



2013

The Road to God Knows Where: Sustaining Northern Ireland NGOs in a Post-Agreement World

Karl Besel
Indiana University Kokomo

Todd Bradley
Indiana University Kokomo

Wolfgang Bielefeld
Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jiass>



Part of the [Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Besel, Karl; Bradley, Todd; and Bielefeld, Wolfgang (2013) "The Road to God Knows Where: Sustaining Northern Ireland NGOs in a Post-Agreement World," *Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences*: Vol. 16 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.

Retrieved from: <https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jiass/vol16/iss1/6>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Butler University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@butler.edu.

The Road to God Knows Where: Sustaining Northern Ireland NGOs in a Post-Agreement World¹

KARL BESEL

Indiana University Kokomo

TODD BRADLEY

Indiana University Kokomo

WOLFGANG BIELEFELD

Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis

ABSTRACT

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played important roles in the fostering of peace agreements within Northern Ireland. As violence has subsided somewhat since the late 1990s, these organizations have experienced cutbacks from both international and national public funding institutions. Decreases in governmental revenues for nonprofits have compelled NGO directors to become more adept in leveraging funds from private-sector sources. This article examines how successful these organizations have been in securing private-sector revenues since the Good Friday Agreement and provides insights with regard to how NGOs can become more sustainable in an era of fiscal austerity.

KEY WORDS NGOs; Nonprofits; Civil Society; Organizational Sustainability; Northern Ireland

The beginning of the Power Sharing Arrangement of 2007 between Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) catalyzed the end of Britain's 38-year military presence within Northern Ireland. This decades-long military presence, known as Operation Banner, constituted the longest single operation ever undertaken by the British Army. Although pictures of British troops vacating Belfast appeared on millions of computer screens throughout the world, a more thorough understanding about how sectarian violence drew to a close in Northern Ireland must include knowledge of the pivotal role played by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in fostering these events. NGOs worked with academics in organizing meetings between opposing groups which eventually led to formal negotiations. During and following these formal negotiations, NGOs continued to provide a variety of reconciliation services, including job training for

former paramilitary members, aimed at sustaining the peace efforts (Mansergh 1999 McCartney, 1999). Reconciliation services (domestically and internationally) can help foster long-term peace; however, transforming a society's belief systems can make long-term peace-building efforts quite arduous, as Byrne et al. (2009) have demonstrated. That is, a society's ideologies and attitudes (which are both culturally driven to a certain extent) can create scenarios whereby institutionalization of peace is made more difficult. Additionally Byrne and his team of researchers point out, international economic providers (e.g., International Fund for Ireland and the European Peace II Fund) should attempt to partner with grassroots organizations to help foster more local empowerment. Local organizations (including NGOs) will need to work with groups that have past animosities (in our case, the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland). That may be easier said than done, however; witness the ethnic cleavages of post-colonial Sudan and Somalia. Nevertheless, as Byrne et al. suggest, organizations need to be inclusive to engender long-term peace.

Furthermore, as Mari Fitzduff (2013) pointed out in the Second Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report:

The Northern Ireland peace process has had its most difficult year for a decade. The flags' dispute has shaken any complacency about the inevitability of progress, but it has not led to any suspension of the political institutions. Street demonstrations, although determined and protracted, were not on the scale of the Drumcree disturbances of the 1990s or the protests against the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the 1980s.

Likewise, the activities of dissident republicans, however callous or threatening, have not succeeded in disrupting the political consensus on the overall architecture of the peace accord, and are not on the scale of dissident violence a decade ago. "In the long-term perspective" says the Report's author, Dr Paul Nolan, "the challenges thrown up over the past year are the sort of upsets that all peace processes must face. The really significant development over the past year lies elsewhere. The 2011 census shows that in Northern Ireland, as in many conflict societies, it is the long slow demographic shifts that most radically alter the political landscape." The new reality of Northern Ireland politics, as revealed by the census, is that dominance is not an option for either community. There is now a demographic equilibrium, with a 48/45 split between those from a Protestant background and those from a Catholic background. No community has more than a 50 per cent share. This is now a society made up of minorities.

