The Religious Implications of Hobhouse's Philosophy

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THE RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF
HOBHOUSE'S PHILOSOPHY

by

H. Austin Smith

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
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Department of
Philosophy of Religion
College of Religion
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Foreword:

The philosophy of L. T. Hobhouse interested me primarily because it is an attempt at a synthesis of the results of empirical science and of rational thought. The religious aspect of his work, both in his definite criticisms and contributions in the specific field of religion and in the more general implications of his system as a whole, seemed to me worth compiling and examining. This labor I have attempted to perform. I gratefully acknowledge the valuable specific guidance of the head of the department of Philosophy of Religion, Dr. A. Campbell Garnett. I am likewise deeply indebted to other members of the College of Religion Faculty, and especially to Dean Fredrick D. Kershner and Dr. Elijah Jordan. These men have profoundly influenced my thinking. It is only fair to them, however, to state that I have frequently diverged from their respected viewpoints. The blame for such errors as may result from these divergences or from misinterpretation of Hobhouse or other writers must be upon my own head; the merits of the present work, if any be found, must be largely credited to older and wiser heads. Nevertheless, the plan is of my own making and the purpose of my own choosing. I have herein sought to discover what place religion, and more especially Christianity, occupies in the thinking of a competent scholar and man of affairs who is not prejudiced in favor of religion but who does find some meaningful interpretation of reality necessary to his intellectual peace.
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CHAPTER I

BIOGRAPHY

The religious aspect of a man's thought necessarily depends, to a large degree, upon personal factors in his total experience. This is sufficient reason for beginning the present study with a brief biographical note.

Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse was born September 8, 1864, at St. Ives, a Cornish village. He was the seventh and youngest child in the family of the village rector, Reginald Hobhouse, who for five years, (1877-82) was Archdeacon of Bodmin. The paternal grandfather was a public servant of considerable distinction and traced his ancestry to a family of prosperous merchants in Bristol at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Leonard's mother, whose maiden name, Trelawny, was incorporated into the Christian name of her son, was a member of an old and famous Cornish family. Her comradeship with her children, her interest in their early education,—she was a linguist of no mean ability,—her vivacious, witty personality, all seem to have made a lasting impression on Leonard. The clergyman father was an austere man, and, in marked contrast to the subsequent development of his famous son, was narrowly orthodox in religion and conservative in politics.

Leonard Hobhouse entered preparatory school at Exmouth at the age of eight or nine years. From there he went to Marlborough College, a famous old English "public school", at the age of twelve, and thence to Corpus College, Oxford, at nineteen. Of his university career his friend and biog-
rapher Mr. J. A. Hobson writes:

"His university career was one of great distinction. After winning a First in Classical Moderations and in Greats, he obtained a prize fellowship at Merton in 1887. Three years later he was appointed an assistant tutor in his old college, Corpus, where he was elected a Fellow in 1894." 1

Hobhouse manifested marked Liberal tendencies even at Marlborough. On one occasion, at the end of his term of office as Senior Prefect, he had to read a welcome to Prince Leopold, who was present at the prize-giving. The budding democrat prepared himself for the occasion by moving, some weeks before the event, "a Republican motion in the Debating Society" 2—an excellent example of his rare combination of English consistency and Cornish temperament. Needless to say, his welcome address contained a minimum of obsequiousness.

The days of his tutorship at Oxford were crowded ones. The teaching of philosophy was mingled with such interesting diversions as active Labor Union agitation in neighboring towns, the study of Biology under J. S. Haldane, and a romance which culminated in his union with Miss N. Hadwen of Halifax in 1891. His first book, The Labor Movement, published in 1893, reflects his social and political views during this period. His philosophical interest at this time was primarily epistemological and his masters were Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant and Green, none of whom could satisfactorily solve his problems. Out of this study came his own epistemological work, The Theory of Knowledge, published in

2. Ibid p. 21
1896. It was entirely too much a Realist theory to receive anything more than a very cold welcome among the Oxford Idealists. The following year he left Oxford, which he gen-

erally characterized, along with colleges in general, as "an organization pourrire".

Joining the staff of the Manchester Guardian, he gave himself to journalism and philosophical investigation. He remained a member of that staff until 1905, at which time he became political editor of the London Tribune. His Liberalism bordered too near Collectivism to suit the management of this latter paper and he terminated his connection with it in 1907 to become the first incumbent of the Martin White Chair of Sociology in the University of London.

Previous to the outbreak of the Great War Hobhouse had engaged in a serious effort to prevent the occurrence of such a catastrophe. His writings, even during the Boer War, were pacific in tone. Furthermore, in 1911, he had aided in the formation of a Foreign Policy Committee, of which Mr. E. C. K. Esher was secretary. Its purpose was to promote peace and understanding between nations. But English instinct for fair play and Cornish sentimentality could not abide the horrors of the rape of Belgium and he reluctantly but unstintedly gave his cooperation to the Allied cause.

Following the War, the development of the Trade Boards system in England claimed a portion of the time and energy of Professor Hobhouse. As chairman of a number of Boards he rendered a practical and important service.

1. Hobson and Ginsberg, L. T. Hobhouse p. 34
"In the opinion of all who were in a position to judge he was the most eminent of the many distinguished men who have been connected with Trade Boards, and he communicated to their work something of his own sanity and wisdom." 1

In the riper years of his scholarship several offers came from American universities, some of them quite complimentary, but he remained Professor of Sociology at London until the day of his death.

Erratic in temperament, but a prodigious worker when in the mood, possessor of a remarkable memory and a strong emotional nature, he produced a body of published works the scope and variety of which is remarkable. This is the more apparent when one considers the other duties apart from his writing that claimed his attention. His style is lucid and flowing rather than concise and compact. His philosophy is in the main consistent, though in my opinion his consisten­cy has been rather overdone by some of his admirers. I find it marred by two serious lapses. (1) He proposes a synthesis of empiricism and rationalism through the evolutionary concept; but he finds that the trinity raises questions it cannot answer, and which are of such an ultimate and im­portant nature as to cast more or less serious doubts upon the whole procedure. (2) His social and political theories fail to measure up to his own test of truth, i.e. consilience of all elements. This failure is most glaringly evi­dent in connection with the World War. Of its effect upon Hobhouse his son says:

1. Hobson and Ginsberg, L. T. Hobhouse p.57
"The great war was a shattering blow to him. It struck directly at the whole foundation of his thought, and I am sure that its consequences were largely responsible for the break-up of his health in 1924 and his early death."

I believe it is possible to discern a very definite undertone of doubt and disillusionment in his post-war works. That he grimly held his position in the face of the practical inconsistencies it came to involve during the latter years of his life is perhaps a finer tribute to his courage than to his very laudable but not infallible erudition.

He died in the summer of 1929.

1. Hobson and Ginsberg, L. T. Hobhouse p.91
CHAPTER II
CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS VIEWS

The temperament and training of L. T. Hobhouse fit him for significant activity in the arena of religious thought in his own day. The major problems of the time, in the field of natural theology, come to a focus in what Pringle-Pattison calls "The Nineteenth Century Duel Between Idealism and Naturalism." If that duel were to end in reconciliation and a higher synthesis of the values resident in the opposing theories no better peacemaker could have been found than Hobhouse.

The problem precipitated by naturalistic writers of the later nineteenth century, who regarded the principle of value as purely subjective and therefore ultimately unreal, may be stated as follows:

"It (the value principle) was taken as presenting only a subjective certitude, an assertion of the heart against the head. As such it is not very effective for in well balanced minds the strength of the heart's assertions cannot serve to silence rationally grounded doubts. What is needed is to show that the very sciences on which Naturalistic theories are grounded need, for their rounding out into a consistent philosophy, to be supplemented by truths implied in the recognition of the objective reality of values, while, on the other hand, the conclusions of Naturalism rest on a misinterpretation of scientific theories. This cannot be done so long as values are relegated to the realm of the heart (of subjective feeling) while reason is held to be concerned with the facts of natural science alone." 2

Hobhouse faces this problem with the passion for comprehension and rational synthesis that commonly belongs

to religious monists and philosophical absolutists coupled with the critical attitude common to the scientific approach.

All of the various philosophical positions current in the closing decades of the nineteenth century were strongly influenced by Descartes. 1 His separation of mind and matter sets a problem from which subsequent thought cannot escape. The problem is further complicated by Locke. When he began his modest attempt to discover "the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge" 2 it is reasonably certain that he did not foresee the effects that were destined to follow. His adoption of the doctrine of simple ideas, 3 an abstraction as unwarranted and misleading as the Cartesian dualism itself, immediately led to some most serious difficulties. When he attempts to account for the order and connection of ideas actually found in experience he is driven perilously near the rationalism he sought to avoid. Berkeley, uncritically accepting the Lockian position, succeeded in extricating himself from its thorns only by the use of that familiar and adaptable device of theologians, the *deus ex machina*. He apparently did not see that if the order of sensations is guaranteed by the mind of God, 3 then the mind of God is something so radically different from other minds that he had no rational ground for calling it mind at all. For, evidently, God

1. Calkins, Mary W., The Persistent Problems of Philosophy p. 55
in knowing objects whose esse is percipi thereby constitutes them possible objects for other knowing minds. This is quite contrary to the human experience of knowing and appears to necessitate as its logical ground either a complete Absolutism or Solipsism. Hume places the capstone on the sensationalist structure by eliminating Berkeley's God and all other causal factors,¹ (though he retains an illogical faith in a Supreme Being.) The fact that causal relations are subjectively certain and regular is of no value; indeed it is, on Hume's own ground, an unwarranted inference. For if all that can be known is sensation and all sensation is atomistic, 'loose and separate', then no amount of repetition can confer any slightest degree of certainty upon apparent connections of cause or even of temporal sequence.² "Experience" as Professor G. F. Stout points out, "is as powerless as rational insight to supply any real warrant for inference from one matter of fact to another."³

It is this ultimate skepticism of Hume that starts Kant in the opposite direction and points the way to the opposite pole of speculation, Absolute Idealism. Kant discovered the tremendously important fact that no simple idea is ever presented to consciousness in isolation, that all ideas are interconnected.⁴ The bond of their connection he places in the activity of mind. Reality is known

1. Hume, David, A Treatise on Human Nature Book I pp.80-81
2. Calkins, Mary W., The Persistent Problem of Philosophy p.160
3. Stout, G. F., Mind and Matter p.27
only by faith. Scientific knowledge is mere knowledge of phenomena. This further development of the old dualism made possible the subsequent antagonism of Naturalism and Idealism. Hegel, and later, in England, Bosanquet and Bradley, developed idealism to the point of identifying logic and metaphysics. Hegel makes the identification fully and unblinkingly, declaring that "Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts.---thought accredited able to express the essential reality of things".1 Bosanquet experiences some difficulty in reducing the experience of value to that logical consistency and unity of the system which is the Absolute Idealist's criterion of ultimate reality, but finally succeeds by making "non-contradiction, wholeness, or Individuality our criterion of the ultimately real".2 And he says: "in content, Logic is one with Metaphysics"3 and "intelligence is one with the being of Reality".4 Bradley struggles vainly to escape the identification of fact and idea which he cannot deny and will not admit. He knows that "the movement of our mind remains discursive, symbolic and abstract".5 "No cheap and easy Monism" can satisfy him.

"Unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if 'thinking' is not used with some strange implication that never was a part of the

1. Hegel, G.W.F., Logic. Trans. by Wm. Wallace. 2nd Ed. p.45
2. Bosanquet, Bernard, The Principle of Individuality and Value p.68
4. Ibid.
5. Bradley, F. H., The Principles of Logic p.527
meaning of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational. 1

Yet there is no escape from the conclusions unless that way of escape lie through the morass of ultimate and complete skepticism. "Though dragged to such conclusions, we can not embrace them." 2 No more can we escape them, if we set out from the Absolute Idealist's starting point.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the question of ultimates, Materialists have been equally rash in pressing beyond the cautious Kantian "as if..." and have produced metaphysical theories as fantastic and abstract as any Rationalist ever dared imagine. Huxley, whose brilliant lectures were startling the theologians of England when Hobhouse was learning his French at his mother's knee, may be cited as a fairly characteristic representative of Materialism. He sympathizes with the frank skepticism of Hume in regard to all theological and spiritual questions, and, ignoring Kant's dictum that science is mere knowledge of phenomena, rests his case upon science as the mathematical formulation of empirical facts. The Darwinian theory of evolution is pressed to its logical conclusion in such characteristic passages as the following:

"If digestion were a thing to be trifled with, I might sup upon lobster, and the matter of life of the crustacean would undergo the same wonderful metamorphosis into humanity. And were I to...undergo shipwreck, the crustacean might, and probably would, return the compliment, and demonstrate our common nature by turn-

1. Bradley, F. H., The Principles of Logic p.533
2. Ibid.
ing my protoplasm into living lobster." 1

"But if, as I have endeavored to prove to you, their
protoplasm is essentially identical with, and most read-
ily converted into, that of any animal, I can discover
no halting-place between the admission that such is the
case, and the further concession that all vital action
may, with equal propriety, be said to be the result of
the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays
it. And if so, it must be true, in the same sense and
to the same extent, that the thoughts to which I am now
giving utterance, and your thoughts regarding them, are
the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life
which is the source of our other vital phenomena." 2

Subsequent Materialists have done little more than to
restate, sometimes with less precision, the above position.
Nor has anyone, to my knowledge, more clearly and frankly
set forth the logical ground on which Materialism must, of
necessity, rest, than has this great Naturalist:

"Let us suppose that knowledge is absolute, and not
relative, and therefore, that our conception of matter
represents that which really is. Let us suppose, fur-
ther, that we do know more of cause and effect than a
certain definite order of succession among facts, and
that we have a knowledge of the necessity of that suc-
cession— and hence of necessary laws— and I, for my
part, do not see what escape there is from utter mater-
ialism and necessitarianism." 3

The necessitarianism he evades by refusing to identify the
hypothetical "will happen" of scientific law statistically
derived, with the "must happen" of scientific law hypo-
thesized as Cause. But the materialism he embraces as "in
every way to be preferred" 4 as a basis for scientific

1. Huxley, T. H., On the Physical Basis of Life, in Auto-
biography and Selected Essays from Lay Sermons
edited by E. H. Kemper McComb. p.101
2. Ibid p.103
3. Ibid p.109
4. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose Intr. p.18
"formulae and symbols".

From such complete mechanism in the realm of biological evolution, Hobhouse recoils. The notion that mind is an organ like the lungs or liver, "a sort of glorified reflex",¹ is to him unthinkable. Further, the thought that man is a mere passing phase of evolution, doomed to vanish as the earth cools, that progress is an illusion and social ethics utterly without meaning,---all of which are valid deductions from and familiar statements of the materialistic position,---is impossible for him.

But, on the other hand, the alternative solution of Idealism was equally untenable from Hobhouse's point of view. Hegelian metaphysics might save the "spiritual conception of human life and of the entire world order",² but it involved conclusions Hobhouse could not accept. The conception of "reality as all spiritual was as fatal to clear thinking and to the most cherished ideas of the Idealist himself as Materialism."³ This is particularly true with respect to the difficulties raised by the problem of good and evil.

In the face of this dilemma he declares that philosophy must make its account with science. "Neither is all embracing",⁴ and in his consideration of their relations and limitations, he advances from his early position that philosophy is primarily critical and negative to the point

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose Intr. p.18
2. Ibid p.19
3. Ibid p.19
4. Ibid p.20
of regarding it as constructively synthetic; but continues to insist that the speculations of philosophy must be "corroborated by a synthetic view of experience." 1

At this point another strand of the web which symbolizes the completed system of Hobhouse's philosophy must be woven in. That strand is Utilitarian Humanism. Beginning with the enthusiastic Positivism and Humanism of Auguste Comte and descending to Hobhouse principally through Bentham and J. S. Mill, the anthropocentric note is strong and persistent in all his work. It is significant to note that, in his article in Muirhead's Contemporary British Philosophy, he states that he came to the study of philosophy by the social reform route. Furthermore, his final position in the active world of affairs where he played many and varied roles as labor agitator, teacher, journalist, author, and Trades Board chairman, was the Chair of Sociology at London. The Alpha and the Omega of his work was Man.

Thus we see that the approach of our author to the problems involved in nineteenth century philosophical discussion was by no means a narrow or biased one. Influenced, as he himself states, by Spencer to a remarkable degree, he nevertheless rejects Spencer's Unknowable and resolutely sets out to discover and analyze the nature of ultimate reality. A great admirer of Mill, he utterly repudiates the simple sensationalism Mill borrowed from Hume. Fro-

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose Intr. p.20
foundly influenced by T. H. Green, he nevertheless rejects the central stone of his structure, namely the Spiritual Principle or on bloc mentalism which Green propounded. Willing to grant that the Hegelian philosophy has a certain rough empirical value, he regards Absolute Idealism as rationally impossible and morally pernicious. Accepting the principle of evolution as the fundamental concept of his own system, he rejects the Intuitionism which Bergson finds so essential to the grasp of the abs. vital. A steadfast Epistemological Realist, he is almost completely a Rational Idealist in metaphysics.

Out of all these various and contradictory points of view Hobhouse attempts to construct a unified system of thought which will satisfactorily stand the tests that reason and experience are constantly imposing upon all philosophical systems in the endless process of evolving thought. How far he succeeded must be judged in the light of the finished work. That he made the attempt is in itself a significant fact, especially for the purpose envisaged in the present paper. Religion may be defined as "The effort of man as a finite individual to relate his life satisfactorily to the Infinite Reality in the midst of which he dwells". Unquestionably an important phase of that Infinite Reality is the world of human thought as represented in the great scientific, philosophical systems of the

1. Macintosh, Douglas Clyde, The Problem of Knowledge p.244
2. Class notes on A. C. Garnett's lectures, "Philosophy of Religion", Butler University 1931.
past and present. The man of catholic grasp in these fields can scarcely fail to meet and grapple with the great questions of religion. How Hobhouse met these questions and the solutions he proposed for them will occupy the remainder of this paper.

