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Ethical and religious values in Lotze's philosophy

John Wesley Burkhardt
Butler University

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Ethical and Religious Values in Lotze's Philosophy

A Thesis

by

John Wesley Burkhardt, B. S., A.B.

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Chapter I.

A Brier Survey of The Ethical System of Lotze.

Every student of Lotze is familiar with the antithesis which recurs frequently throughout his work between scientific thought on the one hand and ethical and religious conviction on the other. Keeping this in mind let us first, develop the chief points in Lotze's ethical system; secondly, work over those portions of the Metaphysic that are related to his ethics, taking pains to point out these relations on the way; and finally, sum up what Lotze has done in the way of reconciling the two poles of the antithesis. First, then, let us inquire into Lotze's ethics.

The title of this chapter might, perhaps, be considered misleading on the ground that Lotze never gave to the world anything in the field of ethics worthy of bearing the title, system. However, while a premature death did preclude the possibility of Lotze's completing the last division of his System of Philosophy in which he had purposed to treat the philosophy of religion, morals, and aesthetics, there is probably sufficient material left us in the 'Outlines' and the Microcosmos altho it is much abridged and somewhat scattered, to enable us to form an ethical theory which will approximate at least what he might have given us.

In the opening paragraph of his introduction to the

Practical Philosophy, Lotze uses these words: "The conflict of our needs, in part with the course of nature and in part with social conditions; the frustrating of our plans in life; and, finally, regret and the doubt how to escape from our own self-condemnation,--such are the inducements which, taken together, incite us to inquire: How are we to conduct ourselves so as at the same time to attain outward good fortune and inward peace?" "This very inquiry involves the supposition that there exist certain rules for the attainment of this object, which admit of being expressed in universal form, and which have a universal validity." "To investigate these rules and to combine them into a system" is what he sets out to do in the Practical Philosophy.¹ His Practical Philosophy, as he himself says, is thus broader than Ethics, which he would make include "merely those general propositions according to which the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the disposition is estimated". Yet what is included more than in Ethics is clearly of "subordinate rank" since "no outward good would satisfy us without the inward good of self-approbation, and, further that only the shaping of our own mind, and not that of the outward world, stands directly within our control."² In thus subordinating the outward good to an inward good of self-approbation, Lotze by no means intends to leave out of account the outward good. This is illustrated by a number of his statements, one of which it will be sufficient to quote: "All talk of absolute obligatory forms of conduct, which should have no reference at all to

¹ Prac. Phil. 1

² Prac. Phil. 2

the resulting consequences, is perhaps very nobly meant, but is a formal service that arises from a complete misunderstanding.¹"

In attempting to ascertain the general principles that should govern conduct, some have confined themselves to an investigation of the nature of the active spirit (agent) in the belief that, with this determined and analysed, the laws of conduct could then be deduced. In its earliest forms this method tended toward a wide differentiation of obligatory rules, ascribing a particular code of conduct to individuals and classes, depending for its exact statement and peculiar application, upon rank, position, relation, etc. "Nothing but the great pressure which arose from such a state of affairs, turned attention little by little to the fact that there must be supreme laws of moral conduct which are obligatory upon every person in relation to every other."²

Nor can we be satisfied, Lotze thinks, with an obligatory code which is based upon the nature of man universal. For granting the possibility of determining the nature of man-- a thing which seems as yet far from demonstrable--the most this could hope to do would be to bring us to an Ethics which would be binding merely upon men and not upon spiritual beings" generally. "But concerning the supreme laws which are to determine our conduct, we cannot concede that other laws exist beside them, without working injury thereby to the unconditioned worth and majesty which we desire them to have."³

¹ Prac. Phil. 7
² Prac. Phil. 3
³ Prac. Phil. 3

Besides, we have no necessity for believing that, were the nature of man determinable, we could be sure of finding the Ethical in "adhering to this nature and in forwarding in conduct that to which nature of itself impels us." For in the actual working out of things we observe certain types of mind in all ages "which have found 'the Ethical', not in following, but in industriously striving against all natural impulses, and which have sacrificed all the good things of life to this conviction."²

To the argument that the nature of man is more inclusive than his natural impulses and must take into account as well, man's final purpose or destiny, Lotze merely replies that the destiny of man involves likewise the destiny of the universe and at once we find ourselves so involved as to make it utterly impossible to get out with our limited powers of cognition. Directly opposed, moreover, to this stringent demand upon the intellect is the evident fact "that fundamental ethical laws, if they are to have any value, must be immediately obvious and certain to the individual man."³

Lotze now feels convinced that he has successfully refuted all attempts to deduce the obligatory laws of morality that are based upon an "analysis of the subject" (active spirit or agent) and at this point he turns, still critically, towards those theories which start "from the conception of conduct as an act, to determine those kinds of conduct which are incumbent upon us."⁴

1	Prac. Phil.	3
2	" "	3
3	" "	3
4	" "	4

Among these theories falls 'Rigorism' which Lotze seems always to associate with Kant, and of which we shall speak first. Kant's position is, that moral conduct is absolutely independent of consequences, that it consists essentially in obedience to a law, a formal categorical imperative, which is absolute and universal. It must be free from personal interest and desire. "Nothing in the whole world, or even outside of the world, can possibly be regarded as good without limitation, except a good will." "Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavor of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, then like a jewel it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness, or fruitlessness, can neither add nor take away anything from its value." In reply to such statements Lotze would remark: "If obedience or disobedience to an ethical law were to occasion not a trace of pleasure or pain to any sensitive being in the world--whether God, angels, or men--it would be utterly incomprehensible, why it is just the obedience and not the disobedience to the law that must have an obligatory force; since after all the effects of the two modes of conduct consist only in the production of different states of fact, one of which would be as indifferent as the other. In a word it is impossible to understand what is to constitute the 'value' of any action if its results are not

¹Met. of Ethics. Abbots tr. pp.9, 10; quoted from Roger's Hist. of Phil. p. 434.

able to produce some 'Good' somewhere in the world, or to increase the sum of already existing 'Good'.¹"

Concerning Kant's formula: "Act so that the maxim (that followed in the choice thou hast resolved upon) of thy conduct be adopted for universal legislation", Lotze observes that it "not only presupposes a work of theoretic interpretation by which in each case the definite maxim has to be discovered; but also that it is altogether an illusion to believe every regard for resulting consequences, and for the production of happiness, to be excluded by the aforesaid axiom. That is to say; if it is of no account whatever just what results in case of certain conduct of ours, then there is no maxim of any sort which could not be set up as a universal law."²

Again: "When Kant believed that he had found a universal formula for moral action, in opposition to the aims of self-interest, he was candid enough to admit that he had not discovered in it the precise ground of its binding authority over us."³ If some contend that it is sufficient to say that man is obligated to do the will of the Absolute, Lotze asks "But how is the Absolute should not desire such a relation. This question should remind us that the sacredness of the command depends upon the will of the Supreme Being, upon his capacity of receiving pleasure or pain from our obedience or disobedience, and upon that relation of ourselves to Him in virtue of which we find our own blessedness in his pleasure. If we eliminate from our conception of the Supreme Being every trace of reel-

