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The Specter of ‘Spirituality’—On the (In)Utility of an Analytical Category

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The Specter of “Spirituality”—On the (In)Utility of an Analytical Category

Chad M. Bauman

Introduction

*Spirituality in Higher Education: A National Study of College Students’ Search for Meaning and Purpose* was the result of a multi-year study initiated in 2003 by the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) and supported with a $1.9 million grant from the John Templeton Foundation. It involved a longitudinal study of over a hundred thousand students from more than two hundred colleges and universities. It is certainly laudable for its scope, for the many insights it offers regarding the religious lives of American college students, and for contributing positively to the debate about the proper place of religion on American campuses. Yet the usefulness of the study is compromised in significant ways by its incautious use of “spirituality” as an analytical category.

In the first part of the article, I develop this criticism more fully, and argue that in the report “spirituality” is both inadequately defined and unhelpfully measured. Then, in the second part of the paper, I argue that the HERI report’s problems are symptomatic of a broader lack of social consensus about the meaning of the word “spirituality,” and attempt to develop a typology of common definitions of the word, both in scholarly and conventional usage. Finally, in the conclusion, I ask whether there is any hope that “spirituality” can be measured in meaningful ways, or whether the term should be abandoned entirely as a sociological category. Spirituality is therefore a specter, as I have suggested in the title, because it is pellucid, hazy, both seen and not seen, and also because it haunts and ultimately disrupts and disturbs our ability as scholars to describe the religious lives of those we study in accurate and meaningful ways.

Having said that, however, I would like to make it clear that nothing in this article should be taken as a comment, one way or another, on the question of whether “spirituality” deserves a place in higher education. I consider that issue a distinct one, though no doubt in some ways related to the one I am addressing here, particularly since many of those authors who write about spirituality do so in order to argue for greater institutional and classroom attention. For further discussion of this topic, see [Eu...](#)

Part I: “Spirituality” as an Analytical Category

There are two ways to think about “spirituality” as an analytical category. First, it can be defined that it rests and moves in a particular way. In the report *Spirituality in Higher Education*, and phrases that it is used, it is understood the term to include such as compass, care, meaning, and spirituality.

In the first part of the article, I develop this criticism more fully, and argue that in the report “spirituality” is both inadequately defined and unhelpfully measured. Then, in the second part of the paper, I argue that the HERI report’s problems are symptomatic of a broader lack of social consensus about the meaning of the word “spirituality,” and attempt to develop a typology of common definitions of the word, both in scholarly and conventional usage. Finally, in the conclusion, I ask whether there is any hope that “spirituality” can be measured in meaningful ways, or whether the term should be abandoned entirely as a sociological category. Spirituality is therefore a specter, as I have suggested in the title, because it is pellucid, hazy, both seen and not seen, and also because it haunts and ultimately disrupts and disturbs our ability as scholars to describe the religious lives of those we study in accurate and meaningful ways.

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Part I: “Spirituality” in the HERI Report

There are two primary problems with the HERI report’s use of “spirituality” as an analytical category. The first is that the term is so variously defined that it really isn’t defined at all, or at least not in any meaningful way. In the report itself, “spirituality” is associated with many other terms and phrases that together give us some sense of what the report’s authors understood the term to mean. For example, readers are told that “qualities such as compassion, generosity, optimism, and kindness” are “related” to spirituality.1 In other places, the report suggests a significant relationship between “spirituality” and terms like “personal values”2 and “equanimity.”3 This is a rather vast array of associations, and is connotative at best. No simple or direct definition of the term is ever given.

Moreover, the distinction between “spirituality” and “religion” remains insufficiently explored and articulated. At some points in the report, “spirituality” and “religion” are used as if more or less synonymous, such as in the phrases “spiritual/religious practices,”4 “spiritual/religious quest,”5 “spiritual and religious matters,”6 or “religious/spiritual beliefs.”7 At other points, however, a somewhat clear line is drawn between them, such as in the questionnaire’s statement (with which 83% of respondents concurred), “most people can grow spiritually without being religious.”8 Implied by this, of course, but only fuzzily, is the distinction that many of our students make between religion as an institutional reality and spirituality as a personal one which may or may not include institutional affiliation (more on this below).