His method is the examination of animal and human psychology, and the ethical history of man, the definition of consciousness, by rigidly empirical methods, the avoiding of theories and, as he himself puts it, "confining myself almost entirely to a comparison of the actual content of each stage of development." He was at first opposed to theism or teleology, regarding "mechanical causation" as the "ultimate category of science". But, as this paper will attempt to show, he discovered the inadequacy of this category as many other scientists and Naturalists, among them, notably, Bertrand Russell, have done.

2. Russell, Bertrand, Our Knowledge of the External World p. 255
CHAPTER III
THE BIOLOGICAL STATUS OF MAN

The first problem is that which the systematic theologian of the old days would have called the Anthropology of Hobhouse, the question of the nature of man and the place he occupies in the general scheme of things. This is an important aspect of any religious or philosophical system. To Hobhouse it is paramount. The general problem subdivides, in his treatment of it, into three branches, Biology, Psychology, and Sociology. While he regarded the second as central and made it the object of his first major work, The Theory of Knowledge, we, in viewing his work as a whole, may as well take the physical organism as our starting point.

As already indicated, Hobhouse accepts the evolutionary hypothesis as a starting point in his system. He is not prepared, however, to concede that a mere mechanical juxtaposition of atoms or electrons in varying combinations can account for all the varied phenomena of life and mind. The common materialistic hypothesis, that all organic movements are mechanical but that some are not yet understood, he rejects. He proposes therefore, in the preface of his Mind in Evolution, to survey the field of animal and human life in search of evidence that will bear upon the question at issue: namely, Is the principle known as mind operative in all organic evolution?

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Mind in Evolution Ch. 2
The common hypothesis of Materialism, that mechanical processes, if more fully understood, would be found to account for the phenomena of mind, is discussed and rejected. In this he agrees with the eminent naturalist and Gifford Lecturer,—his erstwhile teacher in biology,—J. S. Haldane. Haldane says:

"One often meets the statement, repeated parrot-like, by various persons, that scientific physiology is progressively revealing the mechanism of life. In the light of actual progress this is quite untrue, and can only be described as claptrap.... Discovery of a physico-chemical mechanism of life..." seems "more distant than it did to Schwann and the other leaders of the mechanistic movement in physiology of last century." 1

The maintenance of organic equilibrium is tentatively explained as a result of "mind immersed in physical processes constituting the life of the organism". 2 Biological evolution, it is shown, does not necessarily produce a higher type of organic life. The process which does so is more correctly described as "Orthogenic evolution" of which the tendency and direction are one from first to last --- the evolution of mind as the dominating principle in this world." 3 In the lower reaches of evolution the process is marked by prolific increase and an enormously high mortality. Life and death are the selective implements of the developing order. Higher stages show a progressively decreasing birth rate and a correspondingly lower death rate, so that pleasure and pain instead of life and death become the sanctions of the process. Mind progressively comes to

1. Haldane, J. S., The Sciences and Philosophy p.56-7
3. Ibid p.398
dominate and direct the process.

Hobhouse sees two principles operating in the field of biological evolution, the one making for harmony and the other producing discord. The first is instanced in all the cooperative enterprises of organic structures, from the division of labor effected in very low orders of multicellular organisms to the cooperation of the most highly organized biological entities. Its most common and most persistent expression is probably to be found in connection with the phenomena of sex. The other tendency he sometimes calls "the will to live"—that aggressive, self-assertive tendency that characterizes every individual in every order of organic existence. There must evidently be some force tending to unify these two divergent tendencies, and this he finds in the structural correlation of the organism.

This inherent structure is a result of environmental factors in the realm of biology, but the structure or framework developed and transmitted in the process of heredity is "elastic" not "frigid". Two methods of correlation are cited: (1) inherited constitution and (2) individual adaptation. ¹ Two types of unity result, (1) unity of personality and (2) cooperative unity. In both types of unity the result is a product of a process of securing harmony through mutual liberty. Determinate variation is rejected and mind, residing in the organism, is regarded as the cause of variation. This gives the organism a twofold aspect.

¹. Muirhead, Contemporary British Philosophers pp.171-2-3
It is at once mechanical and teleological, and the two features are combined. Natural selection becomes a trial and error process, predominantly mechanical in its course; but mind operates indirectly upon the physical organism by alteration of environmental conditions. 1 Mind and mechanism are both present throughout the process. Mind, he avers, belongs even to unicellular organisms and to support his statement he cites the observed activity of the amoeba which would, in higher forms of life, unhesitatingly be labeled conative. Mind, then, is the teleological aspect of the whole process and mechanism is the causal aspect of the same process. The brain, for example, "may act in one relation on one mode and in another on the other." 2 Mind itself is "a structure that can remake itself", 3 and is coeval with matter, intimately connected with the merely mechanical forces of nature, the product and at the same time the moulder and vis directrix of organic process. Biological development is describable in terms of the following generalizations. (1) The fact of reproduction. (2) The tel per tel fili tendency, which does not produce absolute identity but instead gives various degrees of variations which (3) are sometimes perpetuated in the offspring. (4) Death of some individuals without offspring due to (5) hostile environment which imposes the condition that all successful variations must assist the individual in sustaining its own.

1. Muirhead, Contemporary British Philosophers p.178
2. Ibid pp.176-7
3. Ibid p.174
life and producing offspring. (6) Discontinuous variations or "mutations" which are now accepted but not yet explained, and which seem to point to a "directive agency at work in the germ plasm". ¹

In higher organisms mind becomes the dominant factor, but the advantage is social rather than individual.

"At the same time it must be observed that related organisms may have each more than one possible line of development, and that among them those which conflict will destroy one another, while those that harmonize will survive. Thus (1) a harmonious whole has an advantage over others and (2) a partial harmony tends to become a complete harmony. In both ways harmony is a self-multiplying process and though a higher unity is always liable to destruction by lower ones which it has not incorporated, yet over long periods the permanent make-weight has its effect and there is a progress of development which is complete only when the whole field of reality is subdued to the needs of a single organic whole." ²

This process may be described in four moments or distinguishable sets of conditions.

"i. In the formation of any new organism there is either a separation of factors previously held together or a union of factors previously separated or a combination of both processes, the result being always a new individual of more or less distinctive character. ii. In the organs so formed, the operation of parts is conditioned by the requirements of the whole which are such that the organism maintains itself (under certain environmental conditions) through change and generally undergoes a certain harmonious differentiation and reproduces its kind.

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.5
2. Ibid p.473
iii. Both as a condition and result of this development elements of energy originally foreign to the organism are absorbed and arranged so as to subserve the organic movement.

iv. By reproduction the organism maintains a type which is only varied (a) by differing environmental stimuli, (b) internally, by special differentiations or syntheses, the exact nature and condition of which are not yet adequately determined." 1

Now all this dual aspect theory of the evolutionary process faces further difficulties in the question of ultimate causation:

"How the living individual first comes into being is no doubt the crux of all theories of development. The dilemma has always seemed to be absolute. Either life is eternal (omne vivum ex vivo) or at some point of time absolutely lifeless matter becomes alive. The first alternative is negatived by all that we know or reasonably infer about the earlier state of the world as incompatible with any form of life. So far as this earth is concerned the difficulty has indeed been resolved by the rather childish resource of conceiving germs of life as arriving from some other planet, but this is the Hegelian method of banishing the difficulty to the region of the invisible where no suggestion can very well be confuted. On the results here reached two things at least may be said with some confidence. On the one hand there is no question at all of the ultimate origin of life as distinct from the ultimate origin of things, for Mind, which certainly has life, is coeval with Reality.... Again, we have not to think of the mind factor as something altogether outside the elements, coming down upon them and setting them in order after the mode of Anaxagoras, but rather as conditioning the elements from the first, striving for dominance within them and finding its way by differential grouping, the first of which is individual life." 2

This statement goes straight to the heart of the problem, offers the limited solution that is available and stops without any attempt to obscure the evident fact of its limitations.

This "self-conscious evolution" is slow at first, but

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.468-9
2. Ibid. pp.464-5
is accelerating. It is "neither purely mechanical nor purely teleological".¹ As to origins, there is no determinate starting point. "Nature is neither wholly blind, nor wholly the creature of intelligent purpose."² Biologically, man is, in Pringle-Pattison’s phrase, "organic to the world".³ The problem of ultimate origin is, at least so far as the origin of life is concerned, ultimately unintelligible.

This notion of evolution or development is the central idea, as the discussion which is to follow will show, of Hobhouse’s system. It will not be out of place to raise a question at this time which must wait upon that discussion for its answer. Just how far is the evolutionary concept logically defensible and religiously valuable? On the basis of the discussion thus far it purports to give us direct contact with the modus operandi of Ultimate Reality in the process of producing individual centers of life. If it does so, then, as one means of satisfactorily relating the finite being to the Infinite, it possesses real religious value.

"If, then, the whole course of history, or rather of physical, biological or social evolution, is to be summed up in this—that it is a process wherein mind grows from the humblest beginnings to an adult vigor, in which it can— as in the creed of humanity it does—conceive the idea of directing its own course, mastering the conditions external and internal of its exercise, if this is a true account of evolution—and it is the account to which positive Science points—then we cannot say that this is a mean and unimportant feature of reality that is disclosed to us. We can hardly suppose such a process accidental or quite peculiar to the conditions of this earth. At any rate, as far as the widest syn-

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Mind in Evolution p.404
2. Ibid p.405
theses of our experience goes it shows us Reality neither as a providentially ruled order nor as a process of fortuitous combinations and dissolutions, but as the movement of a mind appearing under rigidly limited conditions of physical organization in countless organisms.  

If, on the other hand, the whole concept of development be found to be logically invalid, resting, deductively upon an inference which is open to the double charge of the un-critical use of Agreement and the confusion of observation and inference, then its religious and philosophical value will be somewhat less impressive. It is manifestly impossible to deduce a general law of development from particular cases within the general order. What, then, of the inductive argument? So far as biology is concerned what is actually observed is change within the set of conditions, either relatively simple or relatively complex, which happens to be under observation. No new set of conditions which can arbitrarily and absolutely be called a new individual is ever found. The process of change is continuous and change from complex to simple is probably as universal, continuous and significant as the reverse process upon which the evolutionary concept rests. Decay and death are as common as birth and growth. Evolution tends, it seems, to ignore the one and magnify the other. Furthermore, there is a grave doubt as to whether what is actually observed, even within the eclectic limits indicated above, is really development or whether we infer development from the fact of

3. Ibid p.306
change as Hume declared we infer cause from mere sequence in observed phenomena.

Hobhouse recognizes three possible explanations of the living organism: (1) supernatural adjustment, (2) mechanism and (3) organic growth, of which he says:

"To these questions the third theory offers the following reply. Whatever the course or origin of the organism, it is in itself not a purely mechanical arrangement of parts. It is neither a machine created by intelligence \textit{ab extra}, nor one built up by unintelligent processes. It is not a pure machine at all, but a whole having a conative principle at work within, operating on and modifying what are otherwise physical, mechanically determined elements, and so fashioning the growth and function of the parts by reference to the requirements of the whole."\textsuperscript{1}

And man, as one among many such organisms, manifests this combination of mechanical and teleological qualities which Hobhouse finds to be characteristic of all organic life. Being the highest product of the process he will manifest the teleological and mental side of evolutionary movement to a higher degree than does any other animal. The basis for this supremacy lies in the nature of Mind and occupies our attention in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
PSYCHOLOGY

When we inquire into the subject which Hobhouse regarded as central to all philosophical inquiry, namely Psychology, we shall not be surprised to find him approaching it from an empirical standpoint. His book, Mind in Evolution, is a strictly psychological treatment of the subject and his Theory of Knowledge is a logical and epistemological treatment of the same problem—the nature and place of Mind in the scheme of things.

There are, as he states in the preface to the former work, two phases to this inquiry: (1) the statement of his hypothesis as to the general trend of mental evolution and (2) the testing of that hypothesis in the field of animal psychology, involving, as a constituent problem, the general distinctions between animal and human intelligence. The results of this testing, however, can make no claim to finality. Many of his views, he says, were derived from Comte, Mill, Spencer and Dr. Lester Ward.

The first task to which he addresses himself is that of examining the phenomena grouped together under the head of reflexes. There he finds an inarticulate correlation of the elements of environment operating in two ways: (a) by selective modification, present even in certain Infusoria (e.g.

1. Muirhead, Contemporary British Philosophy Article by Hobhouse. p.152.
3. Ibid
Protozoa) and (b) by assimilation, i.e. "a union of elements in consciousness based on relations that do not enter consciousness." ¹

Biological equilibrium is maintained by modification of the behavior of the individual by following "beaten paths if possible, if not by beating out new paths"; ² and the action involved is mainly mechanical in kind though in a very general sense it may be termed teleological as looking toward the maintenance of the "organic balance".

"The precise function of consciousness then in sensori-motor action is to grasp the unique combination of stimuli, each of which having its special reaction modified by the concomitant reactions, there follows a response appropriate to the unique situation as a whole." ³

This low order of correlation is effected in but not by consciousness ⁴ and depends upon organic structure. Non-correlated or sporadic action is not found in purity, though the random discharge of energy in strong emotion offers a fairly close approach to it and seems to reveal an underlying urge that is the basis of all correlated action. ⁵

"The function of consciousness in sensori-motor action is not to correlate the present with the past or the future but to correlate the data of the present with one another in a way which effects a corresponding correlation of the functions of pre-existing structure." ⁶

"This is probably the earliest verifiable function of consciousness as it is certainly one of the most widespread." ⁷

The function of nerve tissue is to secure the correlation of

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.71
2. " " " Mind in Evolution ch. 3
3. " " " Development and Purpose p.59
4. Ibid p.45
5. Ibid
6. Ibid p.60
7. Ibid
different parts of the body in the work of adaptation to its needs and to those of the race.\(^1\)

It is seen in the above statement that the basis of mind is physical,— "The ground layer of mind is a property of the hereditary structure,"\(^2\) and is "shaped indirectly by the experience of the ancestral stock".\(^3\)

"The method of adaptation in which mind is especially concerned is the correlation of one experience or act with others, and we may regard such correlation as partaking of a physical character. Its special organ in consciousness without which new correlations are effected indirectly and cumbronsly."\(^4\)

And development is measured by the character of the correlations. So, while mind is unquestionably grounded in organism, the higher it goes in the evolutionary scale the more fully it exhibits a non-physical character that is present, albeit in a very low degree, in all acts of correlation.

He passes on from reflexes and primitive consciousness to instinct, which he defines as "a tension of feeling guiding a train of sensori-motor acts—and reflex acts along with them—and persisting till a result of importance to the organism is attained".\(^5\) This is "the highest form of correlation effected by heredity and coexistent conditions combined".\(^6\) At the human level, "Past experience," both individual and racial, "operates unconsciously on the highest and most developed, as on the most elementary, products".\(^7\)

2. Ibid p.41
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.44
5. Ibid p.61
6. Ibid p.64
7. Ibid p.74
Past and future are correlated but the correlation is "massive" and inarticulate "affected by consciousness but not in consciousness".

Intelligence is "born within the realm of instinct and at first grasps only a little of what instinct prompts." 1

Assimilation and readjustment are next considered and Hobhouse finds that we may "note that there is abundant evidence on which human perceptions are based far down in the animal scale." 2 This glimmering of correlative activity marks "the first stage beyond instinct in the evolution of Mind". 3

Feeling, like impulse, must on the whole be conducive to survival. Feeling is a "mode of consciousness the biological functions of which govern impulse", 4 and there is "no principle of action derivable from thought or ratiocination abstracted from feeling". 5

Passing onward and upward he discusses sensation and perception as found in the concrete experience of practical judgment. Hume's associationism is rejected as "fundamental error", 6 and practical judgment as exercised by men or animals in behavior adjustments is found to depend upon the number and strength of relations holding among the terms involved in the judgment. Practical judgment is similar to, though not identical with, logical judgment. Objects are

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Mind in Evolution p.77
2. Ibid p.102
3. Ibid
5. Ibid p.55
6. 
recognized by relations which are internal to the terms.

Recall, readjustment, expectation and memory are
based upon the same fundamental relational nature of experi-
ence.

The appearance of purpose in organic life is regarded
as an event of great importance. He says:

"The appearance of actions definitely directed to
and determined by the ends they serve is perhaps the
most critical moment in the evolution of the mind." 1

An idea, for Hobhouse, is the consciousness of refer-
ence to an end. Analogy is really similarity of relations
within the total field of present and past experience. Ar-
ticulate ideas, defined as relations that are perceived, re-
tained and used as a basis of action, are to be found among
some, at least, of the animals below the human level. 2 His
theory of the nature of apprehension, both as to process and
as to content, will serve to clarify this point. To the
question, "What is the simplest and most primitive form of
experience?", he answers that all are complex. 3 This com-
plexity makes abstraction necessary. "To grasp anything at
all we must leave out the greater part of it." 4 And the
higher the range of the mental grasp the greater is the de-
gree of mental abstraction. The facts, however, and even
their relations, are present in the experience, to be ana-
lyzed out. He holds that "simple introspection" gives rela-

1. Hobhouse, E. T., Mind in Evolution p.127
2. Ibid ch. 10
3. Hobhouse, E. T., Theory of Knowledge pp.15-16
4. Ibid p.6
5. Ibid p.7
tions, within limits; and there are no sensations without relations.\textsuperscript{1} Articulate ideas, therefore, being so intimately grounded in the real nature of the universe as experienced by men and animals, are readily grasped and made the basis for action. He summarizes the topic as follows:

"Putting all the evidence under these heads (Single Instance Learning, Perception of objects in their relations and application of Experience) together I think it may be held that the cluster of functions here grouped under the head of Practical Judgement are to be found in the animal world below man."\textsuperscript{2}

He devotes a large portion\textsuperscript{3} of the book, \textit{Mind in Evolution}, to an examination of animal psychology, using as a basis experiments performed and recorded by others and the results of his own experimentation. Thorndyke's experiments are criticized on two grounds, first, their extreme difficulty, and secondly, the fact that Thorndyke's interpretation of them is not necessitated by the statistical tables of results he sets forth.\textsuperscript{4} Thorndyke regarded memory as an absolute thing either present in perfection or entirely absent, and on the basis of this pre-conceived theory interpreted the behavior of his cats as pure trial and error associationism. Hobhouse believes that memory is present in all degrees of perfection and imperfection and sees evidence of its use even in the tabulated results of Thorndyke's experiments. In a series of experiments which he himself performed, using as his subjects dogs, cats, apes, monkeys, an

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hobhouse, L. T., \textit{Theory of Knowledge} p.7
\item " " " \textit{Mind in Evolution} p.269
\item \textit{Ibid} chapters 7-10
\item \textit{Ibid} p.144-5
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
elephant and an otter, he finds evidence that animals learn by being manipulated, and he is inclined to think they learn by observation of their human teachers, providing their attention can be fixed on the teacher rather than on the food being used as an incentive. These experiments lead him to say that "on the whole it would seem that animals are influenced by similarity of relations", though he does not care to be dogmatic about the matter.