¹ Phil. of Rel. 67
² Prac. Phil. 5
³ Mik. I p. 690.

ing, and transform our conception into that of inflexible physical force, a power which, though intelligent, is devoid of feeling we see at once that the subordination above referred to is altogether without worth".¹ "An unconditioned Ought is unthinkable; and only a conditioned Ought is possible, which attaches advantages and disadvantages to the observance or non-observance of what is prescribed" says Lotze.² And to the 'Rigorist' he ever asks: "What then would be the result, if these laws were not obeyed?"³

A second ethical theory to which Lotze has attended is that of Herbart who consciously and critically passes beyond the Rigorism of Kant and "advances the view that the ethical axioms, which ought to determine the conduct of the individual man at the particular moment, must not only be immediately obvious and certain, but must also have a definite content."⁴ Herbart classes ethica as a branch of the general theory of art and his ethical theory therefore grows immediately out of his Aesthetics' Falckenberg summarizes his position thus: "The beautiful is distinguished from the agreeable and the desirable, which, like it, are the objects of preference and rejection, by the facts, first, that it arouses an involuntary and disinterested judgment of approval; and second, that it is a predicate which is ascribed to the object or is objective. To these is added, thirdly, that while desire seeks for that which is to come, taste possesses in the present that which it

Mik. I p 691.
 Phil. or Rel. 79
 Phil. or Rel. 67
 Prac. Phil. 6.

judges." "That which pleases or displeases is always the form, never the matter; and further is always a relation, for that which is entirely simple is indifferent. As in music we have succeeded in discovering the simplest relations, which please immediately and absolutely-----so this must be attempted' with respect to moral beauty".² "What is required, therefore, is to enumerate the simplest elementary relations of one will to another";³ such as will form the general basis of conduct (the details to be worked out as combinations and modifications of these); and then to submit each of these elementary relations to conscience for its approval or disapproval. In this way are derived a plurality of 'practical Ideas' or 'pattern-concepts' "in accordance with which moral taste, involuntarily and with unconditional evidence, judges concerning the worth or unworth of (actually happening or merely represented) volitions".⁴

Now just here Lotze finds fault with Herbart's theory. He objects to a plurality of ethical primary judgments which are wholly independent of one another in origin and application. Even though it might be possible, theoretically to deduce such a plurality from a single principle, it would be merely an intellectual gain; "the certainty, worth, and obligatory character of the practical ideas themselves would have won nothing thereby, and would have lost nothing, if this attempt were not to succeed."⁵ Lotze certainly justly contends that, if not the

¹ Hist. of Phil. p. 532.

² Ibid.

³ Prac. Phil. 6

⁴ Hist. of Phil. p. 533.

⁵ Prac. Phil. 6

practical life, yet surely the science of Ethics cannot be satisfied short of an ultimate, unitary principle which is to be sought for, not in any immediate revelation of conscience, but in the realm of metaphysics.¹ Lotze's metaphysics has led him to an apprehension of the world as a coherent totality and so, for this manifest reason it seems to him quite improbable "that the spirits that are summoned to conduct should be controlled by a plurality of incoherent supreme commands".² Furthermore, it seems unwarranted to him that the 'practical ideas' which are revelations of conscience should be designated as aesthetic judgments and at the same time be held "to possess an unconditioned value and a force incontrovertibly obligatory." It seems to him that Herbart has here confused theoretical and aesthetic judgments by attempting to deprive the latter of the element of feeling which, in reality, is an essential characteristic theory. "Aesthetic judgments are in general possible only in a spiritual being which has the capacity of feeling pleasure and pain". In a world of spirits possessing bare intelligence there is no conceivable reason why, "instead of an existing state 'a', over which no one is rejoiced or troubled, another state 'b' would have to be brought to pass by certain conduct,--over which latter state in like manner no one would be either rejoiced or troubled". In short, "in such a world it would be quite incomprehensible that there should be definite rules which should obligate spiritual beings to any one definite form of conduct, and forbid them another form."³

1 Prac. Phil. 7
 2 Prac. Phil. 7
 3 " " 7

The third and last theory of the group,¹ against which Lotze directed his criticism, is Eudaemonism, which we shall now consider. By Eudaemonism Lotze has in mind that theory which sets up 'pleasure' as the 'highest Good', "the only absolutely self-assertory end" and consequently makes "the conduct, too, which seeks to fulfill this end" "the only kind in itself worthy of being commended and obligatory."

As insistent as Lotze is that pleasure shall have its place in any valid ethical system, he is yet unwilling to grant it the position of undoubted "chief Principle".² "No one will venture-----to set up pleasure in any form, or pleasure at any price, as an allowable end or action."³ Conscience itself forbids any such maxim of conduct as this. In the first place, while conscience in no wise condemns the effort to attain pleasure, it nevertheless makes such effort in no degree meritorious.⁴ Such a statement would seem to make moral conduct almost, if not indeed quite, indifferent to the element of pleasure; and yet as passages cited early in this chapter show, Lotze does not aim to go to that extreme. In a number of related passages he seems somewhat inconsistent and even contradictory and it is only in the light of conclusions which he himself declares have been reached that we are able to interpret them individually. An attempt will be made later in the chapter to approach more closely Lotze's real position. It is enough for the present to bear in mind that he is trying to occupy a middle ground, rigidly denying the possibility of

¹ Cr. p. 5

² Prac. Phil. 4

³ Mik. I p. 694.

⁴ Prac. Phil. 4

ruling pleasure out entirely, and at the same time strenuously insisting that it occupy a subordinate place.

In addition to the above-mentioned attitude of conscience toward pleasure we are abundantly aware of a qualitative difference of pleasure, a difference which enables us to distinguish "the higher and nobler form the baser forms". This difference is revealed to us by the judgment of conscience and is wholly independent of quantitative differences whether the latter be regarded in reference to the individual or to the mass of mankind.--a fact which is in itself incompatible with any theory that makes pleasure alone the moral objective!

There are, too, logical absurdities connected with the Endaemonistic theory, says Lotze. Granted that 'Pleasure' is the 'Supreme Good', the thing that is ever to regulate conduct, who can foresee the results even of a single act and thereby know how to direct his conduct so as to secure the greatest amount of pleasure? Add to this the complexities that are introduced by a consideration of the happiness of all persons and at once the problem becomes so involved that the finite mind is plunged hopelessly into a perplexity from which it can never extricate itself. Obviously the individual would be dependent largely for his rule of conduct upon the historical experience of the race. This necessarily is incomplete and the most it could be expected to furnish would "be rules of 'probability', which would have to admit of exceptions".

¹ Mik. I pp.695-6---Phil. of Rel. 68.

This mere probability at once deprives this standard of conduct of "the absolute worth which our conscience ascribes to the ethical maxims that are recognized as such by us."