The evidence of the new balance is even clearer when national identities are taken into account. The 2011 census shows that although 48% are from a Protestant background that does not automatically confer a British identity—only 40% described themselves as British. Similarly, although 45% of the population is from a Catholic background, only 25% describe themselves as Irish. The new category is Northern Irish which accounts for 21% of the population. All three groups have to co-exist, but the events which began on 3 December with the Belfast city council vote on the union flag show that there are still difficulties for some in adjusting to the new realities.

Third-sector organizations, though serving as essential tools of governance when the state is unable to intervene, are often dependent upon governmental funds for their operations. In tandem with this dependence are political whims that can wreak havoc on their revenue streams. Moreover, application procedures for economic assistance in peace-building processes must be less academic (i.e., using less jargon) and less time-consuming as a step toward enduring peace building (Byrne, Thiessen, and Fissuh 2007). That is, economic aid paperwork must be accessible, doable, and less burdensome for aid recipients. Additionally, appropriate criteria and streamlined bureaucratic processes (not a “cookie cutter” model) need to be established if long-term peace building is to be institutionalized via economic aid. This streamlining is even more crucial for small, rural, and volunteer-based NGOs in Northern Ireland (and beyond). NGOs within Northern Ireland have waxed and waned in political support (and subsequent losses of public-funding support) as many British officials no longer deem it necessary to finance their operations in light of the recent Power Sharing Arrangement. This article focuses on how successful NGOs within Northern Ireland’s second largest city, Londonderry (Derry), have been in leveraging funding from private-sector sources.

Description of Study

The analysis that follows is based on both a review of government publications, general-interest books and academic articles, and a set of individual interviews (face-to-face and telephone interviews) with key informants. The lead author of this article visited Northern Ireland during the summer of 2005; the approach was exploratory and wide-ranging, with the intention being to develop a general understanding of private-sector funding of NGOs since the Good Friday Accord. During the summer of 2007, the lead author returned to Northern Ireland to foster a more focused approach with regard to the leveraging of private-sector funding by NGOs since the Power Sharing Arrangement between Sinn Féin and the DUP. In addition to these face-to-face interviews, phone interviews were also conducted in all of 2007 and 2012. A total of 22 key informants were interviewed, including agency directors, city council members, and clergy. Although most of the participants were based in Derry, a few Dublin- and Belfast-based clergy and agency directors who worked as members of network organizations were also

interviewed. The aim was not to find a representative sample but rather to hold detailed discussions with key officials and agency directors. A semi-structured questionnaire was employed as a vehicle for eliciting information from all the aforementioned professionals and officials regarding funding streams since the Power Sharing Arrangement, and its impact. Following the completion of this qualitative data-collection process, NGO directors in Northern Ireland were selected via snowball sampling methods to complete a survey that consisted of questions pertaining to funding sources and to collaborations with other institutions. To make comparisons between existing and start-up organizations, the researchers made attempts to select organizations that represented both of these groups. Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, responses of all participants remained anonymous.

Northern Ireland remains a predominately rural region of around 1.7 million people within the United Kingdom. The six counties that comprise Northern Ireland, or Ulster (as Northern Ireland is often called), cover less than 14,245 square kilometers (5,500 square miles). Belfast, with its population of just over 300,000, is home to one quarter of all Northern Ireland's citizens. In addition to being a major population center within Northern Ireland, Derry is a city of considerable historical significance. The "Maiden City" is one of the few European cities not to have its walls breached. The most famous attempt to level the city's stone walls was the Siege of Derry in 1689 by King James II of England and his Catholic supporters. Derry's Protestant supporters of William III of England prevailed against James II for 105 days. Significant recent events within Derry include the Bloody Sunday incident of 1972, in which 26 civil rights protesters were shot by British troops (Eurostat 2010). Although Protestants fighting for William III prevailed over Catholic invaders in the late 1600s, the demographic shift over the past century has favored Catholics. Subsequently, a recent report compiled by the Derry City Council (2011) reveals that 75 percent of the city's residents are Catholic, with only 23 percent of residents reporting to be members of a Protestant faith. As previously mentioned, this demographic is in contrast to the slight majority (48 percent) of Northern Ireland inhabitants who are members of a Protestant religious group. In light of the predominance of Catholicism in the Maiden City, the historical information presented within this article emphasizes the emergence of Catholic Nationalism within this region instead of Protestant Unionism.