Yet confusing the matter is that a third possible relationship of spirituality and religion is implied by passages in the report and elements of the questionnaire which link “spirituality” primarily with the interior life or with questions of meaning and purpose (as in the subtitle of the report), and thereby imply that a thoughtful atheist who occasionally ponders the meaning of life should necessarily be considered a “spiritual” person (despite her likely protestations).

It therefore becomes very difficult, in interpreting the report’s data, to know exactly what is being measured beyond the extent to which college students use and identify with the term “spirituality.” The question of identification is itself a somewhat interesting one. But we really learn little about students other than that. We would have similar problems if we asked college students the question, “Are you old?” From the results we
would know how many college students identified with the word “old,” which might, for cultural anthropologists, be of some marginal interest. But we would have no idea, from the answers to that question, how old college students really are, or what they mean when they use the term.

Moreover, the HERI report claims that there are “important similarities and distinctions between those students who are strongly religious and those who are highly spiritual” in terms of their “practices, feelings, self-conceptions, and worldviews,” as well as in terms of their “political and social attitudes” and “psychological and physical well-being.” Such similarities and differences would indeed be of great interest to researchers and those who work with college students. But I contend that the definitional problems articulated above, as well as the methodological problems in the measurement of “spirituality” discussed below, undermine the usefulness of the results of this comparison.

Let us move now to those methodological issues. The second general problem with the HERI report’s use of the term “spirituality” as an analytical category is that “spirituality” is measured in a problematic fashion. One of the most central claims of the report’s authors is that today’s “entering college students report high levels of spiritual interest and involvement.” As evidence for this claim, the authors of the report point, among other things, to the fact that 80% of incoming college students indicate “having an interest in spirituality,” nearly two-thirds consider their “spirituality” a “source of joy,” and three-quarters say they are “searching for meaning/purpose in life.”

But herein lies the problem. The report identifies six indicators of student spirituality. Highly spiritual students, according to the report, are those who 1) “believe in the sacredness of life,” 2) “have an interest in spirituality,” 3) “search for meaning/purpose in life,” 4) “have discussions about the meaning of life with friends,” 5) consider their spirituality “a source of joy,” and 6) “seek out opportunities” to help them “grow spiritually.” The first of these indicators, belief in the sacredness of life, seems to me no accurate predictor of spirituality. Many a critic of religion and spirituality considers life sacred, if by sacred one means nothing more than “inviolable,” or “worth preserving.” (There are of course other definitions of the term, but these are perfectly valid and common ones.) Moreover, I see no logical reason why a search for meaning and purpose, central to the third and fourth indicators, must be necessarily spiritual (as opposed to philosophical) unless of course one believes it impossible for non-religious or non-spiritual people to care about and/or answer questions of meaning and purpose. It seems to me that only people who consider themselves religious or spiritual could possibly make such an a priori claim.
And here I am willing to expose one of my biases, and that is, that no matter what else it may mean, "spirituality" in the most common conventional usages, involves, at least in part, something more than a merely introspective or philosophical quest for meaning in life, something different from or more than the "interior life." As I will discuss below, there are scholars for whom "spirituality" means little more than the interior life. But their definition of the term is irreconcilable with conventional usage. Moreover, such a broad definition of spirituality yokes many introspective but non-religious people who care about questions of meaning and purpose with a label they would reject.

If we remove these three indicators I have criticized, we are then left with only three others, each of which employs versions of the word "spirituality." Spiritual students are those who tend to affirm that they 1) "have an interest in spirituality," 2) consider their "spirituality a source of joy," and 3) "seek out opportunities" to help themselves grow "spiritually" (5). But this constitutes an entirely circular, self-referential definition of spirituality. Spirituality is as spirituality does. It tells us nothing about spiritual people except, as indicated earlier, that they identify with the word "spiritual."

Equally confusing is why certain of the indicators of religiousness were not also considered indicators of spirituality. For example, the fourth and fifth indicators of "religiousness," according to the report, are that students report discussing "religion/spirituality"—again, the circular definition—with, respectively, friends and family. Why should agreement with such statements not also be an indicator of spirituality? Another indicator of "religiousness" is belief in God. Again, it is unclear to me why this indicator should separate the religious from the spiritual, particularly since a large percentage of those who would call themselves spiritual would also believe in God, or at least in some abstract divine power, whereas a decent percentage of Buddhists, some of whom might call themselves "religious" (if the language they speak has such a word), would not.