From these statements it is quite evident that Hobhouse regards a large portion of the domain of mental activity as the common property of man and the lower animals.

The concept, however, seems to be peculiar to mankind. Concepts are formed by analysis which "breaks up the percept", but always consists in a movement of attention within the sphere of the given, not in assertion of aught that lies beyond." In this he is in substantial agreement with Professor C. Spearman's second principle: "The mentally presenting of any two or more characters (simple or complex) tends to evoke immediately a knowing of relations between them." Hobhouse seems to be a little less inclined to countenance any trace of the Kantian a priori than is Spearman, whose "education" tends to become creative in contrast to Hobhouse's "analysis" which is a pure process of discovery.

They share the conviction that the whole process is immediately present in mind. Further pursuit of this problem would

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Mind in Evolution p.222
2. Ibid p.293
take us into logic on the one hand and epistemology on the other. These are matters for future consideration.

The nature of the Self next engages attention. The formation of concepts makes possible the continuity of past, present and future, which is an indispensable condition for selfhood. But this continuity is never perfect. The Socratic injunction: "Know thyself" is only relatively possible.

He sums up the evolution of mind and the self up to the present human level as follows:

"If we conceive the critical movement carried to its completion, shall have reached a central point from which, in outline, the genesis, the development, the conditions of Mind in man lie open to view, and with them its potentialities and, we may say, its future. The entire history of mind may be said to lead up to this point, at which it becomes, as we have put it, self-conscious. The question that now arises is how far this self knowledge yields self control, how far, that is to say, having gained this point of view, the Mind can not only forecast but shape its future. To answer this question we must turn from the development of thought to that of action." 1

This problem lies in the field of Ethics and will be considered later. It may be noted here that this self or will consists of or comprises such elements as happiness, self-realisation, duty, etc., as interconnected "elements in an ethical experience which is, after all, a unity". 2 The psychophysical basis of the self is hereditary. The inarticulate correlation through feeling---pleasure-pain relations---is animal in nature and even the articulate correlation through purpose is common to the higher animals. The sense of duty and other moral elements in the life of the self are ground-

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.151
2. Ibid p.153
ed in sympathy and the necessity for social order.

Hobhouse acknowledges his debt to James and to Bradley for the concept of the self at which he finally arrives, but departs from the position of the latter in holding "a definite meaning for the conception of self". He says: "The self, then, to me is real." Various powers of this self as ethical and religious will be considered later; memory, as a psychological problem with important implications for the religious problem, must be faced here.

Time is regarded as a continuum. "Memory is a present content" referring to time recognized as past and is due to "the permanence of modifications effected in the organism by experience." "Remembered fact is not present to the mind like the apprehended fact. It is asserted." Memory is not a distinct faculty, nor is it association, nor yet the re-excitation of nerve centers. Full psychological explanation of memory is impossible on the basis of present knowledge of organic process, but its "validity is one of the ultimate postulates of our knowledge".

When we come to consider the relation of mind or consciousness to the whole process of development we discover that:

"Progress, then, is an evolution of harmony. This is a self furthering process in the sense explained, but is none the less subject to arrest by causes of discord within or without. In all but the lowest stages it is effected by conscious correlation, and its development depends on the extension of the sphere of conscious control. As to the condition and consequences
of this extension our review of development has given results which may be briefly summarised.

i. Consciousness arises under the conditions of physical life, and in the first place as a means to secure ends subordinate to the general struggle for existence. But so far as the sphere of consciousness extends, it establishes a harmony of which feeling is the medium.

ii. The conditions (whether in the constitution of the individual or in the environment) under which consciousness at any stage subsists, prescribe the general direction of its activity, except in so far as these conditions have themselves come within the grasp of consciousness. As between any distinct centres of consciousness (whether in different individuals or in the same individual at different times and in different relations) there is no necessary correlation, and the aims of conscious activity are correspondingly discordant.

iii. The development of consciousness in its principal phases has as its basis an enlargement and a redirection of activity depending on the absorption into the body of consciousness of some of the conditions which have previously operated upon consciousness from without. The effect of this change is in each case an extension of harmony.

iv. Conditions which, under the selective action of consciousness, become conducive to harmony limit its action and thwart its development as long as they remain outside its grasp. Among them the most important is the existence of distinct centres of consciousness, which, until they are brought into relation, have discordant aims and cancel each other’s efforts.

v. In the highest stage the redirection which occurs lies in the systematic effort to absorb the entire conditions of development itself. If this were successful, there would be no ‘external’ conditions left to operate. The sources of disorganisation would be removed, and orderly progress would be assured by the complete harmony of interacting parts.

vi. Thus at any stage there exist conditions of further growth which need a further condition to complete them, viz., that they should be understood, if it be admitted that Mind has arrived at the point at which the conception of development becomes the basis of its operation, we have the pre-existing (hitherto external) conditions completed by the new condition that they are recognised, and we are, therefore, in possession of the principle necessary to complete the intelligent control of life, and it needs only to work out its application. Against (whether in different individuals or in the same individual at different times and in different relations) there is no necessary correlation, and the aims of conscious activity are correspondingly discordant.

Such then, in brief outline, is the psychology of Hobhouse. Psychologically, man is a product of the evolutionary forces, mental and material, which operate throughout the universe. Mentally as well as physically man is "organic to the world". He is the highest individual development of that process and as such,---a mind grounded in biological structure and brought to the level of self-conscious activity,---he forms the basis for the social, political and religious structures of the cultured world and provides the field of study for ethics, logic and the kindred social sciences.

The next higher reach of psychology, for Hobhouse, carries him entirely beyond the borders of psychology as commonly understood. Since he has found mind so far down in the scale of organic life, we shall not be surprised to find him extending its domain in the opposite direction also. "Human nature", then, becomes to him "an organism with a natural growth of its own"; mind becomes an attribute of human society and the individual development becomes a function of the social development. So we pass to his Sociology.

Hobhouse, L. T. Mind In Evolution p. 350
CHAPTER V

SOCIology

In keeping with his customary realism, Hobhouse bases his social theories on empirical investigation of historical and contemporaneous social patterns. The external form of his most finished statement on this subject, *Elements of Social Justice*, is rational and deductive,---the social application, as he remarks in the preface, of the ethical principles explained in *The Rational Good*,---but the content, as he is careful to explain, is based on experience.

The basis for any sort of social organization is found in the animal nature of man in the form of "highly plastic" instincts incorporated in the biological structure.1 This instinctive nature "is always pressing the animal along the ways which will satisfy it",2 and in man and some other mammals as well as in certain birds and insects, the ways which satisfy are social ways. Among these species regulation of some sort is invariably found. Indeed, regulation of some sort is common to all life; but regulation by custom, law and belief is peculiar to man.

In pursuit of the rudiments of social order Hobhouse investigates the available data on primitive tribes now extant, the historic remains of previous cultures and current sociological phenomena such as Trade Unions and Trade Boards. The Rock Veddahs of Ceylon and the Yahgans of Tierra del

2. Ibid. p. 9
Fuego may be cited as examples of the first, while the Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Chinese civilizations offer the best instances of the second.

Three types of social bond are found existing in various forms in different levels of civilization. The most primitive is the bond of kinship—the usual basis of savage society. It may hold through either the patriarchal tie or through "mother right". Authority is the next higher stage and is usually based on conquest, though in most instances it tends to pass over into priestocracy and merge the civil and military function with the religious rites. Citizenship forms the basis of the third and highest tie. It is based on the concept of personal rights and the common good and finds expression in the form of the City-state of ancient civilization and in the Nation States of the modern era.

The evolutionary principle is here, as everywhere throughout Hobhouse's work, central and primal. "Social customs must bear some fairly close relation to primitive man's instinctive reactions and be suited to conditions which make for maintenance of society and...will therefore include good and bad elements and may be inimical to progress." "Humanity is a growing rather than a matured unity," and in this developmental process proceeds by the method of trial and error. Humanity is as blind and imperfect as man himself in

1. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution Vol. 1 p.50
2. Ibid p.35
3. Hobhouse, The Rational Good p.224
4.
the process of social evolution. Furthermore, the state is not a super-person free from moral obligations that devolve upon the component individuals within it. Indeed, all social and political institutions are regarded as means to an end rather than as ends in and for themselves. At this point he reflects Bentham's principle of "the greatest possible good to the greatest possible number",\(^1\) especially as interpreted in lucid, vivid impartiality by J.S. Mill. He denies that Utilitarianism is merely "Fig Philosophy\(^2\)" and quotes with approval the dictum that "between his own happiness and that of any other human being the Utilitarian theory requires a man to be rigidly impartial".\(^3\)

Now all this seems to be tending directly toward a complete hedonistic individualism. Nothing could be farther from the intent of our author. He repudiates hedonism as an ultimate standard and declares that its subjective and egocentric expression is the most culpable fault of the Benthamite School. But on the other hand, he holds it to be true "that the good is universally the pleasurable" and regards this fact as "the root of truth in the Utilitarian doctrine".\(^4\) Rights and duties, then, are conditions of social welfare, or as we define such welfare, of a life of harmony. Likewise, he rejects Political Rationalism, but includes rationalism in his developmental wholism, stating his position in the following words. "Reason, as distinguished

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2. Ibid p.7
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.15
from feeling, is not the basis of social action, but the system of feeling at the basis of our social action is reasonable."

Law and justice in the social order are the product of long evolution. They have their ground in the exorable law of nature and are early confused with and sanctioned by the religious cult of the social group. For example, incestuous marriage naturally brings extinction to a tribe; consequently most primitive tribes are legally and religiously exogamous. The Lex Talionis is very early, as is shown by the Hammurabic and Levitical codes. Later, the social rank of the victim of violence is taken into account. Vicarious and collective responsibility are common features of early criminal codes. The payment of indemnities and, later, of fines or but is a further development of the primitive retributive justice. Trial among the primitives is usually by ordeal, or magic, or a mixture of the two. Animals and even tools are punished for acts of violence in primitive cultures. Outlawry, or ostracism, is a common and effective form of punishment, whereas execution is relatively rare in primitive tribes and proves to be an inefficient deterrent of crime, except in regard to the subsequent career of the immediate victim.

Marriage and the general attitude of human society on the sex question offer another valuable index to social sci-

4. Exodus 21: 13-14
Sheer promiscuity is held to be exceedingly rare, if indeed, it ever exists with social sanction. Polygamy is common in uncivilized society and a "loose and easily dissolved marriage tie in lower stages of culture, which gives way to a binding form of marriage with decided privileges for the husband in the next grade", seems to describe the ordinary course of development. Four methods of marriage are described: (1) Capture, which may be real or merely formal connubial capture, (2) Purchase, (3) Service, and (4) Consent.

"The civilized conception of the sanctity of woman exists only in germ in the more primitive cultures of human society. With the dawn of civilization the condition of woman changes somewhat. Babylonia practiced restricted polygamy. China from very early days has regarded woman as subordinate to man, and she spends her days in servitude to father, husband and son in turn. Ancient Rome, on the contrary, allowed woman a very considerable degree of freedom. From these beginnings there has been a gradual evolution to the present highly complex and varied conglomeration of codes governing marriage and divorce.

The relations existing within and between communities is next examined. Since this ground must be thoroughly covered in the section on Ethics it will be sufficient to note here that Hobhouse conceives primitive society as composed

2. Genesis XXIX: 18
3. Hobhouse, L. T., Morals in Evolution p.177
of homogeneous groups or tribes in which individuality was impossible, and traces the course of development by a double track, (1) the widening of the group and (2) the recognition of the individual.

"Fellow-Greeks, co-religionists, fellow-white men, ultimately fellow-men, enter the circle to which obligations apply". . . . "The 'group' is thus widened till it includes all humanity, at which point group-morality disappears, merges in universalism.". . . . "But the rights first recognized are those of the person. To take into account the rights of the organized community is a further step, following logically from the first, no doubt, but following slowly." ¹

"In the early stages of development, rights and duties do not attach to a human being as such. They attach to him as a member of a group.". . . . "Morality is in its origin group-morality". . . . "Civilized humanity is still organized in groups." ² These tribal individualities inevitably come into conflict with one another. Savage warfare, taking its rise in pillaging raids, runs through various forms of magical and religious ceremony, head hunting, scalping and cannibalism, and advances to slavery, which is the most prominent object in wars of early civilization though religious extermination is still practised in historic times. Against this disruptive and destructive tendency a harmonizing influence has waged a continuous, if not altogether constant, warfare. China has been peaceful from a very early date. "While the Gospels pronounced definitely against violence in any shape or form, the Church accommodated her teaching to the practices of a warlike age, and Augustine upholds

¹ Hobhouse, L. T., Morals in Evolution Vol. 1 p.330
² Ibid p.240
the soldier's profession. The Church attempted, unsuccess-
fully, to regulate warfare in the Middle Ages. Grotius, the
father of international law, appeals to Law of nature as the
ground of his plea. "Just as international law rests in its
beginnings on the conception of humanity as incarnate in the
person of every human being, so in the consummated conception
of right and brotherhood, it touches the other pole of mod-
ern ethics,—the conception of humanity as a whole, the sum
of all human beings and their collective history" and "group-
morality disappears".2

The World Court is here prophesied. Hobhouse clearly
sees that if human society is to endure this harmonizing in-
fluence must triumph. "We must either find some way to an
effective internationalism or encounter wars, which must
break up industrialised and organised civilisations, and we
must either discover methods of fuller voluntary co-operation
in industry or prepare for a succession of conflicts which
must end in industrial paralysis."3 And prior to the World
War, he had high hopes that the harmonizing principle might
triumph along the lines his philosophy contemplates. In 1927
he wrote less optimistically:

"If we are counting up the achievements of higher
civilisations we may now reckon among them, without
merely gilding nonentities with fine phrases, the cre-
ation of a germinal league of the world. Whether the
germ is to mature or not depends on the amount of a-
vailable moral wisdom among the peoples of the world,
and whether this will prove equal to its task remains
doubtful. From the practical point of view, hope is
on the whole a better counsellor than fear, but we are

2. Ibid p.279
3. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.220-1
looking at the matter as it bears on social theory, and, theoretically, we are compelled simply to register a non liquet. We can only say that the alternative appears to be not merely the cessation of progress, but the break up of our distinctive civilisation. Humanity would have to go back upon its traces and find some other way, as it has done before. All that has been said of her modern achievement must be held subject to this overhanging doubt.  

And he adds a somber footnote to his previous optimistic passages on world brotherhood.

"I leave the passage as written in 1912, but it is hardly necessary to say that the dangers of a real arrest or reversal of civilisation are far more real and near than was then supposed. At the same time the grounds of hope remain."  

The internal industrial and economic relationships of a community are sociologically and religiously no less important than are the external relations already considered. Among these class relations loom large. The primitive community was homogeneous. Slavery is the first class distinction. The slave at first is rightless, but gradually he gains some rights in various countries. "Under Hadrian the power of life and death was taken from the master, and under Antoninus Pius the master who killed his own slave sine causa was punished as a homicide."  

Indian caste is originally based on Aryan conquest. "*Varna*, the Sanskrit word for caste, means originally colour."  

Serfs of the Middle Ages were not really slaves. The influence of the Church is generally against slavery, and it has gradually been eliminated. Serfdom was outlawed in France, August  

2. Ibid p.237  
3. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution p.312  
4. Ibid p.302
The advent of the factory brought child labor and the other evils attendant on industrialized civilization, thus precipitating a problem that has not yet been solved.

"One could not then claim that modern society has as yet succeeded in the general task of organising industrial energy for the common good (indeed as a comprehensive object, it can hardly be said yet to have been attempted) but it would be equally unreasonable to deny that it has some solid achievement to show in the way of extending and generalising effective partnership in the elements of civilised life."  

The problem of labor and that of capital or wealth are inseparably connected. "Among primitive peoples there is little scope for the institution of private property," though that little is protected by laws against stealing which carry very severe punishment. Allotment of tribal land to individuals for cultivation serves in place of ownership of land. Later communism of villages gives way to family communism, and this to private property, which opens the way for exchange of goods, thus bringing all the modern problems of capital.

It is interesting that the care of the poor is very ancient and was generally more efficient among savage tribes than in modern industrialized society.

Property rights are based on control of goods. Property is "a form of regulated control." In a world composed exclusively of right-minded persons there might be no need of property, private or collective. As things are, anarchis-
tic communism can be safely applied only to the unlimited and unspoilable. "If property in the economic basis of freedom and self-dependence, the possession of some property is desirable for individuals and for any corporate body that has to direct its own affairs."\(^1\) But property also involves "power over other persons",\(^2\) and as "property is in one aspect freedom, it is under another aspect power: and which aspect is the more important depends on the nature of the property and its distribution."\(^3\) Therefore, "for the sake of liberty, the final directing power in industry must be in communal hands, since, if exercised by individuals, it gives them the disposal of the lives of others."\(^4\) These statements are the more significant, because they are based on Hobhouse's Trades Board experience with the very problems here treated. Religiously, they compare favorably with the Book of Acts 2: 46. He says further: "Ethically, two main arguments may be advanced against production for private profit under social control." (1) Inequality and irregularity and (2) low motive. Guild Socialism is rejected.

