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Romanian Autonomy and Arms Control Policies

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Book Reviews
Romanian Autonomy and Arms

David S. Mason*

Romania has proved to be an interesting case of autonomy within the Soviet bloc. Romania's foreign policy has been increasingly independent of Soviet dictates over the past decade while domestic controls have remained as rigid as ever. There have been a number of cases where the Romanians stood out in dramatic fashion their distance from Soviet control. These include their refusal to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the decision not to support East Germany in 1967, and their unwillingness to participate in military exercises or the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Less well known is Romania's unorthodox but effective approach to arms control and disarmament, particularly with respect to its relations with the West. Romania has been one of the few Eastern European countries to recognize the need to reduce arms, especially nuclear weapons, and to pursue active policies of disarmament. This is in contrast to other countries in the region, which have been more reluctant to engage in such efforts.

Romania's geostrategic position helps explain its interest in arms control. As a small state, it is vulnerable to external pressures and has a major stake in reducing the likelihood and consequences of a major war between the superpowers. Romania has a major interest in avoiding such a conflict and in promoting greater equality for the smaller powers in the international arena.

Romania's policies on arms control may be seen as a reflection of the country's broader vision for the world order. This vision includes a greater role for states in international affairs, a decreased reliance on the superpowers, and a consequent reduction in the importation of international politics, and a consequent reduction in the importation of international politics, and a consequent reduction in the importation of international politics.
Romanian Autonomy and Arms Control Policies

David S. Mason*

Romania has proved to be an interesting case study of the limits of autonomy within the Soviet bloc. Romania's foreign policy has become increasingly independent of Soviet dictates over the last fifteen years, while domestic controls have remained as rigid as any in Eastern Europe.

There have been a number of cases where the Romanians have indicated in dramatic fashion their distance from Soviet foreign policy: their refusal to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute; their recognition of West Germany in 1967; and their unwillingness to participate in Warsaw Pact military exercises or the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Less well known is Romania's unorthodox position on arms control and disarmament, particularly with respect to European security. Romania has been East Europe's most outspoken critic of the arms race, and assigns equal blame to the superpowers for their inability or unwillingness to moderate this race. President Ceausescu and his representatives have proposed numerous, detailed, and far reaching plans for military disengagement and disarmament in Europe. And Romania has played an active and independent role in United Nations and other multilateral arms control forums.

Romania's geostrategic position helps explain its arms control and disarmament policies. As a small state, concerned about maintaining its sovereignty in the shadow of a great power, and fearful of the possibility of a major war between the superpowers on European soil, Romania has a major stake in arms control, especially on the European continent. To reduce armaments, especially nuclear ones, would not only minimize the likelihood and consequences of a European war, but would provide greater equality for the smaller powers by reducing the military prerogatives of the big ones.

Romania's policies on arms control may be viewed as a means by which that country has tried to implement its own vision of a desirable world order. This vision includes a greater role and autonomy for smaller states in the international arena, a decreased use of force in relations among states, a reduction in the importance of military blocs in international politics, and a consequent reduction in the predominance...
of security issues in such relations.

Many of Romania’s foreign policy activities may be seen as instruments to achieve these goals. These include increased diplomatic and trade relations with Western and Third World states, increased participation in international organizations and multilateral forums, and increased propaganda, diplomacy, and activity in arms control and disarmament.

For Romania to achieve its goals would be to allow it a greater measure of autonomy, and to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union. In some respects, Romania seems to be following Marshall Singer’s prescription for Weak States in a World of Powers, where he argues that ‘power rests as much, or more, on the ability to attract as it does on the ability to coerce.’ Romania’s power of coercion vis-à-vis any state is quite small, so it has utilized diplomacy and trade as a means of ‘attracting’ other states to it. Singer identifies the three components of power as wealth, organization, and status. Again, in the absence of any great advantages in the first two, Romania has concentrated on the latter in its diplomatic activities, and with some degree of success. Singer counsels the weak states to diversify the powers upon which they depend, and to expand ‘the degree of political consultation and accommodation’ with other weak states. Romania has also done this, as will be seen below. The result is that Romania does seem to have moved from dependence on the Soviet Union toward interdependence, a much more stable and beneficial relationship for both, in Singer’s view.

**Romania’s World View**

Romania has proposed a ‘new world order’ in which all states are sovereign, independent, autonomous, and cooperative. Romania rejects supranational institutions, and stresses the importance of the national state, which ‘has remained and will long remain an important motive force of social and political growth, of progress on a domestic and world scale.’ The concepts of sovereignty and autonomous development have been important themes in Romanian foreign policy since the early 1960s, when two issues were driving Romania apart from the Soviet Union.

The first dispute was over Khrushchev’s plan to increase the supranational functions of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) by calling for a ‘socialist division of labor’ in Eastern Europe, which would have required Romania to emphasize light industry and agricultural production. Romania rejected this formulation, and continued with its own economic plans for rapid industrialization. The second issue was the increasingly vitriolic Sino-Soviet dispute. Romania opposed the open airing of these differences and tried to play a mediating role between the two states at a number of commissures in 1959 and afterwards.

In 1964, the Romanian Party leadership was a criticism of the Soviets and their efforts to influence communist states. In a dramatic ‘Statement of Romanian Workers’ Party Concerning the Problem of the Communist and Working-Class Movement,’ Central Committee in April 1964, the Romanian CPSU and the CCP to avoid a split in the world and suggested that all the socialist countries s CMEA. The Statement also asserted the right of its own form of development, rejected the CMEA and stressed the importance of nationh eighty, and noninterference in the affairs of other. Romania’s emphasis on sovereignty and in opposition to ‘bloc politics,’ the ‘policy of domination of the small powers by the big. W member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (V reduced its participation in that organization. T blocs was made clear by President Ceausescu in military blocs and the existence of militar the territory of other states are barriers in among the peoples. The existence of blocs to other countries, is an anachron independence and national sovereignty relations among states.

This position has led Romania to call for the blocs. It should be noted that the official Warsaw the ‘simultaneous’ dismantling of WTO and in the Romanian and Soviet WTO view of the the former finds fault with the system of blocs. the latter focuses on NATO as the primary obstinates. Romania’s emphasis on sovereignty, and it has also led it to appeal for a reduction in one-state relations. At the 12th Party Congress Ceausescu called for ‘total elimination of the international life, the elimination of interfer of other states, and the policy of spheres of influence. From the Romanian point of view, of cou these norms are the big powers. In fact, as the U.N. Disarmament Committee pointed out, the
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Foreign policy activities may be seen as instru­
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international participation in Western and Third World states, increased participa-
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diplomacy, and activity in arms control and
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**Romania’s World View**

With a ‘new world order’ in which all states are
sovereign and autonomous, and cooperative, Romania rejects
this, and stresses the importance of the national
sovereignty and autonomous development have
in Romanian foreign policy since the early 1960s,
leaving Romania apart from the Soviet Union.

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‘socialist division of labor’ in Eastern Europe,
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between the two states at a number of communist party conferences in
1959 and afterwards.