Moreover, he who makes Pleasure the goal of moral conduct misapprehends the nature of pleasure altogether.² "'Pleasure absolutely' is nothing at all that could ever become actual as a psychological state; accordingly, it is also nothing which could be set up as a goal for our conduct in general"³ "Pleasure in itself is an incomplete thought so long as we are not also told what it is that is enjoyed. I do not refer to the external impression from which it arises, but to the specific content of the pleasure itself where it has arisen. Just as it is impossible to feel in general without feeling something, or, to speak more correctly, without feeling in some particular way, as e.g. in the ways which we call red or sweet, hard or warm; just as it is also impossible to imagine a sensation as merely greater or less in degree; so it is out of the question to talk of pleasure which is simply pure enjoyment, and not the enjoyment of something, of pleasure which is merely greater or less in amount, merely more or less evanescent, but without qualitative content."⁴ "We speak of pleasure and pain in general, just as we do of movement in general; we can abstract from the direction and velocity of the latter, but no movement can occur without having velocity and direction; in the same way pain or pleasure can never occur in this formless and

¹ Prac. Phil 4

² " " 8 --- Phil. of Rel. 69

³ " " 8

⁴ Mik. I p. 694.

colorless generality, but must always have, or rather must always be, something definite in form or color, as in fact we should say that movement is velocity which has some given direction, and not that it has velocity and deirection.¹"

The reason Lotze examined and criticised just these several theories and no others seems to be contained in the fact that in each of them there was an element which attracted him and which he felt he could, with slight modifications, perhaps, adopt and fit into his own theory. Whether this be true or not it is certainly not too much to say that there is in each an element which an analysis of his theory will disclose. We shall now endeavor to bring together these elements, and then determine, if possible, what over and above them is contained in Lotze's theory.

First, then what does Lotze find in Kant's Rigorism which he can incorporate in his own system? There are two things upon which Kant insists that I believe Lotze could accept with a very slight modification: The first of these is the emphasis which is placed on the 'will'. Kant, it will be remembered, as has been pointed out² held that nothing could be regarded as absolutely good save a good will. Let us see now what importance is attached to the will by Lotze. Early in chapter II of the Practical Philosophy he draws a distinction between conduct and mere action. "Conduct", he says, "occurs merely in cases where a conscious idea of what is to be attained thereby forms the point of starting for its own actualisation."

¹ Ibid p. 695.

² See p; 5

Moreover, this consciousness of the outcome does not constitute conduct, neither does conduct consist in the working out of results which are brought about merely by blind forces operating according to mechanical law within the realm of ideas, which results in turn enter into the chain of causal connection of bodily movements. On the contrary these ideas "only serve as motives for the will, which present to it the different possible forms of conduct, but commit to the will itself the choice between them!" It is not even essential that the ideas which serve as motives shall be strictly in harmony with the truth; i.e. there may very possibly be misleading motives,² due to intellectual misapprehension but they remain motives just the same. That these are but motives and not necessary causes is emphatically brought out in these words: "The moral 'freedom of the will' which we desire,-----absolutely requires that the spirit in its willing and acting be independent not merely of external causes, but also of 'its own nature'; that it must execute not merely that which is consequent upon what is preformed in this nature of its own; but must at every moment be able to turn about, step out of this path, and break off the consecutiveness of its development with an entirely new beginning."³ Lotze opposes with vehemence Kant's theory that with respect to the phenomenal world we are determined and form only a part of the totality of the causally connected world. He says again: "Unless we are able in this life in time, which

¹ Cf. Mik I. pp. 687-8; also pp. 255-6; -- Prac. Phil. 10; Phil. of Rel. 61.

² Cf. Phil. of Rel. 61

³ Prac. Phil. 18

is the only one that we know of and are actually living, to repeat at every moment the aforesaid self-determination, we shall not be consoled for such a loss by any free act which we are assumed to have brought to pass in some existence altogether unknown to us!"

Concerning the intensity of the will, its power to assert itself as against the subjective passions of the soul as well as against the external forces of nature Lotze is just the least bit wavering. However he says: "Every act of the will must have some degree of intensity" and on the whole seems to feel that the good will can and does assert itself. To be sure there are some limitations e.g. the will, i.e. the moral will, is confined to the realm of moral conduct and outside of this realm there is perhaps little freedom. Then, too, in all cases the will is shut up in any particular choice to the set of ideas which are acting as motives.²

The metaphysical justification of the freedom of the will as worked out by Lotze will be taken up in the succeeding chapter. It is enough for us to note here that in his ethical system he recognizes it as valid and assigns to it a large place indeed. To summarize in his own words: "We therefore restrict the term 'conduct' to those cases in which an idea of different possible modes of conduct, further, an idea of their different value, and, finally, a decision between them, have preceded; the last of which we attribute--no matter now whether rightly or wrongly--to the free determination of our will."³

¹ Prac. Phil. 18

² Mik. I. p. 254ff.--Prac. Phil. 22

³ Prac. Phil. 10

A second element in Kant's theory which reappears in Lotze (although it is doubtful whether Lotze can be said to have borrowed it, in any sense, from Kant) is the universality and the absoluteness of the ethical law, the 'categorical imperative'. We have already seen¹ that Lotze is satisfied with no ethical code which shall not be binding not only on all men but on all spirits as well. The absoluteness of his code can readily be deduced from the following expression taken from the Philosophy of Religion section eighty: "Ethical laws we designate as the will of God" Also a sentence from the Microcosmus: "If love is the great commandment, then that that great commandment must be carried out for love's sake is a necessary corollary; neither the realization of any Idea for its own sake, merely in order that it, devoid of sensibility as it is, should be put into act, nor the residence of all excellences within ourselves, the egoistic glorification of self, but only love to the living God, only the longing to be approved not by our own hearts but by Him--this, and this only, is the basis of Christian morality, and science will never find one that is plainer, nor life one that is surer."² It would seem that Lotze is satisfied with the Christian basis of morality. The manner in which he arrives at a personal absolute spirit whose will is the highest Good will be taken up later.

When we turn to Herbart to see what Lotze finds there we discover that the 'Right' has an appeal to the individual which it makes through the conscience. In this connection, then,

¹ See p. 3

² Microcosmus p. 473.

let us examine the nature of conscience and the part it plays in the moral life as worked out by Lotze.

As introductory to such examination we quote the following: An ancient tradition has assigned to man an innate Moral Law which rules his sentiments and a Spiritual Revelation which determines his ends, as two steady points of support for his naturally irresolute endeavors.¹ Lotze now inquires into the validity of any such a statement. He agrees that in conscience the individual is provided with something which is very helpful indeed indispensable, in attaining moral ideals but that Conscience is like every other human faculty in that it is at first a mere germ or capacity, that it is subject to the laws of growth, that it is not infallible, that it is conditioned by the aid of other faculties, that it comes to approximate perfection only by experiences. "As human knowledge is animated by faith in the existence of truth, but must leave it to investigation--which often blunders--to discover in what this truth consists, so we may also say that the second essential characteristic of human nature is that it everywhere carries about with it the thought of Duty and of Obligation; but what it is that corresponds to these notions, and what kind of action they require, it has to find out by degrees in the course of its development."² These two things or factors must be borne in mind: (1) the power or experience to develop and (2) the original presence of the germ upon which experience operates. "We may,

¹ Mik. I p. 684.

