Romanian Autonomy and Arms Control Policies

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Recommended Citation
Romanian Autonomy and Arms

David S. Mason*

Romania has proved to be an interesting case of autonomy within the Soviet bloc. Romania’s foreign policy has been increasingly independent of Soviet dictates over the last two decades while domestic controls have remained as rigid as before. There have been a number of cases where the Romanian government has distanced itself from Soviet foreign policies, such as its refusal to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute; its support for Germany in 1967; and its unwillingness to participate in joint military exercises or the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Less well known is Romania’s unorthodox foreign policy in the area of arms control and disarmament, particularly with respect to nuclear arms. Romania has been East Europe’s most outspoken advocate for arms control and disarmament, particularly with respect to nuclear arms. Romania has been a vocal critic of the superpowers’ unwillingness to moderate their arms race. President Ceaușescu has proposed numerous, detailed plans for military disengagement and disarmament.

Romania’s geostrategic position helps explain its strong stance on disarmament policies. As a small state, concerned with its national sovereignty in the shadow of a great power, Romania has a major stake in arms control, especially nuclear weapons. To reduce armaments, especially nuclear weapons, it is vital that a greater equality for the smaller powers be achieved and that the prerogatives of the big ones be respected.

Romania’s policies on arms control may be an indication of how that country has tried to implement its own vision of world order. This vision includes a greater role for smaller states in the international arena, a decreased emphasis on the military aspects of international politics, and a consequent reduction in the importance of the superpowers’ prerogatives.
Romanian Autonomy and Arms Control Policies

David S. Mason*

Romania has proved to be an interesting case study of the limits of autonomy within the Soviet bloc. Romania’s foreign policy has become increasingly independent of Soviet dictates over the last fifteen years, while domestic controls have remained as rigid as any in Eastern Europe. There have been a number of cases where the Romanians have indicated in dramatic fashion their distance from Soviet foreign policy: their refusal to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute; their recognition of West Germany in 1967; and their unwillingness to participate in Warsaw Pact military exercises or the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Less well known is Romania’s unorthodox position on arms control and disarmament, particularly with respect to European security. Romania has been East Europe’s most outspoken critic of the arms race, and assigns equal blame to the superpowers for their inability or unwillingness to moderate this race. President Ceausescu and his representatives have proposed numerous, detailed, and far reaching plans for military disengagement and disarmament in Europe. And Romania has played an active and independent role in United Nations and other multilateral arms control forums.

Romania’s geostrategic position helps explain its arms control and disarmament policies. As a small state, concerned about maintaining its sovereignty in the shadow of a great power, and fearful of the possibility of a major war between the superpowers on European soil, Romania has a major stake in arms control, especially on the European continent. To reduce armaments, especially nuclear ones, would not only minimize the likelihood and consequences of a European war, but would provide greater equality for the smaller powers by reducing the military prerogatives of the big ones.

Romania’s policies on arms control may be viewed as a means by which that country has tried to implement its own vision of a desirable world order. This vision includes a greater role and autonomy for smaller states in the international arena, a decreased use of force in relations among states, a reduction in the importance of military blocs in international politics, and a consequent reduction in the predominance

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Many of Romania's foreign policy activities may be seen as instruments to achieve these goals. These include increased diplomatic and trade relations with Western and Third World states, increased participation in international organizations and multilateral forums, and increased propaganda, diplomacy, and activity in arms control and disarmament.

For Romania to achieve its goals would be to allow it a greater measure of autonomy, and to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union. In some respects, Romania seems to be following Marshall Singer's prescription for *Weak States in a World of Powers*, where he argues that 'power rests as much, or more, on the ability to attract as it does on the ability to coerce.' Romania's power of coercion vis à vis any state is quite small, so it has utilized diplomacy and trade as a means of 'attracting' other states to it. Singer identifies the three components of power as wealth, organization, and status. Again, in the absence of any great advantages in the first two, Romania has concentrated on the latter in its diplomatic activities, and with some degree of success. Singer counsels the weak states to diversify the powers upon which they depend, and to expand 'the degree of political consultation and accommodation' with other weak states. Romania has also done this, as will be seen below. The result is that Romania does seem to have moved from dependence on the Soviet Union toward interdependence, a much more stable and beneficial relationship for both, in Singer's view.

**Romania's World View**

Romania has proposed a 'new world order' in which all states are sovereign, independent, autonomous, and cooperative. Romania rejects supranational institutions, and stresses the importance of the national state, which 'has remained and will long remain an important motive force of social and political growth, of progress on a domestic and world scale.' The concepts of sovereignty and autonomous development have been important themes in Romanian foreign policy since the early 1960s, when two issues were driving Romania apart from the Soviet Union.

The first dispute was over Khrushchev's plan to increase the supranational functions of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) by calling for a 'socialist division of labor' in Eastern Europe, which would have required Romania to emphasize light industry and agricultural production. Romania rejected this formulation, and continued with its own economic plans for rapid industrialization. The second issue was the increasingly vitriolic Sino-Soviet dispute. Romania opposed the open airing of these differences and tried to play a mediating role between the two states at a number ofcommun 1959 and afterwards.

In 1964, the Romanian Party leadership was criticized by the Soviets and their efforts to communist states. In a dramatic 'Statement Romanian Workers' Party Concerning the Probl Communist and Working-Class Movement,' Central Committee in April 1964, the Roman CPSU and the CCP to avoid a split in the world and suggested that all the socialist countries s CMEA. The Statement also asserted the right of its own form of development, rejected the su CMEA and stressed the importance of nation. Finally, and noninterference in the affairs of one Romania's emphasis on sovereignty and ind its opposition to 'bloc politics,' the 'policy of domination of the small powers by the big W member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (V reduced its participation in that organization. T blocs was made clear by President Ceausescu in military blocs and the existence of military bloc the territory of other states are barriers in among the peoples. The existence of blocs troops to other countries, is an anachron independence and national sovereignty relations among states.

This position has led Romania to call for the blocs. It should be noted that the official Warsa the 'simultaneous' dismantling of WTO and in the Romanian and Soviet WTO view of the former finds fault with the system of blocs, the latter focuses on NATO as the primary obsta states. Romania's emphasis on sovereignty, and its blocs, has also led it to appeal for a reduction interstate relations. At the 12th Party Congress Ceausescu called for 'total elimination of the p international life, the elimination of interference other states, and the policy of spheres of inf From the Romanian point of view, of course these norms are the big powers. In fact, as the U.N. Disarmament Committee pointed out, the
which relations. Foreign policy activities may be seen as instru-
ments to achieve goals. These include increased diplomatic and
military activities, increased participation in organizations and
multilateral forums, and increased diplomacy, and activity in arms control and
arms control policies. In 1959 and afterwards.
In 1964, the Romanian Party leadership went public with its own
rapidecritism of the Soviets and their efforts to dominate the world
of communist states. In a dramatic ‘Statement on the Stand of the
Romanian Workers’ Party Concerning the Problems of the International
Communist and Working-Class Movement,’ adopted by the Party’s
Central Committee in April 1964, the Romanian Party called on the
CPSU and the CCP to avoid a split in the world communist movement
and suggested that all the socialist countries should participate in
CMEA. The Statement also asserted the right of each socialist country to
its own form of development, rejected the supranational functions of
CMEA and stressed the importance of national independence, sover-
eignty, and noninterference in the affairs of other states.

Romania’s emphasis on sovereignty and independence is reflected in
its opposition to bloc politics, the ‘policy of diktat,’ and the continued
domination of the small powers by the big. While Romania remains a
member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), it has substantially
reduced its participation in that organization. The Romanian position on
blocs was made clear by President Ceausescu in a 1966 speech:

In a ‘new world order’ in which all states are
autonomous, and cooperative. Romania rejects
these ideas, and stresses the importance of the national
sovereignty and autonomous development have
in Romanian foreign policy since the early 1960s,
giving Romania apart from the Soviet Union.