In the end, because spirituality is not adequately defined by the report, because the distinction between religion and spirituality is not clearly articulated, and because the measurement of "spirituality" is flawed, circular, and self-referential, the report tells us precious little of substance about college students. The problem stems, I suspect, from an ambiguity or disagreement among the report's authors about the very meaning of the term. Some elements of the study's design suggest a definition of "spirituality" as introspection or attention to the "inner life" and to big questions of meaning (which could, theoretically be carried out on a purely philosophical plane without reference to religion, institutional or otherwise). Other elements of
the study's design suggest a definition of spirituality as religion, or as interior religion, spirituality—given the common contemporary suspicion of religious institutions—as religion with a smiley-face emoticon.

Because of this evident internal lack of consensus about the meaning of "spirituality," and the potential that those responding to the questionnaire similarly understood its questions in radically different ways, the report's findings are impossible to interpret. Though through statistical analysis one could figure out what percentage of students who scored high on indicators of spirituality also scored high on indicators of religiousness (and vice versa), one has absolutely no way of knowing what they were saying when they answered the questions as they did. We cannot tell from the data whether we should consider spirituality a component of religion or something entirely separate from it. Consequently, we cannot truly know the extent to which the lives of people who identify with the word "spiritual" differ from the lives of those who identify with the word "religion," despite the report's claim to be able to do so.

Admittedly, there are problems attendant to the sociological analysis of anything so abstract as spirituality. But such problems were compounded in the HERI report, it seems to me, by the fact that basic definitional issues were not worked out in advance and therefore lived to haunt the questionnaire and the data it produced. Nevertheless, as I indicated at the very outset, these problems are not entirely unique to the HERI report, but rather reflect a lack of consensus about the meaning of "spirituality" in American society more generally. It is to that thorny muddle that we now turn.

Part II: Meanings of "Spirituality"

Scholars who write about spirituality and higher education employ the term "spirituality" in diverse ways. And many of them recognize its unwieldy semantic range. In this section, I will attempt to construct a typology of the varied definitions of spirituality as used conventionally and by scholars who write about the topic. I will also argue that while some scholarly definitions of the term conform rather closely to conventional usage, other definitions are more specialized or idiosyncratic.

One specialized use of "spirituality" is as a synonym for "spiritual formation" within a particular faith. For example, for Stella Ma "spirituality" refers "to one's growth toward spiritual maturity, which is reflected in one's relationships with God, self, and others." For Ma and scholars like her "spirituality" is not only linked quite strongly with religion, it is identified with a particular kind of religion, in this case Christianity. If we were to con-
or as intangible, or as conventional usages of the word "spiritual"

The meaning of the word "spirituality," as the questionnaire says, the report's par
tical analysis one might make on indicators of religion (and vice versa),
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uged at the very report, but rather in American now turn.

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ceive of the meanings attributed to "spirituality" as a continuum, therefore, Ma's definition would be located at one pole, because of its close association with the term "religion."

At the opposite pole would lie an equally peculiar definition which, in theory, delinks "spirituality" semantically from religion altogether and conceives of it as little more than a thoughtful search for meaning and purpose. In an article entitled "Why Spirituality Deserves a Central Place in Liberal Education," Alexander Astin argues, "Since the term (spirituality) covers a lot of territory and means different things to different people, there's little point in trying to develop a precise definition." This kind of evasiveness pervades the literature on spirituality in higher education, but in this particular article, Astin does proceed to write about the range of things that the word suggests to him. This range includes terms like "interior" (that is, the interior life), "self awareness," our "subjective life," our "qualitative or affectional experiences," the "values we hold most dear," the "meaning and purpose we see in our work and our life," and "our sense of connectedness."

In a different article, Astin and his wife and fellow researcher, Helen, suggest that spirituality is, at root, indistinguishable from a search for meaning and purpose: "How one defines his or her spirituality or, if you prefer, sense of meaning and purpose in life," they write, "is not the issue." Nevertheless, I would argue that spirituality defined as a thoughtful search for meaning and purpose is not analytically useful because, as Astin himself writes (but in his case with approval), "Within this very broad umbrella, virtually everyone qualifies as a spiritual being ..." If all people are spiritual beings, then what could we really learn about a person by calling her "spiritual" or saying she is interested in "spirituality?"