"The industrial organisation which we are thus led to contemplate is one in which unearned wealth would accrue to the community; the universal and elementary conditions of private work and remuneration would be laid down by law, and would be adjusted in detail, developed, expanded and improved as the conditions of each trade allow by Trade Boards; while industrial management would be in the hands of joint boards of consumers and producers, the Municipality, co-operative associations, or private enterprises, according to the nature of the industry, and the relative efficiency

2. Ibid. p.181
3. Ibid. p.182
4. Ibid. p.186
for varying purposes of which various forms of organisation prove themselves capable." 1

As to the payment of service: "Reward, as we have seen, is a function of harmony." 2 The minimum must meet vital cost to worker of minimum skill, with a maximum scale for increased effort or special ability, with "exchange of goods and service at equal values, where the cost of goods is determined by the payment for social services, and the payment of services is reckoned from the unit which suffices on the average to meet the vital cost of the worker, subject to an increment depending on the extra value of the service and the rarity of the capacity to perform it." 3 Harmony is the goal.

In dealing with social and personal factors in wealth he says: "There are broadly two grounds on which the claims of the community on available wealth may be based." 4 (1) Function, such as government, education and the production of wealth, which need certain amounts and forms of wealth in order that the function may operate. (2) The fact that social factors like the increase of population create property values.

"Subject to this understanding, then, we are free to maintain that personally accumulated capital is personal property, and that hereditary capital should be communal property, i.e. that property in general should pass to the community at death," not, however, "'personalia', such as furniture, books, etc." 5

1. Hobhouse, E. T., Elements of Social Justice p.216
2. Ibid p.140
3. Ibid p.171
4. Ibid p.183
5. Ibid p.195
The basic reason for discord and, therefore, for the necessity of government is set forward as follows.

"The conditions (whether in the constitution of the individual or in the environment) under which consciousness at any stage subsists prescribe the general direction of its activity, except in so far as these conditions have themselves come within the grasp of consciousness. As between any distinct centres of consciousness (whether in different individuals or in the same individual at different times and in different relations) there is no necessary correlation, and the aims of conscious activity are correspondingly discordant. Conditions which, under the selective action of consciousness, become conducive to harmony limit its action and thwart its development as long as they remain outside its grasp. Among them the most important is the existence of distinct centres of consciousness, which, until they are brought into relation, have discordant aims and cancel each other's efforts." 1

The fundamental idea of government is the Aristotelian notion of equality. Aristotle declared the just to be a form of the equal. 2 What does this mean in society? The French Constituent Assembly, whose famous declaration runs, "All men are by nature free and equal in respect to their rights. Distinctions can only be founded on public utility." 3 This is "not equality of endowment, but equality of right" 4 resting on "human nature" as "something generic, of which there may be specific, as well as quantitative differences, but which underlies and embraces them all." 5 "Given the social system", 6 certain distinctions of rank and birth, etc. are just, but that merely transfers the question to the justice of the system. The economics of the wage system are

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.245
4. Ibid p.105
5. Ibid
6. Ibid p.108-9
based on "the hard facts of the human market rather than on ethical principle."¹ Desert is a function of personality, and the form of government which in Hobhouse's opinion is most capable of realizing these ideals is Democracy.

"Equal freedom in a common life is the simple meaning of democracy,"² but democracy by popular vote is impractical, and almost irrelevant to the course of real politics. "The power of conscious democracy is practically limited to certain critical decisions, and largely to a veto of the proposals of the bureaucrat."³ It is difficult to get any will at all; "democracy is apt to bubble up into some emotional decision, and then relapse into a flat quiescence and leaves everything to its rulers...until next time."⁴ "In ethical truth, there is only one ultimate community, which is the human race. This community, alas! has never yet found organised expression."⁵ "Such considerations as these have suggested a fundamental theory of society. Social life rests on the combined operation of many activities. Any one of these which involves the work of many human beings should be organised and become, primarily, self-governing."⁶

He deplores equally the "one-sided exaltation of of the state" and "one-sided individualism" as equally immoral to progress.

"Rights and duties, then, are conditions of social

2. Ibid p.318
3. Ibid p.220-1
4. Ibid p.221
5. Ibid p.235
6. Ibid p.237
welfare, or as we define such welfare, of a life of harmony. A general rule of right or duty is one in general necessary to social welfare. A particular right or duty is that which, in a given case, all things considered, is necessary to social welfare. To this welfare, then, every member of the community stands in a double relation. He has his share in it. That is the sum of his rights. He has to contribute his share. That is the sum of his duties.¹

This applies also to "any corporate personality—a family, a municipality—",² etc., or the community itself. The highest test of statesmanship is the synthesis of conflicting rights.

Social organization is thus seen to be religiously important for Hobhouse. In this he is in essential agreement with the best philosophical and religious thought of the ages. Comte made it the base and soul of his religion of Humanity. Hegel found in the metaphysical state the final expression of religion. Plato's Republic, Hobbes Leviathan and the Kingdom of Heaven envisaged by Jesus are so many various attempts to identify the ideal social relations of religion with the actual facts of organized humanity.

How far did Hobhouse succeed in constructing a practical Utopia? What contributions to the development of a religiously satisfactory society mark his work? He clearly went beyond Comte. Comte failed to see, as Hefding remarks, that the problems of religion begin where Humanism stops. Hobhouse did see this, and made a strenuous attempt to establish a system of relations between the merely human order and the wider order of nature in which man lives. Fur-

¹ Hobhouse, L. T., Elements of Social Justice pp. 35-6
² Ibid p. 38
thermore, the effort is not, like Kant's doctrine of God, who guarantees immortality and the reward of righteousness because hedonism demands more than experience supplies, open to the charge of introducing a *deus ex machina*. Hobhouse's God is immanent in humanity and, as we shall see more fully in his metaphysical doctrines, immanent likewise in the total process of which man is a part. Yet his social system seems to me incomplete and self-contradictory.

It seems strange, in view of the penetrating insight displayed in thus grasping the ultimate unifying principle upon which Humanity depends for its life and development, that Hobhouse should have overlooked, almost entirely, the intermediate expressions of his principle that give it its most common, and perhaps its most important, expression, namely, those "corporate persons" which exist in the actual order of human society, are empirically discoverable there, and mediate between the individual human center and whatever ultimate Being unifies the whole. I say almost, for in a few places, notably those cited above, in another connection, he seems hovering near the discovery of this important notion. But he blandly, not to say blindly, passes by the one concept which could have given his sociological and political system unity, and clings to the too concrete and particular individual, and the too abstract and general Humanity, without any visible, real connecting link between them. If his God is to function in a social organized world of human-

2. Footnote 1, p. 46, f. 6, p. 48, f. 2, p. 49
ity, it seems to me that he must function in and through those concrete, yet universal persons, the Family, the School, the Church, Industry, the State, etc., which Hobhouse so effectively ignores. May it not be that the shattering effect of the Great War on his philosophy is revelation of this weakness, even as the War itself was, in all probability, the revelation of a corresponding weakness in the political organization of human society? In other words, it may very well be that the War was a direct result of individualism organized into vast subjective systems, represented by nation-states, and the consequent deterioration or starvation of those real social units which, being objectively, culturally, real, and metaphysically universal, can relate man's varied activities harmoniously in the development of true, useful, and beautiful cultural objects. If this is true, the cure is not, as Hobhouse contended, the extension of the principle of democracy and individualism, but the abandonment of these principles and the construction of a social system in which the principle of harmony will find expression and development in and through the real institutions that comprise the total social order. Hobhouse misses the mark, then, when he identifies the limited homogeneity of the primitive tribe with the universal homogeneity which he hypostatizes as the essence of the ultimate social order in his expression: "ultimately fellow man."

The difference is the unbridged gulf between objectivity and subjectivity. The primitive order is objectively
real. His ultimate world democracy is essentially and incurably subjective. Of course, there is in every objectification of reality, organic, psycho-physical, or socio-cultural, a reference beyond itself to its other. This transient subjectivism or expression of the essential tendency of every finite being to realize itself in union with its other, is quite likely the accompaniment of, if not the cause, of all development, perhaps of all change, but the other, like the one must always be, for all existences, objectively real. The Immanuel of the Kingdom of God, transcending the limits of one human body, comes to be incorporated in the Church, the body of the Messiah, and its objectively real organization and activity become the real and necessary expression of the El Immanent in the social order. One may regret that Hobhouse, with his genius for correlation of the empirical and objective reality with the rational and universal, did not devote more attention to these real social entities, their historic development, and their probable direction of development. Instead he makes all his empirical sociology subservient to the nebulous universal Humanity, which, so far as I can see, can never be more than a subjective abstraction, impotent as a means of development and dangerous as a goal. Whereas those real institutions, which he recognizes as historically effective but stigmatizes as "archaic", may perhaps offer the real basis for meaningful government. He admits that these

"archaic institutions of society, with their ele-
ments of reciprocity and spontaneous association, exhibit their vitality in the midst of the authoritarian order. The patriarchal family, the joint family, and the self-governing village, play their part in the protection of the humbler classes, and in some cases, as in China and in parts of India, seem to be for long ages the real and effective carriers of the social life upon which the authority of the central government and its officials is imposed as something extraneous and remote." 1

We may well turn now to the discussion of religion proper as a form of social organization, which is closely connected with the ethical problems of life.

"The control of the environment is one of the two great channels through which the influence of mental development affects the entire social structure. The other great channel is that of the ethical-religious outlook. In ethical development we have distinguished the stage of primeval custom, of moral common sense, of ethical idealism and of realistic humanitarianism. The centre of the development is the idea of humanity in its two meanings—the humanity which is in each of us, and the humanity which is in all of us." 2

And

"when we consider religious conceptions, we are dealing with the entire attitude of men to life and the world, an attitude which is, in fact, the expression of their total heredity and their total experience,—likely therefore, one may say, to be of all things the last to receive satisfactory shape in explicit thought, and yet incapable of taking distinct shape and performing its functions effectively, except through the medium of explicit thought." 3

The problem is both very ancient and very difficult.

"Religion is one form in which experience, taking the word in its most comprehensive sense, is organized. All true revelation is from within. The only Sinai is a fresh height of man's spiritual nature, and the missionary attempts to preach religion can only succeed in so far as an equation, so to say, establishes itself between the doctrine taught and the minds of those who learn. Thus it is the perpetual tragedy of the higher

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.219
2. Ibid p.199
3. Ibid p.284
religions to be vulgarized as they become popular, and
to be ruined by success. When the apostle has convert-
ed the crowd, he becomes a bishop." 1

Short cuts to a solution by appeal to authority Hobhouse
finds unsatisfactory. The religious needs of man go too deep
for that kind of solution:

"It is the irony of human thought that experience
itself forces on man problems, which it cannot solve,
and yet successively destroys all solutions which rest
on any authority but its own. Not that religion is
wholly divorced from experience. There are at the core
of religious psychology elements of genuine experience,
which as experience is just as real as the sensation of
heat and cold." 2

"Man requires to be in some sort reconciled with his
place in nature", hence religion. 3

The problem of religion is the problem of the whole of
life and its relationships. Naturally, therefore, there
will be a rough correlation in its development and the de-
velopment of other institutions in the social whole.

"The growth of reflection has in many races and under
divers conditions of culture carried mankind beyond the
stage of Polytheism." 4 The search for "general truths under-
lying or permeating experience and giving unity and meaning
to human progress" continues. 5 Imagery is replaced by rea-
soned conception. The rise of mathematics influences reli-
gion and ethics by causing a trend toward monotheism or pan-
theism. Spiritually, "the individual must enter into rela-
tions with the universal spirit, and to do so, he must put

2. Ibid.  Development and Purpose  p.120
3. Ibid  p.121
5. Ibid
off his individuality."1 "Religion cannot be imposed as a rigid system on any sort or condition of men without regard to their characteristics", 2 but must develop out of the whole of life and its conditions. Religions in general, and more especially Christianity, he describes as follows:

“They take up a position above experience, and, reasoning downward therefrom, determine the destiny of man and prescribe rules of conduct. Their appeal is in the last resort to 'faith', the inner light or to the wisdom of the illuminated. They may use historical narratives or miraculous signs as buttresses of faith, but at bottom they know that these are only outworks to impress the vulgar. The religious order stands on its own basis. But as the common sense order is equally firm the result is a virtual recognition of two orders such as may be said roughly to express the attitude of popular Christianity. Here is our world, the world of space and time, of inanimate matter and of conscious human life, the scene of our personal history and the theatre of our efforts. Over there beyond the bounds of death is another world, where we shall live again and where the Kingdom of God is now. Both worlds are real, and for all practical purposes both have their laws. Doubtless God rules this world, too. He made it out of nothing and could destroy it as a slip of paper in the fire, but it is part of His plan to let it run its course guided by immutable laws of matter and the free will of man. Our guidance in this world is the empirical order as elaborated by science. Only on the side of the ethic-religious duty do we come into regular contact with the spiritual order, and direct interventions of Providence in answer to prayer are irregular and uncertain. The two orders issue, in theory, from one being, but, in practice, they are two. They touch here and there and mechanically interact, but in the main they are self-dependent and equally real. Substantially, this form of solution may be regarded as the common property of Monotheism, the tendency of which is always to conceive of the Deity as Creator and Ruler set above and over, and so outside the world, which is accordingly a separate entity. That any such theory must make its account with the opposite drive toward Monism, which would merge the world in the Divine nature, is an interesting point. It is also the source of many logical and

2. " " " Development and Purpose p. 121
moral incoherences and inconsistencies which need not detain us here. It is sufficient to note the extent to which a distinctly dualistic system is possible, and to observe that it is stronger in popular practice than in the closer reasoning of theory." 1

There are, then, two orders, one of 'common sense' or sensory experience, the other the spiritual order based on "the felt needs of man". 2 Man faces the necessity of "a choice, a compromise, or a synthesis". 3

He traces a series of gradations in religious history as follows.

"In its lowest phase the spiritual, while gradually emerging as an idea out of primitive emotions and quasi-instinctive practices, remains as an idea wholly confused with the material, the unintelligent and even the bestial. It is the stage of animism, of stone worship, beast worship, of the binding of spirits by magic incantations and charms, of cajolments and threats intermingled with petitions. In the second stage the spirit stands out as a clearly recognized personality. It is anthropomorphic, human and even super human. In the third stage it embodies the ethical and intellectual ideal. Intellectually, it is the Absolute, the Infinite, even the Whole of Reality. These attributes are, in fact, irreconcilable, but the upshot of a dispassionate criticism of experience is that, though Spirit is not the whole of things nor their unconditioned creator, it is a dynamic force in things, and a force which progressively enlarges its borders. From being the eternal and immutable basis of order, the spiritual becomes the moving impulse towards the highest order, which may be called the harmony of life, and the evolution of humanity is the revelation of certain phases of its growth." 4

And he states the ultimate problem thus.

"The problem of religion, then, comes to determine what is noblest, and ask how it has come to be and what it has in it to be. The old order is inverted." .... "As a consequence, the whole ethico-religious sphere is enlarged. It does not become less personal. Indeed, its hold on personality deepens in proportion as it is

2. Ibid p.126
3. Ibid p.126
4. Ibid p.200
realized that for each man its value depends on the spontaneous response of his whole nature. But it recognizes social salvation as the greater, and including personal salvation within it, and it finds justice, or what is right in the relation of man to man, a higher spiritual achievement than any virtue of the soul in which the individual can wrap himself in moral warmth." 1

But religion has no infallible criterion for determining what is noblest.

"While revealing profound and fundamental truths which may justly be termed true scientific discoveries as any which physical science can boast, this teaching has its limitations and its liabilities to error. Essentially a matter of insight rather than of reasoning, its truths are partial rather than complete, and where it seeks to cover the whole field of knowledge and action it does so rather by deduction from conceived positions than it does by patient reconstruction of experience. In support of its central position, which rapidly becomes crystallized in dogmas, it postulates Faith, and Faith comes to replace Love as the keynote of the arch, and so to distort the whole ethical edifice. Moreover, its appreciation of spiritual truth being attained rather by penetrating insight into certain aspects than by the resolute effort of reason to grasp the whole, is partial and one-sided. In particular, in insisting on self-surrender it is apt to ignore the claims of self-development, and in dwelling on Love pay less attention to justice. In holding before the individual the way to obtain peace with his own soul it has less regard for the collective life of humanity, and has little concern for the possibilities of true social progress upon earth. It tends to foster rather than to overcome the antithesis between the world of the flesh and the world of the spirit, and while confident that the one world only is true and real, has practically to abandon the attempt to incorporate the other within it. In the result it either acquiesces in the division of the spiritual and temporal power, or to maintain the force of supremacy explains away its own fundamental teaching. Its comparative failure in practice is therefore not to be attributed solely to the hardness of heart of the sons of men, but equally to its inherent limitations." 2

And it often finds itself involved in conflicts and inconsistencies. "Every one of the Christian virtues is ob-

1. Hobhouse, L. T. Development and Purpose. p. 185
2. Ibid. p. 172-3
viously a disadvantage to its possessor in the struggle for existence, more particularly in a Christian community. The greatest offense a man can commit against society is to be in any respect better than society, but his contribution is incorporated and "the world wonders how it could ever have got on without it. The martyr of the past generation is duly canonized, while the gridiron is being cheerfully heated for the prophet of a still higher creed." Yet in spite of all this, "Humanitarianism indeed has justified the Christian ethics on its positive side. As against those who maintained that the Sermon on the Mount has only an ideal meaning applicable to a better world, it has vindicated the practical application of the Beatitudes to this world of ours."3

The principal value and the principal power of religion, according to the view of Hobhouse, are in the concomitant feeling states aroused by it.