This position has led Romania to call for the abolition of all military
blocs. It should be noted that the official Warsaw Pact position is also for
the ‘simultaneous’ dismantling of WTO and NATO. The difference
in the Romanian and Soviet WTO view of military blocs is that while
the former finds fault with the system of blocs and bloc politics, the
latter focuses on NATO as the primary obstacle to cooperation among
states.

Romania’s emphasis on sovereignty, and its criticism of the military
blocs, has also led it to appeal for a reduction of the use of force in
interstate relations. At the 12th Party Congress in 1979, for example,
Ceausescu called for ‘total elimination of the policy of force and diktat in
international life, the elimination of interference in the domestic affairs
of other states, and the policy of spheres of influence.’

From the Romanian point of view, of course, the main violators of
these norms are the big powers. In fact, as the Romanian delegate to the
U.N. Disarmament Committee pointed out, the most damaging trends in
international affairs are caused, in part, by the intensification of the policy of domination and interference in the internal affairs of other states [and] the consolidation of spheres of influence. The Romanian Party opposed not only the threat or use of force in international politics, but also the 'import or export of revolution or counter-revolution.' The Romanian criticism of the big powers is most specific in terms of their military policies. They find the policies of exporting arms, establishing foreign military bases, and stationing troops in other countries to be both destabilizing of the international system, and exploitative of the recipient states. Ion Nicolae, writing in the foreign affairs weekly *Lumea*, finds that the deployment of troops and bases on foreign territories 'causes insecurity, tension, portends war, infringes the host states' independent policies, and stimulates arms proliferation.' Nicolae also asserts that:

The supply of weapons along with the assignment of military instructors and advisors are assets the military powers use to gain domineering positions in the importing states' economic and political life, and tutor these states' foreign policy in conformity with the suppliers' interests. It should be noted here that these Romanian assertions are different from similar Soviet ones in that they do not assign blame exclusively to the Western imperialist powers, as the Soviets do. The Romanians do not explicitly identify the Soviets as being at fault here, of course, but neither do they specifically exclude them from the category of 'big power.'

Romania has been evenhanded in its criticism of the big powers for the use of force in international relations. During the Vietnam war, Ceausescu was harshly critical of American policy. But Romania did not participate in the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and boldly criticized that action too. More recently Romania, unlike the other bloc states, refused to express support for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and abstained in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution criticizing the Soviet action. And with the beginning of unrest in Poland in the summer of 1980, the Romanian Party daily *Scintia* asserted that the problems 'can and must be solved by the Polish people ... with no outside interference.... The Polish nation has clearly stated its policy pointing out that by no means does it wish or want others to solve its problems.'

Romania's appeal for a reduction in the use of force and intimidation by the big powers has been accompanied by an argument for a greater role in international affairs for small and medium sized states no longer need to play the role of a big imperialist powers.' Romania has made a concerted effort to support smaller powers, particularly in international fora for such states outside of existing blocs, and leading role in procedural jockeying for full membership for all states 'outside of military alliances' at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1973; at the U.N. Disarmament Conference in 1979.

**Instruments of Romanian Policy**

Romania has adopted a number of foreign policy instruments outlined above. These include reduced economic dependence on the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, an expansion of diplomatic and trade relations with non-communist countries, increased participation in UN and other multilateral forums, and increased control and disarmament proposals and activities. The focus of this paper, the others provide for arms control policies, and will be reviewed briefly.

Romania has gradually reduced its involvement in wars and conflicts since the mid-1960s. As noted above, dispute between Romania and the Soviet Union economic planning within CMEA. Romania resisted the Soviet economic cooperation with the WTO. In the years 1966-1969 Romania reduced its military expenditures and gradually reduced its trade dependence on the Soviet Union, and continued with its efforts to integrate the Romanian economy, continued with its efforts to integrate the Romanian economy, and reduced its trade dependence on its trading partners within the WTO. In the years 1966-1969 Romania refused to participate in any member of that organization.

With the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, and Nicolae Ceausescu's leadership in March 1965, Romania's challenge thus began to spill into the military sphere and intrude within the WTO. In the years 1966-1969 Romania reduced its armed forces, reduced the length of military service, called for abolition of the military bloc, refused to participate in Soviet military mission in Bucharest, criticized Soviets in the WTO, refused to participate in, and refused to allow such exercises on Romanian territory. Romania has continued these policies affecting its relationship with the WTO, but also began...
are caused, in part, 'by the intensification of the threat or use of force in international politics, and interference in the internal affairs of other states. The Romanian threat is most specific in terms of exporting arms, military bases, and stationing troops in other states. They find the deployment of troops and bases on their territories insecurities, tension, portends war, infringes the sovereignty of the importing states, and stimulates arms proliferation.'

At: weapons along with the assignment of military advisors are assets the military powers use to gain advantages in the importing states' economic and strategic interests. Romania has made a concerted effort to achieve equal status for smaller powers, particularly in international forums, and greater participation for such states outside of existing blocs. Romania played a major and leading role in procedural jockeying for full and equal participation for all states 'outside of military alliances' at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1973; at the Vienna negotiations on mutual force reductions; and at the U.N. Disarmament Committee in 1979.

Instruments of Romanian Policy

Romania has adopted a number of foreign policy instruments in pursuit of the goals outlined above. These include reduced participation in and dependence on the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, an expansion of diplomatic and trade relations with non-communist countries, increased participation in international organizations and other multilateral forums, and increased emphasis on arms control and disarmament proposals and activities. While the last of these is the focus of this paper, the others provide a context for Romanian arms control policies, and will be reviewed briefly below.

Romania has gradually reduced its involvement in Soviet bloc activities since the mid-1960s. As noted above, the first major point of dispute between Romania and the Soviet Union was supranational economic planning within CMEA. Romania rejected Khrushchev's plan for the Romanian economy, continued with its own economic plans, and gradually reduced its trade dependence on its communist allies. By the 1970s, Romania's proportion of trade within CMEA was the smallest of any member of that organization.

With the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, and Nicolae Ceausescu's accession to leadership in March 1965, Romania's challenges to the Soviet Union began to spill into the military sphere and intrude on Romania's position under the WTO. In the years 1966-1969 Romania initiated unilateral reductions in its armed forces, reduced the length of compulsory military service, called for abolition of the military blocs, reduced the size of the Soviet military mission in Bucharest, criticized the dominant role of the Soviets in the WTO, refused to participate in joint WTO maneuvers, and refused to allow such exercises on Romanian soil. Romania has continued these policies affecting its military posture and its relationship with the WTO, but also began in the middle 1960s to

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adopt stances on major foreign policy issues that were quite independent of the Soviet and WTO line. In 1967, Romania became the first bloc state to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany. The same year, Romania was the only East European state not to sever relations with Israel after the June War. As already noted, Romania did not participate in the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, and harshly criticized that action.

Romania’s independent position in foreign affairs has required it to become more self-sufficient and autonomous in the military realm. This point should not be made too much of, since Romania remains a member of the Warsaw Pact, attends most Pact meetings, and expresses agreement with most of the documents that issue from that organization. But within these limits, the Ceausescu leadership has tried to become both less dependent on the Soviet Union for military protection, and better able to fend off erstwhile allies if it becomes necessary. This has posed something of a dilemma for the regime, since it has also persistently called for a reduction of force levels and military expenditures in Europe, and has tried to set an example in this regard, as will be discussed below. The result is that Romania has reduced the size of its regular armed forces and military budget, while at the same time it has built up its own production of military equipment and developed local and guerilla defenses for use in the event of an outside attack.

Romania’s military spending as a percentage of government spending and as a percentage of GNP is the smallest of the WTO, and its armed forces, as a percentage of eligible males, are also the smallest in the Pact. The country’s armed forces declined in size from 1965 to 1979, and in the last few years the government claims to have made cuts in defense expenditures as well. One result of this, whether intended or not, is that the Romanian military has become the least useful to the Soviet Union, strictly in numerical and technological terms. At the same time, to relieve itself of total dependence on the Soviet Union, Romania began production of light arms and military goods in the late 1960s, such that by 1975, Romania claimed to be producing 60% of the equipment necessary for its armed forces. There has also been a diversification of the sources of arms imports and production, with the purchase of American jet aircraft for military transport, and agreements with the British and West Germans for the production of transport aircraft, with the French for Alouette III helicopters and with the Yugoslavs for Orao fighter and ground attack aircraft.