Northern Ireland in a Pre-Belfast/Good Friday Agreement Period

To understand the complex array of political and economic circumstances that are currently faced by nonprofits* operating within Northern Ireland, one must have an appreciation of the unique history that led to the recently passed Power Sharing Arrangement. Unlike elsewhere in Europe, on the island of Ireland, cultural nationalism was submerged for most of the early 19th century by political agitation that focused on

* Although the term nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is employed throughout the article to describe civil-society institutions, most of the interviewees preferred the term "nonprofit" in describing third-sector organizations.

Catholic emancipation (Smyth 2004). With the Republic of Ireland's Protestant population rapidly diminishing, the Catholic Church was able to play a key role as a cultural unifier during most of the 20th century.² In Northern Ireland, however, interlinked factors such as religion, social justice, and cultural expression exacerbated the political difficulties that lingered after partition. The relationship between the Catholic Church and cultural nationalism within Northern Ireland was therefore less clear cut; republicans have often had to distance themselves from the Catholic Church, stressing their role as political reformers rather than as religious adherents. Condemnation of paramilitary violence by some members of the Catholic clergy was particularly ill received during the 1981 hunger strikes, for example.³

As Irish Republicanism emerged with the goal of a united Ireland following the Republic's independence, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its political wing, Sinn Féin, continued to solidify their followers around the quasi-religious notion of shared Catholic heritage. This is evidenced by Sinn Féin's apparent change from a recommended socialist agenda to a more Catholic-based one, arguably to maintain the allegiance of rural supporters. For example, in late 1979, the attempt to integrate anti-imperialist and Marxist ideas into republican discourse was formulated in "Eire Nua: The Social, Economic, and Political Dimensions," which was drafted by Gerry Adams and presented to the Sinn Féin leadership (Maloney 2002). While retaining the Eire Nua title, this short document was uncompromising in recommending a socialist agenda, including the call for the abolition of capitalism:

Furthermore, with James Connolly, we believe that the present system of society is based upon the robbery of the working class and that capitalist property cannot exist without the plundering of labour, we desire to see capitalism abolished and a democratic system of common or public ownership created in its stead. The democratic system, which is called socialism, will, we believe, come as a result of the continuous increase of power of the working class. Only by this means can we secure the abolition of destitution and all the misery, crime and immorality which flow from that unnecessary evil. (Quoted in Maloney 2002:186-87)

Passages in the document, such as the one above, recall the Communist Manifesto and perhaps reflect the radicalization of many IRA volunteers during their time in prison.⁴ For more conservative republicans perhaps more used to traditional Catholic social doctrine as the basis for change, this document went against their core beliefs. Sinn Féin was therefore forced to retreat from these written statements because its rural supporters would never condone nationalization of family farms, or the atheistic Soviet Union by welcoming communist ideas into the movement (Smyth 2004).

