2018

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PUBLIC FINANCING AND THE UNDERREPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN UNITED STATES ELECTED POLITICAL OFFICES

LIBBY MOYER, BUTLER UNIVERSITY
MENTOR: MARGARET BRABANT AND GREGORY SHUFELDT

Women have historically been underrepresented in elected offices throughout the United States. Although many women are active in political organizations and exercise their right to vote, this underrepresentation remains constant across all levels of government. The lack of female representation in elected offices of the United States is detrimental to the future of our country as we work toward building a more inclusive environment for all citizens. Women are often successful when they choose to seek office. However, women are not choosing to run for political office. Several factors contribute to this decision not to run for elected political office including the political ambition gap, a state’s political culture, and perceived difficulty in campaign fundraising for women. This paper focuses on the role that campaign finance plays in a woman’s decision to seek elected political office. Through analysis of existing research and a comparative case study of Minnesota and Iowa, my thesis will prove that public funding of campaigns can reduce gender equality in state legislative offices.

Women Aren’t in Office Because Women Don’t Run for Office

The existing literature on the topic of female inequality in politics and specifically serving in state legislatures is extensive but not yet conclusive. Undoubtedly, women are proportionally underrepresented in American politics. However, research on the cause of this inequality is conflicting. A variety of sources credit partisanship, race, state district structure, women’s lack of ambition, political culture and ideology, fundraising difficulties, and gender stereotypes for the lack of female representation (Lawless and Fox; Arceneaux; Dolan; Rule; Pyeatt and Yanus; Sanbonmatsu, “Political”; King). One common focus of the literature is that women might be less likely to run for office due to difficulty raising money (Lawless and Fox; Mann; Sanbonmatsu, “Do Parties”; Burrell). However, sources disagree on whether female candidates are truly at a disadvantage in fundraising. Some researchers claim that fundraising difficulties for women are simply perceived and not actual obstacles to being elected to office (Sanbonmatsu, “Political”; Lawless and Fox). My thesis attempts to connect existing research and
prove that public financing can increase gender representation in state legislatures by helping women seek political office.

In general, women win political seats at a similar rate as men, yet women still are consistently underrepresented in elected office (Sanbonmatsu, “Political” 432). Women have experienced recent success at the ballot box. For example, 1992 was considered the “Year of the Woman,” symbolizing a shift toward a view of women in elected political office as acceptable. The 1992 federal election resulted in the number of female Senators doubling and women in the House increasing from 28 to 47 (Tumulty).

The success of women at the polls could be related to the fact that gender does not seem to directly affect choices at the ballot boxes. Negative gender stereotypes do not directly affect women’s chances of winning elected office according to Kathleen Dolan. Negative gender stereotypes in this context include views that consider women unfit or unqualified for political office. However, gender stereotypes do play a role in conducting a campaign and voter evaluations of a female candidate’s qualifications. Nevertheless, Dolan’s research suggests that these stereotypes do not affect voter behavior at the polls.

Through surveys on voter behavior in the 2010 U.S. House of Representatives election, Dolan found no empirical evidence that abstract gender stereotypes impact voter behavior for real-world candidates (Dolan 104). Dolan finds that gender stereotypes do not play a large role in voter behavior at the polls because of party loyalty: Most Democrats will vote for Democrats, and most Republicans will vote for Republicans regardless of the gender of the candidates. In other words, in practice, while voters may perceive candidates differently based on gender in campaign season, candidate gender does not play a major role in the choice voters make at the polls. This inequality exists not because women cannot win when they seek office but because women do not run for political seats.

When women choose to seek office, they realistically can fundraise as well as men although they fundraise in different ways. Female candidates also are raising as much or more in campaign funds as male candidates. Despite perceptions that women lack the skills and network needed to fundraise successfully, many women are matching their male opponents dollar for dollar or are raising substantially more than them (Burrell 119). For example, in the 2016 general election, Hillary Clinton raised more than $2.35 million more than Donald Trump.

4 In the example of the most recent presidential election, Donald Trump self-funded almost 20 percent of his own campaign with over $66 million in campaign funds.
Barbara Burrell did not find any inequalities among genders within party spending on behalf of congressional candidates or the ability for men and women to raise early money for campaigns. She even goes as far as to say that women are advantaged in terms of financing congressional campaigns (120). As with both genders, the ability to fundraise effectively can depend on a candidate’s personal connections and personal wealth, as is obvious with the examples of Clinton and Trump.