The corollary to all of this is the system of total national defense, which is modeled on the Yugoslav practice. The origins for this go back to August 21, 1968, the day of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, when Ceausescu announced the formation of an armed patriotic guard of some 100,000. The system was formalized in a decree which provides for an “all horizons” defense, loc: the event of attack, and the decentralization of wartime.11 A 1979 ‘Decree on the Operation Units in Wartime’ provides for decentralized as well.12 So, according to The Military Balance proportionately the smallest military force (186,000) has, even in absolute terms, by far the largest forces (737,000; much larger than that of either Union) and the third largest number of reservists Union and Poland.15

Romania’s efforts to dissociate itself from the WTO have led it to diversify its diplomatic and the early 1960s, Romania found some room for the Soviet Union and China, and managed to mediate in that dispute. As it became clearer that it could be of little help to the Romanians, and Europe were reduced, Romania began to express West. By 1974, almost half of Romania’s trade with the United States, and there were rumors of purchase armaments from Western countries an agreement with Canada to purchase the first CANDU nuclear reactors. But by this time, the era of detente had all been useful to the West, consequently reducing Romanian dependence on the Soviet bloc by means of the middle 1970s, Romania began to associate the developing and non-aligned countries of the 1972 Party Conference Romania was formally nation, and in February 1976, Romania was elected to the World’s Group of 77. Romania’s foreign trade grew from 4% of the total in 1960 to over 10% of international meetings. Romania has also participated in the private meetings of the non-aligned rather than those of the Warsaw Pact. Romania has also gained worldwide visibility in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Romanian media report on bilateral and multilateral summits, usually featuring President Ceausescu committed itself heavily to participation in intergovernmental organizations, and internation Rom
for foreign policy issues that were quite independent of foreign policy line. In 1967, Romania became the first bloc state to sever relations with West Germany. The same year, Romania was the first East European state not to sever relations with West Germany. As already noted, Romania did not participate in intervention in Czechoslovakia, and harshly and independently in foreign affairs has required it to be efficient and autonomous in the military realm. This made too much of, since Romania remains a Pact state, attends most Pact meetings, and signs and ratifies most of the documents that issue from that organization. The Ceausescu leadership has tried to be dependent on the Soviet Union for military equipment and military help, and has tried to set an example in this regard, as well. The result is that Romania has reduced the size of its armed forces, has reduced the size of its defense budget, while at the same time it has increased the size of its paramilitary forces. There has also been a diversification of the remaining forces and production, with the purchase of American fighter aircraft and the French and with the Yugoslavs for Orao fighter aircraft. The origins of this are the system of total national defense, a Yugoslav practice. The origins for this go back day of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and marked the formation of an armed patriotic guard of some 100,000. The system was formalized in the Defense Law of 1972, which provides for an 'all horizons' defense, local and guerrilla actions in the event of attack, and the decentralization of military command in wartime. A 1979 'Decree on the Operation of Militarized Socialist Units in Wartime' provides for decentralized control of the economy as well. So, according to The Military Balance, while Romania has proportionately the smallest military force (180,000) in East Europe, it has, even in absolute terms, by far the largest number of paramilitary forces (737,000; much larger than that of either the GDR or the Soviet Union) and the third largest number of reservists, behind only the Soviet Union and Poland.

Romania's efforts to dissociate itself from the Soviet Union and the WTO have led it to diversify its diplomatic and economic ties as well. In the early 1960s, Romania found some room for itself in the gap between the Soviet Union and China, and managed rather effectively to play a mediating role in that dispute. As it became clear, however, that China could be of little help to the Romanians, and as Cold War tensions in Europe were reduced, Romania began to expand its contacts with the West. By 1974, almost half of Romania's trade was with the Western countries. By 1975, Romania had achieved most favored nation status with the United States, and there were rumors that it was attempting to purchase armaments from Western countries. In 1978, Romania signed an agreement with Canada to purchase the first of several 600 megawatt CANDU nuclear reactors. But by this time, the era of detente had already made Romania less useful to the West, consequently reducing Romania's ability to lever itself away from the Soviet bloc by means of the Western states. Thus, in the middle 1970s, Romania began to associate itself more and more with the developing and non-aligned countries of the Third World. In the July 1972 Party Conference Romania was formally identified as a developing nation, and in February 1976, Romania was admitted to the Third World's Group of 77. Romania's foreign trade with developing countries grew from 4% of the total in 1960 to over 18% in 1976. And in some international meetings, Romania has identified itself with, and often participated in the private meetings of, the nonaligned and neutral states rather than those of the Warsaw Pact.
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It has been especially active in multilateral forums on arms control and security, including the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its follow-up sessions; the Vienna negotiations on mutual force reductions in Europe; and the various U.N. disarmament forums.

All of these foreign policy actions have brought Romania closer to its desired position in the international political arena. Romania has been able to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, to make them less dependent on Romania, and to establish greater recognition of the regime as a relatively autonomous state in a divided Europe. These activities are complemented and enhanced by Romania's position on arms control and disarmament. These policies also may be viewed as instruments of Romanian foreign policy, in that they contribute to the country's long term and short term foreign policy goals. But it is also apparent that Ceausescu and the Romanian leadership view an end to the arms race as an important goal in itself.

Romanian Views on the Arms Race and Arms Control

The importance of disarmament in Romanian foreign policy is evident from the frequent references to this goal in the speeches of Ceausescu and other political leaders. The President has said, for example, that one of the historic missions of socialism and communism, besides the liberation of peoples from any domination and oppression, is that of saving mankind from a new war, of achieving disarmament and, first of all, nuclear disarmament.22

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Romania's criticisms of the arms race and appeals for disarmament did not always reflect a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the arms race and the political and technical complexities of arms control negotiations. Of late, however, this no longer seems to be the case; perhaps partially because of Romania's own participation in disarmament negotiations at the United Nations and in the Mutual Force Reduction talks in Vienna. Academic studies in particular increasingly demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of issues of strategy, proliferation, and arms control. Most of these rely heavily on the standard Western sources of data, such as SIPRI and IISS, and seem well acquainted with the major Western, particularly American, studies in this area.23

The Romanians see the main cause of the arms race as a structural one, resulting from the existence of competitive military blocs and the action-reaction phenomenon. Unlike the Soviet Union, Romania does not put the main responsibility on NATO, the United States, and

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The main and fundamental cause under post-war Europe resides in the structuring the old and noxious policy of the use and in the so-called 'balance of Eurostrategic dynamic and exponential growth in nation.'

Gheorghe Doigiu, similarly non-judgmental perpetrator of the arms race, identifies five continue: technological improvements, lead cycle; new military doctrines which envisage the on the battlefield; the competition for a pree socio-economic factors, such as the military-indust effort to form spheres of domination.25

Romanian delegates to international meeting assigning blame for the arms race. The Rom auN. Disarmament Committee, for example, f international disarmament negotiations was be poers' and the non-nuclear states and not, as a result of intransigence by the Western states2 expected, are not happy with this kind of app the same forum, Soviet ambassador Troyan assertions, 'particularly in this Organization' al of the great powers for the arms race.27

In discussing the consequences of the arm press typically cite the general negative effect on the global economy, often citing data f Military and Social Expenditures series. In mo somewhat more elaboration of the specific Eu European and Romanian security. Nicolae mented above, identifies several particular tizing aspects of the arms race: the possibility be used, thus destroying Europe; the dev 'limited' collateral destruction and the miniatures weapons lowering the nuclear threshold; and cated technology of weapons systems making.28 Romanian writers have also contende 'does not propose merely the absence of cen poses the establishment of a broad framev cooperation between all countries.29 The arm undermines efforts to build such cooperation.