Throughout "the Troubles" (that period of political violence between 1969 and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998), the IRA galvanized support for its militant cause

by harnessing the Catholic community's growing sense of political injustice and awareness of civil rights; potentially secular political philosophies were underpinned by a violent backlash against long-term institutionalized religious and political discrimination. Put simply, paramilitary acts by Nationalist/Catholic terrorist groups were matched with increasing ferocity by Loyalist/Protestant paramilitary groups; speeches of the DUP leader Reverend Ian Paisley often demonstrated that for many in Northern Ireland, "politics and religious beliefs are inextricably linked."⁵

Although the ceasefire has been largely honored by both Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Loyalist groups over the past decade, religious tension is still pervasive. Recent visitors to Belfast and Derry can attest to this, as many working-class communities continue to be divided by politics and religion, with Catholics and Protestants often living in neighborhoods segregated on this basis. In certain interface areas, the religious and political affiliations of residents are clearly evidenced by the appearance of either British or Republic of Ireland flags and the painting of curb stones or murals depicting key historical events. These political symbols may also be quasi-religious in nature; as a result of lingering religious and political tensions, it is perhaps no wonder that many NGOs in Northern Ireland remain primarily secular. Whereas countries such as the United States have embraced the use of so-called faith-based organizations to provide a variety of health and human services, decades of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland prevent broad-based support for a similar governmentally supported initiative in that country.

Origins of the NGO Sector in Northern Ireland

The nonprofit sector in Northern Ireland can be traced back to the beginning of the troubles in the late 1960s. NGOs that emerged during this time evolved in distinct fashions, depending upon the religious affiliations of their communities. Catholic communities generally felt little attachment to governmental institutions they were ideologically opposed to or disenfranchised from (Cochrane 2006). The result of this detachment was the development of a self-help culture for most nonprofits operating within Catholic communities (Morison 2006). In contrast, NGOs serving Protestant areas were more aligned with governmental institutions in their service delivery strategies (McFarlane 2011). As sectarian violence persisted through the 1970s and 1980s, the impotence and the largely aloof nature of direct rule resulted in space opening up for the voluntary and community sectors to provide for their communities. Subsequently, people interested in economic and social issues were attracted to nonprofits because of the powerlessness of the political parties (Cochrane 2006:256). In addition, NGOs were viewed as the best option to address issues such as social exclusion as well as other services deemed unprofitable to the private sector. Nonprofits also managed to play a small but significant role during the peace process (1994–1998) by helping to rally support around the "YES" campaign for the Good Friday Agreement, which perhaps would not have received such a strong mandate without their contributions (Cochrane 2000). The result today of this evolution in the Northern Ireland nonprofit sector is a diverse and large collection of approximately 5,000 organizations, with most facilitating

community recovery through community development and conflict-resolution projects aimed toward building both social and economic infrastructure and promoting reconciliation between the communities (O'Brien 2007).

Northern Ireland Nonprofits in a Post-Good Friday Agreement Period

The recent Power Sharing Arrangement represents a positive step toward reducing sectarian tensions within Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, substantially fewer governmental funds are being allocated to nonprofits in light of the diminishing amount of international attention within the region. Cutbacks in international funding could not have come at a worse time in light of the region's shaky economy. Since the beginning of the global recession, Northern Ireland has been plagued by a collapse in property values and subsequent fiscal tightening by governmental institutions (*Economist* 2010). Subsequently, unemployment in Northern Ireland also remains relatively high when compared to other European Union (EU) countries. Fifty-seven (57) percent of residents within this region aged 16–74 were employed in 2011, making up the majority of the 66 percent who were economically active. Other EU countries had higher average levels of both employment and economic activity, at 77 percent and 85 percent respectively (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 2013). In light of substantial declines in governmental funding support (both national and international) for Northern Ireland NGOs, these organizations are beginning to engage in a variety of private-sector funding strategies, including social entrepreneurship. Social entrepreneurship has been growing for a number of years, fueled by the increasing needs and opportunities that the nonprofit sector faces. Wei-Skillern et. al. (2007: 1) summarize the prevailing concern and subsequent call to action: "Societies worldwide are urgently seeking innovative approaches to addressing persistent social problems that affect their communities but that have not yet been satisfactorily addressed by either governments or the marketplace." Nonetheless, social entrepreneurship is still developing its role and potential in the sector within regions such as Northern Ireland (Bielefeld 2009).

