute-Vienne and the Corrèze. The two deputies continued to purify district and municipal councils, but their attention now turned more closely to military recruitment and the suppression of “religious fanaticism.” Both

tasks went well. In late November, Lanot reported that people were flocking to the Temples of Reason (this may have been an exaggeration) and that each department had furnished two thousand volunteers for the army. A local incident produced the final displacements in Limoges politics in the summer and fall of 1793. It involved three of the most prominent figures from the early years of the Revolution—Jean Baptiste Pétiliaud de Beaupeyrat, Louis Naurissart, and Pierre Dumas. Dumas had been procureur-général-syndic of the department in the 1790–1791 term, had briefly served as president of the Haute-Vienne in November, 1791, and since that time had sat on the departmental council. On July 3, 1793, however, he resigned that post because of his responsibilities as president of the Haute-Vienne Criminal Tribunal (the law of June 14 rendered the two positions incompatible).

Pétiliaud and Naurissart had been at the center of political conflict in Limoges since 1791 and were reputed to be the leaders of the “aristocratic” faction in the town. Charged now with materially aiding émigrés, the two appeared before the Criminal Tribunal in July. Dumas, scrupulously honest by all indications, presided over the preliminary review, which quickly concluded with the dismissal of charges against both Pétiliaud and Naurissart. The two had clearly sent money abroad, but Dumas felt compelled to point out to the jury that the offenses had been committed before such correspondence had been outlawed. This acquittal by virtue of legal technicality infuriated Limoges Jacobins, who charged Dumas with favoring aristocrats and the public prosecutor with incompetence. Both men eventually lost their jobs, dismissed in September by Lanot and Brival, and Dumas went to prison late in 1793. The district comité de surveillance said of Dumas that though he stood on good terms with Limoges sans-culottes, he had lately fallen under suspicion. Dumas had joined in founding the Limoges Jacobin club and had been an early supporter of the Revolution, “but full of ambition and anxious to please all parties, he had eventually all but deserted the club and was suspected of favoring aristocrats in the exercise of his official duties.”

The Jacobins eventually came to his defense, however, and Dumas left prison in February, 1794, only to be arrested two months later by order

7. A.N., AF II 171, dossier 1398, pièce 30, Lanot letter of 3 Frimaire II (November 23, 1793) sent to the Committee of Public Safety.
of the Committee of General Security. Transferred to Paris, Dumas sat in Saint-Lazare prison until November 21, 1794 (1 Frimaire III). 9

The charge that Dumas “favored aristocrats” appears entirely unfounded, particularly with respect to Pétiniaud. The two had been enemies since 1782, when Pétiniaud orchestrated Dumas’ expulsion from a local Freemason lodge. In 1790, Pétiniaud had opposed Dumas’ election as procureur-général-syndic and then his election as president of the Criminal Tribunal. As Dumas later observed in his own defense, he had every reason in the world to convict Pétiniaud but refused to subvert the law. 10

The mission of the deputies Lanot and Brival produced no drastic changes in the Haute-Vienne. The Limoges municipal and district councils, both of which had actively opposed the federalist tendencies of departmental officials, remained virtually intact, and the district council now enjoyed a certain precedence over the diminished departmental administration. The arrival of Brival and Lanot did, nonetheless, bring a temporary end to the long-running battle between moderates and radicals in Limoges. The elections of 1792 had given the upper hand to the latter, and their advantage was now strengthened. In September, the deputies named a local comité de surveillance, which immediately arrested a number of former members of the Amis de la Paix. Few former Amis remained in office in August, 1793, but many were prominent Limoges citizens who were now subjected to close surveillance, even prison, because of their past association with the moderate club. The ascendancy of the Montagnards in Paris thus strengthened the hold of Limoges Jacobins on departmental politics.

In examining the repression in Caen we begin not in August but in mid-June, when the minister of the interior, Joseph Garat, sent his first agents to Normandy and when the Convention first denounced the Calvados federalists. On June 13, 1793, the National Convention issued a decree of accusation against the administrators and other officials in Calvados who had signed the June 9 order for the arrest of the two representatives on mission, Romme and Prieur. In August, this decree would serve as the core of an indictment against seventy-three administrators, judges, and representatives of the Caen

10. See La Franc-maçonnerie Limousine, son passé, son présent, ses ambitions, in the Bibliothèque Nationale, 8°H. Piece 2255.
sections and clubs who had adhered to the June 9 order. Most of these men eventually went to prison, but probably only a handful of officials in Caen knew in June of the decree of accusation. After June 8, the departmental directory refused to register or announce any orders or laws issued by the Convention, and only at the end of July did the Calvados directory lift that ban.

The Convention issued two more decrees directed against the federalist rebels. The first concerned General Félix Wimpffen. On June 26, the Committee of Public Safety received the letter from Wimpffen in which he pledged to come to Paris only at the head of sixty thousand men. Bertrand Barère read this insolent letter to the outraged deputies, and after some debate (there were those who wished to place a price on Wimpffen’s head), the Convention voted a decree of accusation against the general and dismissed him as commander of the Army of the Coasts of Cherbourg.

During that same session, Robert Lindet introduced a measure relative to all administrators who had signed insurrectionary orders. Lindet, who had been in Lyon during the first two weeks of June, argued that the majority of citizens and administrators were good republicans, regrettably misled regarding events in Paris and the freedom of the Convention. Now that sufficient time had passed for the facts to become known, however, all administrators who had given orders to arm the people against each other, who had intercepted official correspondence, or who had spread spurious reports regarding the Convention ought to be called on to retract publicly those statements within three days or be declared traitors. The Convention quickly adopted this proposal, with the three-day period to begin on publication of the decree. As Lindet hoped, retractions quickly followed in many departments. In Calvados, the decree did not become publicly known until July 20 or 21, at which time, as we have seen, the Caen district council hastily revoked its adherence to the declarations of June 8 and 9.11

These three decrees comprised the official punitive measures directed against the rebels in Calvados. More positive steps were taken as well. Early in June, the Convention prepared an official account of the events of May 31 through June 2, stressing the cooperation of the Central Revolutionary Committee and the people of Paris in the cause of liberty, unity, and the indi-

11. For the text and discussion in the Convention of these three decrees, see Réimpression de l’Ancien Moniteur, XVI, 641 (session of June 13, 1793), and 755–757 (session of June 26, 1793).
visibility of the Republic. More importantly, the Convention moved quickly to satisfy the year-long demands for a new constitution. On June 10, Jean-bon Saint-André addressed the deputies: “It is time to prove to the departments that the unity and the indivisibility of the Republic are the fundamental dogmas of the constitution; it is the constitution that will call back to their duties all constituted authorities.”