² " I p. 686.

indeed, certainly ascribe to the human mind the possession of innate general ideas of Right, or what ought to be; but the moral skill which enables us to find, in every individual case the special form in which this Right should be realized, is decidedly a product of progressive civilization, and happy traits of natural disposition are not a full and sufficient but only an extremely imperfect and fragmentary substitute for it.¹ The end of conscience is to lead one, even though somewhat blindly, into the highest Good, into the will of the Absolute.² Perhaps it will be well here to summarize in a way what has been said with reference to conscience and this can best be done in Lotze's own words: "...The self-judging Conscience, and the ineradicable Idea of binding Duty which in us accompanies action and feeling, distinguish human creatures, as members of a realm of Mind, from brutes whose vital activity depends upon feeling merely. If we choose to sum up under the name of the Infinite that which stands opposed to particular finite manifestations, we may say that the capacity of becoming conscious of the Infinite is the distinguishing endowment of the human mind, and we believe that we can at the same time pronounce, as a result of our considerations, that this capacity has not been produced in us by the influence of experience with all its manifold content, but that having its origin in the very nature of our being, it only needed favoring conditions of experience for its development."³

There yet remains to be reviewed Endaemonism which also contains an element that is found all through Lotze's system.

¹ Mik. II p. 51 -- Cr. Mik. I p. 685--See also Prac. Phil. 9

² Mik. I. p. 710. Prac. Phil. 9.-- Phil. of Rel. 77ff.

It has already been stated¹ that one has to read carefully and interpret individual passages in the light of Lotze's own conclusions in order to be at all certain concerning his position with reference to pleasure. This much, however, seems certain, that he does necessarily connect good conduct with pleasure. One further quotation from the Practical Philosophy will bear this out: "Whatever may be the more intimate mode of the still obscure connection between the ethical laws and pleasure and pain, this much is-----already made certain:--namely, that an indissoluble connection exists²." Is a thing good because it is pleasing or is it pleasing because it is good? Lotze says that 'to be good' and 'to be pleasing' "have by no means so different a significance that the one could serve as a reason for the other. They rather designate exactly one and the same thing. There is nothing at all in the world, which would have any value until it has produced some pleasure in some being or other capable of enjoyment. Everything antecedent to this is naught but an indifferent kind of fact, to which a value of its own can be ascribed only in an anticipatory way, and with reference to some pleasure that is to originate from it"³. Such a statement as this certainly sounds somewhat ambiguous as does also the following from the Microcosmos: "It is not at all the case that we first recognize excellence unmoved, and then bring forth in response a definite quantity of our pleasure, -----, It is rather the case that we are constrained by the

¹ See pp. 13-14

² Prac. Phil. 7

³ " " 8

inherent worth of things; and though of course, our pleasure must in some degree depend upon our own nature,-----yet the special differences between our pleasurable feelings can by no means be reduced to merely quantitative differences of a uniform feeling of subjective well-being!" Lotze, in the above statements, is by no means clear and I feel sure does not intend to convey the meaning his words seem naturally to express (although he perhaps nowhere expressly forbids such confusion, yet he does implicitly do so I think² and I believe that with this distinction well kept in mind one would come more closely, as well as a great deal more easily into his real meaning. He says our conscience clearly "condemns the egoism which uses up all objects, relations, and events with a complete disregard for their specific content, as mere means for satisfying the demand of personal well-being,--very much as both common and costly material may be consumed as fuel in order to produce from both the same kind of heat." On the other hand "the pleasurable feeling of the subject enjoying it can also in turn be regarded as the sole means, by which the specific value that lies in the things, or their peculiar beauty and excellence, is first brought to its true realization,--as light, for example, must illumine things in order that their different colors, which they do not have in the darkness, may originate³."

In bringing together in the way of a brief summary just what is Lotze's position in reference to the relation of con-

¹ Mik. I. p. 695

² Cf. Prac. Phil. 9

³ Prac. Phil. 8 -- Mik. I. p. 695.

duct and pleasure, two things stand out prominently for which he contends: (1) that there is an objective validity in ethical conduct which is separate from and independent of subjective feeling; and (a) at the same any particular mode of conduct finds its justification only in the satisfaction of some feeling spirit.

Thus far in our effort to construct Lotze's ethical position our method has been eclectic. We will now endeavor to ascertain what is found in Lotze's position over and above the elements which have been pointed out!

It is when we look more closely into the nature of that which furnishes the objective validity of the Good that we are carried a step in advance of any of the theories above discussed. Lotze insists on these being a 'world-aim' whose realisations constitutes the Highest Good. This aim evidently must be that which has supreme value:² and value, too, for a feeling, an enjoying spirit, since Good cannot exist apart from or outside of personal spirits.³ Now the common religious conviction is that nothing but the conception of 'blessedness' seems to express this supreme value!⁴ In his endeavor to construct the "simple moral ideals" he concludes that in Benevolence is found the "sole supreme principle of all moral conduct" and therefore "that it is not the effort after our own, but only that for the production of another's felicity, which is ethically meritorious."⁵

¹ See p. 13

² Cr. Phil. or Rel. 65-66

³ Cr. Mik. II. p. 728

⁴ See Phil. or Rel. 66

⁵ Prac. Phil. 15

It would seem that Lotze's 'objective validity', when analyzed, amounts to this--the satisfaction or blessedness of spirits outside of self, including God the Supreme Spirit. The inference I think is that the realisation of such an objective Good implies the greatest happiness or blessedness for self.

The theoretical justification of Lotze's ethical pre-suppositions such as the nature of the Absolute, the freedom of the will, the existence of a world-aim will be treated in the chapter on Metaphysic to which we shall now turn.

Chapter II

Metaphysical Implications of Lotze's Ethics.

Any system of ethics is related fundamentally, either expressly or implicitly, to a more or less well defined metaphysic, and a knowledge of the latter is always helpful to a correct understanding of the former. Although Lotze, on the whole, seems to regard ethics as fundamental to his metaphysic¹ rather than the reverse, it is yet true that his ethics can only be understood in the light of his metaphysic. It will be the purpose of this chapter to review such parts of his metaphysic as will show more clearly the grounds and nature of some of his ethical positions and clear up some of the topics treated in the previous chapter which may have been left somewhat vague, because these metaphysical presuppositions had not been presented.

"Metaphysic is the science of that which is actual, not of that which is merely thinkable. By actuality we distinguish a thing that is, from one that is not, an event that happens from one that does not happen, a relation that exists from one that does not exist."² Events that happen and relations that exist presuppose existing things in which, and between which these happen and exist. Two conceptions are here involved, 'Being' and 'Thing'.³ 'Being' is not 'to be perceived' (since what really exists we are forced to think as existing even when no one is perceiving it), but 'Being' is to stand in relations "and being perceived is itself only one such relation."⁴

¹ Cr. Phil. or Rel. 75 also conclusion of Met.

² Met. 8. Cf. Met. Intro. I. ³ Cf. Out. of Met. 9.

⁴ Out. of Met. 9. -- Met. 6.