Table 1 highlights themes that emerged from the qualitative interviews. Questions that were asked of all 22 key informants include (1) Who are the major donors to Northern Ireland nonprofits? (2) Are donors supporting policy and advocacy efforts in addition to direct service? and (3) Will an increase in giving mean more money for established or start-up nonprofits? In essence, the lead author of this study used these questions to generate in-depth discussions about the ability of Northern Ireland nonprofits to leverage funds from the private sector, including efforts focused on social entrepreneurship.


Figures 1 and 2 provide "profiles" of four NGOs operating within the Derry area. Efforts were made to select organizations with similar service delivery strategies and operational budgets so accurate comparisons could be made between established NGOs and start-ups. Start-ups were defined as being organizations that had been in operation for fewer than ten years, and established organizations had been in operation for more than ten years. All of the NGOs selected provided mainly direct services to clients related to community and economic development, general human services, and educational

Table 1. Themes of Key Informants Related to Leveraging Private-Sector Funding


<i>Who are the major donors to Northern Ireland nonprofits?</i>	<i>Are donors supporting policy and advocacy efforts in addition to direct service?</i>	<i>Will an increase in giving mean more money for established or start-up nonprofits?</i>	<i>Is social entrepreneurship being used to generate revenue; are there differences between start-up and established nonprofits?</i>
European Union Peace Funding (phases II & III)	Will new donors follow the same pattern? Yes (60%) No (40%)	"New funding will go to established agencies."	"Most organizations are just trying to sustain themselves."
The International Fund for Northern Ireland	"Yes" answers generally reflect the belief that policy and advocacy programs such as cross-community peace building will continue to receive some preference from donors. "No" answers generally reflect the belief that if the application process is complete, each organization has an equal chance regardless of service delivery strategies. Thus, a preference for policy and advocacy programs will probably end.	"New nonprofits deserve a chance—this would most likely come in the event an established agency does not sustain itself." "I would like to see new agencies being funded, but history has proven that is not the case."	"Most funders need organizations to prove they <i>can</i> sustain themselves <i>and</i> have an exit strategy as well, so they must work for a profit." "Social entrepreneurship is the only way they can continue to fund their organizations." "A farmer can use his land for a tourist site when his profits are down; there are grants for that here, so yes."
Rowntree Cadbury Trust, the National Lottery	The pattern will change because we are coming out of the conflict and funding will decrease.	"The system is not set up to deny start-up agencies; established agencies have just proven sustainability."	"The major difference between start-ups and established agencies is that start-ups would need funds and others could sustain themselves."

assistance. Although all of the organizations reported operating budgets in terms of less than 501,000 pounds, the start-up NGOs reported total annual revenues of less than 200,000 pounds. In tandem with the observations made by key stakeholders, some of the start-ups and established agencies continue to rely heavily on governmental sources for their operations; however, Figure 1 shows that one start-up and one established organization leveraged most of their revenue from the private sector, and Figure 2 demonstrates that these funds have been sustaining the organizations for at least five years. Although the established organizations appear to be more reliant on both public and private funds from international organizations, younger and older NGOs within Northern Ireland appear to be gaining skills in securing revenue from private sources.

Figure 1. Operating Budget Revenue Sources for Northern Ireland NGOs



As illustrated by Figures 1 and 2, nonprofits still appear to be funded primarily by international institutions within both the public and private sectors, such as the European Union, International Fund for Northern Ireland, Atlantic Philanthropies, and the Rowntree Cadbury Trust. Although not reported as a major donor by any of the interviewees, the Irish American billionaire Chuck Feeney was the only donor mentioned of any significance. Now around eighty years old, Feeney plans on spending the