Reports from representatives on mission to the departments reinforced this call time and again. From Brittany, the deputies P. M. Gillet and Antoine Merlin wrote to the Committee of Public Safety on June 12, warning it of the impending general assembly in Rennes and observing that “it would seem simple to us to avert the consequences that might follow such an extraordinary measure, if the Convention turns without delay to the constitution.” Robert Lindet, while still on mission in Lyon, wrote succinctly on June 15: “Publish a constitution.” The Convention did precisely that. Marie Jean Hérault-Séchelles began his report on the newly drafted articles during the session of June 10, and after two weeks of discussion and revision, the deputies approved the constitution on June 24. Two days later, C. Lacroix (of the Marne) underlined the importance of this document: “When the constitution is presented to the people, they will abandon those who have misled them and will rally around this Palladium of liberty.”

To present the constitution to the people in those departments where the local authorities could not be expected to cooperate, the minister of the interior, Garat, commissioned fifty-two agents to travel incognito, distributing copies as they went. He assigned no fewer than seven of these fifty-two agents to Calvados and the surrounding departments.

Another group of agents sent by the minister of the interior was in the field at this time. As early as January, 1793, Garat had expressed dismay at the lack of means for surveillance of the departments and had warned the Executive Council and later the Committee of Public Safety of internal enemies who threatened the Revolution. The Executive Council authorized Garat to assign seventy-two agents, whose mission would be secret, to visit the departments and report back to Paris on political and economic conditions. Although the plan was never fully implemented, Garat named thirty-

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12. Ibid., 608.
six agents in May and June, and two of these “observers” journeyed to Calvados.\footnote{Caron, \textit{Rapports des Agents du Ministre de l'Intérieur}, I, iii–xxv. Caron describes these agents as coming from the liberal professions for the most part. That they were sent to gather more than political information is suggested by the fact that each was given copies of Arthur Young's \textit{Voyage en France} and Adam Smith's \textit{Recherche sur la nature et les causes de la richesse des nations} and told to study and be inspired by them. Garat was clearly interested in gathering information on commerce, agriculture, and industry from throughout France, and some of the published reports deal with those subjects.}

One of the first of these agents to be named was Perrin de Sainte-Emmelie, sent in late April to observe the Channel coast. Still on mission when the revolt broke out, Perrin wrote from Valognes (in the Manche) on June 11, reporting to Garat that public rumor blamed the recent conduct of Romme and Prieur for the extreme measures taken by the Calvados authorities. A letter written four days later amended this report, declaring that the actions of the people of Caen grew largely from their resentment that the 14th Military Division headquarters had not been established in their city. One may doubt that the location of the headquarters in Bayeux rather than Caen could have caused such hard feelings. Romme and Prieur's order dissolving the administrative council attached to the 14th Division may well have engendered considerable resentment among local authorities, however. Additional rancor may have been caused by the dismissal from office of several minor officials ordered by the two deputies late in May.\footnote{Ibid., II, 303–304; A. D. Calvados, L10024 (departmental administration \textit{procès-verbal}, May 27, 1793). Several Caen citizens protested their dismissal from office at a May 27 departmental council meeting. I found no other reference to these dismissals, suggesting that those affected held minor posts.}

No other secret agents sent reports from Normandy during the month of June. The second observer sent to Calvados, Le Grand, was appointed on June 29 and arrived near Evreux just after the rebel forces had been routed on July 13. Le Grand wrote to Garat on July 16, describing the disorderly retreat of a force that he estimated at two thousand men. He mingled with the soldiers and heard a number of them complain “that they had been deceived by their leaders as to the motives of their gathering and that they would now return to their homes.” He considered it unlikely that the rebels would be able to rally their forces. Le Grand followed the volunteers to Lisieux and wrote on July 20 that three hundred more had recently deserted, muttering as they left “that they believed they were going to the \textit{fédération} in Paris, and not to do battle.” Wimpffen reportedly still hoped for re-
inforcements, but Le Grand counted more leaving than arriving and wrote that outside of Caen no support for the revolt could be found in Calvados.\textsuperscript{17}

This news must have been heartening indeed compared with the pessimistic reports sent to Paris just one week earlier by representatives on mission. On July 3, the Convention had empowered the deputies L. Le Cointre and Pierre Louis Prieur (of the Marne), already in Normandy, to take all measures necessary for the suppression of the rebels in the Eure and Calvados. This authorization proved to be of little value, since authorities in Calvados had kept a close watch on the two deputies and in late June had peacefully escorted them out of the department.\textsuperscript{18} On July 4, the Committee of Public Safety received news of the march of forces from Eure and Calvados on Paris and began taking steps to resist that march. The Committee assembled an army composed of Parisian battalions (soon christened the "army of pacification" by the people of Evreux) and on July 9 sent Robert Lindet, a member of the Committee, and Jean Michel DuRoy to the Eure for one last try at averting the confrontation through mediation and conciliation.\textsuperscript{19}

The July 13 skirmish at Vernon signaled the failure of these efforts, and early reports to Paris did not make clear the disarray into which the rebel troops were falling. Lindet's brother, Thomas, wrote to him from Paris almost daily, relaying the concern felt in the capital over the situation in Normandy. On July 15, he advised Lindet against pursuing a strategy of conciliation, observing that the Normans had shown their true colors by attacking the Parisians at Vernon, and warned him that to enter Evreux ahead of the army would be both dangerous and unnecessary.\textsuperscript{20}

Robert Lindet worried about the liability posed by the Parisian battalions almost as much as he felt reassured by the protection they offered. In an undated letter to Jean Baptiste Noel Bouchotte, the minister of war, he complained: "The composition of our small army is disquieting. The chasseurs have the worst reputation and merit it. We receive serious complaints about them. The hussars are also, by their conduct, a continual source of alarm or indisposition." Lindet reported that the troops mistreated the people of the countryside and spread panic faster than the representatives could inspire.

\textsuperscript{17} Caron, \textit{Rapports des Agents du Ministre de l'Intérieur}, II, 192–95.
\textsuperscript{18} A. D. Calvados, L189 (Registre des arrêtés du Conseil Général du département du Calvados, 11 août 1792–26 juillet 1793). On June 27, the Calvados general assembly ordered two of its members to accompany Le Cointre and Prieur, then in Vire, out of Calvados.
\textsuperscript{20} A. D. Calvados, L10122 (Lindet personal papers).
confidence. The arrival in Evreux on July 24 of Xavier Audouin, the erstwhile resident of Limoges who now served as adjunct to the minister of war, helped to resolve this problem. Lindet himself had requested Audouin's presence. The two of them, in conjunction with General Sepher (commander of the Parisian troops), instituted strict regulations forbidding harassment of the countrypeople and managed to restore discipline to the five-thousand-man army.  

Despite Thomas Linder's misgivings, Robert Lindet and his fellow representative on mission, DuRoy, entered Evreux without incident and by July 18 could report that no rebel forces remained in the department of the Eure. Anxious not to lose their temporary advantage by allowing Wimpffen time to regroup his soldiers, Robert Lindet appealed to Paris for an extension of the two representatives' powers so that they might press on into Calvados. This authorization reached Evreux on July 21 along with Pierre Louis Bonnet de Meautry, who had been dispatched by the Committee of Public Safety to assist DuRoy and Lindet in Calvados. The Committee sent Bonnet de Meautry, a Calvados deputy to the Convention and former mayor of Caen, because of his familiarity with the local citizenry.