Some may contend that before a thing can stand in relations it must first 'be', but says Lotze "if we actually exclude all relations then the 'pure Being' would consist in a mere 'position'; by virtue of which, however, that which is thus existent cannot be discovered at any place in the world, or at any point of time in the occasion of events, and does not assert itself in actuality by any effect upon anything whatever, and cannot be affected at all by any element of actuality. But it is precisely by these same features that we recognize, as we believe, the non-existent."¹

Now what is the definition of 'Thingness'? Of course the things we perceive are made up of many elements and change with the modification of these elements. We must look to these elements for the genuine 'Things' and not attempt to define their essence by any sensible properties since these "never specify what the things are."² The 'Thing' is always taken to be more than the sum of its qualities.³ Herbart's supersensible quality is no more satisfactory than sensible qualities. For in the first place its very nature would prevent us from knowing any more about the 'Thing' than we would before the Quality was predicated.⁴ And besides what is simple cannot be the subject of change.⁵ A 'Thing' must be able to pass from one state to another and yet always retain its identity. Its essence in that case seems to consist in a law or bond which maintains a coherency among a multiplicity of successive states, a coherency which involves a unity or identity of the 'Thing'

¹ Out of Met. 11 -- Cf. Met. 7

² Out. of Met. 16

³ Met. 16

⁴ Cf. Met. 17

⁵ Met. 19

with itself by which is meant that it is even confined in its changes to a definite closed series of forms a, a_2, a_3 without even going over into another series b, b_2, b_3 .¹

But we are accustomed to thinking of law as a mere descriptive term which has existence only in the mind of the thinker. This is not enough to constitute 'Thinkhood'. We require of 'Thing' that it be a subject, that can fall into states, and be affected, and produce effects." How can we conceive of 'law' in this case as being "really extant in the 'Thing' as an actual power over its properties?"²

"Let us, in the first place, recall the fact that in what we are now asking for there is something intrinsically unthinkable. We are not satisfied with the doctrine that the thing is an individual law. We believe that we gain something by assuming of it that in its own nature it is something more and other than this, and that its conformity to this law, by which it distinguishes itself from everything else, is merely its mode or procedure----- . If this nucleus of reality, which we deem it necessary to seek for, possessed a definite nature, alien to that which the law enjoins, how could it nevertheless come to adjust itself to the law? And if we would assume that there are sundry conditions or which the operation upon it might compel it to such obedience, would this compulsion be itself intelligible, unless its own nature gave it the law that upon these conditions supervening it should obey that other law supposed to be quite alien to its nature?"³ That is to

¹ See Met. 24 rr--also Out. or Met. 22 rr

² Out. or Met. 23-24-25 -- Cr. Met. 32.33

³ Met. 34

say, by the conformity to law we mean nothing else than the proper being and behavior of the Thing itself. "On the other side; What exactly are we to take the laws to be before they are conformed to?" The gist of the whole matter is this,-- it is impossible to separate Things from their mode of behavior. Either one is meaningless without the other. "No 'law' and no 'truth' can exist within the world, before, outside, between, or above the 'Things', concerning which it is assumed to hold good."

In the same way Lotze disposes of the law of causality. He is convinced that anything like a satisfactory apprehension of the World inevitably involves the conception of efficient causation, that to deny it and attempt to comprehend the complex operations of the manifold of phenomena is utterly futile. At the same time he is confident that the nature of causation itself is wholly incomprehensible and inexplicable. All that can be done is to observe actual happenings and describe the order in which events take place. The real cause even evades us.¹ The tenacity with which Lotze has held to a plurality of elements interacting according to the law of causality has led some to call him a materialist. But Lotze does not stop here. In all causation he sees interchange of action,² and not action going in a single direction. Moreover it is absurd to think of action and interaction taking place in the air between two independent elements!³ We have just seen that an element is inseparable from the law of its

¹ Out. of Met. 95

² Cr. Met. 35-36

² Out. of Met. ch V

³ Cr. Met. 50

⁴ Out. of Met. 48 -- Cr. Met. 62.

activity. If one element be isolated and independent of all others it is inconceivable how it could come into relation with them.¹ The solution of the difficulty can only come with an assumption that there is a fundamental unity underlying all the elements; that this basis of this unity is the one infinite, unconditioned Absolute; that from the beginning the individual elements have not been separate and independent entering relations and then passing out of those relations again but have on the contrary been mere ('modes', 'states', or 'moments' in the one individual Being.²

It gives Lotze great satisfaction to come to this conclusion of an ultimate world ground. It is first of all a demand of his metaphysical thinking. "----Though I am old-fashioned enough not to be indifferent to the religious interests which are involved in these problems, the views for which I have been contending rest on a purely scientific basis, quite without reference to religion. No course of things, whether harmonious or discordant, seems to me conceivable, except on the supposition of this unity, which alone makes possible the reciprocal action of individual existences. The disturbing effects which things exercise upon each other witness to this unity, not less clearly than the joint action of forces with a view to a common end."³ Thus, as he thinks, has he made it possible to think the world as a mechanism and only as it is thus thought can it be apprehended.

The fact that this unity of the world ground meets the

¹ Cf. Met. 70-71

² Cr. Out. of Met. 48

³ Met. 233.

demands of his metaphysical thinking, however, is not the chief reason for his feeling of satisfaction; nor again that he can now think the universe as a mechanism consistently; nor finally, that he sees in this latter a possibility of apprehending the World. Each of these is in itself good and not to be neglected but all alike are of secondary importance, of subordinate rank. It is because he discovers this Absolute, and this mechanism as yet empty of content that pleases him most. It gives him a place in which to lodge his ethical and religious content, the disposal of which might otherwise place him in a serious difficulty. Let us now investigate the manner in which he ascribes an ethical and religious content to these as yet empty and abstract terms.

First then what does Lotze see in mechanism that is of worth, what does he add to it that the materialist omits and is perhaps indifferent about, and to what does he subordinate it, seeing he does not make it the chief thing? Lotze says what is meant by mechanism is, "the organization of means either with a view to realising a particular end, or to being prepared for carrying out different but kindred objects." It is just here that Lotze sees the true worth of mechanism,--that it is a means to an end. Let us unite he says, the morally Good with the 'beautiful' and the 'happy' or 'blessedness' into one complex of all that has value. And then we affirm: "Genuine Reality in the world (to-wit, in the sense that all else is, in relation to It, subordinate, deduced, mere semblance or means to an end)

consists alone in this Highest Good personal, which is at the same time the highest good Thing.¹

Mechanism is not an agent that brings things to pass, neither does it of itself accomplish anything. Its significance "never consists in its being a kind of magic artifice by which is brought about an event which though all its conditions are complete, yet in some incomprehensible way delays to happen; in every case it is required only in the interests of constancy and regularity of the cosmic course, which demand not only that every real occurrence should have an adequate ground, but also require that every intermediate link, by which the inadequate passes into the adequate, should itself be previously realized as an actual state of some real being."² We cannot dispense with mechanism, nor do we wish to do so, yet we can still insist that "besides all which exists and which happens according to settled laws there is also enjoyment of both, also pain and pleasure."³ While we must abandon the outgrown theory that all phenomenal activity is due to the impulses of a plurality of unseen spirits we can yet retain from such a theory the element most demanded by our ethical and religious needs,--namely, that underlying the manifold of phenomena there is an ideal spiritual life giving expression to itself. To quote again: "And although we found the notion of impulses inadequate for detailed investigations, and substituted for it the unbroken causal chain of mechanism, there is here nothing antagonistic