Figure 2. Consistent and Dependable Funding Sources over the Past Five Years

remaining four billion Euros in his foundation, Atlantic Philanthropies, within his lifetime. This billionaire who secretly and irrevocably transferred the vast majority of his nearly 40 percent stake in “Duty Free Shoppers” (DFS) to his charitable foundation, surpasses the philanthropic generosity of the Mellons, Rockefellers, and DuPonts (University College Dublin News 2007). As depicted in Figure 2, Northern Ireland NGOs are heavily dependent upon international funding institutions such as Atlantic Philanthropies. Subsequently, it appears that most funds leveraged from the private sector come primarily from foundations or individuals outside of Northern Ireland, the most substantial of these institutions being the Rowntree Cadbury Trust. The continuing presence and financial support from international foundations and private individuals from outside of the region is not surprising in light of the considerable political investment made by countries such as the United States in Northern Ireland’s future. President Clinton played a pivotal role in the Northern Ireland peace process, along with Prime Ministers John Major and Tony Blair. Subsequently, Clinton views his role in bringing together rival factions through informal and formal negotiations related to the

Good Friday Agreement as one of his primary international accomplishments during his two terms as president (Clinton 2004; Mansergh 1999; McCartney 1999). In turn, NGOs continue to receive financial support from private individuals and foundations from outside of Northern Ireland.

With regard to the types of services donors would fund, most of the stakeholders thought that both public- and private-sector institutions would continue to fund policy and advocacy services. Nonetheless, fewer than half of the respondents thought a shift in funding priorities would take place because “we are coming out of the conflict and funding for these services will decrease.” While most of the respondents believed that the current funding climate favored established agencies over start-ups (organizations that had been in operation for fewer than five years), the government has established mechanisms for fostering social entrepreneurship with nonprofits. Subsequently, interviewees reported that a growing number of public and private entities are funding grant opportunities for initiating nonprofit services, such as tourist sites, as well as providing funding for innovative new services. Tourism seemed to be a key industry where examples of social entrepreneurship were most evident; however, the stakeholders reported that the vast majority of nonprofit organizations based in Northern Ireland continue to rely heavily on long-term funding from international and domestic governmental sources.

Next Steps: Levering More Support from the Private Sector

Although many organizations within Northern Ireland are heavily reliant on governmental funding for their operations, this article provides examples of organizations, both start-up and established, that are beginning to secure sustainable funding from the private sector. In many ways, this trend is typical in Western countries. In the United States, nonprofits are also heavily dependent upon public funds for their operations, according to the Nonprofit Almanac (Independent Sector 2001). The positive light that is shed on this observation is that Northern Ireland NGOs are fortunate to be supported by a more viable economy than the one evident during the Troubles. This stronger economic picture, despite relatively high unemployment rates and fallout from the real estate crisis, is evidenced by the continuation of substantial infrastructure projects within Northern Ireland. One of the most prominent of these large-scale redevelopment projects is the Titanic Quarter. This waterfront development project, supported by a variety of local and international investors, seeks to transform 185 acres of mostly derelict, postindustrial landscape into a primary Belfast tourist destination (*Economist* 2010).

Northern Ireland NGOs, many of which fostered the conditions needed for business investment to occur through peace and reconciliation efforts, require a similar level of commitment from the private sector. More support is needed from the private sector in the form of grants from private foundations and other private sources so that funding streams can be diversified. Gronjberg (1993) points to the importance of nonprofit agencies being able to manage diverse funding sources to foster long-term sustainability. Although Irish prosperity has declined somewhat with the demise of the

Celtic Tiger, financial firms are more willing to invest in Northern Ireland now than they were during the Troubles. This article shows evidence of how some Northern Ireland nonprofits have already found sustainable funding in the form of domestically generated private revenue. Subsequently, the Northern Ireland Giving Survey (2008) demonstrates that the region continues to be one where charitable giving continues to increase. The average monthly donation made in Northern Ireland in 2008 was 22 pounds, an increase of 4.2 percent from 2005. This increase in giving can be viewed positively and in many respects is evidence of the generosity of residents within this region. In addition, this finding also suggests that despite the decline in the number of givers with the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008, those who are making donations are giving more (Northern Ireland Giving Survey 2008).