As the representatives prepared to move on to Lisieux, their primary concern remained the reputation for pillaging and disorder that preceded the "army of pacification." Several of Garat's secret agents, now in Calvados, reported the common fear that the army had been sent to slaughter everyone. Etienne LeHodey wrote to Garat on July 29 that the March 29, 1793, census decree calling for the posting at each house of the names, ages, and so on of all residents had been libeled in Calvados as an order of Marat, issued so that some night all those older than sixty or younger than ten could be killed in their sleep. The agents tried to reassure those they met and, in fact, had some success in allaying the people's fears. One agent, Guillaume Delabarre, visited Lisieux posing as a cattle merchant, an appropriate disguise in that rich grazing region. He met some of the Norman volunteers in the cafés and, after listening to their complaints about the deceptions of their leaders, urged them to support the Convention and abandon Wimpffen. He reported that many did so. The agent Heudier, sixty years old and a native of Calvados, arrived in Caen on July 20, allegedly on matters of business (a plausible story, since he was a wine merchant). He stayed with relatives, which strengthened his cover, and told everyone he met that local admin-

21. A. D. Calvados, L10119 (Lindet correspondence).
Administrators had misinformed the public about events in Paris and had prevented messengers from the Convention from reaching them. All of these agents also distributed the new constitution, a measure made doubly important because the Central Committee of Resistance to Oppression (the coordinating body of the assembled protesting departments) had reportedly begun to spread false copies.

The role of Carat's secret agents during this period was a very important one, too seldom noted by historians. At least in Normandy, they quietly and effectively acted as ears and eyes for the representatives on mission, who never could have gained access to the people with whom the agents mingled. These men also disseminated information favorable to the Montagnard Convention, allaying the fears and suspicions of the people they met. They thus functioned successfully (the best among them, anyhow) as intermediaries between officials of the state and the people of the towns and countryside. Without that mediation, the task of the representatives on mission and the "army of pacification" would have proved much more difficult.

After the rout of the federalist forces, the representatives on mission quickly took steps to reorganize their forces, to influence public opinion, and to make clear the purpose of their expedition. They secured an order from the minister of war, Bouchotte, bringing the Cherbourg army and the Parisian volunteers under the sole command of General Sepher, thereby boosting troop morale and reducing dissension between the two general staffs. To counter the propaganda in the newspaper being issued by the authorities gathered in Caen, Lindet obtained a printing press and commenced publication of the Journal de l'Armée des Côtes de Cherbourg. The first issue appeared on July 28 in Evreux. The press moved with the troops, and the Journal issued its second number in Lisieux on July 30. Its opening paragraph, characteristic of the content of the Journal during the weeks that followed, read: "Be reassured, respectable inhabitants of the countryside; we will watch over your tranquility, and your homes will be protected."
The "army of pacification" arrived in Lisieux the evening of July 28 and found the town calm. All three section assemblies had unanimously adopted the new constitution, and the town turned out a fraternal greeting for the army. Lindet wrote to Paris that the people of Lisieux had only reluctantly supported the revolt under the considerable pressure of departmental authorities. Although they had housed the Caen volunteers on their route to Evreux, few had actively participated in the insurrection. Patriotism in Lisieux remained strong, though republican enthusiasm required revitalization. The most pressing need, however, was to restock the Lisieux grain market, which had been seriously undersupplied since the enactment of the maximum. The success of the representatives in securing supplementary grain facilitated their political mission in Evreux, Lisieux, and later Caen.

Encouraging news awaited the representatives in Lisieux regarding the current situation in Caen. Earlier reports of the town's preparations to defend itself gave way to word that Wimpfen had fled, that the administrators had issued retractions, and that Romme and Prieur once again enjoyed their freedom. Cause for concern persisted, however. Lindet doubted the sincerity of the Calvados retractions. Issued only out of fear, they sounded more like an apology or a defense of past actions than an admission of error or guilt. In addition, the rebel administrators had incurred "unbelievable expenses," draining large sums of money from the public treasury. Lindet considered it imperative that an accounting of the records be made and that no false assignats be allowed to circulate. He also felt it necessary to replace all local officials, since the people would certainly no longer tolerate their former administrators.

As Lindet, DuRoy, and Bonnet prepared to advance from Lisieux to Caen, so did the people of Caen prepare to receive them. For most of the departmental administrators, this meant a swift, but discreet, departure from Caen. Sixteen of the thirty-seven members were present at the July 26 meet-

24. At least the Journal of July 30, 1793, reported that the army had been well received. Another account suggests that the reception was not a warm one, but I found no solid evidence to support this view. Lindet, who would have had no reason to deceive or fabricate, consistently spoke well of the Lisieux citizens and their patriotism in his letters to Paris. For the contrary opinion, see Gaston Lavalle, "La Presse en Normandie: Journal de l'Armée des Côtes de Cherbourg," Mémoires de l'Académie Nationale des Sciences, Arts et Belles-lettres de Caen (1899), 205-75.

25. A. D. Calvados, L10119 (July 31, 1793, letter to Garat).

26. Ibid. (July 29, 1793, letter to Bouchotte; July 31 letter to Audouin; and August 1 letter from the three representatives to the Committee of Public Safety).
ing for the signing of the formal retraction. By the next day, their numbers had dwindled to ten, and only five officials attended a session on July 31. Of the nine members of the departmental directory, only four attended a July 30 meeting, and by August 8, only two remained. Those present called on other administrators to fill the vacancies on the directory, but no one appeared. All five of the directors who had accompanied the departmental force to Evreux returned to Caen to sign the retraction, but only Adrien Thiboult remained at his post as late as July 31. Pierre Jean Lévêque never attended a meeting, Pierre Mesnil attended one, and Hippolyte Bougon-Longrais and René Lenormand attended two apiece. The directory made no conciliatory overtures to the representatives on mission, concerning itself instead with registering the hundreds of decrees from the Convention that had been ignored since May 31. 27

The Caen district administration had been less compromised by the revolt, and so its officials had little reason to flee. With the exception of Louis Caille and Bernard Lequeru, members who had maintained regular attendance during June and July continued to attend both the district directory and the district council meetings. 28 Seven of the thirteen administrators signed a retraction, dated July 21 and addressed to the Committee of Public Safety, emphasizing the adverse circumstances that had prevented them from actively opposing the insurrection and citing in particular Robert Tirel’s futile objections to the arrest of Romme and Prieur. Two district officials, Daniel François Claude L’honorey and Henri Michel Saillenfest, attended the July 21 meeting but did not sign, though L’honorey later signed the general assembly retraction. René Lahaye, the only district administrator other than Caille to play an active role in the revolt, disagreed with his colleagues over other matters and had not attended a meeting since May 29. 29 During the last week of July, the rest of the council devoted its attention to the increasingly difficult problem of supplying Caen with grain.