In 1964, the Romanian Party leadership went public with its own
criticism of the Soviets and their efforts to dominate the world
of communist states. In a dramatic ‘Statement on the Stand of
the Romanian Workers’ Party Concerning the Problems of the International
Communist and Working-Class Movement,’ adopted by the Party’s
Central Committee in April 1964, the Romanian Party called on the
CPSU and the CCP to avoid a split in the world communist movement
and suggested that all the socialist countries should participate in
CMEA. The Statement also asserted the right of each socialist country to
its own form of development, rejected the supranational functions of
CMEA and stressed the importance of national independence, sover­
eignty, and noninterference in the affairs of other states. 4

Romania’s emphasis on sovereignty and independence is reflected in
its opposition to ‘bloc politics,’ the ‘policy of diktat,’ and the continued
domination of the small powers by the big. While Romania remains a
member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), it has substantially
reduced its participation in that organization. The Romanian position on
blocs was made clear by President Ceausescu in a 1966 speech:

> military blocs and the existence of military bases and of troops on
> the territory of other states are barriers in the path of collaboration
> among the peoples. The existence of blocs, as well as the sending of
troops to other countries, is an anachronism inconsistent with the
independence and national sovereignty of peoples and normal
relations among states. 5

This position has led Romania to call for the abolition of all military
blocs. It should be noted that the official Warsaw Pact position is also for
the ‘simultaneous’ dismantling of WTO and NATO. The difference
in the Romanian and Soviet WTO view of military blocs is that while
the former finds fault with the system of blocs and bloc politics, the
latter focuses on NATO as the primary obstacle to cooperation among
states. 6

Romania’s emphasis on sovereignty, and its criticism of the military
blocs, has also led it to appeal for a reduction of the use of force in
interstate relations. At the 12th Party Congress in 1979, for example,
Ceausescu called for ‘total elimination of the policy of force and diktat
in international life, the elimination of interference in the domestic affairs
of other states, and the policy of spheres of influence.’ 7

From the Romanian point of view, of course, the main violators of
these norms are the big powers. In fact, as the Romanian delegate to the
U.N. Disarmament Committee pointed out, the most damaging trends in
international affairs are caused, in part, 'by the intensification of the policy of domination and interference in the internal affairs of other states [and] the consolidation of spheres of influence.' The Romanian Party opposed not only the threat or use of force in international politics, but also the 'import or export of revolution or counter-revolution.'

The Romanian criticism of the big powers is most specific in terms of their military policies. They find the policies of exporting arms, establishing foreign military bases, and stationing troops in other countries to be both destabilizing of the international system, and exploitative of the recipient states. Ion Nicolae, writing in the foreign affairs weekly Lumea, finds that the deployment of troops and bases on foreign territories 'causes insecurity, tension, portends war, infringes the host states' independent policies, and stimulates arms proliferation.'

Nicolae also asserts that:

The supply of weapons along with the assignment of military instructors and advisors are assets the military powers use to gain domineering positions in the importing states' economic and political life, and tutor these states' foreign policy in conformity with the suppliers' interests.

It should be noted here that these Romanian assertions are different from similar Soviet ones in that they do not assign blame exclusively to the Western imperialist powers, as the Soviets do. The Romanians do not explicitly identify the Soviets as being at fault here, of course, but neither do they specifically exclude them from the category of 'big power.'

Romania has been evenhanded in its criticism of the big powers for the use of force in international relations. During the Vietnam war, Ceausescu was harshly critical of American policy. But Romania did not participate in the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and boldly criticized that action too. More recently Romania, unlike the other bloc states, refused to express support for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and abstained in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution criticizing the Soviet action. And with the beginning of unrest in Poland in the summer of 1980, the Romanian Party daily Scinteia asserted that the problems 'can and must be solved by the Polish people ... with no outside interference....' The Polish nation has clearly stated its policy pointing out that by no means does it wish or want others to solve its problems.

Romania's appeal for a reduction in the use of force and intimidation by the big powers has been accompanied by an argument for a greater role in international affairs for small and medium sized states no longer need 'to play the role of p. big imperialist powers.' Corneliu Bogdan ev writers as Alastair Buchan and Klaus Knorr on the small states to defy the big ones.

Romania has made a concerted effort to i smaller powers, particularly in international for petition for such states outside of existing blocs, and leading role in procedural jockeying for ful for all states 'outside of military alliances' at the Cooperation in Europe in 1973; at the U.N. Dis 1979.

**Instruments of Romanian Policy**

Romania has adopted a number of foreign poli of the goals outlined above. These include red dependence on the Warsaw Pact and the Cour Assistance, an expansion of diplomatic and t communist countries, increased participation i nations and other multilateral forums, and inc control and disarmament proposals and activit is the focus of this paper, the others provide arms control policies, and will be reviewed brief Romania has gradually reduced its invo activities since the mid-1960s. As noted above, dispute between Romania and the Soviet U economic planning within CMEA. Romania re the Romanian economy, continued with its gradually reduced its trade dependence on it 1970s, Romania's proportion of trade within C any member of that organization.

With the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, and Nico leadership in March 1965, Romania's chall began to spill into the military sphere and intru within the WTO. In the years 1966-1969 ROJ reductions in its armed forces, reduced the service, called for abolition of the military b Soviet military mission in Bucharest, criticized Soviets in the WTO, refused to participate i and refused to allow such exercises on Roman Ro Romania has continued these policies affecti relationship with the WTO, but also beg
are caused, in part, by the intensification of the threat or use of force in international politics, by export of revolution or counter-revolution. The Romanian assertion of big power primacy in terms of destabilizing the international system and recipient states. Ion Nicolae, writing in the foreign press, finds that the deployment of troops and bases on bases portends war, infringes the sovereignty of the recipient states, and stimulates arms proliferation. 

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are in pursuit of the goals outlined above. These include reduced participation in and dependence on the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, an expansion of diplomatic and trade relations with non-communist countries, increased participation in international organizations and other multilateral forums, and increased emphasis on arms control and disarmament proposals and activities. While the last of these is the focus of this paper, the others provide a context for Romanian arms control policies, and will be reviewed briefly below. 

Romania has gradually reduced its involvement in Soviet bloc activities since the mid-1960s. As noted above, the first major point of dispute between Romania and the Soviet Union was supranational economic planning within CMEA. Romania rejected Khrushchev's plan for the Romanian economy, continued with its own economic plans, and gradually reduced its trade dependence on its communist allies. By the 1970s, Romania's proportion of trade within CMEA was the smallest of any member of that organization. 

Romania has continued these policies affecting its military posture and its relationship with the WTO, but also began in the middle 1960s to
adopt stances on major foreign policy issues that were quite independent of the Soviet and WTO line. In 1967, Romania became the first bloc state to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany. The same year, Romania was the only East European state not to sever relations with Israel after the June War. As already noted, Romania did not participate in the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, and harshly criticized that action.

Romania's independent position in foreign affairs has required it to become more self-sufficient and autonomous in the military realm. This point should not be made too much of, since Romania remains a member of the Warsaw Pact, attends most Pact meetings, and signs and expresses agreement with most of the documents that issue from that organization. But within these limits, the Ceausescu leadership has tried to become less dependent on the Soviet Union for military protection, and better able to fend off erstwhile allies if it becomes necessary. This has posed something of a dilemma for the regime, since it has also consistently called for a reduction of force levels and military expenditures in Europe, and has tried to set an own example in this regard, as will be discussed below. The result is that Romania has reduced the size of its regular armed forces and military budget, while at the same time it has built up its own production of military equipment and developed local and guerilla defenses for use in the event of an outside attack.