"The real force behind a dogma is a mass of feeling that has never been analysed, never left its home in the mother-sense. But this feeling is not so strong as to be happy without the appearance of evidence and reasoning. It spins such evidence and reasoning, accordingly, out of the first materials that come to hand, and invests the flimsy web with its own intensity of emotion. The only element of assured truth in the whole matter as analysis disentangles it, is the feeling in the background. This feeling is so far entitled to respect that it belongs to the mother-sense, that is to say, it has grown up in response to the requirements of the environment, but how it is to be interpreted in detail, is unfortunately not to be judged by the simple deliverances of consciousness in which it issues."4

One unfortunate development of religion is its other

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Mind in Evolution p.392
2. Ibid
4. " " Development and Purpose p.235
worldliness or detachment from life. This phase is especially prevalent in the Orient which Hobhouse characterizes as the home of spiritual religions, mentioning especially Brahmanism and Persian dualism. The conscience of the righteous is depicted as a beautiful maiden, while the conscience of the wicked is portrayed as a profligate and diseased woman. The element of mysticism, identifying God and Self is strong. Oriental religionists generally accept magical pardon from sin.

"The Brahmanic code is not the work of reformers or of men inspired with a social or human ideal. It is the code of a society in which barbaric elements survive but which has made great advances in civilization and of a priesthood which has grasped certain sides of spiritual truth, but has neither disencumbered itself of primitive ways of thought nor advanced to the point at which the ethical and the spiritual unite." 1

Buddhism exalts a life of love for all, but it is subjective purity and goodness that is meant. This weakness is found also in Chinese Quietism. "Those very qualities which should refine the world are thought to be soiled by the world." 2

Nor has Western religious thought entirely escaped this blight. "The truth is that neither Protestantism nor the Roman Church advanced to the ethical position that it is the good man through his goodness who is nearest to God." 3 "Detachment" is the curse of every ethical religion. Of Christian Socialists he writes, "Here as elsewhere it is the few who take the Gospel literally who leave their mark upon the

2. Ibid p.118
3. Ibid p.147
Thus, in a comprehensive, critical, yet constructive manner, Hobhouse surveys the field of religion and uncovers what he regards as its underlying principle—mind-guided evolution. He lays down, at the same time, the ideal conditions, so far as he is able to grasp them, for future development. In view of his heterodoxy in religion it is interesting to note how these ideas compare with the Christianity of the New Testament Scriptures. Perhaps he is really more Christian, in insisting upon the unity of faith and works, on literal application of Christ's doctrines of brotherhood and on a progressive unfolding of the religious life of man, than were the orthodox theologians whose Christianity he repudiated.

At any rate there is abundant evidence in his dealing with religion, of two important religious truths. First, any man who faces the deeper and more vital implications of the social order will inevitably come to grips with the fundamental problems that underlie both ethics and religion; and this is true even when natural predilection inclines the investigator to other than religious fields. Secondly the unbiased observer and investigator in the field of Sociology—and if Hobhouse had a bias on the question it was away from rather than toward the orthodox position of his clergyman father—is literally driven to recognize the tremendous social and ethical value of Christ's teaching. The experience of Hobhouse in this matter is not unique. The author

of one of the most abstruse and thoroughly revolutionary theories of social and political reform produced in modern times remarked to the present writer during a discussion of this theme: "I should be perfectly willing to take my Gospel from the Book of Acts." And the general attitude of great thinkers seems to reflect the spirit set forth in Rauschenbusch's Prayer for Kings and Magnates:

"O God, we worship thee as the sole lord and sovereign of humanity, and render free obedience to thee because thy laws are just and thy will is love. We pray thee for the kings and princes of the nations, to whom power has descended from the past, and for the lords of industry and trade in whose hands the wealth and power of our modern world have gathered. We beseech thee to save them from the terrible temptations of their position, lest they follow in the somber lineage of those who have lorded it in the past and have used the people's powers for their oppression. Suffer them not to waste the labor of the many for their own luxury, or to use the precious life-blood of men for the corruption of all."

Hobhouse sees religion evolving toward that ethical and social ideal.

The legal, social, political, industrial and religious institutions of man are likewise in a process of evolution and are, like man himself, mind-guided but far from perfect.

In body, mind and social order, man is one with the nature of the universe. Evolution is the process by which he has arrived at his present station, and the means by which he must advance. Mind, embodied in individuals and also in the social order, is the guiding and controlling principle of this evolution. Here as elsewhere the notion of development with a teleological element somehow included in its course
is the central and primal doctrine. But this theory raises questions that are very difficult to answer. Hobhouse passes smoothly over most of these difficulties and simply calls in mind to explain them, having already tacitly assumed that mind is the explaining principle. Such questions as the following remain unanswered. (1) How is it possible for mind to influence the course of material events or "change the environment"? (2) What is the nature of matter, which is at the same time so utile and so intractable for the purposes of mind and mentally guided development? (3) How shall the notion of evolution be reconciled with the notion of mind-guidance?

Leaving these questions, for the present, unanswered, we turn to his Epistemology and Logic.
CHAPTER VI

EPistemology

Epistemological and Logical problems enjoy a very limited popularity in the present day because of the erstwhile universal reign of empirical pragmatism in every field of human activity, including the field of religion. There is evidence that the reign is over. If it is, then the problem of how we may know, what we may know, and how we may know our knowledge to be valid may once more become important. In any case Hobhouse regarded these problems as essential to the understanding of the world in which we live and the possible world into which it is, on his theory, evolving.

Three general viewpoints may be cited as underlying all the various modern epistemological positions. One is the Intuitionist view which bases all possibility of knowledge on that which is immediately grasped by consciousness. The second is the Rationalist attitude which makes knowledge possible by the operation of mind in ordering concepts and relations. The third is the Empiricist's view which makes knowledge depend upon the sensory experience. These three general notions have been combined in such a variety of patterns and have each and all been subjected to such pertinent criticism that one is reminded of the six blind men who went to see the elephant. Doubtless "each is partly in the right, though all are in the wrong."

Hobhouse begins by criticizing all such particular views
as too narrow. He says that Rationalistic Idealism makes the mistake of regarding knowledge as relative because it involves a relation of knower and known. He insists that philosophy must share the experimental nature of science and must never sink to the level of mere ratiocination, but must always be busy synthesising the results of scientific research and checking its results by application. 1

Nor is he kindlier to the naive realist position.

"The mistake of natural or intuitive realism is to start with the assumption that the independence of the percept is immediately given; the mistake of any subjective idealism is to assume that the object is first given as inward. To our view it is in fact not given as either. It is given as content present to an inward state." 2

His criticism of Intuitionism in any form is devastating, and never more so than in our peculiar field of the religious aspect of his thought.

"In the first place, the religious order must make its account with experience. In spite of all efforts to escape, in spite of a hundred abortive flights through loopholes of irrationalism and mysticism, religious thought is in its inner consciousness aware that in the end it must abide by reason or perish. In the last resort accordingly it falls back from mythology, from faith, and from intuition on experience." 3

Now one would naturally think that reason would be his final criterion of truth and his infallible guide to truth. Not so: he insists upon "disclaiming any exaggerated estimate of the primacy of thought in human life. Thought is not an independent process." 4

In short, experience, considered as a total process and

1. Muirhead, Contemporary British Philosophers p.151-2
2. Hobhouse, L. T., Theory of Knowledge p.537
3. " " " Development and Purpose p.185
4. Ibid p.193
as a process in continuous development, puts us in touch with reality, and its nature is to be discovered by "studying its behavior and relations." Knowledge and belief are "dependent on sentience and thought which implies a mind that thinks and feels." "The object of knowledge is a world of reality." Now the reasons he gives to substantiate these statements will furnish not only a survey of his epistemology but also a considerable degree of insight into the deeper problem of his ontology. For surely the problem of the nature of the act of knowing is essentially connected with the further problem of the nature of both the knower and the object known. Hobhouse regards epistemology as the basis of knowledge.

Nor is this problem, as it might at first seem to be, merely a question for psychology. Psychology is concerned with mental states and processes. The relation of these states and processes to any reality external to mind lies outside the psychologists' field and belongs properly to the epistemological investigator.

Hobhouse may be classified as one of the "more moderate" of "realistic epistemological monists," thinkers, and his "great work", *Theory of Knowledge*, is one of the earliest in this school of thought.

We may profitably consider his views on the nature of

2. Ibid p.262
4. Macintosh, Douglas Clyde, *The Problem of Knowledge* p.244
5. Ibid p.245
knowing as connected with "(a) perceptual objects, (b) mental processes such as feelings and volitions, (c) sensory images and hallucinatory objects, (d) remembered and imagined objects, (e) general principles and universals and (f) values." ¹

Perceptual objects are externally real and most of the sensory qualities of these objects are also externally real, according to Hobhouse. This, and his discussion of memory, are perhaps the weakest points in his theory of knowledge. He is forced to recognize that not all of the sense qualities (sensa) can be regarded as externally real and he offers as explanation of the rejected ones the statement that they are due to "some reaction of our nervous organization on a given physical event." ² In the case of a locomotive whistle which is heard at different pitches by persons in different relations to the speeding engine he clearly recognizes that naive realism cannot account for the variations. He thinks, however, that the "pitch in fact remains constant", and that "If the whole mass of our perceptions were systematized...the correlated values which they would give would be the true external order." ³

Macintosh criticizes this psychological pragmatism as failing to recognize the relational element involved in each separate experience of the whistle, even the experience of the engineer. Surely this criticism is valid and the whis-

1. Class notes in A. C. Garnett's Epistemology, Butler U. 1931
2. Hobhouse, L. T., Theory of Knowledge p.225
3. Ibid p.530-1
tle's pitch is a function of a complex relational set and will therefore vary with any variation therein.

Mental processes, feelings and volitions are subjective and belong to the realm of mind, which, though based on organic structure, is not externally real. In feeling esse is percipi.¹

Cognition presupposes two elements, Mind and Object. Neither is explicable in terms of the other, yet subjective thoughts do somehow become objects of cognition.²

The same subjectivity applies to the activity of reasoning, though the objects of the process are generally external.

"Reason in general may be briefly defined as the impulse towards interconnection."³
"In cognition the rational impulse is to establish a harmonious system."⁴

All the mental processes are in the same category, as partial, and therefore imperfect, expressions of the organizing and developing power of mind.

"Thus the work of reason appears unsatisfactory, because, at any stage, there is more working in the mind than can get itself clearly expressed. The world of mind is not irrational, but at any stage short of perfection it is imperfectly rational. Yet Reason is not a separate faculty, dominating one compartment and legitimately excluded from another on which it wrongfully encroaches. Nor does it aim at an aggression which is to domineer and destroy. The weakness or defect of reason is equally the weakness or defect of the non-rational elements. Its extension to them, their inclusion within its sphere, is their redemption. Its legitimate empire is co-extensive with Mind, for every feeling, impulse, and even fancy had its legitimate meaning and true development within the harmonious whole toward which it moves."⁵

Sensory images and hallucinations are subjective.

² Muirhead, *Contemporary British Philosophers* p.161-2
³ Hobhouse, L. T., *Development and Purpose* p.312
⁴ Ibid p.315
⁵ Ibid p.287-8
In dealing with remembered and imagined objects, Hobhouse gives a weak and inconsistent discussion. Hume's "faint copy" theory is true of images but not of ideas, though psychologically the two are similar. Logically they are in direct contrast because the idea refers or "looks out to a world beyond itself." His theory of memory as discussed in the chapter on Psychology need not be reviewed here. Its inadequacy points to the need of further analysis of this problem. Bertrand Russell's discussion of the problem is logically a congenial supplementation of Hobhouse's theory, with Russell's "mnemic causation" replacing Hobhouse's "mind". The likeness, however, between the two systems as systems is by no means as close and one cannot say that Russell offers a more ultimately satisfying theory of memory than does Hobhouse. His "mnemic causation" requires explanation and support that is not forthcoming from his system as a whole, and no one sees its limitations more clearly than does Russell himself.

Hobhouse, too, sees that his memory theory is inadequate. On values, he holds that though secondary qualities are not subjective, tertiary qualities probably are. "That is to say, I believe value and goodness to be conditioned by the life of mind." But even these have a sort of immaterial objectification as instanced in the case of happiness in the

2. Ibid
3. Russell, Bertrand Philosophy chapter 28
4. Ibid.
5. Hobhouse, L. T. The Rational Good p. 159
love of two people who love a child and through him the universe of mind where "The distinction of self and other has vanished because outside this 'self' there is no other." 1

When he faces the problem of general principles, universals and ground, he feels himself on surer ground. "The critical use of experience yields a rational interpretation of reality which by persistent effort grows in width and depth." 2 Relations are internal to the terms, indeed, objects are known as centers of relations. Of Resemblance and Identity, he says that perception of resemblance and difference is "simply a matter of fact." 3 This is also true of identity, but all such perceptions are only roughly defined, overlapping to some extent. Real identity is always abstract. General ideas are not blurred memories though they may be inexplicit and ambiguous. "Ideas, then, are individual, indeterminate or general." 4 They are not a tertium quid between mind and reality. A symbol is that. Reason is "the ultimate organic principle alike in thought and reality", 5 and "we arrive at the ideal of reason as an order of reality built up of a system of universals interconnecting all its parts." And "the proof of the body of judgments as a whole is their standing together as a connected system." 6

When he comes to face the question "of ultimate validity of the processes employed and the results attained" in the

2. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p. 359
3. " " " The Theory of Knowledge p. 97
4. Ibid
5. Hobhouse, L. T., The Rational Good ch. 3
6. Ibid
empirical order he discovers language is the distinctive mark of human intelligence, because it "reflects the con­ceptions by which empirical data are brought into relation." He states clearly that these principles of interconnection which it reflects are real. It would be impossible to ef­fect the above synthesis unless Reality constitutes such a system. The hypothesis of rational thought is that it is such a system, having everywhere a ground or continuity a­mong discontinuous relations. In the correlation of uni­versals by analysis and synthesis, he finds two common ele­ments of experience which serve as a basis of intercon­nection between its parts, (1) "community of character, or re­semblance, which lies at the basis of all generalization," and (2) "continuity of existence, i.e. the continuity of an individual passing through various phases or presenting num­erous qualities in simultaneity and succession." Conscious­ness of Self with a central impulse called Will is a product of this continuity and rests upon a "correlation of univers­als based on the conditions of racial and social develop­ment which are not yet brought into consciousness." 3

The objective reality of ground and consequent are stated as reasonable though not dogmatically certain in these words:

"Thus our principles are found in the operation of thought in experience through criticism. They form a coherent system of interconnected thoughts and thus conform to our criteria of validity, and the asser-

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.95
2. Ibid p.87
3. Ibid p.90
tions about the real order which they involve, as e.g., the law of ground and consequent, are reasonably taken true. At the same time our methods, being the result of criticism, must be held liable, like the results which they themselves yield, to further and fuller criticism. ¹

The results of his epistemological inquiry may be briefly stated as follows: Knowledge and Belief are "dependent on sentience and thought, and this implies a mind that thinks and feels." But "the object of knowledge is a world of reality."² Mental phenomena and the external order are progressively correlated in the mind-guided development of the whole.

That there is no possibility of definite proof for his realism is clearly recognized. The assumption of a reality behind appearances is natural though "in one sense we never get beyond" the sensory experience. "Our own experience and our own thought remain the sole basis of our knowledge. If they yield us no truth, then we possess none."³ We are left with a "paradox" of mental activity which is "ideally a closed circle, and yet at every point its reference is beyond itself."⁴

Now this type of realism has remarkable implications for religion. In contrast to the Lockian impressionism which has been the base and bane of much modern theology, this position implies that God, if there be a God, is not only an externally real object of knowledge but that He is

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.357
2. " " The Theory of Knowledge p.622
3. " " Development and Purpose p.117
4. Muirhead, Contemporary British Philosophers p.159-60
present in experience and can be known by analysis of experience. How such analysis is effected will be the problem of the next chapter.
 CHAPTER VII

LOGIC

No Aristotelian grasp of science is possible in the complex, detailed field of knowledge today, so a synthesis is needed. And in this conceptual and experimental reconstruction "detachment, continuity and accuracy are the three marks of any science." ¹

Logic, as the method of this synthesis and the test of truth, becomes important as a matter of religious concern. In this field Hobhouse acknowledges his debt to Mill and to F. H. Bradley "whom I have been compelled to single out for criticism simply because his statement of the views which I wish to combat is the most powerful to be found."² Mill had said:

"Reasoning in the extended sense in which I use the term, and in which it is synonymous with Inference, is popularly said to be of two kinds: reasoning from particular to general, and reasoning from generals to particulars; the former being called induction, and the latter Ratiocination or Syllogism. It will presently be shown that there is a third species of reasoning, which falls under neither of these descriptions, and which, nevertheless, is not only valid, but the foundation of both the others."³

This third species, of observation and experimentation, embodying both deductive and inductive logic and providing at the same time the check upon both, is the method chosen by Hobhouse.

The Empirical Order is the first step in human thought and is not abstract perfection but practical approximation

¹. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.127
². " " The Theory of Knowledge preface
³. Mill, J. S., A System of Logic p.111
"differentiation of belief from feeling" based on the "demand for exactitude". Magic is the science of the primitive mind yet at the same time a priori reasoning is involved in all empiricism, even of this low order.

Three questions are discussed in regard to the nature of judgment: (1) the meaning or content, (2) the nature of ground, and (3) truth of falsity. In dealing with concepts we discovered that even for apprehension, "to grasp anything at all we must leave out the greater part of it." Thought and logic he discovers are still more abstract and are faced with the further difficulty that any statement is more or less unintelligible in isolation.

Of the Qualitative Judgment he says, "My apprehension of the present cannot in any way be constituted by relations between it and other things. They do not determine it but it determines them," and from this "whole of apprehension" the qualitative judgment analyses out some elements which it subsumes under a "general Quality".