27. A. D. Calvados, L165 (Registre des procès-verbaux du Directoire du Département à Caen, 16 mars 1793–10 septembre 1793).
28. A. D. Calvados, L387 (Registre servant à la transcription des procès-verbaux des délibérations du Conseil Général du district de Caen, 15 janvier 1793–20 avril 1795), and L182 (Transcriptions des procès-verbaux des délibérations du Directoire du district de Caen, 15 mars 1793–3 février 1794). Louis Caille went into hiding for obvious reasons. Lequeru, however, played no public role in the revolt and may have quit attending meetings for personal reasons. He had resigned as council president in mid-May in order to deal with family business. He quit attending directory meetings after July 29, without any explanation, but continued to attend general council sessions.
29. A. D. Calvados, L187.
No perceptible change occurred in the pattern of attendance at municipal council meetings in late July, although the council did not record who was present between July 20 and August 27. On the latter date, attendance was normal, with a majority of council members present. On July 25, the municipal council had sent a letter to the representatives on mission along with its retraction. Like the district administration, it stressed that the will of the people had forced it to adhere to the insurrectionary measures of the general assembly, an error that by then had become all too clear. The three representatives responded on July 28 with a carefully worded letter addressed to the municipality. Adopting a reassuring tone, they described their mission as the peaceful restoration of order and liberty among the people of Caen. A public letter to the citizens of Caen followed three days later, explaining that the "army of pacification" must come to Caen in order to prove to the people that the Republic had raised its army not to massacre but rather to fraternize, to restore liberty, and to erase traces of the recent aberration in Calvados. These letters produced the desired effect, and on July 31, the municipal council sent four of its members to Lisieux to pledge its cooperation to the representatives. The municipality offered to greet the deputies with a festive celebration, but Lindet declined, explaining that it would be inappropriate to accept such a welcome from a town that had so recently arrested and imprisoned two of his colleagues.30

Officials in Caen were clearly anxious to forget the past two months and to return as discreetly as possible to "business as usual." The municipal council postponed the release of Romme and Prieur from the Château for several days, hoping that public agitation would subside. Finally released on July 29, Romme reported to the Convention one week later that the council had initially suggested that they be released at night, through a back entrance, in order to avoid attracting a crowd. The two deputies objected emphatically, insisting that only a public exit could begin to atone for the public outrage committed against the National Convention. Their objections prevailed, and they left the Château to the sound of saluting cannons before the assembled National Guard and a cheering crowd of citizens.31

Upon their release, Romme and Prieur immediately wrote to their col-
leagues in Lisieux, urging them to come to Caen as soon as possible. Their letter reported that Caen was quiet and predicted a friendly reception for the three deputies. They cautioned, however, that the town remained in a state of shock: "The people appear cold and passive; the municipality shows itself well. Several members of the Department have the air of being greatly afraid." 12

Thus advised, Lindet, DuRoy, and Bonnet made the short journey from Lisieux to Caen on August 3, one day behind the "army of pacification." They arrived in Caen still unsure of the precise extent of their authority and responsibilities. The Committee of Public Safety had instructed them to restore order in Calvados and presumably to arrest the guilty. Not until August 6 did the Convention issue a decree authorizing the replacement of departmental administrators, as well as the Caen district and municipal councils. It also called for the demolition of the dungeon in the Château and the dissolution of the Carabot club. Although official notification of this decree did not reach Caen until August 9, Lindet and DuRoy began to consult "local citizens known for their patriotism" regarding the appointment of new administrators shortly after their arrival. 13

The success of all other measures depended on the ability of the representatives on mission to find adequate grain supplies for the local markets. Curiously, the departmental administration had appealed to the minister of the interior for food supplies late in June, despite its revolt against the central government and the food boycott directed against Paris. One can scarcely believe that the administrators expected a favorable reply. It seems likely that the Committee of Public Safety and the minister of the interior took all possible measures during the revolt (as they did in the cases of Bordeaux and Marseille) to deprive Calvados of grain supplies from Le Havre and Rouen, as a tactic aimed at undermining the insurrection. Several times in July authorities in Caen had been forced to release military supplies to the hungry people in order to prevent pillaging of the granaries. Those stores were now almost exhausted, and armed searches for caches in the surrounding countryside met with only infrequent reward.

In two letters to the Committee of Public Safety, dated August 8 and 9, Lindet, DuRoy, and Bonnet reported that Caen, Lisieux, Bayeux, and Falaise

32. A. D. Calvados, L.10119 (letter of July 30, 1793).
33. A. D. Calvados, L.165; and A. C. Caen, I46 (Répression, etc., juillet 1793–Pluviose an II).
all lacked bread. They charged hoarders and monopolizers with depriving the population of what had been an abundant harvest in 1792 and issued proclamations to the countryside threatening fines and imprisonment to farmers who refused to deliver available grain. This brought some grain to the markets, but the representatives had to turn their efforts elsewhere as well. On August 18, Lindet and DuRoy announced to the municipal council that they had procured eight hundred quintals of rye, eight hundred quintals of wheat, and six hundred quintals of flour, which now awaited shipment in Le Havre. This provided temporary relief, enough for approximately ten days, but the supply in Caen remained precariously low well into September.\(^4\)

As they had done in Evreux and Lisieux, the deputies met with the Jacobin club and held public meetings in churches in an attempt to rally patriotism and revive public spirit. Lindet defended the Convention before these gatherings and denied the existence in Paris of any “disorganizing party, known by the name of maratists and anarchists.” He even praised Marat; and on August 7, he published a pamphlet detailing why he had voted on June 2 for the arrest of the twenty-nine deputies, citing their conduct since that date as ample proof of their guilt. These efforts produced only a moderate effect. The *Journal de l’Armée* continued to complain of public apathy and low attendance at Jacobin club meetings.