Romania's military spending as a percentage of government spending and as a percentage of GNP is the smallest of the WTO, and its armed forces, as a percentage of eligible males, are also the smallest in the Pact. The country's armed forces declined in size from 1965 to 1979, and in the last few years the government has made cuts in defense expenditures as well. One result of this, whether intended or not, is that the Romanian military has become the least useful to the Soviet Union, strictly in numerical and technological terms. At the same time, to relieve itself of total dependence on the Soviet Union, Romania began production of light arms and military goods in the late 1960s, such that by 1975, Romania claimed to be producing 60% of the equipment necessary for its armed forces. There has also been a diversification of the sources of arms imports and production, with the purchase of American jet aircraft for military transport, and agreements with the British and West Germans for the production of transport aircraft, with the French for Alouette III helicopters and with the Yugoslavs for Orao fighter and ground attack aircraft.

The corollary to all of this is the system of total national defense, which is modeled on the Yugoslav practice. The origins for this go back to August 21, 1968, the day of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, when Ceausescu announced the formation of an armed patriotic guard of some 100,000. The system was formalized in a decree which provides for an "all horizons" defense, loc: the event of attack, and the decentralization of wartime. A 1979 Decree on the Operation Units in Wartime provides for decentralized well. So, according to The Military Balance, proportionately the smallest military force (186,000, even in absolute terms, by far the largest forces (737,000; much larger than that of either Union) and the third largest number of reservists Union and Poland. Romania's efforts to dissociate itself from the WTO have led it to diversify its diplomatic and early 1960s, Romania found some room for the Soviet Union and China, and managed a mediation role in that dispute. As it became clear, it could be of little help to the Romanians, and Europe were reduced, Romania began to exp. By 1974, most of Romania's arms were produced in countries. By 1975, Romania had achieved its own production of military equipment and developed local and guerilla defenses for use in the event of an outside attack.

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for foreign policy issues that were quite independent of the TO line. In 1967, Romania became the first bloc state to sever relations with West Germany. The same year, it was the only East European state not to sever relations with West Germany. As already noted, Romania did not participate in intervention in Czechoslovakia, and harshly independent position in foreign affairs has required it to be efficient and autonomous in the military realm. This made too much of, since Romania remains a key Pact state, attends most Pact meetings, and signs and ratifies most of the documents that issue from that. Within these limits, the Ceausescu leadership has tried to be dependent on the Soviet Union for military aid able to fend off erstwhile allies if it becomes clear something of a dilemma for the regime, since it called for a reduction of force levels and military spending as a percentage of government spending. If GNP is the smallest of the WTO, and its armed forces declined in size from 1965 to 1979, the government claims to have made cuts in well. One result of this, whether intended or not, military has become the least useful to the Soviet Union, and the dependence on the Soviet Union, Romania began to associate itself more and more with the developing and non-aligned countries of the Third World. In the July 1972 Party Conference Romania was formally identified as a developing nation, and in February 1976, Romania was admitted to the Third World's Group of 77. Romania's foreign trade with developing countries grew from 4% of the total in 1960 to over 18% in 1976. And in some international meetings, Romania has identified itself with, and often participated in the private meetings of, the nonaligned and neutral states rather than those of the Warsaw Pact.

Romania has also gained worldwide visibility by playing an active role in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Almost every day, the Romanian media report on bilateral communiques, agreements, or summits, usually featuring President Ceausescu. Romania has also committed itself heavily to participation in international meetings, intergovernmental organizations, and international agreements. In 1972, Romania became the first eastern bloc member of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It has been especially active in multilateral forums on arms control and security, including the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its follow-up sessions; the Vienna negotiations on mutual force reductions in Europe; and the various U.N. disarmament forums.

All of these foreign policy actions have brought Romania closer to its desired position in the international political arena. Romania has been able to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, to make them less dependent on Romania, and to establish greater recognition of the regime as a relatively autonomous state in a divided Europe. These activities are complemented and enhanced by Romania's position on arms control and disarmament. These policies also may be viewed as instruments of Romanian foreign policy, in that they contribute to the country's long term and short term foreign policy goals. But it is also apparent that Ceausescu and the Romanian leadership view an end to the arms race as an important goal in itself.

**Romanian Views on the Arms Race and Arms Control**

The importance of disarmament in Romanian foreign policy is evident from the frequent references to this goal in the speeches of Ceausescu and other political leaders. The President has said, for example, that one of the historic missions of socialism and communism, besides the liberation of peoples from any domination and oppression, is that of saving mankind from a new war, of achieving disarmament and, first of all, nuclear disarmament.22

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Romania's criticisms of the arms race and appeals for disarmament did not always reflect a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the arms race and the political and technical complexities of arms control negotiations. Of late, however, this no longer seems to be the case, perhaps partially because of Romania's own participation in disarmament negotiations at the United Nations and in the Mutual Force Reduction talks in Vienna. Academic studies in particular increasingly demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of issues of strategy, proliferation, and arms control. Most of these rely heavily on the standard Western sources of data, such as SIPRI and IISS, and seem well acquainted with the major Western, particularly American, studies in this area.23

The Romanians see the main cause of the arms race as a structural one, resulting from the existence of competitive military blocs and the action-reaction phenomenon. Unlike the Soviet Union, Romania does not put the main responsibility on NATO, the United States, and

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"aggressive imperialist circles." Nicolae Moraru, f

The main and fundamental cause under post-war Europe resides in the structuring the old and noxious policy of the use and in the so-called 'balance of Eurostrategic dynamic and exponential growth in nation'.

Gheorghe Doiug, similarly non-judgmental perpetuator of the arms race, identifies five continue: technological improvements, leadir cycle; new military doctrines which envisage th on the battlefield; the competition for a pere socio-economic factors, such as the military-ind effort to form spheres of domination.25

Romanian delegates to international meetings assigning blame for the arms race. The Roman U.N. Disarmament Committee, for example, for international disarmament negotiations was be and the non-nuclear states and not, as a result of intransigence by the Western states expected, are not happy with this kind of app the same forum, Soviet ambassador Troyan assertions, 'particularly in this Organization' al territory of the great powers for the arms race.26

In discussing the consequences of the arm press typically cite the general negative effect on the global economy, often citing data from Military and Social Expenditures series. In mos somewhat more elaboration of the specific European and Romanian security. Nicolae mentioned above, identifies several particularizing aspects of the arms race: the possibility be used, thus destroying Europe; the development 'limited' collateral destruction and the miniatures weapons lowering the nuclear threshold; and cated technology of weapons systems making 28 Romanian writers have also contended 'does not propose merely the absence of cen positions the establishment of a broad framev cooperation between all countries.'29 The arm undermines efforts to build such cooperation.

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ARMS CONTROL

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Introduction

Policy actions have brought Romania closer to its role in the international political arena. Romania has been independent on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact countries, and to establish greater time as a relatively autonomous state in a divided

ties are complemented and enhanced by Romania’s control and disarmament. These policies also may be part of Romanian foreign policy, in that they are long and short term foreign policy goals that Ceausescu and the Romanian leadership view as an important goal in itself.

The Arms Race and Arms Control

A arms race is evident in Romania foreign policy in evident references to this goal in the speeches of Ceausescu and others. The President has said, for example, that

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ternal sources of data, such as SIPRI and IISS, and on the major Western, particularly Ameri-

the main cause of the arms race as a structural given by the existence of competitive military blocs and the tension. Unlike the Soviet Union, Romania does not propose merely the absence of certain conflicts, but presupposes the establishment of a broad framework of collaboration and cooperation between all countries. The arms race, it is argued, simply undermines efforts to build such cooperation.