Resemblance, Identity and Difference are, according to Hobhouse, real and "simply a matter of fact", though complete identity is always abstract. Judgment is the reference of an ideal content to reality. "A subsumption which adds nothing but itself to the present, i.e. which states the conformity of the present to a general attribute is judgment. If it adds more it is logically inference." This

2. Ibid p.130
3. Ibid Ch. VIII
4. Ibid p.132
makes judgment identical with recognition. He says "the whole content of a judgment can generally be put as an idea" and that it may involve any explicit degree of belief. 

Considering next the question of the validity of a judgment he states clearly and concisely the predication dilemma. If the predicate is contained in the subject then the judgment is unnecessary; if the predicate is not contained in the subject then the judgment is untrue. But, as a matter of fact, in experience "judgment really deals with a total in which subject and predicate are elements and its business is to declare this total in its analysed form." A judgment, then, is a statement of a discovery resulting from analysis. Hobhouse repudiates completely the Hegelian aufhebung, declaring that thought does not affect reality at all. Furthermore, "thought moves not by contradiction, but by supplementing results already achieved." Bradley's and Hegel's difficulties arise, according to Hobhouse, from "the surreptitious addition of something to or the abstraction of something from the concept as actually acquired."

The "logic of inference has for its main object to formulate the valid methods of reasoning" and to show why they are valid and how they are known to be valid. "The central fact of inference is its use of a datum as the ground from

2. Ibid p.154
3. Ibid p.159
4. Ibid p.172
5. Ibid p.180-1
6. Ibid p.230
which some further content flows as consequence." 1 And an inference always implies a universal judgment. Syllogistic reasoning is a process of effecting a "combination of a universal judgment with a particular." This is not Mill's argument from particulars to particulars, though much like it. Bradley's criticism of Mill is irrelevant. Hobhouse thinks Bradley agrees essentially with Mill. "To put it briefly Mill says you argue from a given case to one which resembles it. Bradley says, no, you argue from the universal or the common quality. But what is this quality? It is that which appears in both cases. That is, it is the point of resemblance between them." 2

"In generalization we start from a given conjunction of facts and infer that whenever one of these facts occurs the second will recur in a similar relation to it....every fact without exception has a ground from which it follows universally." 3

Consequently, in discussing the problems of probability he further disagrees with Bradley and the Neo-Hegelians in general by affirming that the "laws of probability are reasonable" and that "frequency of conjunction must have its cause and that cause must be in the antecedents of the conjoined facts and their relations to one another." 4 He is here affirming a faith in the rational constitution of the objective universe as remarkable as that of any Idealist. Indeed he is almost, though not quite, willing to agree with the Idealists in regard to validity.

2. Ibid p.284
3. Ibid p.272
4. Ibid p.316
With all the difficulties that beset Kant's theory and Mill's and Hegel's and Mr. Bradley's they give us a clue that is worth following up in the quest for a ground for validity in judgment. Apprehension is the starting point; then follow in order, analysis, construction, remembrance and generalization.

"What we have to enquire, then, is by what methods thought treats this material and whether these methods are valid. The broad answer to the first question is that thought acts on its material, (1) by decomposing or analysing it into its elements, (2) by bringing different elements together, without being necessarily confined in doing so to the empirical order, (3) by taking relations which it so finds under certain conditions as true of reality in general, and (4) by comparing its results and correcting them by one another. The broad answer to the second question is that this process of correlation and correction can be so adequately performed as to yield results which, in their general application, will hold true." 2

"But to obtain proof we must go a step further, and frankly base our beliefs upon experience itself. But simple as this sounds and familiar as the method is in the trivial operations of every-day life, to carry it through as a theory of knowledge, and to make experience as a whole the basis of our view of reality as a whole, is the most complex of all tasks, requiring the maximum of self-criticism in the use of the method and open at many points to the charge of paradox and self-contradiction." 3

And here the empirical order must be taken into account.

Hobhouse regards language as the vehicle by means of which empirical sense data are brought into relation and made amenable to the processes of logic. The categories are the forms of these data.

"The victory of the categories is not established without a struggle, and like other victories it ends in a dictatorship under which death or exile is the penalty of recalcitrance.... The empirical order thus established

2. " " " Development and Purpose p.291
3. Ibid p.298
on the solid foundation of the categories constitutes what we know as the world of common sense." 1

"To sum up the results" of his inquiry into the nature and validity of the logical process, "we have traced" it "to the systematic interconnection of given elements of experience". "This implies that there are methods of interconnection" which if valid will be found to form "an interconnected system."

Truth and falsity are known in the relations of judgments to one another. Truth resides in "a system of judgments which corroborate one another", 2 "but actual thought falls short of this ideal." 3

Fallacies arise principally from the tendency to regard abstractions as valid realities. Identity, for instance, implies some difference. "Bare identity, identity exclusive of any difference, is an abstraction within an abstraction," 4 and is false. Hardening of interwoven aspects of experience into mutually exclusive categories is a third fallacy which "distorts our rendering of experience itself by transforming the fluid and continuous into a series of crystallized terms divided by the void." 5

"Another family of fallacies derives from the relation of whole and parts in the organic order. In this order a whole is never mere sum of parts, but involves such mutual actions and modifications among them as will upset our calculations if we seek to reason from the parts as self-subsistent entities. The crudest form of fallacy here is to take the sum of parts for

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p. 97
2. Ibid p. 304
3. Ibid p. 311
4. Ibid p. 262
5. Ibid p. 264
the whole. A slightly more refined error is to take the organic character as an extra part added to the others, possessed of mysterious efficacy and acting in an ill-defined manner among the rest. Thus the behavior of living beings has been partially resolved into a complex interaction of mechanical forces. One school of consequence assumes that it has only to pursue the same methods further in order to make the analysis exhaustive. Others crystallize the difference between mechanical and vital processes into a separate substance which interacts with body and perhaps has its seat in some problematical region of the brain. Others again infer somewhat prematurely, that the characteristic phenomena of life are hidden from our intelligence and can only be felt and perhaps made a subject for poetry and rhetoric but never for systematic study. If we let ourselves be guided by experience, what we find is that the behavior of living beings diverges from the mechanical model in that it is constantly adapted to the requirements of the whole. To ascertain the precise nature and conditions of this divergence then becomes a purely empirical problem, but to state it squarely is to recognize that the character of each and every part is modified by the whole to which it belongs. The analytical view which resolves behavior into its ultimate elements has then to be corrected by the synthetic view which accounts for each element by its place in the whole. The peculiarity of the organic character lies not in one specific part but just in its wholeness. 1

The practical importance of Logic, then, is that in this science of thought we have the essential method of all the fields of scientific investigation. "Thought is that which has the function of correlating experience" and "a logic of experience" 2 which borrows freely from both deductive and inductive logic but which is dominated by neither, is the most needed tool of modern science. He does not agree with those who "deny the rationality of generalization and reduce the strict operation of science proper to the rendering in terms of concepts of all that which has in fact been observed", 3 but holds that "we have every reason

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.277-8
2. Ibid p.143
3. Ibid p.517
to think that the principles of rational interpretation are founded on Reality." "We need not think that, so far as we have formulated them, they are exhaustive of Reality." ¹

Now these conclusions, if valid, are of tremendous importance in religion. They mean that within the complex whole of presented experience there are given the elements which Religion regards as the eternal values and that these elements are discoverable by analysis of the presented facts. Furthermore, if his epistemological realism is valid, the objects discovered by these logical processes are not hounded by any subjectivist taint of unreality but are objectively real in the structure of the Universal Mind. Moreover that Mind, of which all finite minds are constituent parts, is progressively realizing itself in a developing universe. But these last questions belong of right to the chapter on Metaphysics.

¹ Hobhouse, L. T., *Development and Purpose*, p.358
CHAPTER VIII
ETHICS

The nature of the Good next occupies our attention. The two volumes of *Morals in Evolution* offer a fairly complete insight into Hobhouse's moral theories studied from an historical angle and his *Rational Good* develops the more rationalistic features of his theory. His ethical conceptions grow naturally out of his psychology and epistemology. The growth of the moral judgment seems to be connected with the process of generalising concepts from particular experiences, plus the process of communication arising in articulate speech. In order to understand the nature of the moral evolution of humanity therefore one must study the history of ethical conceptions held by the race at various times and in varying circumstances. This Hobhouse does in the first volume of *Morals in Evolution*. The study is a critical one, for he recognizes that humanity tends constantly to hold at least two codes of ethics, one for use and the other for ornament. Sometimes indeed there are several conflicting codes, and there are often evidences of "an evolution of evil" paralleling the ethical evolution. The social patterns in which these early codes express themselves have been surveyed in the chapter on Sociology.

These early ethical regulations consist mostly of taboos, which Hobhouse believes to be based upon natural and psychological results of wrong doing. Most of the morality

present in the world to the present day is still based on taboos. Polytheism brings a new type of morality, not based exclusively on fear. For instance, in the Egyptian Book of the Dead: "There is much of kindness, much of social good nature, much of prudent moderation, something of self reliance and dignity, but 'there is hardly a single splendid feeling; there is not one burst of magnanimous sacrifice.' Polytheism is transcended by thought. "The growth of reflection has, in many races and under divers conditions of culture, carried mankind beyond the stage of Polytheism" in the search for "general truths underlying or permeating experience and giving unity and meaning to human progress."

The springs of action and the possibility of morality are found in the physical and psychological constitution of man, and more especially in such phenomena as instincts, impulses, emotions, reason (itself at bottom an instinct) and will. Psychology says that instincts and impulses and emotions determine action, but codes and customs also exercise an influence. Reason is not to be divorced from the complex of life as a whole. It is argued by psychologists that impulses are controlled by counter impulses. This might conceivably be true on a merely animal level, but for human life concepts or ideas exercise an undeniable influence. This is the factual basis for the psychological doctrine of the in-

3. Ibid
fluence of ideals—using the word in its popular non-philosophical sense.

Turning to the discussion of will Hobhouse declares that will is the expression of life as a whole. Ordinary unreflecting morality is lower than deliberate conduct "regulated by some general principle", but higher than "Practical Judgment", and is adapted to maintenance of the moral status quo. This follows from his definitions of the moral will, which he regards as neither a God implanted, supernatural principle, nor a mere instinctive principle, but is a unification of all that life means, as an active directive tendency toward higher development.

The will in development is a synthesis of happiness, self-realization, duty, etc. interconnected "elements in an ethical experience which is, after all, at bottom a unity." It includes (1) a psycho-physical basis of ethical conduct which is hereditary, (2) an inarticulate correlation in feeling, pleasure, and pain which is purely animal, (3) an articulate correlation in purpose which is present in higher animals, and (4) a Moral Law which is grounded in sympathy and necessity for social order which is peculiar to man.

Responsibility rests on the will and "to realize—-that is at once to understand and feel—-the bearing of our actions on the common good is the true ethical discipline of the will." Private good is not "merged within the common good, but sustained and developed (however much modified )

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.152
2. " " " Elements of Social Justice p.142
within it.\textsuperscript{1} Deserts include both rewards and punishments, both working toward inner and outer harmony for the personality, and thereby providing the point of contact between the moral person and his world.

Hobhouse next considers the Ethical Idealism of Greek philosophy and of Confucianism. Ethics, he maintains, is not dependent on the Religious sanction. "The basis of morals, then, is the intrinsic desirability of a great ideal which accords with the true principles of man's nature when brought to their true development by proper education,"\textsuperscript{2} and outwardly expressed in practical life. The development of philosophical ethics waited the advent of a sound logical method, which was developed and transmitted by the Classical Greek civilization. Is Truth identical with Reality? What is the Good? These questions first answered in the magico-religious conceptions of antiquity, were answered in the negative by the Sophist skeptics. Moral reconstruction began under Socrates and his contribution consisted in the notion of the good as knowledge and moral health. The notion was objectified by Aristotle in the doctrine of the Mean and suffered subjectivist eclipse in the ethical theories of the Cynics. The contribution of the Classical age is summed up in the following words: "Greek Ethics thus bequeathed two great contributions to the solution of the ethical problem: (1) virtue was not the emptying but the fulfillment of the personality; (2) it laid the foundations for a universalist

ethics by conceiving an ideal standard of conduct applicable to all mankind. In neither of these directions, however, was its analysis final.

"Modern Moral Philosophy starts with the wisdom of the Greeks as its working capital, "1 and proceeds to develop two theories. "Modern systems have moved between the poles of an authoritative moral law and an unrestrained self-direction of human nature."2 Both positions are open to criticism.

Hobhouse next criticizes Hedonistic Ethics as based on desert. He says "the object of desire is the experience" 3 not the sensation, and this is not hedonistic. The highest pleasure is "harmonious fulfillment of human powers".4 Mill held the sense of obligation to be built up on the laws of association: He says "all action is founded on intensity of desire." "Green conceives the ethical order as arising from the spiritual principle in men seeking to realize itself in a Common Good."5 He regards pleasure as integral and essential, good as secondarily consequential. "Feeling holds the reins though impulse is often a refractory steed, and the more rational we become the clearer is the coincidence between lines of life which we seek to lay down and those in which, if not actual happiness, at least real peace and inward satisfaction are found,"6 and this is not egoistic---gradually emerging social harmony necessitates curtailment of self ex-

2. Ibid p.211
4. Ibid p.196
5. Ibid p.199
6. Ibid p.201
pression and self-sacrifice which is not good in itself but only a means. "The rational good is not the good for the individual as an independent unit, it is the good of the whole of which he forms a part."\(^1\) Of the obligation of sacrifice he says: "Psychologically its condition is that co-national synthesis constituting the main bent of his personality is governed in the last resort by his conception of the whole or of certain principles which fashion the life of the whole."\(^2\) "Reason is not a faculty enthroned on a judgment seat above impulse, but is the synthesis of impulse itself made aware of its goal,"\(^3\) which justifies love and worship.

"The moral system directly or indirectly asserts, as we have seen, a tie which is universal and independent of any particular social organization between all rational and perhaps all conscious beings, that come into relations with one another."\(^4\)

Is this God? The question may be postponed to the chapter on Metaphysics.

Meantime, our author's ideas of moral obligation may be stated as follows: (1) Obligation is a psychological fact, not external, but as Kant shows, self-imposed. (2) It is also objective. (3) The question as to whether the moral order is a rational order admits of no final judgment. "To prove morality rational, then, we must be able to exhibit the moral order as a coherent whole. Its manifold judgments must not merely tolerate but actively support one another and must similarly agree with any deductions from our knowledge.

2. Ibid p.205
3. Ibid p.211
4. Ibid p.223
of the physical or social order which may bear upon them, and this can never be done to perfection. (4) Objectivity in ethics is absolutely necessary to the ultimate meaning of morality. (5) Hedonism is not final but morality derives its sanctions from the sense of social obligation and the sense of harmony with the natural order as developed by Gratian, Thomas Aquinas, Grotius and Thos. Hobbes. (6) The doctrine of the Rights of Man as developed in the French Revolution must be made integral in any complete system of ethics.

Thus he attempts to unite the various and often discordant elements of objectivity and subjectivity, of individuality and the social whole.

Having traced the historic, and psychological aspects of ethical conceptions, Hobhouse now faces the more difficult task of finding the rational basis of morality. This problem is the thesis of his second volume of Morals in Evolution. His method here is analytical rather than historically descriptive. He says elsewhere: "We shall distinguish, though we shall not therefore separate, the religious, the ethical, the scientific and other lines of development and follow each in turn so far as it is necessary for our purposes." The rational good is concerned with the function of reason in practical life. Is there a rational, demonstrable standard for men and institutions? The good is to "apply the defi-
nition of the rational to the world of practice." ¹ "If there is a rational order of action our purposes must form an inter-connected system:"² but why are there conflicting elements? Good is actively, conatively defined. "Good and bad in their moral as in their sensory application, signify a harmony or disharmony between feeling and action,"³ and either feeling or action is good by virtue of its place in the harmony.

Doubtless it is such passages as this that prompted one reviewer of The Rational Good to exclaim "almost too rational to be good". Morality as well as reason is mutual consistency, wholeness. The rational good must be consistent---must form a connected whole, in which no part is isolated but in the end every element involves every other, and "is objective", its objectivity being an aspect of universality. "This harmony the mind does not find but creates, or rather let us say that it finds it in dying cadences and catches of which it seeks to make a music universal."⁴ "The moral judgment imposes on us an obligation."⁵ "Kant is right, it is the self which both commands and obeys."⁶ But, "To suppose that I can definitely ascertain my own good and proceed to the inference that the good of every other person is like it, is unduly to simplify the moral problem."⁷ "The all-embracing harmony in which we found the ideal of the practical reason

1. Hobhouse, L. T., The Rational Good p.77
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.102
5. Ibid p.105
6. Ibid
7. Ibid p.121
is in strictness incapable of complete realization."¹

However, the super rationality to which some, especially Intuitionists, might object is rendered less objectionable by such qualifications as the following: "Far from dominating the moral code, reason, as an explicit conception is the latest comer on the field."²

The rational good must be the applied concept of harmony actually operative in the world of experience. The principles of this application he attempts to work out in his Elements of Social Justice. "The subject of this book is the social application of the ethical principles explained in the Rational Good."³ It is deductive in form but based on experience. Social and political institutions are not ends but means, not static but growing. His purpose is to examine the laws of their growth. He favors Bentham's principle of "greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number,"⁴ especially for its impartiality as taught by J. S. Mill. "Between his own happiness and that of any other human being, the Utilitarian theory requires a man to be rigidly impartial."⁵ The Benthamite school really comes to grief in its hedonism which is necessarily subjective and egocentric. Desire is not for pleasure, but for some attainment which brings pleasure. There is, "then, in normal desire a certain harmony of feeling, action and experience."⁶

2. Ibid p.166
3. Hobhouse, L. T., Elements of Social Justice preface
4. Ibid p.6
5. Ibid p.7
6. Ibid p.14
"The root of truth in the Utilitarian doctrine is that the good is universally the Pleasurable."\(^1\) "Reason as distinguished from feeling is not the basis of our social action, but the system of feeling at the basis of our social action is reasonable."\(^2\) "'Good' thus means a harmony of anything that in the widest sense may be called experience with feeling,"\(^3\) not "order resting on mere repression".\(^4\) Social harmony is the great experiment for progressive development of mankind.