The influence of this broad definition of the term is felt widely, including in the HERI report itself, on which Alexander Astin was a lead researcher. (Astin was also the founding director of HERI.) A great variety of scholars, many of whom have worked with Astin, link "spirituality" explicitly with the search for meaning and purpose. "Spirituality," writes Jane Fried, for example, "can be understood as the ability to experience connections and to create meaning in one's life." Closely related to these scholars are those who connect "spirituality" to the search for "authenticity," "wholeness," "integration," "interconnectedness," or "self-transcendence."

Certainly the search for meaning and purpose very often does take a "spiritual" or "religious" direction. But as I've argued above, it seems to me rather inappropriate for scholars of religion to assume, a priori, that it must necessarily do so. For this reason, it would be more logical to speak of
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those who search for meaning and purpose as the primary category, with those who do so with recourse to what we would more commonly call spiritual and/or religious ideas and practices constituting a sub-category. Yet there seems to be among many of these same scholars a certain reticence to make spirituality a sub-category in the way I've just described, to relinquish its broad connotations. This reticence is so palpable that one begins to wonder, as one surveys the literature, whether there is an unstated agenda at work here.

Evidence that there may be comes from the title of Astin's aforementioned article, "Why Spirituality Deserves a Central Place in Liberal Education." For those trying to make the argument that spirituality does deserve a central place in liberal education, it is imperative to make spirituality as innocuous as possible, to package it in a palatable way for the secular academy by divorcing it from anything vaguely religious. Some of the scholars who use "spirituality" in this broad way, like Arthur Chickering, acknowledge that the term does not appeal to "Atheists, agnostics and persons with strong humanistic orientations" for whom words like purpose and meaning are more acceptable. But why, then, do these scholars persist with and insist on such a broad definition of the term "spiritual"? One reason might be that such a definition is politically expedient, and therefore appealing in a number of ways.

I have already mentioned, for example, that using the term "spirituality" rather than "religion" allows those who argue that it deserves a more prominent place in higher education to fly under the rationalist radar of the secular academy, which often considers "spirituality" somehow more ecumenical and inclusive than "religion." Similarly, using the term "spirituality" to denote things like the search for meaning and purpose may pique the interest of religious research funding agencies like the Lilly Endowment and the Templeton Foundation in a way that using a term like "introspection" would not. Likewise, the language of spirituality allows agnostic school administrators to speak with a clear conscience to their often quite religious constituencies in an idiom that resonates with those constituencies. When such administrators say "spirituality," they mean "the search for meaning and purpose." But their students, community supporters, donors and parents hear "religion," and are satisfied. While in some ways misleading, these expedient uses of the term "spirituality" are no more immoral than any other kinds of marketing. Nor is a definition wrong merely because it is political or politically expedient. Nevertheless, a definition is not analytically useful simply because it is politically useful. Therefore, though such broad definitions of the term "spirituality" may be politically useful, they remain, for the reasons articulated above, analytically unhelpful.
As I indicated earlier, one can conceive of these two definitions—spirituality as spiritual formation and spirituality as the search for meaning and purpose—as opposite poles of a continuum. Neither, I would argue, is particularly useful for religion scholars because they are both somewhat idiosyncratic definitions which do not conform to conventional usage. In between these two poles, however, lie a number of potentially useful definitions of the term.

If we are to come to some meaningful understanding of the term “spirituality,” and what people mean when they say it, we must take seriously the common phrase, “I’m spiritual, not religious.” The phrase is, of course, a cliché, and a tired one at that. But presumably phrases become clichés at least in part because they effectively express ideas not otherwise easily expressed. By differentiating spirituality from religion, the phrase, “I’m religious, not spiritual” suggests both that spirituality can be distinguished from religion and that the two terms are sufficiently related to one another to require differentiation.

Spirituality, for those who use this phrase, is not so much distinct from “religion” in the broad sense that many scholars of religion would use the term, but rather distinct from religious institutions (particularly religious institutions with long histories). While engaged in the academic study of religion, my students see spirituality everywhere: in Max Mueller’s “faculty of the infinite,” in Otto’s “mysterium tremendum et fascinans,” in William James’s “inner religion.” Yet as I listen to my students use the phrase, I notice that they are using it in at least two subtly different ways.

For those with a strong sense of affiliation to a particular traditional religious community like Judaism or Christianity, the phrase “spiritual, not religious” suggests not that there is anything wrong with religious institutions, but rather that there is a core of faith, a basic human yearning for God, which is pre-institutional and which therefore cannot be expressed fully by or be reduced to the conventional pieties of institutionalized religion. According to those with a strong sense of affiliation, this core is spirituality.