In sum, gender representation in elected office has increased over the past century, and “The Year of the Woman” illustrated the rate at which women can win political seats. Women win elected office and fundraise as well as men, and negative stereotypes do not seem to influence voters at the polls. If the gender difference is not a product of women not winning, the question still remains: Why are women underrepresented in elected political offices? Further research suggests that gender inequality in elected office exists simply because women are not seeking political office. The lack of desire to run for office is caused by a lack of political ambition, political culture and ideology, negative gender stereotypes, and perceived fundraising difficulties for female candidates (Lawless and Fox; Arceneaux; Sanbonmatsu, Carroll, and Walsh; “Money and Women Candidates”).

The gender gap in political ambition or the “ambition gap” causes young women to be less likely to consider running for public office than young men (Lawless and Fox 2). A 2013 study conducted by Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox shows female underrepresentation in politics exists because women are not running for office, and the underrepresentation is not a result of voters choosing male candidates over female candidates at the polls. Through online surveys of college students, Lawless and Fox were able to attribute the gender gap to the socialization of young women, including young women’s limited exposure to political information and discourse, limited participation in organized and competitive sports, lack of encouragement to run for office, and lack of confidence in their qualifications to run for office in comparison to men. Women are less likely to believe they are qualified to run for office, perhaps due to the lack of encouragement they receive to seek office, or the explicit fact that most politicians are not women. Inherently, due to a lack of political female representation, women are less likely to be included in political discourse.

funding. In comparison, Hillary Clinton self-funded less than 1 percent of her campaign with almost $1.5 million in campaign funding (Sultan).
A state’s attitudinal characteristics, estimated based on measures of ideology and political culture, can have negative consequences on a woman’s desire to seek political office and, as a result, the representation of women in state legislature. Kevin Arceneaux defines state political culture as “an orientation toward political action” (144). One attitudinal characteristic refers to a state’s view of appropriate gender roles for women. If a majority of a state’s voters do not believe political office is an appropriate position for a woman, less women are likely to seek the position than if a state viewed female political representatives positively. This negative gender role attitude may also deter party leaders and political elites from recruiting women for office (Arceneaux 145). If party leaders assume voters will not support a female candidate, they are not likely to recruit a woman to run for office and provide resources for her campaign. According to Kira Sanbonmatsu, “party leaders are misperceiving women’s electability” (“Do Parties” 434). The misperception is not consistently overly pessimistic or overly optimistic. Some party leaders overestimate voter support of female candidates while other party leaders underestimate voter support for female candidates. This misconception of women’s political electability can lead to party leaders recruiting female candidates at a lower rate than male candidates and allocating less resources to the recruitment of female candidates.

Lawless and Fox’s discussion of the ambition gap applies to gender role attitudes as well. If women serving in politics are viewed negatively, less women will have the desire to run for political office, and gender inequality in political elected office is maintained. Consequently, the lack of women in elected office will reinforce the perception that women are not fit for politics and lack the skills necessary for winning campaigns. These negative gender role attitudes stem from the stereotypes of women as too weak or nurturing to be political leaders. States that have a political culture that reinforces these negative stereotypes toward women as leaders are less likely to have equal female representation in the state legislature than states that view female political leaders more positively (Arceneaux 147). Although negative gender stereotypes do not directly affect female candidates’ chances of winning, these negative stereotypes may deter women from seeking elected office (Dolan). Ridicule of female candidates as mothers, criticism of their appearance, and a lack of support from other women during the campaign season often keeps women from pursuing a career in politics (Tumulty). These critiques that do not similarly effect male candidates.

Once women make the decision to run for office, they may raise campaign funds at similar rates as their male counterparts, yet there may still be a salient
difference in how campaign fundraising affects potential female candidates. The 2008 Center for American Women and Politics recruitment study found that many women still perceive fundraising to be harder for women than men (Sanbonmatsu, Carroll, and Walsh 38). Women are less likely to be able to self-fund their campaigns and are less reliant on receiving gifts from established donors. Women, if they decide to run for office, also are most likely to campaign against a male incumbent based on the existing gender gap. Incumbents have a built-in fundraising advantage compared to challengers (“Money and Women Candidates”). In order for a woman to be competitive, she needs to cultivate a larger base of individual donors which requires more time and may prove to be too burdensome (Lawless and Fox; Sanbonmatsu, “Do Parties” 447; Ruel and Hauser).