While many of Romania’s early proposals for disarmament were sweeping and non-compromising, its proposals have recently become

"aggressive imperialist circles." Nicolae Moraru, for example, writes:

The main and fundamental cause underlying the arms race in post-war Europe resides in the structuring of European security in the old and pernicious policy of force and or threat of force ... and in the so-called ‘balance of Eurostrategic forces' which entailed a dynamic and exponential growth in national military potentials.

Georghe Dolgu, similarly non-judgmental about the initiator and perpetuator of the arms race, identifies five factors that allow it to continue: technological improvements, leading to an action-reaction cycle; new military doctrines which envisage the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield; the competition for a preemptive strike capability; socio-economic factors, such as the military-industrial complex; and the effort to form spheres of domination.

Romanian delegates to international meetings are also evenhanded in assigning blame for the arms race. The Romanian representative to the U.N. Disarmament Committee, for example, found that the impasse in international disarmament negotiations was between the ‘major nuclear powers' and the non-nuclear states and not, as the Soviets would have it, a result of intransigence by the Western states. The Soviets, as might be expected, are not happy with this kind of approach to the question. In the same forum, Soviet ambassador Troyanovsky complained about assertions, particularly in this Organization about 'the equal responsibility of the great powers for the arms race.'

In discussing the consequences of the arms race, the Party and the press typically cite the general negative effect on European security and on the global economy, often citing data from Ruth Sivard's World Military and Social Expenditures series. In more academic articles, there is somewhat more elaboration of the specific effects of the arms race on European and Romanian security. Nicolae Moraru, in the article mentioned above, identifies several particularly dangerous and destabilizing aspects of the arms race: the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used, thus destroying Europe; the development of weapons of ‘limited' collateral destruction and the miniaturization of tactical nuclear weapons lowering the nuclear threshold; and the increasingly sophisticated technology of weapons systems making negotiations more difficult. Romanian writers have also contended that security in Europe ‘does not propose merely the absence of certain conflicts, but presupposes the establishment of a broad framework of collaboration and cooperation between all countries.' The arms race, it is argued, simply undermines efforts to build such cooperation.

While many of Romania’s early proposals for disarmament were sweeping and non-compromising, its proposals have recently become

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increasingly specific and detailed. In the United Nations, for example, while the Soviets often abstain on specific arms control resolutions because they are too limited or narrow, Romania votes for virtually every resolution in this area, including some which are meant to be seen as alternatives to each other. The Romanians emphasize the need for immediate, concrete, and partial measures, believing that general disarmament may be some years down the road. As a consequence of these different approaches to arms control, the Romanian and Soviet delegations often find themselves voting on opposite sides on U.N. disarmament resolutions.

In resolutions on arms control that were adopted (and in which there was a vote) at the 33rd Session of the General Assembly (1978-9), Romania voted yes on all 22 such resolutions, while the Soviets (and the other WTO states) abstained or voted against on eleven of them. In the 34th Session the next year, Romania and the Soviet Union voted together on eleven resolutions and against each other on eight.20

As is apparent, Romanian views on the arms race and arms control are quite different from those of the Soviet Union, just as their views on other foreign policy issues differ. As will be seen in the following section, these differences are reflected in the specific arms control proposals that the Romanians have put forward over the years.

Romanian Disarmament and Arms Control Proposals

Like other Warsaw Pact states Romania has long favored a number of arms control measures, ranging from limitations on troop movements along borders, to total disarmament and a prohibition of the use of force in the conduct of interstate relations. Like all such proposals, they are a mixture of propaganda and serious intent. But it seems from the prominence given such proposals by Romanian party officials, diplomats, and academics, the sheer persistence with which these proposals are advanced, and the important differences between Romanian and WTO proposals, that Romania does have a serious interest in arms control.

The Romanians, like the Soviets, have put forward dozens of arms control and disarmament proposals over the years. In the 1960s, Romanian proposals largely reflected those of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, and therefore tended to be comprehensive. The 1964 Party Statement, for example, simply expressed support for the Soviet proposals for ending the production and eventual destruction of nuclear weapons, the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories, and the abolition of all armed forces. It also expressed support for the 1960 WTO appeal for the banning of the testing of nuclear weapons and for the abolition of military blocs.

In recent years, Romanian arms control proposals have focused on their own merits, usually without reference to proposals. Many of the Romanian and WTO proposals are similar, but some are quite different. There is an emphasis that the Romanians or the Soviets get.

The main independent proposals emphasize recent years are for the reduction of military establishments of demilitarized zones along national borders, as well as for the elimination of military bases, and for regional nuclear free zones, similar to WTO pronouncements.

The Reduction of Military Budgets

One of Romania's most frequently and insistently expressed views is for the freezing and reduction of military budgets. These appeals have been constant in recent years, and in 1978 decisions by NATO and the WTO to increase defense spending were not lost on the Romanians. The proposal became a major one for the first time in recent years, when NATO and the WTO to increase defense spending were not lost on the Romanians. The proposal became a major one for the first time in recent years, when NATO and the WTO to increase defense spending were not lost on the Romanians.

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The starting point should be a freeze on military budgets, and the gradual cut back at a first stage by 1985.
and detailed. In the United Nations, for example, often abstain on specific arms control resolutions so limited or narrow, Romania votes for virtually his area, including some which are meant to be seen each other. The Romanians emphasize the need for, and partial measures, believing that general some years down the road. As a consequence of measures to arms control, the Romanian and Soviet and themselves voting on opposite sides on U.N. ions.

arms control that were adopted (and in which there 33rd Session of the General Assembly (1978-9), in all 22 such resolutions, while the Soviets (and the obtained or voted against on eleven of them. In the next year, Romania and the Soviet Union voted solutions and against each other on eight.39

Romanian views on the arms race and arms control are those of the Soviet Union. Just as their views on issues differ. As will be seen in the following section, reflected in the specific arms control proposals that put forward over the years.

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ROMANIAN AUTONOMY AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

In recent years, Romanian arms control proposals have been advanced on their own merits, usually without reference to similar WTO or Soviet proposals. Many of the Romanian and WTO proposals are the same, or similar, but some are quite different. There are also differences in the emphasis that the Romanians or the Soviets give to various proposals. The main independent proposals emphasized by the Romanians in recent years are for the reduction of military budgets, and the establishment of demilitarized zones along national borders. They have also appealed for the elimination of military blocs and foreign military bases, and for regional nuclear free zones, though these proposals are similar to WTO pronouncements.

The Reduction of Military Budgets

One of Romania’s most frequently and insistently voiced demands in recent years has been for the freezing and subsequent reduction of military budgets. These appeals have been especially consistent since the 1978 decisions by NATO and the WTO to increase defense spending, but the Romanian proposals in this regard predate those decisions. In 1970, Romania proposed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (the recently enlarged Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee) a series of disarmament measures, including a proposal for the early freezing and subsequent reduction of the military budgets of all states.31 Romania put forward a similar proposal at the Helsinki preparatory talks for the CSCE in 1973.