Even the most ambitious attempt to heal the wounds of federalism met with only partial success. In conjunction with the municipality, the representatives on mission planned a public fete to celebrate the anniversary of the August 10 *journée*, which one year earlier had toppled the monarchy. The fete included a parade, music, and dancing, and the “army of pacification” mingled with the citizens of Caen in a festive atmosphere. Workers had erected a stage on the *prairie*, and there the mayor and others addressed the crowd and exchanged fraternal embraces with DuRoy and Bonnet. In the midst of the celebration, however, plans went awry. Gilet, the municipal employee in charge of preparations, had been pressed for time and had cut corners by painting over an old banner used at previous public affairs. Unfortunately, it rained on the festival (not unusual in Caen even in August), and those present watched in dismay as the newly painted letters disappeared, revealing the slogan, “Vive la Nation, la Loi, et le Roi!” The municipal

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34. A. C. Caen, D2; and A.N., AF II 168, dossier 1380. See Perrot, *Genèse d’une ville moderne*, I, 188, for an estimate of Caen grain consumption in 1793.
council strongly reprimanded Gilet and sent an explanation, along with pro-
fuse apologies, to Lindet and the others.35

More problems grew out of the ceremonies that day. The three represen-
tatives were not working well together. Bonnet’s family lived in Caen, and
the former mayor, despite his political radicalism, still had friends in town.
DuRoy, from the Eure, had visited Calvados in March on a recruitment mis-
sion with Bonnet and also had acquaintances in Caen. The two of them had
been sent to accompany Lindet for precisely that reason—their familiarity
with local officials would help reassure the understandably apprehensive
citizenry. But these assets at the same time presented a liability. DuRoy and
Bonnet were not neutral observers and could not dispassionately place re-
sponsibility on the shoulders of the apparent leaders of the revolt. This
produced tension among the three; and on August 8, after arguing with
DuRoy, Lindet wrote to Paris requesting his own recall.36 In this instance,
Bonnet acted as an intermediary, sending his own report of the quarrel to
the Committee of Public Safety and suggesting that Lindet’s request be ig-
nored. He described Lindet as a difficult man to work with—very sensitive
and often resentful of remonstrance—but he was a hard worker, very ca-
capable, and Bonnet felt it would be a great mistake to transfer Lindet just as
he was mastering the local situation. The three temporarily resolved their
differences, and the next day Lindet withdrew his request.37

Following the August 10 celebration, however, Bonnet, too, argued with
Lindet. Lindet sent a lengthy report to Paris on August 27, outlining the
problems of the preceding two weeks. Two of Garat’s agents, after discreet
investigation, had identified several of the leaders of the revolt. These in-
cluded Louis Caille (“orateur pathologiste”), Bougon-Longrais (“grand di-
sieur de riens”), Chaix-d’Estanges (“prêtre dans toute l’acceptation du
terre”), René Lenormand, Lévêque, Barnabé Cauvin (a departmental ad-
ministrator), and Mauger.38 Lindet added to these most of the departmental
and district administrators, a number of judges, several members of the mu-
nicipality, and all of the commissioners who had gone to Paris or who had
later been sent to other departments. The result was a list of forty-five to fifty

35. A. C. Caen, D2.
37. A.N., AF II 169, dossier 1380, pièce 8.
38. Caron, Rapports des Agents du Ministre de l’Intérieur, II, 20, 212 (reports of Heudier
and LeHodey). The characterizations in parentheses are those of LeHodey.
whom he believed should be arrested. If nothing else, the 1,300,000 livres still missing from the treasury mandated that the guilty be punished.

Lindet presented his list at a meeting with Bonnet, General Sepher, and several other army officers. DuRoy was out of town at the time. Afterwards Bonnet spoke privately to Lindet, objecting that his wife would never speak to him again if they ordered all those arrests! The administrators were not guilty, he claimed, only misled. Local officials had fraternally embraced Bonnet and DuRoy on August 10, in the belief that all had been forgotten. The deputies would be accused of perfidy if they arrested these officials now, and Bonnet would not support such an order.

Bonnet further observed that a single representative on mission could not issue orders. He would willingly sign orders against citizens of the neighboring department of the Manche and finally agreed to the arrest of Cauvin. But he refused to sign an order for the arrest of Samuel Chatry, who had been a member of the committee of insurrection and editor of the Calvados newspaper in July. Although Lindet would assume personal responsibility for the necessary, unpleasant measures, he reached the conclusion that neither Bonnet nor DuRoy would be of any assistance to him in that task. Thus a stalemate had developed.39

Not until early September was this dilemma resolved. On September 7, the deputy Charles Francois Oudot arrived in Caen, apparently as a replacement for both Bonnet and DuRoy. Together, he and Lindet began to arrest those most compromised by the events of June and July. However, the month-long delay increased the difficulty of this task. Many of the administrators had fled the area or gone into hiding, particularly those departmental and district officials who did not live in Caen. Louis Caille, for example, was never apprehended, and René Lenormand hid until after Thermidor near Lénaudières in the Calvados countryside. Lindet did manage to make a few arrests during August. Those taken included the district administrator Lahaye, arrested for having led the party that seized Romme and Prieur in Bayeux; Jean Baptiste Leclerc, acting departmental president during July and August; Barnabé Cauvin; Jean Michel Barbot, the Carabot president; and Gohier de Jumilly, the curé of Saint-Jean, who had played a prominent role in leading volunteers to Evreux.40

Arrests increased in September, but it is impossible in many cases to estab-

40. A.D. Calvados, L 10117 (Bouret and Frémanger mission).
lish the exact date of imprisonment. In the end, the number of men arrested for their alleged participation in the revolt reached approximately forty-five, Lindet's original estimate. Most of these were administrators, including fourteen of the sixteen municipal officers (the mayor and procureur among them). Gabriel Fossey avoided arrest because he had resigned on May 29; Richard de Jort not only retained his freedom but was appointed by Lindet to the new municipal council. Of the thirteen district administrators, five went to prison, roughly the number that had continued to meet during the revolt. Notably absent were Bernard Lequeru, who convinced Lindet of his nonparticipation, and Thomas Violette, who had remained at his post until the representatives on mission arrived. Noting Lindet's surprise at finding him in his office, Violette had reportedly remarked, "Didn't someone have to stay to turn over the records and the keys?" Perhaps Violette's courage earned the respect of the deputy and averted his arrest. Thirteen departmental officials joined these nineteen in the Carmelites prison—again, the majority of those who had remained at their post during the revolt. The remaining prisoners included judges, municipal notables, and leading club members such as Chaix-d'Estanges and Barbot. Despite Lindet's intention to arrest all those who had acted as commissioners to Paris or other departments, most of them escaped imprisonment.

Lindet and Oudot remained in Caen until October 30 or 31 (9 or 10 Brumaire), replaced shortly by the representative on mission Jacques Léonard Laplanche, a former priest from Nevers whose Jacobin reputation preceded him to Caen. Laplanche lived up to expectations. As his first official duty, he raised a force of 1,200 men that departed in early November to battle the Vendée rebels. Esnault noted in his diary that those who had previously marched to Evreux were among the most eager to enroll. Indeed, a group of prisoners arrested by Lindet, including Chaix-d'Estanges, Le Goupil Duclos, Leclerc, and Barbot, sought to prove their patriotism to Laplanche.

41. The list of those arrested by Lindet and Laplanche (who arrived in Caen in late October) includes the names of only twenty-five people, some of whom were not officials, and for each one gives the date of arrest. It almost certainly overlooks several arrests ordered by Laplanche and may have missed a few ordered by Lindet as well. A more complete list of prisoners was prepared after Thermidor. It contains some three hundred names (only fifty or so arrested for federalism) and gives dates of entry and exit into the Maison des Carmelites. Almost all of these, however, would have been held for an undetermined length of time in the maison d'arrêt before transfer to the Carmelites—hence the impossibility of fixing a precise date of arrest. This list is located in Brochures Normandes: Caen sous la Révolution, B. M. Caen, Rés. Fn. Br. D156–209.