While many of Romania's early propos sweeping and non-compromising, its prop
ARMS CONTROL

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ROMANIAN AUTONOMY AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES 21

gressive imperialist circles.' Nicolae Moraru, for example, writes:

The main and fundamental cause underlying the arms race in

ost-war Europe resides in the structuring of European security in

old and noxious policy of the use and/or threat of force ... and

the so-called 'balance of Eurostrategic forces' which entailed a
dynamic and exponential growth in national military potentials.24

Gheorghe Dolgu, similarly non-judgmental about the initiator and

petrator of the arms race, identifies five factors that allow it to

inue: technological improvements, leading to an action-reaction

cycle; new military doctrines which envisage the use of nuclear weapons

he battlefield; the competition for a preemptive strike capability;

ocio-economic factors, such as the military-industrial complex; and the
fort to form spheres of domination.25

Romanian delegates to international meetings are also evenhanded

assigning blame for the arms race. The Romanian representative to the

N. Disarmament Committee, for example, found that the impasse in

ternational disarmament negotiations was between the 'major nuclear

wers' and the non-nuclear states and not, as the Soviets would have it,
a result of intransigence by the Western states.26 The Soviets, as might be
pected, are not happy with this kind of approach to the question. In

same forum, Soviet ambassador Troyanovsky complained about

assertions, 'particularly in this Organization' about 'the equal responsi­

ility of the great powers for the arms race.'27

In discussing the consequences of the arms race, the Party and the

ress typically cite the general negative effect on European security and

on the global economy, often citing data from Ruth Sivard's

orld Military and Social Expenditures series. In more academic articles, there

fewhat more elaboration of the specific effects of the arms race on

uropean and Romanian security. Nicolae Moraru, in the article

ented above, identifies several particularly dangerous and destabi­
lizing aspects of the arms race: the possibility that nuclear weapons will

en, thus destroying Europe; the development of weapons of

ited' collateral destruction and the miniaturization of tactical nuclear

apons lowering the nuclear threshold; and the increasingly sophisti­
cated technology of weapons systems making negotiations more diffi­
cult.28 Romanian writers have also contended that security in Europe
'does not propose merely the absence of certain conflicts, but presup­
oses the establishment of a broad framework of collaboration and

eration between all countries.'29 The arms race, it is argued, simply

inutes efforts to build such cooperation.

While many of Romania's early proposals for disarmament were

weeping and non-compromising, its proposals have recently become
increasingly specific and detailed. In the United Nations, for example, while the Soviets often abstain on specific arms control resolutions because they are too limited or narrow, Romania votes for virtually every resolution in this area, including some which are meant to be seen as alternatives to each other. The Romanians emphasize the need for immediate, concrete, and partial measures, believing that general disarmament may be some years down the road. As a consequence of these different approaches to arms control, the Romanian and Soviet delegations often find themselves voting on opposite sides on U.N. disarmament resolutions.

In resolutions on arms control that were adopted (and in which there was a vote) at the 33rd Session of the General Assembly (1978-9), Romania voted yes on all 22 such resolutions, while the Soviets (and the other WTO states) abstained or voted against on eleven of them. In the 34th Session the next year, Romania and the Soviet Union voted together on eleven resolutions and against each other on eight. As is apparent, Romanian views on the arms race and arms control are quite different from those of the Soviet Union, just as their views on other foreign policy issues differ. As will be seen in the following section, these differences are reflected in the specific arms control proposals that the Romanians have put forward over the years.

Romanian Disarmament and Arms Control Proposals

Like other Warsaw Pact states Romania has long favored a number of arms control measures, ranging from limitations on troop movements along borders, to total disarmament and a prohibition of the use of force in the conduct of interstate relations. Like all such proposals, they are a mixture of propaganda and serious intent. But it seems from the prominence given such proposals by Romanian party officials, diplomats, and academics, the sheer persistence with which these proposals are advanced, and the important differences between Romanian and WTO proposals, that Romania does have a serious interest in arms control.

The Romanians, like the Soviets, have put forward dozens of arms control and disarmament proposals over the years. In the 1960s, Romanian proposals largely reflected those of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, and therefore tended to be comprehensive. The 1964 Party Statement, for example, simply expressed support for the Soviet proposals for ending the production and eventual destruction of nuclear weapons, the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories, and the abolition of all armed forces. It also expressed support for the 1960 WTO appeal for the banning of the testing of nuclear weapons and for the abolition of military blocs.

In recent years, Romanian arms control proposals on their own merits, usually without reference to proposals. Many of the Romanian and WTO p. similar, but some are quite different. There is an emphasis that the Romanians or the Soviets g. The main independent proposals emphasize recent years are for the reduction of military bases, and for regional nuclear free zones, the similar to WTO pronouncements.

The Reduction of Military Budgets

One of Romania's most frequently and insist recent years has been for the freezing and military budgets. These appeals have been esp. 1978 decisions by NATO and the WTO to the Romanian proposals in this regard predates Romania proposed to the Conference of the Co (the recently enlarged Eighteen Nation Dis series of disarmament measures, including freezing and subsequent reduction of the military put forward a similar proposal at talks for the CSCE in 1973. The proposal became a major one for important and divisive issue between Moso meeting of the WTO Heads of State in Moso NATO Council had just adopted a deep appropriations by each of the member states for increased defense spending and tighter the Warsaw Pact. Ceausescu refused to go alone; his return to Romania stated that 'we have to reduce military expenditures, which two socialist countries 'should say a resolute n. the Romanian position on the reduction of remained the formula since that time: The starting point should be a freeze troops, and armaments at the level of gradually cut back at a first stage by 1985.
and detailed. In the United Nations, for example, often abstain on specific arms control resolutions no limited or narrow. Romania votes for virtually this area, including some which are meant to be seen each other. The Romanians emphasize the need for, and partial measures, believing that general some years down the road. As a consequence of, reaches to arms control, the Romanian and Soviet themselves voting on opposite sides on U.N. votes.

arms control that were adopted (and in which there 33rd Session of the General Assembly (1978-9), in all 22 such resolutions, while the Soviets (and the obtained or voted against on eleven of them. In the next year, Romania and the Soviet Union voted solutions and against each other On eight. 30

Romanian views on the arms race and arms control are those of the Soviet Union, just as their views on issues differ. As will be seen in the following section, reflected in the specific arms control proposals that cut forward over the years.

and Arms Control Proposals

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In recent years, Romanian arms control proposals have been advanced on their own merits, usually without reference to similar WTO or Soviet proposals. Many of the Romanian and WTO proposals are the same, or similar, but some are quite different. There are also differences in the emphasis that the Romanians or the Soviets give to various proposals. The main independent proposals emphasized by the Romanians in recent years are for the reduction of military budgets, and the establishment of demilitarized zones along national borders. They have also appealed for the elimination of military blocs and foreign military bases, and for regional nuclear free zones, though these proposals are similar to WTO pronouncements.

The Reduction of Military Budgets

One of Romania's most frequently and insistently voiced demands in recent years has been for the freezing and subsequent reduction of military budgets. These appeals have been especially consistent since the 1978 decisions by NATO and the WTO to increase defense spending, but the Romanian proposals in this regard predate those decisions. In 1970, Romania proposed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (the recently enlarged Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee) a series of disarmament measures, including a proposal for the early freezing and subsequent reduction of the military budgets of all states. Romania put forward a similar proposal at the Helsinki preparatory talks for the CSCE in 1973.