The proposal became a major one for the Romanians, and an important and divisive issue between Moscow and Bucharest at the meeting of the WTO Heads of State in Moscow in November 1978. The NATO Council had just adopted a decision to increase military appropriations by each of the member states, and Moscow was calling for increased defense spending and tighter military integration in the Warsaw Pact.32 Ceausescu refused to go along with these plans, and on his return to Romania stated that ‘we have undertaken no commitment and do not intend to increase our military expenditures.’ He expressed disapproval of the May NATO decision, but also asserted that the socialist countries ‘should say a resolute “no” to the arms race’ and should ‘reduce military expenditures, which are a heavy burden on all the peoples, including the socialist peoples.’33 Ceausescu went on to state the Romanian position on the reduction of military budgets, which has remained the formula since that time:

The starting point should be a freeze on military expenditures, troops, and armaments at the level of 1978, which should then be gradually cut back at a first stage by at least 10-15 per cent by 1985.34
Ceausescu argued that all this was necessary both to reduce international tensions and to help end the arms race, and that it was possible because the danger of war or military action was not imminent.35

The Soviet reaction to all this has been ambivalent. The Russians seem initially to have followed the Romanian lead on the reduction of military budgets. In 1973, three years after the first Romanian proposal, the Soviets introduced into the General Assembly a resolution calling for a 10% reduction in military expenditures by each of the permanent members of the Security Council, and the allocation of part of the released funds for development assistance.36

Until 1978, then, the Soviet and Romanian positions were quite similar. But when Ceausescu refused to go along with the WTO budget increases, Brezhnev criticized those whose 'demagogic arguments' could lead to 'the weakening of our defenses in the face of the growing military might of imperialism.' Nevertheless, perhaps partially as a compromise to the Romanians, the WTO Communiqué of November 1978 included a proposal for the reduction of military budgets 'whether by equal parts, percentage, or in absolute terms' and this formula has been repeated in subsequent Pact Communiqués and in Soviet proposals to the United Nations. But the Soviet Union and all the WTO states except Romania voted against a U.N. General Assembly Resolution adopted in 1978 which provided for a standard international system of measuring and reporting military budgets, and declined to participate in the test of the system in 1979.38

The basic Romanian proposals on military budgets have continued to be pressed, both in speeches and in multilateral forums, though there have been some elaborations on the theme. At the U.N. Commission on Disarmament in May 1979, the 10-15% formula was repeated, but 'with considerably bigger reductions for the heavily armed countries.' And in November 1980, at the U.N. Disarmament Committee, the Romanians put forward the proposition that the nuclear states and those most heavily armed should be the first to engage in the process of freezing and reducing military budgets.40

In following its own prescriptions Romania claims to have effected major reductions in its own military budget in each of the last three years - by some 500 million lei (about 4% of the defense budget) in 1979 and by nearly 2 billion lei (16%) in 1980.41 In 1979, the savings were diverted to increasing state allowances for children. And in the U.N., UNCTAD and other forums, Romania has no doubt won favor among its Third World friends by proposing a Common Development Fund, to be furnished by developed countries' contributions from military spending, to be used primarily for developing countries with annual per capita GNP’s of less than $600.42

While most Romanian arms control proposals WTO initiatives, on the topic of military movements and maneuvers has been continuous. The Romanian delegations at the Helsinki Conference were particularly interested in the CBM (Confidence Building Measures) and the final document, which provided for prior notification of maneuvers of over 25,000 troops within 25 kilometers of the frontiers.43 Romania has also been very active in encouraging the Helsinki agreements. In defense officials between the U.S. and the WTO. And in 1979, Romania has had eight such exchanges with the U.S. and one for Hungary.44 At the CSCE meeting in December 1980, Romania proposed a shutdown of military bases in the 15-20 kilometer wide security belts flanking national borders of other States.45 Then in 1979, advanced at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament an even more realistic proposal for the ending of military movements and maneuvers 'and generally all displays of force, including national borders of other States.'46 Then in 1979, the other major proposal in this area in both blocs. This was first suggested in December 1978 speech, as follows:
that all this was necessary both to reduce international tension and the arms race, and that it was possible because military action was not imminent.35 For all of this has been ambivalent. The Russians ve followed the Romanian lead on the reduction of military expenditures by each of the permanent Security Council, and the allocation of part of the development assistance.36

The Soviet and Romanian positions were quite different from anything proposed by its allies, and are not mentioned or reflected in WTO documents. Romania's interest in military movements and maneuvers has been evident ever since August 1968. The Romanian delegates at the Helsinki CSCE Conference were particularly interested in the CBM (Confidence Building Measures) in the final document, which provided for prior notification of any military maneuvers of over 25,000 troops within 250 kilometers of national frontiers.43 Romania has also been very active in the military exchanges encouraged by the Helsinki agreements. In the exchange of senior defense officials between the U.S. and the NATO countries between 1975 and 1979, Romania has had eight such exchanges compared to six for the Soviet Union and one for Hungary.44 At the CSCE followup meeting in Madrid in December 1980, Romania proposed a Conference on Confidence Building and Disarmament in Europe.45

There are two unique proposals in this area put forward by the Romanians in recent years: one for a cessation of military maneuvers near national borders; and another for a demilitarized zone between NATO and the WYO. Romania has periodically suggested that military maneuvers in Europe be ended altogether. This was an element in the Romanian position at both the Helsinki preparatory conference in 1973 and at the Geneva Disarmament Committee in 1979. Their somewhat more realistic proposal for the ending of military maneuvers on the borders of other states was first enunciated at the time of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia but was not systematically developed until the late 1970s. At the CSCE Review Conference in Belgrade in 1977-8, the Romanian proposals included a cessation of multinational maneuvers near the frontiers of participating states.46 In Ceausescu's December 1978 speech, after the Warsaw Pact meeting calling for closer integration and higher military expenditures, he called for reducing and halting military maneuvers 'and generally all displays of force, in the neighborhood of the national borders of other States.'47 Then in 1979, the following proposal was advanced at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament:

a shutdown of military bases in the border area and creation of 15-20 kilometer wide security belts from the borderline where neither troops nor weapons should ever station.48

The other major proposal in this area is for a demilitarized strip between the two blocs. This was first suggested by Ceausescu in his December 1978 speech, as follows:
It would perhaps be useful to establish a strip between the two blocs, stretching on each side, free of all troops and weapons, and from which all maneuvers and military displays would be banned.19

In February of 1979, Ceausescu elaborated on this proposal, suggesting that the buffer zone should be 80-100 kilometers wide and that only a small national force on each side should be located there. This proposal was put to the Geneva Disarmament Committee that same month.50

Both of these sets of proposals are very different from, and much more thoroughgoing than, anything the Soviets have proposed in recent years. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact proposals have been much more limited, for example, to earlier prior notification of land maneuvers, limitation of maneuvers to 50,000 men, and extension of CBM to naval and aerial maneuvers, and to the Mediterranean.51 The Romanian proposals, understandably, have not even been mentioned by the Soviet Union or the other members of the Warsaw Pact. They pertain, of course, to an area of utmost sensitivity to Soviet defense planners, and the implementation of such measures would severely restrict the intimidating kind of maneuvers practiced in and around Czechoslovakia before their intervention there, and on the borders with Poland more recently. This, of course, may be precisely why the Romanians have proposed them.