In Soul Searching, Christian Smith describes a Christian teen he interviewed who said she was “spiritual, not religious.” She wasn’t rejecting church, according to Smith, but she was speaking of spirituality as faith not overly-obsessed with formality and ritualism. Another teen Smith interviewed spoke of religion as “book-smart” knowledge of God, whereas spirituality had to do with direct experience. Smith writes, “Theirs is a critique, not of traditional religion itself, which they actually practice happily, but merely of the prospect of an empty, habitual, ritualistic faith.”

Religiously affiliated people like these who make a distinction between spirituality and religion do not reject institutional affiliation, nor do they refuse
to participate in the common life and worship of their particular religious communities, which they may still believe are especially conducive to the development of their spirituality. But spirituality is, according to them, something prior to, and more than institutional affiliation. Some of these same people might even go a step farther and suggest, *à la* Mueller, that this inner core of faith, this spirituality, if you will, is inborn, genetic.

However, for those with only a weak sense of affiliation to a religious community, or with positively anti-institutional proclivities, the phrase "spiritual, not religious" generally suggests a stronger distinction between its two elements, and reflects the belief that religious institutions are by their very nature, and because of their stifling routinizations, completely inimical to "true" spiritual expression and growth. People in this category may be open to learning about the religious experiences of others, but they believe strongly that when those experiences become routinized, *normative*, as they do in traditional religious settings, then they represent a shackling, an imposition. Spirituality, for such people, is therefore something *other than* institutional affiliation.

If we were to diagram this difference between how strongly affiliated people, on the one hand, and weakly affiliated/unaffiliated people, on the other, think of the distinction between spirituality and religion, it might look like Diagram 1.

**Diagram 1: Distinction between “spirituality” and “religion” according to...**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Strongly-Affiliated</th>
<th>The Weakly- or Un-Affiliated</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td><strong>Spirituality</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spirituality</strong></td>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the strongly affiliated, spirituality and religion are essentially identical. But spirituality is, for weakly affiliated and unaffiliated people, other than religious. People who participate in some sort of religious community but not to spirituality, as in the diagram below, are essentially forgoing religious affiliation for spirituality, and vice versa.

Finally, it is important to understand that for purposes of this discussion, the term "affiliation" is necessarily institutional, i.e., that conventional understandings of religion can be seen as representing, in some ways, everything that is meant by religion, both—institutional and non-institutional.

**Conclusion**

Whether strongly affiliated, weakly affiliated, or at least one thing in between, spirituality is not identical to religion, but it is generally related to a lack of conventionalized religious experiences. People who understand spirituality as not only institutional, but *qua non* to institutionalized religion, both also understand that religion and non-institutional spirituality are not identical, nor are they necessarily exclusionary of one another. People who live their religious lives "spiritually, not religiously" may be understood to be those who live their religious lives without the shackles of institutionalized religion, both—affiliated or unaffiliated.

We would also argue that people who understand spirituality as not only institutional, but *qua non* to institutionalized religion, both—affiliated or unaffiliated—may be understood to be those who live their religious lives "spiritually, not religiously."
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"Religion" accord-


For the strongly affiliated, "spirituality" is the core of religion. It is pre-
religious, and pre-institutional. It is religion distilled to its "true" essence.
But spirituality can exist and even be nurtured by religion. But for the
weakly affiliated and unaffiliated, it seems to me, spirituality is something
other than religion. For them, the two phenomena (spirituality and religion)
participate in some common reality, and therefore they are not represented
in the diagram by two distinct circles. But religion is in some ways a danger
to spirituality, and can even negate it.

Finally, it is necessary to make two points about these diagrams for the
purposes of the discussion that follows. The first is that both the strongly
affiliated and the weakly affiliated/unaffiliated conceive of religion as a
necessarily institutional thing. The second point is that contrary to this
conventional usage, scholars tend to conceive of "religion" as inclusive of
everything, that is, both institutionalized religion and non-institutionalized re-
ligion, both—according to popular parlance—"religion" and "spirituality."