The proposal became a major one for the Romanians, and an important and divisive issue between Moscow and Bucharest at the meeting of the WTO Heads of State in Moscow in November 1978. The NATO Council had just adopted a decision to increase military appropriations by each of the member states, and Moscow was calling for increased defense spending and tighter military integration in the Warsaw Pact. Ceausescu refused to go along with these plans, and on his return to Romania stated that 'we have undertaken no commitment and do not intend to increase our military expenditures.' He expressed disapproval of the May NATO decision, but also asserted that the socialist countries 'should say a resolute "no" to the arms race' and should 'reduce military expenditures, which are a heavy burden on all the peoples, including the socialist peoples.' Ceausescu went on to state the Romanian position on the reduction of military budgets, which has remained the formula since that time:

The starting point should be a freeze on military expenditures, troops, and armaments at the level of 1978, which should then be gradually cut back at a first stage by at least 10-15 per cent by 1985.
Ceausescu argued that all this was necessary both to reduce international tensions and to help end the arms race, and that it was possible because the danger of war or military action was not imminent.

The Soviet reaction to all of this has been ambivalent. The Russians seem initially to have followed the Romanian lead on the reduction of military budgets. In 1973, three years after the first Romanian proposal, the Soviets introduced into the General Assembly a resolution calling for a 10% reduction in military expenditures by each of the permanent members of the Security Council, and the allocation of part of the released funds for development assistance.

Until 1978, then, the Soviet and Romanian positions were quite similar. But when Ceausescu refused to go along with the WTO budget increases, Brezhnev criticized those whose 'demagogic arguments' could lead to 'the weakening of our defenses in the face of the growing military might of imperialism.' Nevertheless, perhaps partially as a compromise to the Romanians, the WTO Communique of November 1978 included a proposal for the reduction of military budgets 'whether by equal parts, percentage, or in absolute terms' and this formula has been repeated in subsequent Pact Communiques and in Soviet proposals to the United Nations. But the Soviet Union and all the WTO states except Romania voted against a U.N. General Assembly Resolution adopted in 1978 which provided for a standard international system of measuring and reporting military budgets, and declined to participate in the test of the system in 1979.

The basic Romanian proposals on military budgets have continued to be pressed, both in speeches and in multilateral forums, though there have been some elaborations on the theme. At the U.N. Commission on Disarmament in May 1979, the 10-15% formula was repeated, but 'with considerably bigger reductions for the heavily armed countries.' And in November 1980, at the U.N. Disarmament Committee, the Romanians put forward the proposition that the nuclear states and those most heavily armed should be the first to engage in the process of freezing and reducing military budgets.

In following its own prescriptions Romania claims to have effected major reductions in its own military budget in each of the last three years - by some 500 million lei (about 4% of the defense budget) in 1979 and by nearly 2 billion lei (16%) in 1980. In 1979, the savings were diverted to increasing state allowances for children. And in the U.N., UNCTAD and other forums, Romania has no doubt won favor among its Third World friends by proposing a Common Development Fund, to be furnished by developed countries' contributions from military spending, to be used primarily for developing countries with annual per capita GNP's of less than $600.

While most Romanian arms control proposals WTO initiatives, on the topic of military movements and maneuvers has been since 1968. The Romanian delegates at the Helsinki particularly interested in the CBM (Confidence the final document, which provided for prior maneuvers of over 25,000 troops within 250 frontiers. Romania has also been very active encouraged by the Helsinki agreements. In defense officials between the U.S. and the WT and 1979, Romania has had eight exchange Soviet Union and one for Hungary. At the C Madrid in December 1980, Romania pro Confidence Building and Disarmament in Eur There are two unique proposals in this: Romanians in recent years: one for a cessatio near national borders; and another for a de NATO and the WTO. Romania has periodic maneuvers in Europe be ended altogether. T Romanian position at both the Helsinki prep and at the Geneva Disarmament Committee more realistic proposal for the ending of m borders of other states was first enunciated at t convention in Czechoslovakia but was not system late 1970s. At the CSCE Review Conference Romanian proposals included a cessation of m the frontiers of participating states. In Ceaus after the Warsaw Pact meeting calling for clo military expenditures, he called for reducing ever 'and generally all displays of force, in national borders of other States.' Then in 1979 advanced at the U.N. Special Session on Disarm a shutdown of military bases in the block 15-20 kilometer wide security belts if neither troops nor weapons should ever be...
that all this was necessary both to reduce international tension and end the arms race, and that it was possible because military action was not imminent.35

On to all of this has been ambivalent. The Russians followed the Romanian lead on the reduction of military expenditures by each of the permanent Security Council, and the allocation of part of the development assistance.36

The Soviet and Romanian positions were quite different from anything proposed by its allies, and are not mentioned or reflected in WTO documents. Romania's interest in military movements and maneuvers has been evident ever since August 1968. The Romanian delegates at the Helsinki CSCE Conference were particularly interested in the CBM (Confidence Building Measures) in the final document, which provided for prior notification of any military maneuvers of over 25,000 troops within 250 kilometers of national frontiers.40

Nevertheless, perhaps partially as a compromise, the WTO Communiqué of November 1978 included a 10-15% formula for reducing military budgets 'whether by equal parts, or other terms' and this formula has been repeated in communiques and in Soviet proposals to the United Nations and all the WTO states except Romania.43

In the meantime, Romania claims to have effected its own military budget in each of the last three years: an initial lei (about 4% of the defense budget) in 1979, and lei (16%) in 1980.44

Confidence Building Measures and Restrictions on Military Maneuvers

While most Romanian arms control proposals are similar to Soviet or WTO initiatives, on the topic of military maneuvers Romania's suggestions are quite different from anything proposed by its allies, and are not mentioned or reflected in WTO documents. Romania's interest in military movements and maneuvers has been evident ever since August 1968. The Romanian delegates at the Helsinki CSCE Conference were particularly interested in the CBM (Confidence Building Measures) in the final document, which provided for prior notification of any military maneuvers of over 25,000 troops within 250 kilometers of national frontiers.40 Romania has also been very active in the military exchanges encouraged by the Helsinki agreements. In the exchange of senior defense officials between the U.S. and the WTO countries between 1975 and 1979, Romania has had eight such exchanges compared to six for the Soviet Union and one for Hungary.41 At the CSCE followup meeting in Madrid in December 1980, Romania proposed a Conference on Confidence Building and Disarmament in Europe.42

There are two unique proposals in this area put forward by the Romanians in recent years: one for a cessation of military maneuvers near national borders; and another for a demilitarized zone between NATO and the WTO. Romania has periodically suggested that military maneuvers in Europe be ended altogether. This was an element in the Romanian position at both the Helsinki preparatory conference in 1973 and at the Geneva Disarmament Committee in 1979. Their somewhat more realistic proposal for the ending of military maneuvers on the borders of other states was first enunciated at the time of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia but was not systematically developed until the late 1970s. At the CSCE Review Conference in Belgrade in 1977-8, the Romanian proposals included a cessation of multinational maneuvers near the frontiers of participating states.42 In Ceausescu's December 1978 speech, after the Warsaw Pact meeting calling for closer integration and higher military expenditures, he called for reducing and halting military maneuvers 'and generally all displays of force, in the neighborhood of the national borders of other States.'43 Then in 1979, the following proposal was advanced at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament:

- a shutdown of military bases in the border area and creation of 15-20 kilometer wide security belts from the borderline where neither troops nor weapons should ever station.44

The other major proposal in this area is for a demilitarized strip between the two blocs. This was first suggested by Ceausescu in his December 1978 speech, as follows:
It would perhaps be useful to establish a strip between the two blocs, stretching on each side, free of all troops and weapons, and from which all maneuvers and military displays would be banned. In February of 1979, Ceausescu elaborated on this proposal, suggesting that the buffer zone should be 80-100 kilometers wide and that only a small national force on each side should be located there. This proposal was put to the Geneva Disarmament Committee that same month.

Both of these sets of proposals are very different from, and much more thoroughgoing than, anything the Soviets have proposed in recent years. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact proposals have been much more limited, for example, to earlier prior notification of land maneuvers, limitation of maneuvers to 50,000 men, and extension of CBM to naval and aerial maneuvers, and to the Mediterranean. The Romanian proposals, understandably, have not even been mentioned by the Soviet Union or the other members of the Warsaw Pact. They pertain, of course, to an area of utmost sensitivity to Soviet defense planners, and the implementation of such measures would severely restrict the intimidating kind of maneuvers practiced in and around Czechoslovakia before their intervention there, and on the borders with Poland more recently. This, of course, may be precisely why the Romanians have proposed them.