Dissolving the Military Blocs

Romania has, since the 1964 Party Statement, persistently called for the abolition of all military blocs though, in most respects, its appeals here have followed very closely those of the Soviet Union and the WTO. In fact, the Warsaw Treaty itself, signed in 1955 in response to the integration of West Germany into NATO, states that the Organization will be dissolved as soon as NATO is. The appeal for the dissolution of the blocs has been renewed periodically by the WTO. In 1966, the organization proposed the ‘simultaneous’ dissolution of existing military alliances or, as a first step, the abolition of the military organizations within the alliances. This formula was disaggregated and made even less demanding in 1978, when the WTO called for dissolution of the military organizations ‘starting with a mutual reduction of military activity.’52 Ceausescu repeated this formula in a speech just one month after the Pact meeting.

Despite the apparent consonance of views on the dissolution of the military blocs between Romania and the Soviet Union, there are some important differences in both emphasis and motive. As noted above, the Romanians have different views from the Soviets on the role of the blocs in international affairs, with the former assigning both blocs responsibility for international tensions and the arms race, and the latter asserting the differential effects and purpose of Ceausescu’s support for pact dissolutions has been more insistent than that of his WTO allies. He repeatedly activities to reduce the activities of the military measures aimed at the simultaneous dismantling zone, asserted that ‘peace can be served not by intensifying the military blocs, but by cutting the military blocs.’54 This evenhanded criticism was not what the Soviets had in mind.

Foreign Troops and Military Bases

Another frequent Romanian proposal that is less insistent than, WTO proposals, is for the elimination of bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign homelands. These are also long-standing Soviet proposals, way back to 1946.55 The Romanian proposals, however, in three respects: first, their rationale is different from the Soviets’; second, these appeals are not continuous, while those of the Soviets are; and third, the Romanians have been somewhat more insistent, making them slightly different from their WTO counterparts.

Ceausescu, as noted above, identified military troops as anachronisms ‘inconsistent with the sovereignty of peoples.’56 The Warsaw Pact position is that while foreign military forces per se are not military blocs and military bases per se are not military blocs and military bases are obstacles to cooperation; the imperialist forces, constitute an obstacle to cooperation.57 The Soviets, after the relinquishment of the Nordic countries in 1955 and 1956, felt that they had been invited to stay in the Soviet military bases, while Soviet troops remained stationed in the Nordic and in Poland and, after 1968, in Czechoslovakia. Romania does not agree with the Soviet definition of foreign military bases. There is a frequent mentioning of the 700 foreign military bases in the European countryside. Since there are only 10 European countries, and only one of which, France, has no foreign military bases, it seems that the Romanians view the Soviet forces constituting bases as well. While the Soviet military bases as being obstacles to cooperation, constitutes a negative view of all military bases which, in the respective peoples, are a source of pressure in domestic affairs of the respective countries.58
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maps be useful to establish a strip between the two on each side, free of all troops and weapons, and all maneuvers and military displays would be

Ceausescu elaborated on this proposal, suggesting it should be 80-100 kilometers wide and that only a on each side should be located there. This proposal to a Disarmament Committee that same month.50 of proposals are very different from, and much more anything the Soviets have proposed in recent years. saw Pact proposals have been much more limited, prior notification of land maneuvers, limitation of men, and extension of CBM to naval and aerial the Mediterranean.51 The Romanian proposals, not even been mentioned by the Soviet Union or of the Warsaw Pact. They pertain, of course, to an activity to Soviet defense planners, and the implementers would severely restrict the intimidating kind of in and around Czechoslovakia before their intern in the borders with Poland more recently. This, of course why the Romanians have proposed them.

Blocs

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Ceausescu has, as noted above, identified military bases as anachronisms 'inconsistent with the independence and national sovereignty of peoples.'54 The Warsaw Pact position, on the other hand, is that while foreign military forces per se are not bad, 'the existence of military blocs and military bases on territories of other states, imposed by the imperialist forces, constitute an obstacle to cooperation among states.'55 The Soviets, after the relinquishment of their bases in China and Finland in 1955 and 1956, felt that they had no foreign military bases, though Soviet troops remained stationed in the GDR, Hungary, and Poland and, after 1968, in Czechoslovakia.56 That the Romanians do not agree with the Soviet definition of foreign military bases is clear from their frequent mentioning of the 700 foreign military bases in eighteen European countries. Since there are only thirteen European NATO states (one of which, France, has no foreign bases on its territory), it seems that the Romanians view the Soviet definition of foreign military bases is clear from their frequent mentioning of the 700 foreign military bases in eighteen European countries. Since there are only thirteen European NATO states (one of which, France, has no foreign bases on its territory), it seems that the Romanians view the Soviet definition of foreign military bases as being obstacles to cooperation, the Romanians take a negative view of all military bases which, 'far from protecting the respective peoples, are a source of pressure and interference in the domestic affairs of the respective countries.'59

ROMANIAN AUTONOMY AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

for international tensions and the arms race, and the latter vigorously asserting the differential effects and purposes of the two alliances. Ceausescu's support for pact dissolutions has been more consistent and more insistent than that of his WTO allies. He has appealed for 'intense activities to reduce the activities of the military pacts' and 'specific measures aimed at the simultaneous dismantling of those pacts.' He has asserted that 'peace can be served not by intensifying the arms race and strengthening the military blocs, but by cutting down and dismantling the military blocs.'54 This evenhanded criticism of the blocs was probably not what the Soviets had in mind. Foreign Troops and Military Bases

Another frequent Romanian proposal that is similar to, but more insistent than, WTO proposals, is for the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories to their own homelands. These are also long-standing Soviet proposals, going all the way back to 1946.55 The Romanian proposals differ from the Soviets, however, in three respects: first, their rationale for these proposals is different from the Soviets'; second, these appeals have been sustained and continuous, while those of the Soviets and WTO have waxed and waned; and third, the Romanians have elaborated on these ideas somewhat of late, making them slightly different from the extant WTO proposals.

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In terms of continuity and consistency, the Romanian proposals are also different from the Soviets'. While the Soviets and the WTO have for a long time advocated the abolition of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops, these have not always been prominent in the lexicon of Soviet disarmament proposals. While the July 1966 WTO Communiqué called attention to military bases, these proposals gradually disappeared as negotiations for the Helsinki conference got under way. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet and Pact statements simply called for reductions of armed forces in Europe. Not until the November 1978 WTO meeting was the formula on military bases and foreign troops revived. It was repeated in both the 1979 and 1980 WTO Communiqués, although it was not among the list of proposals made by Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981.

For the Romanians, on the other hand, proposals for eliminating foreign military bases, or withdrawing foreign troops, or both have been voiced continuously since at least the 1964 Party Statement, in official speeches and before the U.N. and the CSCE. In 1971, a new twist was added in a Romania-Yugoslav joint communiqué, in which a call for the banning of new military bases and new nuclear weapons on foreign territory was added to the old formula. In his December 1978 speech, Ceaușescu included all these elements plus asking for a pledge from other states not to accept foreign military bases. His formula, as follows, is essentially the one that has been pursued by Romania since then:

Equally important would be pledges not to station more troops and weapons on the territory of other States, and to begin gradually to reduce and then withdraw all foreign troops to within their own national borders, as well as to dismantle military bases, primarily nuclear ones, from the territory of other states; and pledges by all the States not to permit foreign bases on their territory...