¹ Out. of Met. 92

² Mik. II. p. 621

³ Mik. I. p. 683

to the spirit of that theory, since we recognize all the laws of this mechanism as but the very will of the universal soul, all combinations and divisions of efficient means as its own actions, its operations on itself. But after all, what satisfaction could this theory afford it if it were unable to unite the two great contrasting parts that together make up the world--Nature and the sphere of Ethics?-----If we will not -----either externally ground the moral world on a Nature originally given, or assume that the two separate roots coexist without any bond or union in a Supreme Being that we call One, no other choice remains than either to include the Good in the cycle of natural phenomena, or Nature in the accomplishment of Good. I cannot for a moment doubt that the latter alternative is alone permissible; all being, all that we call mode and form, thing and event, the whole sum of Nature, can be nothing else than the condition for the realization of Good, can be as it is only because thus in it the infinite worth of the Good manifested itself!" But all this Lotze says is only an anxious hope, an inner conviction. No demonstrable proof can be given for it. A great chasm divides, for our human reason, "the world of values from the world of forms."²

This demand of the spirit that the world shall be more than mere mechanism; that it shall be the subject of a real history with a possible interpretation; that there be in life after all real meaning, a value to be realized and enjoyed is at once ethical and religious. Lotze yields sympathetically to this

¹ Mik. I. p. 396

² Mik. I. p. 396.

demand and attempts to adjust his metaphysic in harmony with it. It must be borne in mind, however, that in so doing he does not try to get rid of mechanism, but as we have seen he is one of its most ardent defenders, although as has already been shown he does not give it chief place. He goes beyond it and makes it contribute to his desired teleology. He goes so far as to make it an essential condition of the latter. "-----
 Even the idealistic theory of the world, which believes reality to be governed by ends that belong to a plan, if it would render the process of realization of these ends intelligible, necessarily generates the conception of a universal connection of things according to law as a derived principle, tho it may refuse it the dignity of an ultimate principle.¹" So Lotze conceives that the Infinite is somehow realising a continuous purpose in the world and the mechanical laws we observe in operation about us are only the means used in such realization. "When in this sense we reduce all events in Nature to mechanical sequence, we act in accordance with the spirit of the Infinite, and show reverence to its ordinance; we do not set up mechanism in opposition to it as an independent, hostile power that it has to subdue, but we see in this the true efficacy of the Infinite, that which it would wish recognized throughout the world of phenomena as the hand by which its ends are accomplished."²

What step does Lotze take in advance of mechanical science by which he derives all this meaning, this significance, this satisfaction of the ethical and religious of all which this science takes no account and towards which it remains indifferent?

¹ Met. Intro. X

² Mik. I. p. 387.

Precisely that of passing beyond the external phenomenal interaction of the 'atoms' to a more minute study of the inner nature of these 'atoms'. He is sure that here is the key to the real meaning of the world and any theory that stops short of this is worthless. "After having maintained that a change of outer relations is only possible as a consequence of mutual sollicitations in the inner nature of things, we can only regard a mechanism which combines things in mutual action without taking account of this inner nature and its co-operation, as an abstraction of Science, not as a reality!"

In attempting to determine more definitely the nature of the 'atoms' Lotze brings forth two arguments to show that they are psychical and not material. In the first place materiality involves extension; but extension like any other sensuous quality is explained through the reciprocal action of atoms. Hence they themselves cannot possess this quality.¹ This is a negative sort of argument and at best could only be conclusive in case psychical and material exhaust the alternatives. He assumes that matter and spirit are contradictory terms and therefore that to deny the one is equivalent to an affirmation of the other. "It is not a logical but an actual necessity, however, which compels us to choose between spirit and matter in determining our ultimate conception. In life we know these two forms of existence only; but there is nothing inconceivable in the supposition that one or several other forms exist."³

¹ Met. 22,

² Cr. Hoffding, Hist. of Modern Phil. Vol II p. 516 -- See also Out. of Met. 16 and 68.

³ Hoffding pp 518-519

In his second argument for the psychical nature of the elements (atoms) Lotze resorts to analogy. It has been said that 'Things' are the subjects of changing states. But we only know of one permanent subject having such changing states and that is our own conscious self or spirit. Hence if things are to be real they must be related to the nature of our soul.¹ In order to give them any significance or to distinguish them in any way from "perfectly corresponding relations between the actions of the Absolute" we want that they shall be conscious or and enjoy these states of their own, and "not merely be thought of by us as existing in them". "That is to say, (Reality' is 'Being for self'; an expression, by which we designate that most general characteristic of self-apprehension, which is common to all forms of spiritual life, to feeling, to representation, to effort, and to volition.²"

We can readily see a two-fold purpose in Lotze's use of this argument. In the first place it represents a real effort in the solution of his difficulty. But more important still, secondly, it makes room, in his explanation of the universe, for our spiritual nature, a thing which he holds to be very necessary. He cannot understand how anyone can attempt to explain the universe in such a way as to rule out or account his own existence. "Among all the errors of the human mind it has always seemed to me the strangest that it could come to doubt its own existence, of which alone it has direct experience, or to take it at second hand as the product of an external Nature

¹ Cf. Out. of Met. 82-83
² Out of Met. 82.

which we know only indirectly, only by means of the knowledge of the very mind to which we would fain deny existence."

This theory of the psychical nature of the elements, whose difference would seem to be one of degree of 'existence for self'; helps also to account for the interaction between soul and body and hence gets rid of dualism. However, this interaction of soul and body never constituted a difficulty for Lotze. He seems in this only an illustration of his conception of mechanism and the part it plays in the plan of the universe. We have already pointed out that he makes it subordinate to a spiritual purpose, and therefore mechanism does not exclude but rather supplements an ideal interpretation of the world. Another quotation from the *Microcosmus* will help to bring this thought out more clearly: "Those who hold it" (the mechanical conception of externality) "are not prevented from accepting internal states in the effective elements by whose varying combinations they account for the variety of natural phenomena, and a secret energy in the life of these which they are at liberty to heighten, till they come to believe in a play of mental excitations akin to ours."² By such a conception the enjoyment of Nature is generalized; "one favored class has not its geni, while another lies blind and lifeless"; but the glow of feeling prevades all. The innate energy is no longer confined to human psychic life, but is dispersed throughout Nature, carrying with it in manifold degrees "different indescribable modes of enjoyment and feeling."³

¹ Mik. I. p. 263

² " I. p. 398 -- Cf. also Meta. 248

³ Cf. Mik. I. p. 394

What Lotze sees in mechanism can now perhaps be summed up in a fairly inclusive way by quoting a single sentence: "As in the great fabric of the universe the creative spirit imposed on itself unchangeable laws by which it moves the world of phenomena, diffusing the fulness of the Highest Good throughout innumerable forms and events, and distilling it again from them into the bliss of consciousness and enjoyment: so must man, acknowledging the same laws, develop given existence into a knowledge of its value, and the value of his ideals into a series of external forms proceeding from himself."