Because the perception of a gendered difficulty in raising campaign funds deters women from seeking political office, some have questioned whether implementing a state-level public financing program could encourage more women to run for elected office. Public funding involves campaigns that are financed by the government rather than private individual donors or organizations. Thirteen states currently utilize some system of public financing for campaigns (Cruikshank). This method of funding political campaigns has been cited as a possible way to encourage more women to seek elected office because women are more likely to believe that political office is more attractive if campaigns are publicly financed (Lawless and Fox; Werner and Mayer). Public financing programs can entice more women to seek elected office and, as a result, reduce the gender inequality in political elected office. Removing the hurdle of asking for substantial donations, reducing the time commitment of raising substantive funds to run, often against a male incumbent, and seeing more female elected officials should result in more women seeking office and a reduction in gender inequality in elected office. My study of Minnesota and Iowa focuses specifically on state legislature gender representation over a period of time following the implementation of a public financing program.

Research Design

My hypothesis is that public campaign financing programs can increase the opportunity for women to run for and win state legislative seats. For the purpose of my study, I am assuming that this hypothesis is true across all states. In order to test this hypothesis, I would need to collect data on all 50 state campaign finance
systems and all 50 state legislatures, which involves 99 legislative chambers.\textsuperscript{5} This type of analysis would need to be conducted over time.

Due to time and resource limits, I cannot examine every state legislative election outcome and every state campaign finance system. Instead, I used a sample to test my hypothesis. I conducted a comparative case study utilizing John Stuart Mill’s method of difference. Mill’s method of difference is a research design in which the cases that are selected differ on the key explanatory variable – in this case, two states must vary on whether or not they have public financing of campaigns. Those same cases must be similar in all but one independent variable (Malici and Smith 27-28). This method allowed me to select two cases, or states, that were similar in important aspects that affect gender equality in political office and to draw inferences about the relationship between public financing and gender inequality by using a sample of two cases to examine gender inequality on a small, more manageable scale.

Because states are tasked with running and regulating elections, evaluating the success of public financing policies in states in relation to political gender equity can shed light on policies that could be applied in more states or nationally. To test my hypothesis, I selected Minnesota and Iowa as my two cases for comparison. This method allowed me to evaluate the large scale issue of gender inequality in political representation at a smaller level in order to draw broader conclusions and make policy recommendations for the future.

As stated previously, the primary independent variable in my case study is the presence or absence of public financing for state legislatures. Essentially, public financing of campaigns is a system in which political candidates can use public money to fund their campaigns. These systems usually require candidates to follow certain rules or raise a certain amount of money independently in order to establish credibility. Thirteen U.S. states currently provide a public financing option for candidates of certain state offices.\textsuperscript{6} By accepting public money in each of these

\textsuperscript{5} Nebraska employs a unicameral system which accounts for the odd number of legislative chambers.
\textsuperscript{6} Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Vermont have some form of public financing for the election of governor and lieutenant governor. Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, and Minnesota also have public financing options for candidates for state legislative offices. New Mexico and West Virginia offer public financing for candidates for state supreme court and other state offices (Cruikshank).
options, the candidate is promising to limit how much they spend on their campaign and how much they accept in donations from a group or individual (Cruikshank).

I chose Minnesota as my case with public campaign finance programming because I am interested in politics in the Midwest on a state level. Minnesota created its public financing program in 1974 following the Watergate Scandal (Novak and Ammons 14). Minnesota offers a matching funds program for qualifying candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, and state legislative offices. With this program, candidates must raise a certain amount in contributions from private individuals in order to qualify for the program. For example, candidates for State Senate must raise $3,000 and candidates for the State House of Representatives must raise $1,500. After meeting that requirement, candidates may receive up to 50% of their campaign spending limits in public funds ("Public Financing of Campaigns").

After choosing Minnesota, I needed to choose a state that does not have public financing programs but is substantively similar to Minnesota in all other competing explanations. I chose Iowa because of its similarities and proximity to Minnesota. Iowa does not have a public financing program for state legislature candidates; private individuals, Political Action Committees (PACs), unions, and political parties can make unlimited contributions to Iowan candidates for State Congress, while single candidate committees, Super PACs, and corporations are prohibited from making campaign contributions to State Senate and State House of Representative candidates (“Campaign Finance Requirements in Iowa”).

My cases must be similar in other plausible explanations for political gender equity. For example, women are slightly more likely than men to vote for female candidates (Newman 12). Therefore, it is important for my case study to include states that are relatively balanced in terms of their population’s gender make-up. According to the 2010 United States Census, Minnesota’s population is 50.4% female, and Iowa has a population that is 50.5% female ("QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau").