Again we see that the Romanian formula is much more specific than the WTO's rather cursory mention of "the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from other peoples' territories." The Romanian proposal is both more serious and more practical, in that it contains intermediate steps and gradual measures for achieving the final goal.

Nuclear free zones

Another proposal that is commonly associated with the Romanians is for the creation of a nuclear free zone in the Balkans. In fact, this has not been one of the major Romanian interests in recent years, and current Romanian ideas on this are similar to those of the Soviets. The first proposal of this nature was made by Romanian Prime Minister Stoica in September of 1957, when he suggested a con Balkans into a "peace zone". But he did not mention nuclear weapons. This issue was first several days after Soviet Premier Khrushchev, d proposed creating a zone "free from missiles and Balkans and part of the Adriatic region. This conveyed by the Soviet government to six Weste 25, but they eventually rejected it. In 1963, a initiative for a demilitarized zone in the Medite States was then replacing its missile bases in C Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, and well.

After this point, the idea of a Balkan nuclear major element in the Romanian, or Warsaw Pact. The Romanian Party Statement of 1964 did call in a number of regions, including the Balk, specifically Balkan zone was never supported ment and the Romanian proposal gradually general Pact policy for nuclear free zones "in Europe." In recent speeches on arms cont mentioned nuclear free zones at all.

The Romanian retreat on this issue may be due the Khrushchev initiatives and of the Racha Gomulka Plan of 1964 for nuclear free zones there may also have been the feeling that the or redundant alongside other Romanian proposals military bases, especially nuclear ones, for ple to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear one weapons to be introduced in Europe.

Other Arms Control Issues

The issues discussed so far are all arms control yet been implemented. There has also been some the Soviet Union and Romania on arms control been reached, especially the 1963 Partial Nuc the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Romanians have been noticeably quiesc issue that divides the Soviet Union and China the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, and this has been Moscow. While the Romanian Communist banning of the testing of nuclear weapons in not done so since. The Romanians have refr
In the context of arms control, the Romanian proposals are distinct from those of the Soviets. While the Soviets and the WTO have endorsed the abolition of foreign bases and the withdrawal of military forces in Europe, these proposals are not always prominent in the lexicon of arms control discussions. The Romanian proposals, particularly since the Helsinki conference of 1975, have been more specific and have included a call for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other states.

The Romanian Party Statement of 1964 did call for denuclearized zones in several regions, including the Balkans. However, the idea of a Balkan nuclear free zone was never supported in official WTO statements and the Romanian proposal gradually came to reflect the more general Pact policy for nuclear free zones "in various areas, including Europe." In recent speeches on arms control, Ceausescu has not mentioned nuclear free zones at all.

The Romanian retreat on this issue may be due in part to the failure of the Khrushchev initiatives and of the Rapacki Plan of 1958 and the Gomulka Plan of 1964 for nuclear free zones in Central Europe. But there may also have been the feeling that the nuclear free zone plan was redundant alongside other Romanian proposals for eliminating foreign military bases, especially nuclear ones, for pledges by nuclear states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear ones, and for no new nuclear weapons to be introduced in Europe.

Other Arms Control Issues

The issues discussed so far are all arms control proposals which have not yet been implemented. There has also been some disagreement between the Soviet Union and Romania on arms control agreements that have been reached, especially the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Romanians have been noticeably quiescent on the issue of nuclear weapons testing, probably because of their reluctance to take sides on an issue that divides the Soviet Union and China. The PRC has not signed the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, and this has been a source of irritation to Moscow. While the Romanian Communist Party did mention the banning of the testing of nuclear weapons in its 1964 Statement, it has not done so since. The Romanians have refrained from supporting the
Soviet proposals for a complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests and, more recently, for a one year moratorium on such testing, presumably also in deference to China.

On the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Romania has been skeptical from the beginning, feeling that it was biased in favor of the nuclear powers. In a major speech on foreign policy in 1967, Ceausescu expressed reservations with non-proliferation that many non-nuclear powers shared:

Without precise, firm, and efficient measures on the part of all states for ceasing the production of nuclear weapons, for reducing and ultimately liquidating the existing stockpiles, nonproliferation would not only fail to secure progress along the way of liquidating the danger of nuclear war, but would bring about its indefinite perpetuation.

Ceausescu also wanted assurances that the NPT would allow unrestricted access to nuclear energy and that the non-nuclear states would get security guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against them or used to menace them.

Romania's unhappiness with the eventual treaty was such that it refused to sign a WTO Declaration endorsing the Treaty, the first time that a WTO document was not unanimously accepted. And Romania delayed signing the Treaty until February of 1970. Since that time, Romania has complained that the nuclear powers have not kept their side of the deal, have continued vertical proliferation, and have obstructed the transfer of peaceful nuclear energy to non-nuclear countries, particularly developing countries. One can infer that these last charges are aimed particularly at the Soviet Union, especially since Romania has recently contracted with Canada to purchase nuclear reactors.

Romania's Long Term Foreign Policy Goals and Arms Control
Romana’s arms control policies have been an important tool of Romania's foreign policy. They have helped Romania achieve some autonomy within the Soviet bloc, and have contributed to each of the four major elements of Romania's vision of a desirable world order: sovereignty and independence for all states, a reduction of the importance of the military blocs, a decline in the use or threat of force, and an enhanced role for small states in international politics.

Romania's emphasis on sovereignty, independence, and the importance of the national state has been supported by its arms control proposals and policies in two important ways. First of all, many of the country's arms control proposals are aimed at territorial integrity of states. The arguments from foreign military bases and troops, and the propo zones are all aimed at restoring the sovereignty particularly the weaker ones. Second, the very maverick position on arms control issues fortifies in foreign and military policy, and acts as an ex Romania’s rejection of supranational coordination and military spending is also a demonstration and independence and sovereignty.

Ceausescu's opposition to 'bloc politics' and the powers has also been supported by his arms control policies. Most importantly, of course, Romania has renounced cooperation in its own bloc by refusing to participate in maneuvers or allow such maneuvers on Romanian territory with several WTO initiatives (such as the increases in military spending); and by abstaining from action such as the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Romania has expressed its differences with the purposes and usefulness of military blocs and has been a strong advocate for their abolition. Most importantly, perhaps, Romania's allies on the need to strengthen the common purpose and their abolition. Most importantly, perhaps, Romania has been a strong advocate for the abolition of military blocs and alliances.

Most of these policies also support Romania's emphasis on the elimination of the use of force in international relations. They contribute to each of the four major elements of Romania’s vision of a desirable world order: sovereignty and independence for all states, a reduction of the importance of the military blocs, a decline in the use or threat of force, and an enhanced role for small states in international politics.

In line with this, Romania has argued for effective means of conflict, and the occasions that require intervention are infrequent.

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a complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests and, one year moratorium on such testing, presumably China. 

Several factors, feeling that it was biased in favor of the nuclear powers on foreign policy in 1967, Ceauecescu has been skeptical of non-proliferation that many non-nuclear powers, firm, and efficient measures on the part of all states in international politics. They have helped Romania achieve some of its foreign policies, and have contributed to each of the important world orders: sovereignty for all states, a reduction of the impor-tance of military blocs, a decline in the use or threat of force, and an end to the use of force in their relations. Most notably, the European states should try to avoid stepping on to even that first rung of the conflict ladder, and must avoid altogether the use of force in their relations.