Conclusion

Whether strongly, weakly, or not at all affiliated with a religious tradi-
tion, those who identify with the phrase "spiritual, not religious" agree on at
least one thing, and that is that spirituality, like James's "inner religion," is
not identical to institutional religion. And here it becomes apparent that, to
some extent, the semantic confusion associated with "spirituality" is related
to a lack of consensus about the term "religion" itself. While most scholars
of religion conceive of "religion" as a category including both institutional
and non-institutional phenomena, those who identify with the phrase "spir-
tual, not religious" assume that religion is essentially an institutional (and
only institutional) reality. Therefore, if we as scholars of religion concede
the distinction of religion and spirituality at the conceptual level, then we
essentially accept a truncated definition of religion which ties it, as a sine
qua non, to institutional expression and authority. But if we do so, then we
risk excluding from our gaze a great deal of topics we have always consid-
ered religious, as well as a good number of people we have previously
understood to be religious people, those, like many ascetics, for example,
who live their religious lives outside or on the edges of institutional faiths.
We would also, of course risk excluding the very people who call them-
selves "spiritual, not religious."

Robert Wuthnow, Wade Roof and others have traced the development
of American attitudes about religion over the last century, and have sug-
gested that increased individualism and the postmodern suspicion of tradi-
tions, institutions, and affiliations have led to a greater emphasis on individual choice rather than adherence to traditional religious practices. This shift has had definitional ramifications. Drawing on the work of Peter Hill, et al., Liesa Stamm writes:

*Spirituality* in the current definitional approaches is associated with some of the components formerly included as part of religion and is used to describe individual experiences identified with personal transcendence and meaning. As a result of this changed understanding, definitions of religion have become narrower and less inclusive, with religion more often identified with structured religious institutions that are frequently considered to restrict or limit personal potential.

Surely, then, "spirituality" participates in the broader (and older) meaning of the word religion, religion as religion scholars tend to understand it. And one is tempted therefore just to stick with this broader term. But are we not forced, if we wish to truly understand American religious life, to take the popular distinction between religion and spirituality at face value?

The answer is both yes and no. As I have argued above, the conventional distinction between spirituality and religion is an important one, and if we wish to develop a meaningful definition of the term we must listen carefully to how people use it. Nevertheless, the difficulty in developing a precise and common definition of the term is so great, and in my view so insurmountable an obstacle to meaningful sociological analysis, that I would argue that the term should be abandoned entirely as an analytical category. This does not mean that we should stop trying to understand what people mean when they use the term; rather, I am merely suggesting that we should not try to measure it with the blunt instruments of questionnaire and survey.

Rather than utilizing semantically imprecise terms such as spirituality, as the HERI report does, and then being forced to define them so ambiguously and self-referentially that the results are difficult to interpret, I would advocate a different approach, one which concentrates on more easily quantifiable measures of belief, practice, and adherence. For example, just recently the PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life released its *U.S. Religious Landscape Survey.* The report explored religious affiliation in the United States, and also recorded certain kinds of information about those who considered themselves unaffiliated. According to the Survey, 16.1% of adult Americans consider themselves religiously unaffiliated. Around 25% of these individuals identified themselves as "nothing in particular." And so I would argue, rightfully avoiding the label of spirituality. One would expect, then, that more people than those in the survey who were semantically unaffiliated would use words like "atheist" or "agnostic," but the PEW study shows that the lives of college a

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**Notes**

2. Ibid., 3.
3. Ibid., 6.
4. Ibid., 2.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 3.
7. Ibid., 4.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 3.
10. Ibid., 4.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 5.
13. Ibid.
emphasis on individual practices. This work of Peter Hill, as associated with experience, meanings, and institutions, is relevant, with its insistence on limits and meanings.

But are we not required, to take the value? To revive, the conventional, at least one, and if we do, we must listen carefully in my view so as not to misinterpret, that I would interpret, a particular category. And what people would use, that we should know, that we might describe, survey, and interpret. I would interpret, I would interpret, I would interpret, I would interpret. And so ambiguous that words like "atheist," "agnostic," and even "religion" are also problematic—but the PEW study moves us in the right direction, the direction in which we must keep moving if we are to usefully describe and analyze the religious lives of college students, or of Americans more generally.

Notes

2. Ibid., 3.
3. Ibid., 6.
4. Ibid., 2.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 3.
7. Ibid., 4.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 3.
10. Ibid., 4.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 5.
13. Ibid.


18. Ibid., 34-35.


29. Ibid.