Dissolving the Military Blocs

Romania has, since the 1964 Party Statement, persistently called for the abolition of all military blocs though, in most respects, its appeals here have followed very closely those of the Soviet Union and the WTO. In fact, the Warsaw Treaty itself, signed in 1955 in response to the integration of West Germany into NATO, states that the Organization will be dissolved as soon as NATO is. The appeal for the dissolution of the blocs has been renewed periodically by the WTO. In 1966, the organization proposed the 'simultaneous' dissolution of existing military alliances or, as a first step, the abolition of the military organizations within the alliances. This formula was disaggregated and made even less demanding in 1978, when the WTO called for dissolution of the military organizations 'starting with a mutual reduction of military activity.' Ceausescu repeated this formula in a speech just one month after the Pact meeting.

Despite the apparent consonance of views on the dissolution of the military blocs between Romania and the Soviet Union, there are some important differences in both emphasis and motive. As noted above, the Romanians have different views from the Soviets on the role of the blocs in international affairs, with the former assigning both blocs responsibility...
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It was also useful to establish a strip between the two sides of the war, free of all troops and weapons, and all maneuvers and military displays would be prohibited. Ceausescu elaborated on this proposal, suggesting that it should be 80-100 kilometers wide and that only a few troops should be located there. This proposal was presented to the Disarmament Committee that same month. The proposals are very different from, and much more extensive than, anything the Soviets have proposed in recent years. The Warsaw Pact proposals have been much more limited, requiring prior notification of land maneuvers, limitation of military activity to defense planners, and extension of CBM to naval and aerial operations. The Romanian proposals, however, have never been mentioned by the Soviet Union or its allies. They pertain, of course, to an activity that is not even within the scope of NATO. They pertain to the Mediterranean. The Romanian proposals, which are not even within the scope of NATO, are not even within the scope of the Warsaw Pact. They pertain, of course, to an activity that is not even within the scope of NATO. They pertain to the Mediterranean. The Romanian proposals, however, have never been mentioned by the Soviet Union or its allies. They pertain, of course, to an activity that is not even within the scope of NATO. They pertain to the Mediterranean.

Ceausescu has, as noted above, identified military bases and foreign troops as anachronisms ‘inconsistent with the independence and national sovereignty of peoples.’ The Warsaw Pact position, on the other hand, is that while foreign military forces per se are not bad, the existence of military blocs and military bases on territories of other states, imposed by the imperialist forces, constitute an obstacle to cooperation among states. The Soviets, after the relinquishment of their bases in China and Finland in 1955 and 1956, felt that they had no foreign military bases, though Soviet troops remained stationed in the GDR, Hungary, and Poland and, after 1968, in Czechoslovakia. That the Romanians do not agree with the Soviet definition of foreign military bases is clear from their frequent mentioning of the 700 foreign military bases in eighteen European countries. Since there are only thirteen European NATO states (one of which, France, has no foreign bases on its territory), it seems that the Romanians view the Soviet forces in NATO countries as not being bases but as being obstacles to cooperation. The Romanians take a negative view of all military bases which, far from protecting the respective peoples, are a source of pressure and interference in the domestic affairs of the respective countries.
In terms of continuity and consistency, the Romanian proposals are also different from the Soviets'. While the Soviets and the WTO have for a long time advocated the abolition of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops, these have not always been prominent in the lexicon of Soviet disarmament proposals. While the July 1966 WTO Communiqué called attention to military bases, these proposals gradually disappeared as negotiations for the Helsinki conference got under way. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet and Pact statements simply called for reductions of armed forces in Europe. Not until the November 1978 WTO meeting was the formula on military bases and foreign troops revived. It was repeated in both the 1979 and 1980 WTO Communiqués, although it was not among the list of proposals made by Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981.

For the Romanians, on the other hand, proposals for eliminating foreign military bases, or withdrawing foreign troops, or both have been voiced continuously since at least the 1964 Party Statement, in official speeches and before the U.N. and the CSCE. In 1971, a new twist was added in a Romania-Yugoslav joint communiqué, in which a call for the banning of new military bases and new nuclear weapons on foreign territory was added to the old formula. In his December 1978 speech, Ceausescu included all these elements plus asking for a pledge from other states not to accept foreign military bases. His formula, as follows, is essentially the one that has been pursued by Romania since then:

Equally important would be pledges not to station more troops and weapons on the territory of other States, and to begin gradually to reduce and then withdraw all foreign troops to within their own national borders, as well as to dismantle military bases, primarily nuclear ones, from the territory of other states; and pledges by all the States not to permit foreign bases on their territory...

Again we see that the Romanian formula is much more specific than the WTO's rather cursory mention of 'the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from other peoples' territories.' The Romanian proposal is both more serious and more practical, in that it contains intermediate steps and gradual measures for achieving the final goal.

Nuclear free zones

Another proposal that is commonly associated with the Romanians is for the creation of a nuclear free zone in the Balkans. In fact, this has not been one of the major Romanian interests in recent years, and current Romanian ideas on this are similar to those of the Soviets. The first proposal of this nature was made by Romanian Prime Minister Stoica in September of 1957, when he suggested a con on Balkans into a 'peace zone'. But he did not mention nuclear weapons. This issue was first several days after Soviet Premier Khrushchev, proposed creating a zone 'free from missiles and Balkans and part of the Adriatic region. This conveyed by the Soviet government to six West 25, but they eventually rejected it. In 1963, a initiative for a demilitarized zone in the Medit States was then replacing its missile bases in C Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, and it well.

After this point, the idea of a Balkan nuclear major element in the Romanian, or Warsaw Pact. The Romanian Party Statement of 1964 did call in a number of regions, including the Balkan zone, was never supported by the general Pact policy for nuclear free zones in Europe. In recent speeches on arms control, the idea of a nuclear free zone at all.

The Romanian retreat on this issue may be due the Khrushchev initiatives and of the Rapacz Gomulka Plan of 1964 for nuclear free zones in Europe, and there may be have been the feeling that the proposal nuclear free zones, for example the one in the Romanian, or Warsaw Pact, military bases, especially nuclear ones, for use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nuclear weapons to be introduced in Europe.

Other Arms Control Issues

The issues discussed so far are all arms control issues that divide the Soviet Union and China the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, and this has been Moscow. While the Romanian Communist banning of the testing of nuclear weapons in not done so since. The Romanians have re
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In turn and consistency, the Romanian proposals are the Soviets'. While the Soviets and the WTO have for the abolition of foreign bases and the withdrawal, these have not always been prominent in the lexicon of proposals. While the July 1966 WTO Communiqué military bases, these proposals gradually disappeared the Helsinki conference got under way. During the 1970s, Soviet and Pact statements simply called for forces in Europe. Not until the November 1978 the formula on military bases and foreign troops in both the 1979 and 1980 WTO Communiques, among the list of proposals made by Brezhnev at the in February 1981.

Romanian interests in recent years, and current issues are similar to those of the Soviets. The first was made by Romanian Prime Minister Stoica in September of 1957, when he suggested a conference to convert the Balkans into a 'peace zone'. But he did not at that time explicitly mention nuclear weapons. This issue was first raised on June 6, 1959, several days after Soviet Premier Khrushchev, during a visit to Albania, proposed creating a zone 'free from missiles and atomic weapons' in the Balkans and part of the Adriatic region. This proposal was formally conveyed by the Soviet government to six Western governments on June 25, but they eventually rejected it. In 1963, the Soviets revived the initiative for a denuclearized zone in the Mediterranean. But the United States was then replacing its missile bases in Greece and Turkey with Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, and rejected this proposal as well.