In line with this, Romania has argued for efforts to reduce both the means of conflict, and the occasions that might lead to conflict. Romania's proposals for reduction in military budgets, conventional

country's arms control proposals are aimed at trying to preserve the territorial integrity of states. The arguments against military blocs, foreign military bases and troops, and the proposals for demilitarized zones are all aimed at restoring the sovereignty of European states, particularly the weaker ones. Second, the very nature of Romania's maverick position on arms control issues fortifies its own independence in foreign and military policy, and acts as an example to other states. Romania's rejection of supranational coordination of military maneuvers and military spending is also a demonstration and affirmation of its own independence and sovereignty.

Ceauecescu's opposition to "bloc politics" and the domination of the big powers has also been supported by his arms control and military policies. Most importantly, of course, Romania has removed itself from full participation in its own bloc by refusing to participate in WTO maneuvers or allow such maneuvers on Romanian soil; by refusing to go along with several WTO initiatives (such as the NPT, initially, and increases in military spending); and by abstaining from major WTO actions such as the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Romania has expressed its differences with the Soviet Union on the purposes and usefulness of military blocs and has insistently advocated their abolition. Most importantly, perhaps, Romania differs from its allies on the need to strengthen the military component of the Warsaw Pact. While the rest of the Pact has increased military spending and capabilities, Romania has cut back in these areas, and has called upon its allies to do likewise. Romania has built up its civilian defense force (which is modeled on that of the Yugoslavs), which is useful only for defensive operations against an enemy invading Romanian territory. It has cut back, at the same time, on the very forces that would be most useful for the rapid, mobile, and offensive actions the Soviets envisage in a European conflict. Romania has then, by both word and deed, removed itself from the arena of East-West conflict.

Most of these policies also support Romania's position on the elimination of the use of force in international politics. Romania is particularly concerned about the possible use of nuclear weapons in Europe, and sees in their use the probable destruction of the continent. Romanian commentators also contend that a major conflict in Europe is likely to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, Romania believes, the European states should try to avoid stepping on to even that first rung of the conflict ladder, and must avoid altogether the use of force in their relations.

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armaments, military bases, and nuclear weapons support the former, and the proposals for nuclear free zones, demilitarized borders, and increased reliance on diplomacy support the latter.

The commitment to diplomacy is also evident from Romania's record on arms control deliberations, which demonstrate that it is committed as much to the process of arms control negotiations as it is to the outcome. In Romania's view, the primary drawback of the arms race is that it increases tension and reduces the possibility for international cooperation, particularly in Europe. Thus, Romania often emphasizes limited measures in arms control, rather than the grandiose schemes often put forward by the Soviet Union. While the outcomes from such limited accords might not be as dramatic, they can develop some measure of trust and lead to further negotiations. Romania has expressed support for the SALT Treaty, and for Brezhnev's October 1979 initiatives, in this kind of language. Romania's commitment to, and involvement in, multilateral forums on arms control, is also a measure of its interest in the process of arms control negotiations. The Romanian leaders clearly hope that negotiations on arms, and the conclusion of a network of arms control agreements, will reduce the incentive of states to rely on force in their international behavior.

Romania's argument for a more visible role for small states in the international arena has been supported in three ways by its arms control policies. First, Romania has increased its own autonomy by demonstrating, in a public and visible fashion, its distance from the Soviet Union on some arms control issues. It should be emphasized here that Romania's policies in this area are not so much defiant as simply autonomous. Romania has, in fact, supported most of the major Soviet initiatives in arms control, and has attached its signature to all of the Warsaw Pact communiques on these issues. The only Soviet initiative that the Romanians have not supported for political reasons is the comprehensive test ban.

On the other hand, Romania has not simply toed the Soviet line on arms control issues. Some Romanian proposals, most especially those on demilitarized zones on the borders of states and between the two blocs, have been totally independent of the Soviet line. Others have been similar to Soviet or WTO proposals, but have differed in the details or the emphasis given the proposal. There have also been substantial differences in the context within which the Romanians and the Soviets place various arms control initiatives. The Soviets are much more likely to assign the blame for the arms race to the United States and NATO. Romania, in refusing to be so specific, by implication also faults the Soviet Union.

There are two further ways by which Romania's arms control policies have enhanced the role of small states. By the sheer persistence with which Ceausescu has pursued arms control issues, he has achieved a visible and exemplary role as a small state in the international arena. And in many of these international forums the Romanian leaders have seen that in most cases the Soviets have simply conceded their own way, the prospect of a dissenter within a major arms control initiative must surely temper Soviet ambitions. Indeed, it does appear that many of the Warsaw Pact states have been reluctant partners in any arms control measures. Romania's use of arms control as an instrument for diplomatic leverage has been supported in three ways by its arms control policies. First, Romania has increased its own autonomy by demonstrating, in a public and visible fashion, its distance from the Soviet Union on some arms control issues. It should be emphasized here that Romania's policies in this area are not so much defiant as simply autonomous. Romania has, in fact, supported most of the major Soviet initiatives in arms control, and has attached its signature to all of the Warsaw Pact communiques on these issues. The only Soviet initiative that the Romanians have not supported for political reasons is the comprehensive test ban.

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ARMS CONTROL

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It to diplomacy is also evident from Romania's record liberations, which demonstrate that it is committed as to arms control negotiations as it is to the outcome. v, the primary drawback of the arms race is that it reduces the possibility for international cooperation in Europe. Thus, Romania often emphasizes limited control, rather than the grandiose schemes often put forward. While the outcomes from such limited proposals may not be as dramatic, they can develop some measure of further negotiations. Romania has expressed support, and for Brezhnev's October 1979 initiatives, in this way. Its commitment to, and involvement in, arms control, is also a measure of its interest in control negotiations. The Romanian leaders clearly focus on arms, and the conclusion of a network of arms control will reduce the incentive of states to rely on force in behavior.

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Soviet proposals. To the extent that these efforts by small states to promote arms control are successful, even more benefits rebound to them. The Europeans are, after all, the ones who have the most to lose in the event of another major war. Romania has emphasized this time and again. In an era in which superpowers are about to militarize, the best hope of peace may rest with the weak but sensible states.

NOTES

2. Ibid., pp. 309, 416.
7. Cited in Bodgan.
10. Ion Nicolae, 'Political Spillover of the Arms Race,' Lumea, 28 September-4 October 1979, p. 16.
17. Ibid., pp. 5-6; Braun, pp. 120, 196; and David P. Burke, 'Defense and Mass Mobilization in Romania,' Armed Forces and Society 7 (Fall 1980): 36-8.
To the extent that these efforts by small states to assert are successful, even more benefits rebound to us are, after all, the ones who have the most to lose in or major war. Romania has emphasized this time and which superpowers are about to remilitarize, the best rest with the weak but sensible states.

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5. nental Assembly, 35th Session, 1st Committee, Verbain Records, 3 79-80.


10. of Militarized Socialist Units in Wartime,' Bulsineul Oficial, 7 d in JPRS, 2 January 1980, p. 138. 

61. ‘Speech by President Ceausescu,’ p. 86.
64. Ibid.
66. ‘Communique of the Warsaw Pact, 23 November 1978,’ p. 82.
69. Bloed, pp. 44-5.
71. ‘Communique of the Warsaw Pact, 23 November 1978,’ p. 82.
72. See RFER, Background Report, no. 275, 20 December 1978.

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