Party identification also affects the gender make-up of legislative bodies. Federally, women comprise nearly one-third of the Democratic Party in the House and the Senate. On the other hand, the Republican party is made of only 10% women in Congress. On a state level, 16.9% of Republican legislators are women, and 33% of Democratic legislators are women ("Women's Election to Congress" 3). For these reasons, my case study must include states that are relatively balanced in terms of their partisan make-up. A 2015 Gallup poll classifies both Iowa and Minnesota as “competitive” states. This classification means that the Democratic
and Republican Parties are within five points of each other in terms of adult population party affiliation. In Minnesota, 42.9% of adults polled identified as Democratic or Lean Democratic while 39.6% of adults polled in Iowa identified as Democratic or Lean Democratic ("Red States Outnumber Blue").

The dependent variable in my case study is gender representation in state legislative offices in Iowa and Minnesota. Specifically, I observed the percentage of women serving in the State Senate and State House of Representative in both the Iowa and Minnesota Congresses. The Minnesota Senate has 67 seats, and the Minnesota House of Representatives has 134 seats. The Iowa Senate consists of 50 members, with 100 seats in the Iowa House of Representatives. In total, Minnesota has 201 state legislative seats and Iowa has 150. Because of the variance in the number of seats in each of the legislatures, I chose to use as my measurement the percentage of women as opposed to the raw number of women serving in each legislature.

To test my hypothesis, I compared the percentage of women serving in the Minnesota state legislature from the creation of the public financing program in 1974 through the most current election in 2016 to the percentage of women serving in the Iowa state legislature in that same time period. This time period includes 24 election cycles per state, because state legislative elections occur every two years in these states. I collected data for 48 data points. For my hypothesis to be correct, the percentage of women in legislature seats in Minnesota should increase following the implementation of the public financing program. The percentage should also be consistently higher than the percentage of women serving in Iowa legislature seats after 1974. If the percentage of women serving in Minnesota and Iowa both increase but the percentage in Minnesota increases more rapidly, my hypothesis suggests that public campaign financing is the primary cause of this growing gap in gender representation.

I utilized resources from Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics to collect my data. The site has a downloadable document containing the raw numbers of women serving in state legislatures in all 50 states from 1975 to 2014. The document includes percentages for women in all 50 state legislatures for 1979 and beyond, and a separate factsheet with raw numbers and the percentages for women in all 50 state legislatures in 2017. I figured the percentages for Iowa and Minnesota in 1975 and 1979 using the raw numbers provided by the document.

The independent variable in my experiment is the existence of public financing. Minnesota has public financing program and is coded as 1. Iowa does not have public financing and is coded as 0. To test my hypothesis, I used a T-test,
or a difference in means test, to compare women’s representation in state legislatures in Iowa against women’s representation in Minnesota. The T-test allows me to test whether the dependent variables are different and whether Minnesota or Iowa has more women’s representation. By analyzing the results of the T-test, I can make inferences regarding the influence of public financing programs on gender representation in state legislatures.

**Results**

To examine whether public financing of campaigns can reduce gender inequality, I examined the percentage of women elected to state office in Minnesota and Iowa between 1975 and 2017. My comparison of the two cases used the percentages of women in each chamber and in total. By conducting a T-test on the data, I determined that the difference in gender representation between Minnesota and Iowa is statistically significant. Over time, gender representation in Minnesota increased more rapidly than in Iowa. Following the 2016 general election, Minnesota ranks ninth and Iowa ranks thirty-first in terms of gender equality in state legislative chambers in the United States. The data suggests that public finance can increase gender representation in state legislatures.

In order to test the statistical significance of the difference in the cases’ gender representation, I conducted a two-sample T-test assuming equal variances using each state’s average percentage of women’s representation from 1975 to 2017. On average, the Minnesota state legislature is 23% female, and Iowa’s is 18%. This is a 5% difference which is statistically significant at the 99%-level. The T-test showed that my data findings are significantly and substantively different.

As seen in Figure 1, in the first years after Minnesota instituted its public financing program, Iowa had a higher proportion of women in state legislative office. In 1975, Iowa’s state legislature was 9% women, more than double Minnesota’s state legislature (4% women). However, after Minnesota’s public financing program was in place for a decade, the state’s gender representation reached higher levels than in Iowa and has remained above Iowa since 1989. This trend proves my hypothesis is correct. Gender representation increased in Minnesota under a public financing program at a higher rate than in Iowa without public financing.