Although local citizens exhibit relatively high levels of giving, persistently high unemployment rates and a generally underdeveloped network of community foundations has compelled NGOs to rely heavily on national and international governmental entities to fund their operations. This organizational sustainability predicament is captured by the following quote of a former nonprofit director from Derry:

We [NGO directors] were encouraged to try to American model in getting more money from the private sector to support our programs. Since we don't have the huge variety of community foundations and philanthropists, especially based in Northern Ireland, that didn't work. The people here are very generous, but the number of private individuals and foundations that can give ends up being very small. Directors had no choice but to rely on the government for a lot of their funding.

In light of the dilemmas faced by NGO directors in leveraging funding from the private sector, it appears that governmental institutions need to continue to play an active role in sustaining nonprofits. In an era of fiscal austerity, governmental entities need to broaden their role not just to encompass funding but also to act as a vehicle for promoting and providing necessary structures for increases in private-sector funding. Wolk (2008) lays out a variety of actions that government could take. Government can lay the foundation for increased social entrepreneurship by establishing institutions that support and promote social entrepreneurship or by convening sectors and actors to discuss critical social issues to advance solutions. In addition, government can adopt policies to enable and encourage social entrepreneurship, such as removing barriers to encourage social entrepreneurship and scale success or by exploring new tax structures to enable new organizational forms. In light of continuing fiscal problems related to the slower than expected economic recovery, the public sector will probably have to take a more active role in developing and maintaining these policies and regulatory measures. Finally, government can develop and leverage resources to encourage social entrepreneurship by establishing partnerships with foundations and corporations to support social entrepreneurship or by creating public/private social innovation funds. This final point

relates the most to how changes can be implemented at the local level. Although governmental institutions operating at all levels of government need to be actively involved in providing arenas for dialogues to take place, local citizens, including consumers of nonprofit services, need to play active parts in enhancing service delivery strategies. This bottom-up approach resonates well with younger philanthropists and entrepreneurs within both Europe and the United States and may be the key to fostering a more vibrant funding climate for nonprofits within Northern Ireland.

ENDNOTES

1. The title is taken from a republican ballad, the chorus of which goes: We're on the one road/ Sharing the one load/We're on the one road/To God knows where./We're on the one road/It may be the wrong road/But we're together now, who cares?
2. For a psychological perspective, see McGoldrick and Pearce (1981)
3. See, for example, "The Obscenity of H-Blocks: Immediate Issue Is Humanitarian," Gordon C, Sunday Press, at <http://larkspirit.com/hungerstrikes/racs/obscurity.html> (Retrieved December 4, 2006). See also Harris (1993).
4. For further on this, see McEvoy (2001).
5. "Fierce opposition to the Catholic Church combined with a determination to resist the cause of Irish nationalism has always been the cornerstone of Mr. Paisley's beliefs" (BBC 2005).

REFERENCES

- BBC. 2005. "Ian Paisley." (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern_ireland/understanding/profiles/ian_paisley.stm).
- Bielefeld, W. 2009. "Issues in Social Enterprise and Social Entrepreneurship." *Journal of Public Affairs Education* 15(1):69–86.
- Byrne, S., Chuck Thiessen, and Eyob Fissuh. 2007. "Economic Assistance and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland." *The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies* 39(1–2):7–22.
- Byrne, S., Chuck Thiessen, Eyob Fissuh, and Cynthia Irvin. 2009. "The IFI and EU Peace II Fund: Respondents' Perceptions of Funded Project Success in Promoting Peacebuilding and Community Development in Northern Ireland." *Peace and Conflict Studies* 16(1):44–67.
- Clinton, W.J. 2004. *My Life*. New York: Alfred Knopf.
- Cochrane, F. 2000. "Beyond Political Elites: A Comparative Analysis of the Roles and Impacts of Community-Based NGOs in Conflict Resolution Activity." *Civil Wars* 3(2):1–22.
- Cochrane, F. 2006. "Two Cheers for the NGOs: Building Peace from below in Northern Ireland." In *A Farewell to Arms? Beyond the Good Friday Agreement*, edited by M. Cox, A. Guelke, and F. Stephen. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Derry City Council. 2011. *Section 75 Statistics*. Retrieved July 5, 2013 (<http://www.lgsc.org.uk/fs/doc/Derry%20S75%20Statistics.pdf>).