Let us now turn from mechanism and see what content Lotze ascribes to the Absolute.² All that Outology has to say concerning the Absolute is that it is the permanent world-ground of all changing states in the universe; the subject in which all such states are unified. Reasoning by analogy again Lotze says the only subject we know which passes through various states and yet remains itself is the self-conscious spirit. Hence the Absolute is a Spirit, a Personality, the only perfect Personality because it is the only one having perfect self-consciousness.³ Lotze has been severely criticised for ascribing personality to the Absolute on the ground that self-consciousness implies at the same time a consciousness of something that is not self. It seems to me that the criticism is, to say the least, as ill-founded as Lotze's own position because the two are alike based on analogy. Moreover, Lotze does, I believe have the ethical and religious need on his side. Besides, he

¹ Mik. I p. 401

² See p. 28

³ Cf. Phil of Rel. ch IV -- See also Mik. Bk IX Ch IV.

does not pretend to show how personality could develop in the Absolute. Indeed he definitely opposes any such development on the ground that if there ever had been a time when the Absolute did not possess personality, it would fail to satisfy the religious need.¹ He would insist that God is a personal Spirit, eternal, without beginning; and such an assumption he regards no more difficult than the assumptions made by scientists.²

Neither does Lotze stop with this appeal to the religious need but according to his custom he shows the weakness in the argument put forth to prove that the Absolute could not possess personality. To the argument that 'ego' and non-ego are correlative terms and that the idea of one must arise simultaneously with the other, Lotze asks: "If 'ego' and 'non-ego' were two such conceptions", that each barely negated the other: "by what means would the soul then be induced, at the moment of the simultaneous origin of both, to rank itself under the conception of the 'ego' rather than under that of the 'non-ego'; and what does it gain thereby if it does the one and forbears the other?"³

With this much as a start the rest comes rather easy for Lotze. The Absolute is what religious "faith calls God". The will of this Absolute constitutes the standard of all ethical conduct.⁴ This Absolute is the origin or source of all the universe and the latter is ever dependent on the Absolute.⁵ "The world does not preserve itself but is preserved by God."⁶ The laws of the universe, its order and eternal truth are merely the order or behavior in God's nature and intelligence.⁷

¹ Cf. Phil. of Rel. 65

² " " " 40

³ " " " 38

⁴ " " " 80

⁵ " " " 47

⁷ Cf. Phil. of Rel. 49-50

⁶ Phil. of Rel. 55

God is the 'intrinsically Good'¹ There is in the mind of God a supreme purpose which he is realizing in the world. That purpose is one which has supreme value. Nothing other than 'blessedness' seems to satisfy this value.² The Highest Good for man consists in the hope of being loved by God.³

All of these assertions are based not on speculative reasoning but on ethical and religious convictions. They could not be deduced by reason nor can they, Lotze thinks, be refuted by reason.

Let us now sum up what seems to be Lotze's general apprehension of the World. First, "the true reality that is and ought to be, is not matter and is still less Idea, but is the living personal Spirit of God and the world of personal spirit which he has created. They only are the place in which Good and good things exist."⁴ "The one Real Principle" is the Highest Good.⁵ The phenomenal world is simply a condition for the realisation of the Good.⁶

One very apparent difficulty presents itself in connection with such an apprehension of the world and that is the problem of evil. Lotze's consideration and dismissal of this enigma is a noteworthy example of how confidently and contentedly he can rest in the decision of his feeling - judgment. After criticising the several attempts at explanation and frankly confessing that he sees no rational explanation, he seems perfectly satisfied to believe that his failure is due to

¹ See Phil. of Rel. 81

² Cr. Phil. of Rel. 65 ff

³ Cr. " " 82

⁴ Mik. II p. 728

⁵ Out of Met. 93

⁶ " " 92

his own limitations and says that evil if properly understood would fit into his theory of the world without any difficulty.¹

Another interesting feature in Lotze's system and one that occupies a large place, is his discussion on the 'Freedom of the Will'. It will be remembered² that he saw in the 'atoms' a spirit life or more or less will developed self-consciousness. While all these are ultimately dependent upon the Absolute personality still a certain 'existence for self' and hence a limited self-determination has been given over to these finite spirits.³ In this way Lotze makes room for a limited freedom. Let us now examine some of the arguments he puts forth in defence of this freedom.

In that "room of Determinism, which makes all the actions of animate beings proceed according to general laws from their inner spiritual states, with the same necessity as physical effects do from their blind causes". Lotze sees a theory, which in itself, is perfectly clear, logical, and free from contradiction. The thing that makes one hesitate before accepting any such theory is not the 'reason' but the feeling of penitence and self-condemnation that one experiences after having acted in some definite way which feeling compels him to think that he ought, and therefore could have acted otherwise.⁴ Thus we see at the outset that this, like so many of Lotze's views is based primarily on the 'feeling judgment'. His chief objection to Determinism is its failure to meet the needs of our inner demands or feelings. The determinist must

¹ Phil. of Rel. 70-74 -- See also Mik. II. pp. 716 ff

² See p. 33

³ Cf. Phil. of Rel. 54 ff

⁴ Cf. Prac. Phil. 17

not only account for the feeling of penitence in the one who performs the act but also for the feeling of vengeance or retribution in those effected. True he (the determinist) does attempt this, the former by making it come under the general head of discontentment, the latter by calling it a mere mechanical reaction against impressions received. But, says Lotze, "who is blessed with this complete transmutation of human life into a play of fatalistic forces, void of merit and blame, is not to be confuted on speculative grounds. The moving reason for contradicting such views lies entirely in an undemonstrable but strong and immediate conviction that it is not so, and that the conception of 'an ought' and of an obligation, which finds no place at all in such a view, has nevertheless, the most indubitable and incontrovertible significance."

In the foregoing chapter² it was attempted to construct Lotze's own idea of 'freedom'. In his effort to justify his theory he does three things: (1) he shows that Determinism or uninterrupted mechanism cannot be demonstrated: (2) he refutes the objections against the possibility of the conception of freedom. (3) he appeals to the demands of our inner feelings; He nowhere tries to demonstrate actual freedom. Let us now examine these three in their order.

Experience has not as yet taught us and can never teach us the absolute validity of the law of causality for all parts of the universe. What has been done is to carry the law from regions where it has been observed into unknown regions and apply it there. Lotze does not oppose such application of the

¹ Prac. Phil. 17

² See p.13

law in the material universe, but he does question its validity when applied to spiritual life which is totally different in kind.