42. Lesage (Esnault), 114.
by petitioning for their release so that they, too, might join the force and rush to do battle with the enemies of the Republic.\textsuperscript{43} Laplanche declined their generous offer. The volunteer force, having lost not a single man, returned one month later; and Laplanche, anticipating his remaining tasks, addressed the Jacobin club: “Here returns this Montagnard representative, the terror of malveillants and aristocrats, but at the same time the firm supporter of Republicans and true sans-culottes.”\textsuperscript{44} Laplanche worked with zeal, replacing suspect or incompetent administrators and arresting a number of former officials who had escaped the reach of Lindet and Oudot.

While the majority of the forty-five or fifty eventually arrested were in jail by the end of December, a handful did not enter prison until March, 1794. After hearing of the release of several municipal officers arrested the previous fall, they turned themselves in, no longer fearful that the guillotine awaited them and apparently convinced that it would be wiser to suffer prison now than to risk harsher punishment later as fugitives from the law. Time proved their judgment correct, for by the end of August, 1794, all had left the confines of the Carmelites prison and returned to their homes.

Two less fortunate Calvados federalists suffered severer punishments for their participation in the revolt, though in each case their later actions served to increase their jeopardy. Bougon-Longrais fled Caen in early September when the inevitability of his arrest became clear. Before fleeing, he wrote to Louis Jean Taveau, a Calvados conventionnel, to request the deputy’s intercession on his behalf. He suggested that Taveau approach Danton, whose ability and honesty Bougon respected. Bougon proclaimed his own innocence, insisting that he had lent his support to the revolt, reluctantly of course, only after Caille and Chaix-d’Estanges had publicly labeled him a maratiste. He later appealed directly to Robert Lindet, again without success. In November, Bougon fell in with a band of Vendean rebels led by the prince of Talmond. Within two months, Republican troops had apprehended the two. After a quick trial in Rennes, Bougon ascended the scaffold and ended his days on January 5, 1794.\textsuperscript{45}

Dom Mauger also met his death on the guillotine. Laplanche issued an order for his arrest in December, but by then, Mauger had long since fled

\textsuperscript{43} A. D. Calvados, L10131 (Laplanche mission).
\textsuperscript{44} A. D. Calvados, L10529 (Journal de l’Armée des Côtes de Cherbourg, December 9, 1793).
Caen, settling in Saint-Hilaire, not far from Rouen. The *agent national* of the district of Yvetot ordered his arrest on March 5, 1794 (15 Ventôse II), after a citizen had denounced Mauger to the local *comité de surveillance*. Local authorities ordered his transfer to Paris, where he appeared before the Revolutionary Tribunal. The court convicted him for his role in the revolt and for his suspicious behavior since that time. Mauger was executed on May 13, 1794 (24 Floréal II).  

Bougon's appeals to Taveau and Lindet and the petition of Le Goupil Duclos and the other prisoners to Laplanche were not exceptional gestures. The interrogations and pleas for clemency that followed the arrests fill several cartons in the Calvados archives. The interrogations in particular, conducted by Etienne Hubert, a stern *juge de paix*, reveal a great deal about those questioned and their perceptions of the revolt. All of the eleven individuals for whom interrogation transcripts remain professed their innocence. The administrators insisted that they had acted on behalf of the people and that the people had been misled regarding events in Paris. Hubert questioned nearly everyone about instigators and leaders of the revolt and asked about the origin of letters that reportedly had arrived in Caen in late May and early June. All of those questioned denied any knowledge of ringleaders or conspirators, maintaining that the meetings had been public and the decisions shared. Most claimed ignorance of any letters from Paris. Le Goupil Duclos blamed public newspapers for the widespread misconceptions. Only Le Carpentier, a Caen *notable* and leader in the Jacobin club, mentioned letters from the Calvados deputies to the Convention, noting in particular one from Doulcet that had been printed and distributed.

Nearly all of these prisoners condemned the nine commissioners sent to Paris for their volatile report on June 8. Le Goupil Duclos also blamed the fugitive Girondin deputies for inciting the populace and promoting revolt. Each of the three departmental administrators questioned stressed that the general assembly had eclipsed the authority of the departmental council, leaving them powerless to oppose the insurrection. Many of the eleven took care not to claim that they had actually opposed particular orders. Rather, they contended that they had been powerless to do so. Hubert accused Chaix-d'Estanges of having been a leader of the revolt, but Chaix replied that though he had presided over the general assembly during July, the presi-

46. A.N., W364, dossier 795.
dent was only the passive organ of the assembly, without even the right to express his opinion. Unconvinced by Chaix's argument, Laplanche had him sent to Paris, where he languished in prison until after Thermidor.47

Letters requesting clemency also inundated the representatives on mission. Those already in prison claimed to have only erred, not committed a crime, and often recounted their records of public service since 1789 in an effort to demonstrate their patriotism. René Lenormand, while in hiding, published his own Précis exact des motifs qui ont déterminé l'insurrection du département du Calvados, et des faits qui l'ont accompagnée, an eight-page pamphlet that recited the events of June and July and emphasized that those who had marched to Evreux had gone to defend liberty and the unity of France.48 A group of Caen citizens published a similar pamphlet in defense of those arrested.49 In addition, wives, children, and friends of those arrested sent their pleas to the deputies. Occasionally, entire villages wrote on behalf of their native sons. The inhabitants of Douvres, for example, strongly supported their representatives, Saillenfest, François Exupère Mériel, and Jean Jacques Jardin. Some towns, however, took the opportunity to denounce administrators already arrested for their role in the revolt. The citizens of Audrieu wrote to Romme and Prieur in early August regarding their mayor René Lahaye, who was also a district administrator. Not only did they charge him with fomenting civil war, but they also accused him of extortion and hoarding. The people of Bucéles similarly denounced their mayor, Barnabé Cauvin, for having actively spread the revolt in his capacity as departmental administrator. This accusation contrasted sharply with Cauvin's own profession of innocence at his interrogation.50

Long before most of these former administrators had been brought to justice, Lindet had turned to the task of appointing new officials. He and DuRoy took responsibility for this chore, which aroused less contention among the three deputies than did Lindet’s desire to imprison the guilty. They consequently completed the first round of appointments by mid-August, long before the majority of arrests. In the case of departmental administrators, the necessity for replacement was obvious. Despite their protestations of innocence, those officials had held positions of authority and

47. A. D. Calvados, L.10125 and L.10136 (interrogations).
50. A. D. Calvados, L.10117, L.10122–25 (letters addressed to various representatives on mission).
responsibility, had enjoyed public confidence, and could have guided their constituents away from revolt. In dismissing the district and municipal councils, Lindet and DuRoy acknowledged that actual complicity had not yet been demonstrated but stressed that these officials had shown themselves to be undeserving of public confidence by their passivity and their compliance with the general assembly.