- Economist, The. 2010. "Belfast's Titanic Quarter: Back to the Slipway." *The Economist*, July 8. Retrieved October 27, 2010 (<http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm>).
- Eurostat. 2010. *Population and Social Conditions Report, 2010 Calendar Report*. Retrieved January 15, 2010 (<http://www.epp.euros.cec.eu.int>).
- Fitzduff, M. 2013. *Launch of the 2nd Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report*. Community Relations Council. (<http://www.community-relations.org.uk/peace-monitor>).
- Gronjberg, K. 1993. *Understanding Non-Profit Funding*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Harris, M. 1993. *The Catholic Church and the Foundation of the Northern Irish State*. Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press.
- Independent Sector. 2001. *The New Nonprofit Almanac in Brief: Facts and Figures on the Independent Sector*.
- Maloney, E. 2002. *The Secret History of the IRA*. London: Penguin Books.
- Mansergh, M. 1999. "The Early Stages of the Irish Peace Process." In *Striking a Balance: The Northern Ireland Peace Process. Accord*, edited by C. McCartney. London: Conciliation Resources.
- McCartney, C. 1999. "The Role of Civil Society." In *Striking a Balance: The Northern Ireland Peace Process. Accord*, edited by C. McCartney. London: Conciliation Resources.
- McEvoy, K. 2001. *Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland: Resistance, Management and Release*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- McFarlane, P. 2011. "Community Based NGOs in Grassroots Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland." *E-International Relations Journal*. (<http://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/24/community-based-ngos-in-grassroots-peacebuilding-and-reconciliation-in-northern-ireland/>).
- McGoldrick, M. and J. K. Pearce. 1981. "Family Therapy with Irish Americans." *Family Process* 20:223.
- Morison, J. 2006. "Constitutionalism, Civil Society and Democratic Renewal in Northern Ireland." In *A Farewell to Arms? Beyond the Good Friday Agreement*, edited by M. Cox, A. Guelke, and F. Stephen. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Northern Ireland Giving Survey. 2008. *Final Summary, November, 2008*. Retrieved July 9, 2013 (<http://www.nicva.org/.../northern-ireland-individual-giving-survey-2008>).
- Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. 2013. *Census 2011 Detailed Characteristics for Northern Ireland*. Retrieved July 9, 2013 (<http://www.nisra.gov.uk/>).
- O'Brien, C. 2007. "Integrated Community Development/Conflict Resolution Strategies as 'Peacebuilding Potential' in South Africa and Northern Ireland." *Community Development Journal* 42(1):114–80.
- Smyth, J. 2004. "The Road to God Knows Where: Understanding Irish Republicanism." *Capital & Class* 86:135–57.

- University College Dublin News. 2007. "Chuck Feeney, the Secretive Billionaire Who Transformed Irish University Research." September 18. Retrieved November 4, 2010 (http://www.ucd.ie/news/0709_sep/180907_book_feeny.html).
- Wei-Skillern, J., J. Austin, H. Leonard, and H. Stevenson. 2007. *Entrepreneurship in the Social Sector*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Wolk, A. 2008. *Advancing Social Entrepreneurship: Recommendations for Policy Makers and Government Agencies*. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute and Root Cause.