This involves, for one thing, the rationalization and application of the concept of liberty: "there is freedom just as far as there is harmony".\(^5\) "Moral freedom, then, has nothing to do with isolation, but is, as has been said, the harmony of the whole self in the multitudinous external relations which constitute the web of its interest."\(^6\) Liberty is limited by rights of individuals and community as a whole. "Wherever there is a conflict there must be some restriction of liberty, but other things being equal it will always be the lesser liberty that we shall exclude."\(^7\) "So the Common Good develops by a wider and more complex harmony resting on the unconstrained that is the rational, interaction of mind and mind."\(^8\) In the interest of the Common Good "coercion, restraint, etc., are necessary in curbing abnormality and ignorance, and "permanent tutelage" for "the man

2. Ibid p.16
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.17
5. Ibid p.50
6. Ibid p.57
7. Ibid p.67
8. Ibid p.74
who is permanently incapable of self-control."

"To understand the structure of harmony we must begin with its constituent atoms." Evolution of personality is not by subjection of any part to any other, as in Plato, but by mutual development of all parts. (1) Harmonisation of impulse—feelings. (2) Control of objective conditions.

Each personality is a part of a larger whole and inseparable therefrom. Social harmony is therefore important. Social ethics is not a steady evolution, but a growing harmony in the social mind. "The building up of isolated impulses into the Self or Person, and the union of separate individuals in a social bond may be regarded as the two great movements of synthesis, which between them bridge the whole gulf between the isolated impulse and the complete harmony of activity and feeling." They are not separate in operation. They are, respectively, the "Principle of Personality and Principle of Love." Harmony and development mutually support one another. "Fulfillment" is a stage in development. "Viewed as feeling, then, the Rational Good is happiness, viewed as the object of this feeling it is the fulfillment of vital capacity as a consistent whole."

The subjective idealism which has heretofore dominated the field of ethical science to such a large degree has its serious limitations.

2. " " " The Rational Good p.121
3. Ibid p.151
4. Ibid
5. Ibid pp.156-7
"These limitations point to the need for a more fundamental reconstruction. The world of ethical thought and practice, the fabric of social institutions in which thought and practice are crystallized, has to be treated as the world of knowledge is treated. It has to be dug out to its foundations and built over again."

One major difficulty is presented by the fact that:

"Ethico-religious progress is not continuous, but we can recognize the principal steps by which the idea of a spiritual order has been attained, purified, enlarged and brought into relation to ethical experience. Nor is the advance continuous in the domain of ethics proper." 2

There has, nevertheless, been progress and there is hope for further development. Growth may be sporadic,

"But it is untrue to say that there have been no discoveries in the ethical field. On the contrary, there have been four such discoveries of capital importance leading mankind through the stages here distinguished. The first is the establishment of the impartial rule, the foundation of common sense morality. The second is the establishment of the principle of universalism, the foundation of religious idealism. The third is the social personality (if we may use a modern phrase to express the real centre of the Greek doctrine), which governs the first of philosophic ethics. The fourth is the idea of Freedom, as the basis alike of personal development and social co-operation which emerges in the modern reconstruction of ethico-religious idealism. But broader and deeper than any definite 'discovery' is the subtle and penetrative change effected by 'reconstruction' as a whole, which transforms rights and duties from restrictive laws into constituent conditions of the desirable life, and though it leaves morality the master of man, makes it the servant of humanity. These discoveries find their ultimate meaning in the conception of a spiritual order not imposed on humanity from without, but growing up within, and directed, through the control of mechanical conditions and the development of its own many-sided activities, to the fulfillment of the vital capacities of the race. The development of thought, which renders the mind of the race self-conscious, is completed by the development of the will, which renders it self-determining." 3

2. Ibid. p. 186
3. Ibid. p. 186-7
But the question remains: "Are all forms of life at bottom capable of harmony?" Hobhouse says yes. A rational system must "Work", i.e. maintain itself. His is a philosophical Liberalism—liberation of vital impulses, and a philosophical socialism—equality based on similarity. Fulfillment is only a stage in the process of development and the complete realization of the Good is an ideal pursued endlessly while it continuously advances. "The all-embracing harmony in which we found the ideal of the practical reason is in strictness incapable of complete realization." But in answer to the question, "Are all forms of life at bottom capable of harmony?" Hobhouse returns the answer of an intelligent faith, "Yes."

The ethical goal is "an ethical system which will be guided by the concept of the human race as a whole, bound together by the ties of a common nature, and capable under ascertainable conditions of a future for which all earlier evolution is preparatory." This theory is adaptable to either a social or a religious system.

But it must not be supposed that this system guarantees an absolute or unconditional harmony, it is rather that "from the lowest organic grades upward we have a rough correlation of the past, present and future experiences of the species." Man reacts to concepts as animals do to desires and "this reaction to larger purpose we have called will."

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose pp.186-7
2. ibid "Mind in Evolution" p.352
3. ibid "Morals in Evolution" Vol. II, p.258
4. Ibid, p.262
customs must bear some fairly close relation to primitive man's instinctive reactions and be suited to conditions which make for the maintenance of society---will therefore include good and bad elements and may be inimical to progress. 1 Ethics, then, stands in its own right as the science of morality in human development. "Whereas ethics was formerly based on religion, religion now is deemed to have its firmest root in ethics," 2 but certain religious expressions of ethical truth are found to be accurate and important. "Humanitarianism indeed has justified the Christian ethics on its positive side. As against those who maintained that the Sermon on the Mount has only an ideal meaning applicable to a better world, it has vindicated the practical application of the Beatitudes to this world of ours." 3

The future of ethical development is destined to be different from the past because of "an organized intelligence" on the part of humanity. This "self conscious evolution of humanity is the end and central fact of evolution and "It is a message of hope to the world, of suffering lessened and strife assuaged, not by fleeing from reason to the bosom of faith, but by the increasing rational control of things by that collective wisdom, the εἰς ἔννοιαν λόγος which is all that we directly know of the Divine." 4

This notion quite accurately expresses Hobhouse's conception of the Ultimate Good. The notion is subject to further elaboration and perhaps clarification in chapters iv to

2. Ibid p.255
3. Ibid pp.255-6
4. Ibid p.284
vii, inclusive, of The Rational Good. In order to define the Good, we are to "apply the definition of the rational to the world of practice."¹ "If there is a rational order of action, our purposes must form an interconnected system."² "Good and bad in their moral as in their sensory application, signify a harmony or disharmony between feeling and action,"³ and either the feeling or the action is good or bad by virtue of its place in the harmony or disharmony. The Rational Good must be consistent and form "a connected whole in which no part is isolated but in the end every element involves every other."⁴ "This harmony the mind does not find but creates, or rather let us say it finds it in dying cadences and catch-es of which it seeks to make a music universal."⁵ "To understand the structure of harmony we must begin with its constituent atoms,"⁶ and these for the individual personality are the isolated impulses. The evolution of personality proceeds not by the subjugation of any one part by another, as Plato taught, but by the harmonious mutual development of all parts. Harmonization of impulse and feelings is one step in that development, the control of objective conditions of environment is the other and perhaps the highest. At this point the good of the individual comes into direct contact with the larger concept of the social good. This concept is not merely the notion of the greatest good for the greatest

1. Hobhouse, L. T., The Rational Good p.77
2. Ibid
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid p.98
5. Ibid p.102
6. Ibid p.127
number for "To suppose that I can definitely ascertain my own good and proceed to the inference that the good of every other person is like it, is unduly to simplify the moral problem."

On the contrary, each personality is a part of a larger whole and is inseparable therefrom, consequently the process of development is a continuous process. "The building up of isolated impulses into the Self or Person, and the union of separate individuals in a social bond may be regarded as the two great movements of synthesis, which between them bridge the whole gulf between the isolated impulse and the complete harmony of activity and feeling." These processes, furthermore, are not separate in operation. The "Principle of Personality" and the "Principle of Love" mutually support one another. "Viewed as feeling, then, the Rational Good is happiness, viewed as the object of this feeling it is the fulfillment of vital capacity as a consistent whole."

Finally, the evolutionary concept must hold the central place in the field of ethical inquiry. "However little thinkers may agree about its philosophic interpretation, the idea of Development is the central conception of modern thought and the idea of Humanity in development holds that place in modern ethics."

2. *Ibid* p.151
3. *Ibid* p.156-7
CHAPTER IX

METAPHYSICS

The attempt to describe and evaluate the metaphysical doctrines of L. T. Hobhouse should be prefaced by a brief survey of theories in this field which are more or less directly connected with his formulation of the problem. Perhaps the best starting point for such a survey is in those primitive surroundings which Hobhouse himself makes the starting point for his religious and sociological investigations.

It is, of course, exceedingly difficult to determine just what primitive man did believe about the ultimate nature of his universe and of his own being. A reasoned metaphysical he most certainly did not possess, but the basis of those ideas and attitudes which later came to be known as metaphysical is to be found in varying forms and degrees in every primitive culture. E. B. Tylor’s theory\(^1\) that belief in a spiritual world arose from the primitive man’s attempt to account for dreams has been widely accepted but it breaks down, on critical analysis, at two points at least. (1) The belief that the spirit leaves the body during dreams is not nearly co-extensive with the belief in spirits as it should be on Tylor’s theory. (2) This invention of an hypothesis to explain the vivid imagery of the dream when other types of imagery, only a little less vivid, are such common experience for savages and children smacks more of ratiocination

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1. Tylor, E. B. *Primitive Culture*
by those astute and academic philosophers who cannot image their own breakfast tables than of the working of primitive minds. Frazer's theory that belief in spirits grew out of the failure of magic to achieve the control it aimed at breaks down in much the same manner. (1) He is mistaken in his facts, for magic is not found in Australia nor elsewhere in the absence of beliefs about spirits. (2) There is no discoverable belief in a universe governed by material laws and therefore demanding such an explanation of the failure of magic as Frazer thinks the savage makes. Likewise the theory of Durkheim that religious beliefs originate in an attitude of awe and reverence toward the clan and finds its first expression in totemism is likewise weak on both the historical and the philosophical sides. (1) Totemism is not universal, and in many places where it is found it does not seem to be indigenous. (2) The social attitudes are not a sufficiently broad and solid basis to sustain the superstructure of religious belief, for the latter includes beliefs about the nature of the non-human environment which would be very hard to derive from such a primitive Humanism.

In the face of these and similar theories, all of which break down at one point or another under critical examination, it seems necessary to presuppose some underlying attitude or belief more primitive and broad and fundamental than any of these particular expressions. That belief is found in the concept of the world as vaguely alive in the same

sense that the individual experient is alive. Its most primitive formulation seems to be in the Melanesian belief in Mana. According to this view personality is inherent in the nature of the not-self and it is only in subsequent thought that a part of his not-self is depersonalized, while that portion which persistently impresses man with its spontaneity is still regarded as personal and spiritual. And this primitive animatism is the basis, it seems to me, for the doctrines of Idealism and Divine Immanence which occupy so large a place in the world of metaphysics when that science comes to be differentiated and given coherent form.

The metaphysical doctrines of the Old Testament next engage attention and that for two reasons. First they form the background for much of the later metaphysical development especially in the age of Scholasticism, and secondly because the childhood development of Hobhouse himself, being cast in the household of a conservative clergyman, cannot have failed to be profoundly influenced by these doctrines.

No attempt can be made in the space of this paper to trace the development of Hebrew metaphysics. An attempt will be made to portray in brief outline the finished picture as it stood at the beginning of the Christian era. The thought of the Hebrew was dualistic in regard to matter and spirit. His God was transcendent. "To him God
and the world were always distinct."\(^1\) The remains of primitive corporeality in God had been "clarified till He was recognized as a formless spirit."\(^2\) The world, viewed with a naively realistic attitude, was the theatre of God's action. Whether the spiritual element in the universe is a strict monism or a clear cut dualism with Satan occupying the opposing seat of power is a moot question among present day theologians and was likely so among the Hebrews themselves. The same sort of uncertainty was clearly manifested in the controversial positions of the Sadduces and Pharisees on the question of personal immortality. One thing stands out clearly as the basic metaphysic of the Hebrews and that is the duality of matter and spirit, with its corresponding transcendentalism. "A pantheistic conception of nature is quite foreign to the Semetic mind."\(^3\)

In contrast to this rigid dualism stands the Greek metaphysic as developed by Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle, and issuing in the Pantheism which offered such a tremendous opposition to the Christian theories in the third and fourth centuries. This Greek Metaphysics took its rise in the desire for some one universal substance as the basis of the world. Running a checkered course from the Physicists through Platonic Ideas and Aristotelian Matter and Form and Pythagorean Numbers, it issued at last in Neo-Platonism which practically identified the world and God.

2. Ibid p.83
3. Ibid p.97
Into the resulting welter of Hebrew and Greek ideas came the new religion, Christianity. Inasmuch as the emphasis of its leaders was primarily ethical rather than philosophical the metaphysical questions were not given prominence. In the opinion of the present writer it is futile to attempt to state a clear, unambiguous, non-contradictory metaphysic as being characteristic of the primitive Christian community. It seems that the participants in that community tended to carry their previous metaphysical viewpoints, if any, over into the new religion without any attempt to criticize and systematize them. The result is a mixture of immanence and transcendence, of monism and pluralism, and any attempt to untangle it is likely to prove love's labor lost. One or two metaphysical theories do emerge, (1) The ultimate dominance of the world order by the Spiritual Principle of ethical righteousness, (2) Some meaningful and attainable form of personal immortality. But that the Christian metaphysic must necessarily conform to some one pattern as Hoernle seems to think seems to me to be an entirely unwarranted dogmatism. His statement is:

"Orthodox theism, when transposed from the terms of theology into the terms of metaphysics, always reduces to the general type of Spiritual Pluralism.... the logical skeleton upon which Christian theology is found to be constructed when we strip off all the specifically religious covering."

In the world of modern philosophical investigation the following major forms of metaphysical doctrine have been advanced: (1) Cartesian Dualism. (2) The Pluralistic Mater-
Kantians have formulated doctrines which involve contradiction as 
is General. Indeed, his final formulation is, as declared by Hegel. In addition to these positive formulations of 
the problem the Humanists and Positivists have united in declaring that metaphysics is an impossible and unnecessary science, and the Critical Philosophers, Kant and the Neo-
Kantians have formulated doctrines which involve contradictions difficult, if not impossible, to resolve. Indeed, in 
spite of Kant's high hopes of producing the final formulation of the metaphysical problem it is commonly said that 
"Kant and his school are essentially agnostic in relation to ontology." 2

In turning now to Hobhouse's metaphysic we discover two facts which we might have come to expect from his general position. First, his theory of Reality is the final culmination of his work. Secondly, his final formulation is, to say the least, incomplete and tentative. In the introduction to Development and Purpose, which most fully states his metaphysical doctrine, he tells us that the book is the culmination of his three previous works and of twenty-six years of effort. He appears to approach the whole problem with a certain hesitancy common to Positivists. He tells us in the article in Contemporary British Philosophers that he came to

2. Encyclopedia Britannica 14th Ed. Vol. 15 p.332
the study of philosophy by the social reform route and that he kept his metaphysical ideas in the background until "the breakup of materialism and the opening of wider possibilities seemed to justify a greater freedom in synthesis." 1

Though not an orthodox humanistic Positivist, Hobhouse undoubtedly owes much to the influence of Comte and his school. In choosing a central idea in his theory of evolution he selects the Humanity of Positivism. "This higher self-consciousness would be the Humanity of Positivism regulating its own life and controlling its own development," 2 and consciousness as Ritchie contended would influence evolution. "If my view was right it would turn out to be the central point in development." 3

In so far as the element of enthusiasm enters into the work it is enthusiasm for Humanity. "Humanity itself has been conceived as the Great Being that lives and learns without dying." 4 Thus Humanity, in the best sense which the best Positivist writers have given to that word, Humanity as the spirit of harmony and expanding life, shaping the best actions of the best men and women, is the highest incarnation known to us of the divine. If, indeed, we come to the conclusion that God is, and are asked what He is, we may reply that God is that of which the highest and best known embodiment is the distinctive spirit of Humanity." 5

1. Muirhead, Contemporary British Philosophers p.150
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p.477
5. Ibid p.484
These words mark the culmination of Hobhouse's Humanism and fix the point of departure for his very real divergences from orthodox Positivism.

God is not Humanity, but rather the almost Spencerian Unknowable of which Humanity is the highest known incarnation. Reality is to be accepted as a mysterious, indifferent, sometimes hostile force whose relation to man remains a profound but interesting mystery. Such a view might satisfy Comte, who never clearly saw the epistemological problem, but to Hobhouse, the mystery of the nature of Ultimate Reality is a terra incognita into whose domain he cannot but adventure. In short, Hobhouse sees the fragmentary nature of Positivism and is dissatisfied with it.