Lindet and DuRoy first announced the appointment of departmental and district officials. In seeming anticipation of the law of 14 Frimaire II (December 4, 1793), they named only directors and not full councils, though they did appoint a procureur-syndic and a procureur-général-syndic, both suppressed by the later decree and replaced by agents nationaux. None of the fourteen men selected had previous administrative experience, even at the municipal level. Nearly all of the departmental directors came from the district of Caen, because of the difficulty of quickly obtaining reliable information on individuals from other districts and the necessity of filling the posts as soon as possible.51 Five days later, on August 18, Lindet and DuRoy made public a full slate of new municipal officials, including notables. As with the other administrations, they chose men new to public office. Many of those named had acted as presidents, secretaries, or scrutateurs of the Caen sectional assemblies that had accepted the new constitution at the end of July.52 Only one appointee, Richard de Jort, had previously served as a municipal officer, and one of the new notables, Joseph Pierre Chibourg le jeune, had been preceded in office by his father, who had served as a notable in 1790.53

Unfortunately, the appointment of new officials was not a complete success. The people of Caen had witnessed firsthand the liabilities of holding public office, and many undoubtedly hesitated to expose themselves to such dangers. All but one of the new district directors assumed their new posts, but four of the eight departmental directors never attended a meeting, and a considerable number of municipal officials refused to accept their appointments. Many sent their resignations in writing, most often citing lack of sufficient talent or health problems as the reason for their refusal. Vision-impairing headaches seem to have been a common malady!54

51. A. D. Calvados, L165 and L187.
52. Transcripts of those assemblies are in A. C. Caen, L44 (Acceptation de l'acte constitutionnel, 1793).
53. A. C. Caen, D2.
54. A. D. Calvados, L10118 (Lindet mission).
Even among those who accepted their appointments, not all were propitious choices. Some proved simply incompetent; others, politically suspect. Frédéric Vaultier complained in his memoirs that since the revolt had compromised all good patriots in Caen, Lindet had no choice but to select officials from among the town’s petty-bourgeois royalists, most of them of mediocre talent. Many were indeed petty-bourgeois, but few seem to have been royalist — mediocrity, rather, being the most common failing. When the deputy Laplanche arrived in early November, he immediately announced that he would change all the administrations, promising to name “honest shoemakers, tailors, and hatters” to replace the lawyers and other professionals who currently dominated the councils. Laplanche found fewer lawyers in office than he had expected; but in December, after consultation with the “purified” and once again active Jacobin club, he did replace a number of officials deemed incompetent or politically unacceptable.

The problem of who would fill public offices persisted in the changing political climate of the year II. Over the next twelve months, four sets of representatives on mission visited Calvados, and each revised in some fashion the local administrations. Indeed, it becomes difficult to keep track of who held office at any given time. One thing, however, is clear. Few of those who first came to office after July, 1793, enjoyed lengthy careers as public officials, and many of those dismissed in August by Lindet later returned to replace the men who had once replaced them.

In the long term, the Terror in Calvados proved to be milder even than that in the Haute-Vienne. The Limoges Criminal Tribunal sentenced thirteen people to death in early 1794, most of them refractory priests, while in Calvados the Terror claimed only seven victims. Two principal reasons account for the leniency shown to the Caen federalists. The attitude of the representatives on mission to Calvados played a significant role. Both Bonnet and DuRoy showed reluctance to deal harshly with the local officials. Lindet, too, demonstrated moderation, despite his determination to see the guilty punished. He clearly believed that harsh repression would not be the most effective policy in restoring unity to the troubled Republic. While on mission to Lyon in early June, Lindet had repeatedly written to the Committee of

55. Vaultier, Souvenirs, 28.
56. A. D. Calvados, L 10529 (Journal de l’Armée des Côtes de Cherbourg, November 5, 1793).
57. A. D. Calvados, L 10075 (administrative personnel), and L 10128 (Laplanche mission).
Public Safety that the town still contained many good republicans and that mediation and negotiation, along with the publication of a constitution, would provide a resolution to the difficulties. That the Committee could not, or would not, follow Lindet’s recommendations in dealing with Lyon stands as one of the great tragedies of the Revolution. Lindet adopted a similar attitude in Caen, despite pressure from Paris to take more drastic action. In a letter dated September 9, Xavier Audouin pointed out to Lindet that whereas eight people had just been executed in Rouen for burning a tree of liberty, none had yet been so punished in Caen, where an entire army of rebels had gathered.

Lindet resisted even that entreaty, as we have seen, but local circumstances must also be credited for rendering violent repression an infeasible option in Calvados. No organized radical group existed in Caen to push for harsh punishment or to support it had the representatives on mission chosen to impose it. The Carabots had joined in the revolt, consistent with their role as a client group for the merchant elite and the departmental administration. The Jacobin club had severed its ties with the Paris Jacobins and had grown lethargic since the split. It followed the lead of Louis Caille and Chaix-d’Estanges on those rare occasions when it stirred itself to action. Even as the club revived in the months following the revolt, the only calls for revolutionary justice came from an outsider, J.J. Derché, brought to Caen by Lindet to edit the Journal de l’Armée des Côtes de Cherbourg. Men such as Charles Aubin, François Outin, and Jacques Caroger stepped forward to fill positions in the local administrations but showed no desire to persecute the men they replaced.

The repression and reorganization carried out by representatives on mission marked both an end and a beginning in Caen and Limoges. Although the ascendancy of the Girondins had never been complete, their political philosophy was reflected in the relative departmental autonomy that prevailed in the two years before June, 1793. The dangers of that departmental independence for the new republic became apparent in the revolt that challenged the authority of the National Convention after the proscriptions of June 2. The Convention utilized representatives on mission to neutralize those dangers

59. A. D. Calvados, L10126 (representatives on mission).
by eliminating “moderate” elements from local administrations. The law of 14 Frimaire reinforced their efforts by restricting both the size and the responsibilities of departmental administrations, in fact rendering them subordinate to the more dependable district councils in the registration of national laws and decrees. The appointment of agents nationaux, attached to local administrations, and the eventual designation of commissaires du directoire exécutif commenced the consolidation of a centralized government, a process never entirely halted by either the post-Thermidor Convention or the Directory.

In Limoges, this shift constituted not so much a dramatic end as a confirmation of the local political situation. The departmental administration, extremely cautious and mindful of the law, had been politically dominated since the summer of 1792 by the more radical municipality and the Limoges Jacobin club. These groups welcomed the revolution of May 31 and prevented the departmental council from straying into the federalist camp. Representatives on mission rewarded the loyalty of these groups to the Convention by reinforcing their hold on local politics. Only after Thermidor would that hold be broken.