After this point, the idea of a Balkan nuclear free zone was never a major element in the Romanian, or Warsaw Pact, arms control packages. The Romanian Party Statement of 1964 did call for denuclearized zones in a number of regions, including the Balkans. But the idea of a specifically Balkan zone was never supported in official WTO statements and the Romanian proposal gradually came to reflect the more general Pact policy for nuclear free zones 'in various areas, including Europe'. In recent speeches on arms control, Ceausescu has not mentioned nuclear free zones at all.

The Romanian retreat on this issue may be due in part to the failure of the Khrushchev initiatives and of the Rapacki Plan of 1958 and the Gomulka Plan of 1964 for nuclear free zones in Central Europe. But there may also have been the feeling that the nuclear free zone plan was redundant alongside other Romanian proposals for eliminating foreign military bases, especially nuclear ones, for pledges by nuclear states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear ones, and for no new nuclear weapons to be introduced in Europe.

Other Arms Control Issues

The issues discussed so far are all arms control proposals which have not yet been implemented. There has also been some disagreement between the Soviet Union and Romania on arms control agreements that have been reached, especially the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Romanians have been noticeably quiescent on the issue of nuclear weapons testing, probably because of their reluctance to take sides on an issue that divides the Soviet Union and China. The PRC has not signed the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, and this has been a source of irritation to Moscow. While the Romanian Communist Party did mention the banning of the testing of nuclear weapons in its 1964 Statement, it has not done so since. The Romanians have refrained from supporting the
Soviet proposals for a complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests and, more recently, for a one year moratorium on such testing, presumably also in deference to China.

On the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Romania has been skeptical from the beginning, feeling that it was biased in favor of the nuclear powers. In a major speech on foreign policy in 1967, Ceausescu expressed reservations with non-proliferation that many non-nuclear powers shared:

Without precise, firm, and efficient measures on the part of all states for ceasing the production of nuclear weapons, for reducing and ultimately liquidating the existing stockpiles, nonproliferation would not only fail to secure progress along the way of liquidating the danger of nuclear war, but would bring about its indefinite perpetuation.

Ceausescu also wanted assurances that the NPT would allow unrestricted access to nuclear energy and that the non-nuclear states would get security guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against them or used to menace them.

Romania's unhappiness with the eventual treaty was such that it refused to sign a WTO Declaration endorsing the Treaty, the first time that a WTO document was not unanimously accepted. And Romania delayed signing the Treaty until February of 1970. Since that time, Romania has complained that the nuclear powers have not kept their side of the deal, have continued vertical proliferation, and have obstructed the transfer of peaceful nuclear energy to non-nuclear countries, particularly developing countries. One can infer that these last charges are aimed particularly at the Soviet Union, especially since Romania has recently contracted with Canada to purchase nuclear reactors.

Romania's Long Term Foreign Policy Goals and Arms Control

Romania's arms control policies have been an important tool of Romania's foreign policy. They have helped Romania achieve some autonomy within the Soviet bloc, and have contributed to each of the four major elements of Romania's vision of a desirable world order: sovereignty and independence for all states, a reduction of the importance of the military blocs, a decline in the use or threat of force, and an enhanced role for small states in international politics.

Romania's emphasis on sovereignty, independence, and the importance of the national state has been supported by its arms control proposals and policies in two important ways. First of all, many of the country's arms control proposals are aimed at territorial integrity of states. The arguments against foreign military bases and troops, and the propo zones are all aimed at restoring the sovereignty particularly the weaker ones. Second, the very maverick position on arms control issues fortifies in foreign and military policy, and acts as an ex Romania's rejection of supranational coordination and military spending is also a demonstration and independence and sovereignty.

Ceausescu's opposition to 'bloc politics' and the powers has also been supported by his arms control policies. Most importantly, of course, Romania has renounced participation in its own bloc by refusing to partake in maneuvers or to allow such maneuvers on Romanian soil along with several WTO initiatives (such as the increases in military spending); and by abstaining from actions such as the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Romania has expressed its differences with the purposes and usefulness of military blocs and has advocated their abolition. Most importantly, perhaps, Romania has publicly declared that its allies on the need to strengthen the military command and control. While the rest of the Pact has increased military capabilities, Romania has cut back in these areas, particularly in developing countries. One can infer that these last charges are aimed particularly at the Soviet Union, especially since Romania has recently contracted with Canada to purchase nuclear reactors.

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Country’s arms control proposals are aimed at trying to preserve the territorial integrity of states. The arguments against military blocs, foreign military bases and troops, and the proposals for demilitarized zones are all aimed at restoring the sovereignty of European states, particularly the weaker ones. Second, the very nature of Romania’s maverick position on arms control issues fortifies its own independence in foreign and military policy, and acts as an example to other states. Romania’s rejection of supranational coordination of military maneuvers and military spending is also a demonstration and affirmation of its own independence and sovereignty.

Ceausescu’s opposition to ‘bloc politics’ and the domination of the big powers has also been supported by his arms control and military policies. Most importantly, of course, Romania has removed itself from full participation in its own bloc by refusing to participate in WTO maneuvers or allow such maneuvers on Romanian soil; by refusing to go along with several WTO initiatives (such as the NPT, initially, and increases in military spending); and by abstaining from major WTO actions such as the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Romania has expressed its differences with the Soviet Union on the purposes and usefulness of military blocs and has insistently advocated their abolition. Most importantly, perhaps, Romania differs from its allies on the need to strengthen the military component of the Warsaw Pact. While the rest of the Pact has increased military spending and capabilities, Romania has cut back in these areas, and has called upon its allies to do likewise. Romania has built up its civilian defense force (which is modeled on that of the Yugoslavs), which is useful only for defensive operations against an enemy invading Romanian territory. It has cut back, at the same time, on the forces that would be most useful for the rapid, mobile, and offensive actions the Soviets envisage in a European conflict. Romania has then, by both word and deed, removed itself from the arena of East-West conflict.

Most of these policies also support Romania’s position on the elimination of the use of force in international politics. Romania is particularly concerned about the possible use of nuclear weapons in Europe, and sees in their use the probable destruction of the continent. Romanian commentators also contend that a major conflict in Europe is likely to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, Romania believes, the European states should try to avoid stepping on to even that first rung of the conflict ladder, and must avoid altogether the use of force in their relations.

In line with this, Romania has argued for efforts to reduce both the means of conflict, and the occasions that might lead to conflict. Romania’s proposals for reduction in military budgets, conventional

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arms, military bases, and nuclear weapons support the former, and
the proposals for nuclear free zones, demilitarized borders, and increased
reliance on diplomacy support the latter.

The commitment to diplomacy is also evident from Romania's record
on arms control deliberations, which demonstrate that it is committed as
much to the process of arms control negotiations as it is to the outcome.
In Romania's view, the primary drawback of the arms race is that it
increases tension and reduces the possibility for international coopera-
tion, particularly in Europe. Thus, Romania often emphasizes limited
measures in arms control, rather than the grandiose schemes often put
forward by the Soviet Union. While the outcomes from such limited
accords might not be as dramatic, they can develop some measure of
trust and lead to further negotiations. Romania has expressed support
for the SALT Treaty, and for Brezhnev's October 1979 initiatives, in this
kind of language. Romania's commitment to, and involvement in,
multilateral forums on arms control, is also a measure of its interest in
the process of arms control negotiations. The Romanian leaders clearly
hope that negotiations on arms, and the conclusion of a network of arms
control agreements, will reduce the incentive of states to rely on force in
their international behavior.

Romania's argument for a more visible role for small states in the
international arena has been supported in three ways by its arms control
policies. First, Romania has increased its own autonomy by demonstrat-
ing, in a public and visible fashion, its distance from the Soviet Union on some
arms control issues. It should be emphasized here that Romania's policies in
this area are not so much defiant as simply autonomous. Romania has, in
fact, supported most of the major Soviet initiatives in arms control, and has
attached its signature to all of the Warsaw Pact communiques on these
issues. The only Soviet initiative that the Romanians have not supported for
political reasons is the comprehensive test ban.