"At the positive or scientific stage of human development," says Comte, "we give up the search after transcendent-al causes of phenomena such as God (as deus ex machina) and the hypostatized essences or powers of some other metaphysical systems and are content to accept phenomena as such and merely investigate the laws of their interrelations. Such knowledge Comte agrees with Kant is merely of phenomena but, here he differs from Kant, it is not only all we can obtain but it is quite enough not only for science but also for religion."¹ Hobhouse does not accept this limitation so blandly. He seems to agree rather with Hoffding and other theistically inclined writers. Hoffding is surely right in saying: "The religious problem proper only begins where Comte's religion ends," ² i.e. with the question as to how the devel-

1. Garnett, A. C. Lecture notes on Theism
opment of the world is related to that of the human race and
the human ideal. The essential fact of religion is the felt
need and effort of the finite individual to enter into right
relations with infinite reality. But this quest Comte has
pronounced as unscientific, for we can have no knowledge of
any infinite beyond the world of sensible finite phenomena.
He speaks of the unattainable mystery of the essential cause
that produces phenomena. He would have nothing to do with
any 'metaphysical attempt to construe nature and man as ele-
ments in one system of reality by relating them both to a
common principle'. Whatever we may think of Hobhouse's fi-
nal formulation of the problem and of his proffered solution
we must at least honor him for having seen the problem and
for having refused to follow the ostrich-like example of
Comte in holding that "It is idle and indeed injurious to
carry the study of nature beyond the point needed for the
work of the artificial order established by man." 2

His attempt to formulate the problem of the ultimate
nature of Reality leads him, first of all, to the position im-
plied in Positivistic Philosophy though not advanced by that
school of thought as a metaphysical theory. This is Dualism.
If mind is the principle at work in the whole of reality mak-
ing for unity and development it must have as its milieu
something non-mental in nature, for as we have already seen,
Hobhouse is an epistemological realist and cannot for a mo-
ment countenance a universe of relations exclusive of any

2. Comte, A. Positive Polity vol. 2 p. 39
terms between which such relations could hold. In other words, any mind-stuff theory, or purely subjective interpretation of reality is out of the question. His starting point is really a modified Cartesian position. He says:

"However amended, the Cartesian dualism set a problem to modern thought which the work of three centuries has not solved. There will remain the final problem of inter-relating the two orders, a problem which can never be wholly solved until the two terms of the relation are completely understood, but which it is constantly necessary to state and re-state in the light of the best available knowledge."

Here, then, is the point of departure and the essential method of Hobhouse's theory of Reality. The statement must take into account the two terms, matter and mind. It must attempt to show their connection. But in so doing, it must never for a moment lose sight of the constantly developing body of scientific knowledge. Metaphysics must at every point square its account with science. He recognized the difficulty of erecting such a system in the following words:

"But to obtain proof we must go a step further, and frankly base our beliefs upon experience itself. But simple as this sounds, and familiar as the method is in the trivial operations of every-day life, to carry it through as a theory of knowledge, and to make experience as a whole the basis of our view of reality as a whole, is the most complex of all tasks, requiring the maximum of self-criticism in the use of the method, and open at many points to the charge of paradox and self-contradiction."

But he will be content with nothing less, and expresses his contempt for any easy and partial solution as follows: "popular thought wavers between mechanical abstraction on the one side and mysticism on the other, the one, to quote

2. Ibid p.298
a famous antithesis, relatively void, and the other relatively blind."

He devotes a chapter to a consideration of the principles of interconnection and discovers that it is impossible to effect a synthesis of mind and matter unless Reality itself constitutes such an interrelated system. The hypothesis of all rational thought in regarding the ultimate ground of reason as a continuity of underlying identity among discontinuous relations, or as an identity involving differences, is shown to involve the necessity of such an interconnected Ultimate Real.

The concept of a system of interrelated elements uniting to form the whole of reality is not peculiar to the final formulation of his philosophy in Development and Purpose. It runs through his entire work. In fact Hobhouse, as the exponent of the philosophy of development, offers the paradoxical example of having shown remarkably little development in his thought from first to last. He is almost too self-consistent. He rejects absolute monism as involving either fixity or necessity in change\(^1\)--- which it seems to me is only another and external form of fixity. He likewise rejects pluralism as contradictory, which leaves him on the uncertain middle ground of a kind of unrealized monism of purpose involving a pluralistic expression --- "a system of of elements each of which at once conditions and is conditioned by the remainder," \(^2\) "a system of interdependent ele-

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1. Muirhead, Contemporary British Philosophers p.167-8
2. Ibid p.164
ments" a system which "As far as the widest synthesis of our experience goes shows us reality neither as a providentially ruled order nor as a process of fortuitous combinations and dissolutions, but as the movement of a mind appearing under rigidly limited conditions of physical organization in countless organisms and arriving for the first time at a partial unity in the consciousness of a common humanity with a common aim."  

Yet: "The universe so far as we know it is of one tissue throughout." On this view of rational harmony or love being the permanent underlying ground of development he bases his theory. His concept of mind thus differs from the Spinozistic concept not so much in extent as in nature. Mind is for Hobhouse universal, but it is not an attribute of reality. Its existence is substantival rather than adjectival. Mind is one of the two ultimate component substances of which the universe is made. And "if any part of reality becomes intelligible by relation to the remainder a whole field of reality becomes intelligible as constituting such a system. Of any part, however great and however articulate internally, we can, and indeed must always, go on to ask about its connections with further reality. But if we envisage reality as a whole we can ask no such question, and here intelligibility must mean simply the internal completeness of interconnections running through all its elements." "Reason then generically is the principle of interconnection persistently applied." "The rational as such is not an established system, but a process governed by a principle, the process by which understanding deepens, error is repeatedly eliminated, and truth constantly enlarged, ... a whole in which parts sustain and neces-

1. Muirhead, Contemporary British Philosophers p.186
3. Ibid p.235
4. Ibid p.227
Itate one another." 1

And this mental principle, which Hobhouse practically identifies with God, is universal and all pervading.

"Mind as we know it empirically, whether in the individual or in the group, is a product, and so far as it is truly mind, is deservedly reckoned a true constitutive part of the permanent mind. Its existence depends on mechanical conditions, on a cerebro-neural structure for one thing and on complex physical and social relations for another, the shaping of which is precisely the work at which a mechanically conditioned purpose is forever busy. Thus Humanity, in the sense which the best Positivist writers have given to that word, Humanity as the spirit of harmony and expanding life, shaping the best actions of the best men and women, is the highest incarnation known to us of the divine. If, indeed, we come to the conclusion that God is, and are asked what He is, we may reply that God is that of which the highest and best known embodiment is the distinctive spirit of Humanity." 2

Yet even this God is a distinctly limited being. Mind

"can make no pretensions to be the Absolute or the Unconditioned. It is a process within reality, conditioned closely by other elements of Reality." 3

"Our empirical account will in fact yield us a picture of Mind neither as the Lord of All, nor as a causal by-product of the clash of forces, but as an impulse toward organic harmony working under limiting conditions which it gradually subdues, and in such an impulse on a still greater scale we shall find in the end the most reasonable interpretation of the vital process of the cosmic order." 4

Any form of the Mind-stuff theory is rejected. He finds two types of mind, personality and "the second form of unity in mind which experience reveals --- the unity which interconnects minds in beings which each possess a mind. Of such unities there are many species. Any group of human beings

1. Hobhouse, L. T., The Rational Good p.75
2. " " Development and Purpose p.484
3. Ibid p.249
4. Ibid p.44
that are at all closely related forms a more or less compact and durable unit, --- a family, an association, a state, a church .... Humanity itself has been conceived as the Great Being that lives and learns without dying."¹ "But Mind does not stand outside the world structure and mould it as the potter his clay, but is in it struggling for expression."

"One caution is indeed required. The Mind that we are led to contemplate must neither be confused with the whole of things nor with an Omnipotent Creator of things."² Thus he considers mind as in, but not of, the world of matter.

"We have, then, the kind of mutual implication that we require, the objective world postulating mind as its condition, the mind unable to realise itself except in an objective order. But here the substantial difficulty arises. The world thus freely engendered by mind, i.e., without any limiting conditions other than the nature of mind itself, should be wholly satisfactory to mind. Reality should be perfect. But if this is so, perfection loses all its meaning, and the value which we attribute to the whole of things is as discrepant from what we recognise as value that all use of the term becomes misleading. It has brought us only to the edge of the gulf where the piety of optimism disappears into a whirl of unmeaning words."³

And we are led to consider the ultimate nature of Matter.

Here he admits the force of the mechanistic argument. "Now, at any rate as long as we ask no questions about origins there is nothing here to differentiate the organism from the well compacted machine."⁴ Of course adaptation and reproduction are difficult problems for the mechanist, and tend

2. Ibid p. 430
3. Ibid p. 417
4. Ibid p. 370
to indicate a superior intelligence as 'engineer', external to organism. "The living organism is essentially something in process."\(^1\) It is "a union in which the parts are conditioned throughout their existence by mutual requirements."\(^2\) Is it mechanical or teleological?

The possibility of a mechanical explanation is recognised but its difficulties are also clearly seen. In answer to the question, Can all apparent teleological action "be resolved into a mechanical adjustment which simulates teleology"? he examines such phenomena as the Want-Effort-End Relation, etc. and discovers that tension even in its least form has "at least the germ of purpose in it."\(^3\)

And in view of the wavering if not broken front now presented by the mechanistic naturalists he allows himself the luxury of an imaginative flight in which he attributes purpose to the whole process.

"It is permissible to imagine process as having its part to play in leading from a phase which is changeless because inactive to a phase which maintains itself in ceaseless activity without destruction, the function of process being the mutual modification of elements by activities eventually becoming harmonious. The conception of time as lying between two eternities would then have some justification. These are extremely speculative suggestions which may be admissible at a time when the hard-shelled concept of the continuous infinite is breaking up. They are not conceptions on which any positive theory could as yet be founded. But they do suggest that the traditional contradiction between infinitude and wholeness is not insuperable."\(^4\)

And after a strenuous effort to make the concept of matter

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2. Ibid p.379
3. Ibid p.400
4. Ibid p.275-6
mean something apart from mind he gives it up.

"Perhaps we are not incapable of forming such a conception by a kind of idealisation of the blank, the monotonous, the drab, but if we try to think of such a monotony as the full account of reality in its beginnings we are at once faced with the difficulty that mind, which is to evolve structure out of it, must already exist. We have therefore not unbroken monotony but a dualism, and a dualism of stark uncompromising contrariety. The reason of this impasse is simply that mind is an element coeval with the rest and an essential condition of their existence. A world without mind in therefore an abstraction, not a real condition of things." But this tends toward the recognition of Mind as preexisting. "Mind, then, would not be coeval with the beginning of order, but antecedent to it, and therefore to the emergence of distinct elements which in this view is roughly comparable to the precipitation of a solution; and before Mind achieved differentiation and order it would still function in the undifferentiated medium as at once the principle of integration and the effort after self-expression in a unity in which all self-expression is inhibited by mutual pressure, in which therefore liberation and differentiation are steps by which harmonious integration must be approached." 1

But in any case the terminus a quo is more difficult than the terminus ad quem to formulate. 2

He resolves the antithesis of Mind and Matter in a synthesis of teleological development.

On the "one view" (idealist-monetarist) "rational harmony is the essence of the real", and conflict is illusion. On the "opposite view the Real is totally indifferent to the ideal, which is the product of human imagination"; 3 "true causation...being...mechanical." 4 But Hobhouse holds that mechanism and teleology are coordinate categories involved in every event.

1. Hobhouse, E. T., Development and Purpose, p.453
2. Ibid., p.383
3. Ibid., p.359
4. Ibid., p.329-60
Teleology he defines as follows.

"In general terms teleological explanation is the reference of things, acts, processes to their value as a ground." 1

"Now if we look at the purposive state as we know it in ourselves, we say familiarly that it is guided by an idea of the end and of the way and means thereto. This idea is a forward-looking something, its relation to the future, to what is to come out of it, is an integral part of its being. It is, we will not say constituted an extern, but constituted by this relation, this element of movement which it contains. But the forward-looking idea is not the whole of the purpose. The idea must interest, arouse feeling, dominate impulse. The purposive state is an impulse-idea, a conative state an idea-force. It is forward-moving, directive." 2

For Hobhouse the synthesis of the mechanical aspects of the universe as seen in causation and the teleological aspect as seen in mental activity must come through the process of organic development.

"We have found in experience three types of system. Two of these, the mechanical and the teleological, involve fundamentally opposed forms of causal process. The third, the organic, does not appear to involve a distinctive type of causation. Its processes may be either mechanical or teleological or both,---in its fullest development certainly both." 3

In surveying the mechanists' tendency to identify the world of physics and the world of Reality, he says:

"I conclude that the main objection to teleological explanation is not sustained. There is an intelligible sense in which events or processes may be regarded as determined by their relation to results which are to come out of them in the future. This explanation may be applied to an event or a series of events arising out of a purpose, but so far as the series is merely referred to a purpose that appears to stand outside it, the events seem to follow from it as a mechanical sequence." 4

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.363
2. Ibid p.399
3. Ibid p.413
4. Ibid p.394
But the purpose is not external and

"Whatever the cause or origin of the organism it is in itself not a purely mechanical arrangement of parts. It is neither a machine created by intelligence ab extra, nor one built up by unintelligent processes. It is not a pure machine at all, but a whole having a conative principle at work within, operating on and modifying what are otherwise physical, mechanically determined elements, and so fashioning the growth and function of the parts by reference to the requirements of the whole."

And what is thus found to be true of organisms is true also of the whole of reality. "The universe, as far as we know it, is of one tissue throughout."

Ultimate Reality, then, is a system of interconnected parts in continual flux. "If we do not believe that Reality is perfect we cannot represent it as the expression of a single purposive principle, freely determining the character and position of every part by its function in the comprehensive unitary scheme." Some points are clear, others, because of present limits of knowledge, are hypothetical. It seems clear that: (1) "Reality is a system of interdependent elements." (2) "In these there is a teleological factor, mind working toward harmony by correlation." (3) "There is also a mechanical factor, the tendencies of the elements so far as uncorrelated." It follows (4) "that Reality is not purely spiritual, or 'rational' in the sense that it is simply the expression of a purpose. It is rather the effort of a closely conditioned purpose. Evil is not to be explained away. "But (5) there is no evil principle in the sense

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p. 404
2. " " " The Rational Good p. 225
3. " " " Development and Purpose p. 419
that there is a good principle. All evil is traceable to the failure of purpose to coordinate things which so far as uncoordinated act in mutual indifference. Evil is not inherent in the tendencies of elements as such, but depends on conflicts which they bring about when uncoordinated."

(6) "The term 'Mind' expresses an interconnection among minds which develops into a harmony. Harmony in general is the fulfillment of all faculties and needs of mind in so far as mutually compatible."

There is no fixity but rather

"Everywhere, as we approach the wider and deeper conceptions—conceptions which make up the very tissue of our experience, such conceptions as Space, Time, Number, Matter, Force, Energy, Life, Thought, Consciousness, Morality—we enter a region, not of rock-like stability, but of fluidity of which the best that we can hope is that it is the fluidity of growth."

And in this process

"The reality of evil must be recognised as something very different from the mere privation of good. It is the positive result of the clash of processes, and of purposive processes, too, that are not organised. Its extent is the measure of the incompleteness of the order actually achieved by Mind in the world."

If we attempt to classify Hobhouse according to the excellent scheme set forth in the Britannica, we will unhesitatingly declare him an adherent to the ancient and honorable position of Ontological Substantialism. Numerically the case is by no means so clear. He wavers between "a dualism of stark uncompromising contrariety" and "a dualism

1. Mairhead, Contemporary British Philosophers
2. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.427
3. Ibid p.431
5. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p.453
of factors...which may...still be termed organic. ¹ And the bulk of the evidence appears to be on the strictly dualistic side. As to Attributes, each of his dualistic elements seems to be a simple monistic entity --- Mind, throughout, being the harmonizing principle and Matter the source and ground of disharmony. Each of these principles, in spite of their interaction, remains an ultimate irreducible factor in the system of Reality. So far as the question of the mode of action involved in Reality is concerned, we can unhesitatingly classify Hobhouse along with Bergson as an advocate of creative evolution, and with only a little more hesitancy, affording one moment to look askance at his Positivistic leanings, we may dub him a Theist. His God may lack the impressiveness of an Absolute, but He has a satisfying familiarity to the average Christian, as the Mind, or Spirit of harmony that gradually sets all things in order.

Thus he meets one of the famous Kantian trinity of metaphysical problems "God, Freedom and Immortality". The second is subordinated to his Developmental theory in which both freedom and determinism figure as partial and complementary elements in the evolving order. The third question so far as individual immortality is concerned is ignored, though there seems to be room for personal immortality in Hobhouse's notion of Universal Mind in which all individual minds find their meaning, and which does not perish as they do. Hobhouse, however, leaves the problem undeveloped, content to

¹ Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose p. 444
envision an evolving reality, conditioned very strictly during its past and present history by chaotic elements, but gradually developing in a logical and teleological direction toward an ultimate goal of universal harmony.

The question of ultimate origins is shrouded in darkness which Hobhouse fails to penetrate effectively. The body-mind problem, in the magnified form which he gives it in his ultimate dualism, likewise remains unsolved. The nature of God, conceived as the principle of harmony, and his relation to the process of development, i.e., how and to what degree it is under his control, likewise stands at least half hidden in the shadows of our ignorance. Indeed, Hobhouse claims no finality.

"But the strength of the position is that, so far as the two arguments (the empirical and the deductive) cover the same ground, they coincide in the main lines of their teaching. The conclusions which they yield by no means answer all the questions that men ask of experience. But if it is sound, it does settle the fundamental questions—whether the life of man is full of hopeful purpose or void of meaning, whether he can recognise in the constitution of things something that meets his hopes and answers to his aspirations, whether he can make for himself a religion without self-conceit, whether he can finally improve the condition of his race by effort or is doomed always to fall back from every apparently forward step, whether he can trust his reason or must admit the ultimate futility of thought, whether the spirit of human love is justified of her children or blood and iron must continue to rule the world. To all these questions the conclusions here reached supplies a definite and a positive answer. It is, however, maintained here, not as something which is to satisfy all emotional cravings or end all intellectual doubts, not because it is artistically complete or even because it is proved with demonstrative certainty, but merely on the humble and prosaic ground that, on a complete and impartial review
of a vast mass of evidence it is shown to be probably true."

And thus he brings to a climax and close, the discussion of Development and Purpose which is the fruitage of his life long investigation and the basis of his metaphysic.

1. Hobhouse, L. T., *Development and Purpose* p. 468
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