The Terror was not bloody in Limoges, but local authorities enthusiastically embraced its principles by imprisoning royalists, former nobles, and those suspected of incivisme, particularly former adherents of the moderate Limoges club, the Amis de la Paix. This spirit extended beyond local officials and Jacobin club members—most of the people of Limoges shared and supported it. After the deputy Cherrier ordered the disarming of local terrorists in April, 1795, the sections of Limoges vociferously defended them, eventually refusing to vote on the year III constitution until Cherrier had rearmed the terrorists.60

In Caen, on the other hand, the months of August and September, 1793, constituted a definite break with the past. None of the local administrations had been strong enough in its loyalty to the Convention to actively oppose the insurrection. Moderates dominated all three councils, and the weak Jacobin club offered no restraint on the actions of elected administrators. Lindet and DuRoy suspended nearly every local official, replacing them with men new to public office, many of whom lacked the talents or experience necessary to fulfill their responsibilities.

60. A. D. Haute-Vienne, 1.442 (Constitution de l’an III). See also Fray-Fournier, Le Département de la Haute-Vienne, II, 144, 315–34.
Linder suggested that the old officials had misled the people, who would no longer tolerate them in office. Evidence from statements and interrogations made after the revolt tends to confirm this impression. Volunteers for the march to Paris complained that officials had deceived them, leading them to believe that they journeyed to Paris to fraternize and join in another fédération. Le Goupil Duclos and others blamed the Calvados commissioners returned from Paris for falsely reporting on the status of the Convention. Even the concerted efforts of the general assembly (dominated by departmental administrators) to establish belatedly the existence of public support for its actions points to the absence of that very support.

But while the people of Caen had not supported the insurrectionary intentions of their administrations, they showed no desire to see them punished for their actions. In late August, a petition circulating in Caen called for a general amnesty and a recall of the decree issued against the rebel administrators. Lindet squelched this project, warning the citizenry that such a petition to Paris would enrage the National Convention and undermine the progress the deputies had achieved thus far.61

Nor did the people of Caen show enthusiasm for the instruments of the Terror. In October, Linder and Oudot called on section assemblies to elect a comité de salut public, forerunner of the comité de surveillance. The sections responded by choosing men who had played no active role in the Revolution, who were mostly too old or indifferent to care one way or the other. The deputies nullified the elections and appointed a committee themselves, acknowledging that the motivation of the sections had been a desire for peace and quiet after the recent turbulence but warning them against the pitfalls of complacency.62

Local attitudes did not change, however. The deputies J. Frémanger and Bouret arrived on mission in late January, 1794, and found the people of Caen barely in step with the Revolution. Torpor and laziness prevailed, they reported, and the paucity of capable patriots to staff district and municipal administrations appalled them. The representatives appealed to Paris for guidance in reconstituting the councils. People in Caen, they explained, fell into four categories: (1) Conspirators who had supported Buzot and the others. Most were in prison, but some had escaped arrest and still lurked

62. A. D. Calvados, L10124 (repression of federalism).
Those misled during the insurrection. Most had since realized their error but now played no role in public life, forced from their posts by revolutionary committees. They remained eager to serve their country, though, and the deputies felt that the greatest reserve of talent and wisdom lay in this group. (3) Good patriots—fewer in number but long on effort, though unfortunately short on talent. These were the men currently in office. (4) Assorted misfits—"les modérés, les insouciants, les intrigants, les égoïstes, les faux patriotes, les hommes à circonstance, les caméléons du corps politiques." The bitter enemies of the two middle groups, these types always tried to sow division.  

The dilemma that faced Bouret and Frémanger points again to one of the reasons for the mildness of repression in Calvados. No organized Jacobin faction existed in Caen that could step in and capably assume local administrative responsibilities. Bouret and Frémanger wondered if it would not be advisable to restore to office some individuals from the second group, given the shortcomings of those in the third. In retrospect, both their assessment and their recommendation appear particularly astute, but the Committee of Public Safety did not agree. After hearing from Paris, the two deputies made only a few changes in the local administrations. Most of those previously appointed by Lindet, Oudot, and Laplanche remained in office.

Bouret and Frémanger did, however, issue one order that eased the stigma of federalism for the local population. Upon arriving in Caen, the two representatives were swamped by letters from friends and relatives of imprisoned officials, imploring them to grant the prisoners’ release. After consultation with the district comité de surveillance and the Jacobin club, they ordered the release of fifty-two prisoners on March 7, 1794 (17 Ventôse II), including all of the municipal officers arrested as federalists. The town’s joyous celebration three days later convinced the two deputies that they had made the right decision and had taken an important step toward healing old wounds.

The stigma of federalism was not fully removed in Calvados until after

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63. A.N., AF II 175ª, dossier 1435, pièce 45.
64. A.N., AF II 176, dossier 1448, pièce 38; A.C. Caen, 150 (Bouret and Frémanger mission); A.D. Calvados, L1975 (Comité de surveillance générale). In a January letter to Paris, the local comité de surveillance had lamented that the clamor of the people of Caen for the release of the imprisoned federalists was so great that it was impossible to put the affair behind them. They suggested that two representatives on mission be sent to solve the problem. Frémanger and Bouret arrived shortly thereafter.
9 Thermidor (July 27, 1794). By September, 1794, it had virtually disappeared. Representatives on mission released nearly all of those arrested. Many returned to their former positions, and the local administrations once again resembled those of June, 1793. Le Goupil Duclos sat as mayor of Caen, and Pierre Jean Léveque soon returned to head the departmental directory. Léveque subsequently served as departmental commissaire du directoire exécutif from November, 1795, until 1799.

What, then, do the patterns of repression and reorganization tell us about the federalist insurrection? Both the circumstances of the revolt and the nature of the repression reinforce the impression that the revolt was one of leaders without followers. In Limoges, because of the well-organized radical faction in town, this meant that no revolt developed. In Caen, the lack of popular support guaranteed the failure of the revolt. Representatives on mission and official interrogators searched in August and September for evidence of a conspiracy, but without success. Although reports from Garat’s agents suggested that the federalist leaders had misled the populace, there was nothing explicitly devious or conspiratorial about their actions. They genuinely believed that their defense of a moderate republic, and of local autonomy, represented not only their own interests but those of their constituency as well. To a point, they were right—the people’s later defense of their “misguided” leaders shows the confidence and trust they felt in their political elite. For the most part, the lower classes of Caen passively followed those leaders and accepted their dominance in local affairs. Only when their leaders called upon them to arm themselves and march against the radical scoundrels in Paris did they refuse to follow. They would not discard their passivity to actively intervene in national politics, particularly in such a risky endeavor.

Two factors emerge as crucial, then, in determining the stances of Caen and Limoges during the federalist revolt. One is the character and identity of the local political elite (the federalists in Caen) and the manner in which they controlled local politics. The other is the role of the popular classes in guiding or influencing the actions of their elected leaders. We now consider just who those leaders were and explore further the activism of the Limoges popular classes compared with the passivism of those in Caen.