On the other hand, Romania has not simply toed the Soviet line on
arms control issues. Some Romanian proposals, most especially those on
demilitarized zones on the borders of states and between the two blocs,
have been totally independent of the Soviet line. Others have been
similar to Soviet or WTO proposals, but have differed in the details or
the emphasis given the proposal. There have also been substantial
differences in the context within which the Romanians and the Soviets
place various arms control initiatives. The Soviets are much more likely
to assign the blame for the arms race to the United States and NATO.
Romania, in refusing to be so specific, by implication also faults the
Soviet Union.

There are two further ways by which Romania's arms control policies
have enhanced the role of small states. By the sheer persistence with

Romanian autonomy and arms control policies which Ceausescu has pursued arms control issues, h
an active, visible and exemplary role as a small state
arena. And in many of these international forums
enhance the role of all small states by arguing for
participation by all states on important arms control
Romania's use of arms control as an instrument
implications for other states as well. Weak states c
of the Powers, by hammering away at policies which
pursue. This may even affect the policies of the I
that in most cases the Soviets have simply I
their own way, the prospect of a dissenter within t
major arms control initiative must surely temper S
indeed, it does appear that many of the Warsaw Pa
control have touched on issues or included words
Romanians, suggesting some measure of bargaining
within the organization.

The relationship between Romania and the Sov-
some respects to that between the United States particularl
on arms control issues. Just as Romania
on some arms limitations measures than the Sovi
reducing the other. European states have been reluctant partners with
NATO decision to emplace Pershing II and cruise
example, was paired with a commitment to negoti
limitations, largely at European insistence. Belgium
have even delayed their decision on accepting the
evidence of progress on theater arms control.

Historically, the Romanian position within W
French within NATO. France withdrew from m
NATO in 1966, and closed down NATO bases.
action with respect to the WTO in the same per
may be deliberately patterning its behavior on th
former President de Gaulle. Ceausescu's inter
operation and his enthusiasm for the nation
Gaulle's, Romania's 'all horizons' defense law on
'tous azimuts' defense plan adopted in the late 60's
Gaulle's. Romania's 'all horizons' defense law on
cooperation and his enthusiasm for the nation
Gaulle's. Romania's 'all horizons' defense law on
NATO disengaging from NATO. And after Romania's
Pact allies on military spending in December 19
pointedly and approvingly mentioned de Gaulle
NATO.72

So just as the European allies of the Uni
tempered American policies, and required a so
view of communism and the Soviet Union, Roma
ARMS CONTROL

...and security issues. The Romanian leaders clearly favor arms control, and the conclusion of a network of arms controls will reduce the incentive of states to rely on force in behavior. The relationship between Romania and the Soviet Union is similar in some respects to that between the United States and its NATO allies, particularly on arms control issues. Just as Romania has pressed harder on some arms limitations measures than the Soviets have, and has been reluctant to join the chorus denouncing the other side, some of the West European states have been reluctant partners within NATO. The recent NATO decision to emplace Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, for example, was paired with a commitment to negotiation on theater arms limitations, largely at European insistence. Belgium and the Netherlands have even delayed their decision on accepting these missiles, pending evidence of progress on theater arms control.

Historically, the Romanian position within WTO most resembles the French within NATO. France withdrew from military participation in NATO in 1966, and closed down NATO bases. Romania took similar action with respect to the wro in the same period. In fact, Romania may be deliberately patterning its behavior on the French, particularly on former President de Gaulle. Ceausescu's interest in all-European cooperation and his enthusiasm for the nation-state, is similar to de Gaulle's. Romania's 'all horizons' defense law of 1972 recalls France's 'tous azimuts' defense plan adopted in the late 1960s when France was disengaging from NATO. And after Romania's disagreement with its Pact allies on military spending in December 1978, a Scinteia editorial pointedly and approvingly mentioned de Gaulle's 1966 decision on NATO.²

So just as the European allies of the United States have often tempered American policies, and required a somewhat less dogmatic view of communism and the Soviet Union, Romania may help to temper...
Soviet proposals. To the extent that these efforts by small states to promote arms control are successful, even more benefits rebound to them. The Europeans are, after all, the ones who have the most to lose in the event of another major war. Romania has emphasized this time and again. In an era in which superpowers are about to remilitarize, the best hope of peace may rest with the weak but sensible states.

NOTES
2. Ibid., pp. 309, 416.
7. Cited in Bogdan.
10. Ion Nicolaie, 'Political Spillover of the Arms Race,' Lumea, 28 September - 4 October 1979, p. 16.
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23. See for example Nicolae Ecobescu and Vasile Secares, 'Flaws of the Concept of "Arms Control,"' Revue Roumaine, 14, no. 3 (1980), pp. 217-34; and Sergiu Verona, 'Deman
32. 'Speech by President Ceausescu,' 1 December 1978,' Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 86.
34. Scintexa, 21 December 1978, cited in RFER IRSR, 19 Ma
37. The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 1978 and 19
38. Constantine Ent, 'Disarmament,' Lumea, 7-13 September
39. United Nations General Assembly, 35th Session, 1st Co
41. Ent, p. 19.
42. Braun, p. 116.
45. John Toogood, 'Military Aspects of the Belgrade R
46. See for example Nicolae Ecobescu and Vasile Secares, 'Flaws of the Concept of "Arms Control,"' Revue Roumaine, 14, no. 3 (1980), pp. 217-34; and Sergiu Verona, 'Deman
48. See President Ceausescu,' p. 87.
49. Ent, p. 18-20.
50. "Speech by President Ceausescu,' p. 87.
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52. See President Ceausescu,' p. 87.
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55. See for example Nicolae Ecobescu and Vasile Secares, 'Flaws of the Concept of "Arms Control,"' Revue Roumaine, 14, no. 3 (1980), pp. 217-34; and Sergiu Verona, 'Deman
57. Nicolae Calina, 'A Symposium of the Association for Peace in Romania,' JPRS, 19 March 1980, p. 75.
60. 'Speech by President Ceausescu,' 1 December 1978,' Ibid.
61. Ibid., p. 86.
62. Scintexa, 21 December 1978, cited in RFER IRSR, 19 Ma
65. The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 1978 and 19
66. Constantine Ent, 'Disarmament,' Lumea, 7-13 September
67. United Nations General Assembly, 35th Session, 1st Co
69. Ent, p. 19.
73. John Toogood, 'Military Aspects of the Belgrade R
74. See for example Nicolae Ecobescu and Vasile Secares, 'Flaws of the Concept of "Arms Control,"' Revue Roumaine, 14, no. 3 (1980), pp. 217-34; and Sergiu Verona, 'Deman
76. See President Ceausescu,' p. 87.
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80. See for example Nicolae Ecobescu and Vasile Secares, 'Flaws of the Concept of "Arms Control,"' Revue Roumaine, 14, no. 3 (1980), pp. 217-34; and Sergiu Verona, 'Deman
81. See President Ceausescu,' p. 87.
83. Scintexa, 13 and 23 February 1979, and RFER IRSR, 19
84. See President Ceausescu,' p. 87.
ARMS CONTROL

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NOTES


6. 'The Warsaw Pact,' in Romania's European Strategy, America, Praeger, 1976, p. 44.


10. 'Speech by President Ceausescu,' pp. 84-7.

11. Ibid., p. 86.

12. lJrua in 1969; emphasis added.


15. 'Speech by President Ceausescu,' 1 December 1979.' Ibid., pp. 84-7.

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22. 'Survival 21 (March/April 1979): 80.


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30. 'Speech by President Ceausescu,' p. 87.


34. Ibid., p. 19.


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39. 'Speech by President Ceausescu,' p. 87.


46. Enn., p. 18-20.

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56. Sciences, 8 May 1966.

57. Pravdia, 9 July 1966; emphasis added.
The author wishes to acknowledge support for research on this article from the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar program and the Summer Slavic Research Laboratory at the University of Illinois.
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