After the most recent election in 2016, Minnesota leads Iowa in percentage of female representation by ten percentage points. Minnesota’s state legislature is 32% women compared to Iowa’s 22%. Overall, the percentage of women in state
legislative office is increasing in both states. In 2017, state legislatures in Iowa and Minnesota were 27% female, compared to 6.5% in 1975. This is a 20.5% increase over the last 42 years.

Individually, Minnesota increased by 28 percentage points while Iowa increased by only 13 percentage points over the 42-year period. This data follows my theory because Minnesota’s gender representation increased following the state’s implementation of a public financing program. As women had easier access to public financing, more women chose to run for office and were successful. Other women saw these successes and chose to run for office themselves, which in turn increased gender representation in Minnesota legislative office. Iowa did not experience an increase in gender equality at the same rate of Minnesota because women in that state did not have the opportunity to take advantage of a public financing program.

In 1981, Minnesota reached the same percentage as Iowa of women in state legislative office. From 1989 to 2017, Minnesota remained above Iowa in terms of percentage of female state legislators. Following the 1992 election, gender representation increased by 6 percentage points. 1992 became known as “The Year of the Woman” after a record four women had been elected to the U.S. Senate. The highest percentage between the two states was 35% in Minnesota in 2007 and 2009. The Democratic Party and liberals did well in the elections of 2006 and 2008, and the Republican Party did not fare well in those years due to the unpopular Iraq war.

Gender representation has grown much slower in Iowa. The state did not reap the benefits of “The Year of the Woman” as Minnesota did. In 1993, Iowa did not see an increase in gender representation in the state legislature. Iowa saw the greatest increase in gender representation in the 1984 election, an increase of 6 percentage points. In this election, Ronald Reagan swept the presidential election with every state except Minnesota and Washington, D.C. Iowa reached the height of its gender representation in 2007, 2009, 2013, and 2015, at 23%.

The trend of Minnesota overtaking Iowa in gender representation following the implementation of public financing is true regardless of legislative chamber. In 2017, the state House of Representatives in both Minnesota and Iowa had a higher percentage of female leaders than the state Senate in each state. Minnesota House of Representatives was 36% women while the Minnesota Senate trailed at 24%. In Iowa, women made up 27% of the state House of Representatives and 12% of the state Senate. This trend has varied over the past 42 years.
As women have gained more power in the workforce and the public sphere, their numbers have grown steadily in American politics. Correspondingly, gender representation grew in Iowa and Minnesota from 1975 to 2017. Iowa began with a higher percentage of women in the state legislature than Minnesota at the start of Minnesota’s public financing program. However, once the public financing program was implemented, Minnesota quickly overtook Iowa in terms of gender representation. On average, since 1981 Minnesota has led Iowa in state gender representation by 7 percentage points. My hypothesis that public financing increases gender representation is proven correct as gender representation did increase in Minnesota following the implementation of public financing, and it increased at a faster rate in Minnesota than in Iowa, a state without public financing. I conclude that the public financing program in Minnesota allows women to take advantage of a program that eases the perception that women cannot raise funds as well as men. As women began to win public office at increased rate, other women chose to seek elected office, which has resulted in an increase in female representation in the Minnesota state legislature.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The United States representative democracy ought to be representative of the genders that are governed by it, yet women are consistently underrepresented in legislative and executive offices although women are better political representatives of women than male representatives. Studies have shown that a correlation exists between women legislators and progressive policy on issues such as the environment and incarceration, and female legislators of both major parties introduce more bills related to civil rights, labor, and education than male legislators (Arceneaux; Hill). By implementing a public financing program, states can increase gender representation in elected office. Women perceive campaign fundraising to be more difficult for them as a gender, and public financing programs can give women the opportunity to overcome this obstacle. As more women are elected to political office, more women will be empowered to seek political office. I hope that my research will help shape policy concerning women and campaign finance. America cannot foster a truly inclusive environment for all citizens until women are on the same political playing field as men.
Appendix

**Table 1**: Average Levels of Female Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minnesota</th>
<th>Iowa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>0.0085</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p&lt;0.01</td>
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Table 2: Minnesota Gender Representation 1975 to 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># in House</th>
<th>Total House Seats</th>
<th>% Women in House</th>
<th># in Senate</th>
<th>Total Senate Seats</th>
<th>% Women in Senate</th>
<th>Total # of Women</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
<th>Total % in Legislature</th>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>201</td>
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<td>32.05%</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>201</td>
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<td>201</td>
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Table 3. Iowa Gender Representation 1975 to 2017

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Figure 1. Overall Female Representation

Figure 2. Female Representation by Legislature Chamber
Works Cited