Moreover, when we attempt by reflection to determine whether or not any definite decision was produced by the antecedent spiritual states we learn that there are as many times in which we fail as there are in which we seem to succeed. And even in those seemingly successful cases we cannot be sure that the determining motive has not somehow been exalted above its competitors, merely because the 'will' decided in its favor.¹

Attempts have been made to supplement these self-observations by statistics which take into account large numbers of people. In this way it has been concluded that a like number of crimes, e.g. repeat themselves in a like time among like people. Such methods are very hazardous, Lotze thinks, and even if we could concede to such calculations perfect accuracy, the significance would still be uncertain. The difficulty lies in the difference between good and bad intentions on the one hand and their external realization on the other.²

Still another barrier to the absolute validity of the law of causality is in the mere assumption that every event has its cause. There is a limit to such a causal regressus. Science assumes e.g. a great many elements that have no cause, as well as motion in different directions. It is utterly impossible to get motion, for instance, out of perfect rest. Thus we are

¹ Cr. Prac. Phil. 19
² " " " 19

compelled to think of some things as having existed without an antecedent cause.'

And this brings us to the second part of the argument in which Lotze rerutes the objections against the possibility of the conception of freedom. If we are driven necessarily to a condition, or state, or force, which must have existed without cause, what is to prevent us from conceiving that new beginnings of a subsequent origin" Which are not at all connected causally with things prior, should present themselves in the course of things and then take up their place in the coherent totality of the world to be governed by its general laws, to be followed by definite effects, etc.²? These 'new-beginnings' can most easily be expected in the way of spiritual influences, which may enter into the manifold in either of two ways. First, they may proceed directly from the mind of God to the physical world in which case a miracle may be said to take place. A miracle thus conceived is not a transgression or interruption of natural law but the insertion of a new element in the cause which to be sure modifies the effect. This is theoretically possible or conceivable but not demonstrable.³ A second possible outlet for these spiritual influences is through the medium of finite spirits. In this way we are accustomed to interpret or rather explain "great crises of history" which have involved not alone the beginnings of new phases spiritual development, but "extraordinary changes of physical conditions" as well.⁴

Lotze seems to feel that these influences may proceed from the

¹ Cf. Prac. Phil. 20

² " " " 20 -- See also Mik I. p. 260 f

³ " Phil. of Rel. 63-64 -- See also Mik. I. pp. 451-2

⁴ " " " 63 -- Also Mik II. p. 188 seq. and Met. 230

individual independently, within limits, or because of some inner connection with the Absolute. Again he says we can prove neither the necessity nor the real benefit of any such working.

It has been objected that Freedom and Determinism working together constitute a Dualism which is unallowable. Lotze meets this objection by saying that the incompatibility of the two principles is present only in the minds of the determinists. Of course if it is held that all events are necessarily causally connected in just the order in which they occur there is left no room for freedom. But on the other hand in order to make freedom effective it is essential that general laws be in operation so that when certain definite causes are applied definite effects will follow. Otherwise it would be impossible to know beforehand what would be the result of any certain conduct and ethical codes would be meaningless. We are simply mistaken, Lotze says, in the essentials of causal connection. Instead of contending that every event has its cause we ought merely to insist that every cause has its effect.¹ To use his own words: "What constitutes the absolute authority of the causal law is not that every part of the finite sum of things actual must in the finite sphere be produced by fixed causes, according to universal laws, but that each constituent once introduced into this actual course continues to act according to these laws. We commonly speak only of every effect having its cause, but we should on the contrary lay stress

¹ Prac. Phil. 21

chiefly on the other form of the proposition--every cause infallibly has its effect.¹ "Consequently, the principle of Freedom includes the other principle of Determinism, and the charge of Dualism is groundless."²

Having shown that the reason is unable to decide in the matter of Freedom vs. Determinism leaving as it does one equally balanced against the other Lotze now uses the feelings to add weight to the side of Freedom. In the Metaphysic he says: "-----We shrink from pronouncing flatly that the whole of reality including the history of spirits, is only the successive unfolding of consequences absolutely predetermined. That in the real passage of events something should really come to pass, something new which previously was not; that history should be something more than a translation into time of the eternally complete content of an ordered world; this is a deep and irrepressible demand of our spirit, under the influence of which we all act in life. Without its satisfaction the world would be, not indeed unthinkable and self-contradictory, but unmeaning and incredible."³

This is only a typical example of the way in which Lotze, after weighing carefully the theoretical arguments on both sides of a question and failing to find demonstrative proof on either side, simply leaves the reason out of account and accepts for his position the testimony of his ethical and religious convictions.

We have now, perhaps, covered such portions of the Metaphysi

¹ Mik. I. p. 260

² Prac. Hil. 21

³ Met. 65 -- Cf. Out. of Met. 75 -- See also Met. 230

as are necessary to answer the questions before us. It might be well at this time to ask, what does it all mean? What is the relation existing between Lotze's Ethics and his Metaphysic? What, finally, are some of the conclusions he has been led to adopt?

In the first place, Lotze has developed with remarkable clearness two distinct types of mind which the individual may possess in reference to the universe in which he finds himself.

On the one hand there is the mere thinking being, who, having been brought into contact with the phenomenal world of objects by means of his bodily senses, occupies himself in observing facts, ascertaining constant relations (mechanical laws) and who is at the same time utterly blind so far as an interpretation of these facts and relations are concerned. On the other hand there is the radical type of feeling subject, religious and ethical in his nature, possessing a sense of absolute dependence on a superior power, possessing likewise a moral nature (conscience) which ever keeps him conscious of the idea of the 'Good' and his continuous obligation thereto, and who sees in the phenomenal world only a hindrance to the satisfactory realization of a world of values. Now it is in the reconciliation of these two types of mind that Lotze has made a helpful contribution--a reconciliation which to him at least was complete and satisfying. 'Thought' will never be able to bring its work to a successful culmination and so give to the world the true philosophy until it takes cognizance not alone of the world of forms' but of 'the world of values' as well; until it uses as its data not only the manifold of

phenomena but likewise the fears, the hopes, and the ideals of the human soul. Neither will the religious mystic ever succeed in transforming a world of wickedness into a world of righteousness until he comes down from the mountain of solitary communion with God into the valley of human daily toil, with its battles against material forces, with its institutions, with its myriads of forms that must be made to serve as means if it is ever to come to its own; until he recognize that not even God is accomplishing his ends here upon the earth save as he works through the forms, and the events and the laws which here persist and operate.

To Lotze all this evidently came only after a real struggle and must have been regarded by him as a great victory. Because of his work in Physiology, Anatomy, and Medicine he esteemed very highly the methods and the results of scientific research and he was extremely averse to doing or accepting anything that might defeat its purposes. On the other hand he seems to have been by nature religiously inclined. He ever remained old fashioned enough not to be wholly indifferent to the working of the common unphilosophic mind. These two elements strove together in Lotze's mind. Each was finally successful in that it received its rightful place. The feeling of worth, the value judgment, the real of ethics, imparts to us the knowledge of what ought to be. And through this and this alone is made intelligible the world of reality which is the world of metaphysics.

To me this fundamental task to which Lotze set himself seems well done. It is at once unobstructing and exalting to the work of Science; it is practical as a theory on which to base reform;