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POLAND'S NEW TRADE UNIONS

By David S. Mason*

With the declaration of martial law in December 1981 and the formal banning of Solidarity in October 1982, the Polish regime created for itself a dilemma: how to provide a channel for participation by the workers without reactivating Solidarity and without allowing that participation to assume political dimensions. The Jaruzelski leadership professed a desire to achieve reconciliation and understanding in the aftermath of the heady days of Solidarity and the depressing denouement of martial law. One of the principal means to do this was through the creation of new institutions, allegedly independent, which would absorb some of the creative and participatory energy of Solidarity, without allowing a return to what the regime claimed had been political activities by the union. In the early months of martial law, the regime created an organization called the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), which it hoped would attract mass membership. PRON was not very successful in this regard, but the regime placed similar hopes in the new post-Solidarity trade union structure which gained legal existence in the same October 1982 law that ended Solidarity's. From the regime's point of view, the new trade unions were a crucial element in the government's plans to implement the economic reform programme, boost labour productivity, and win some measure of support from the population. Confronting these hopes was the appeal by the Solidarity underground for a boycott of the new unions and a widespread scepticism about them on the part of workers.

Origins of the New Unions

The legislation that governed the trade union structure before Solidarity dated from 1949. In the years before 1980 trade unions were organized on the 'branch' basis, by different sectors of industry. Some twelve million people, almost all employees in Poland, belonged to the trade unions. With the emergence of Solidarity in the autumn of 1980 the old trade unions quickly dwindled in size, and in December 1980 the Central Council of Trade Unions, the national governing body for the unions, was formally dissolved. In the 'Gdańsk Agreements' signed between the striking shipyard workers and the government in August 1980, the government undertook 'to introduce appropriate amendments to the laws on trade unions and workers' self-management and to the Labour Code'. In October 1980 the government established a Committee, including representatives of Solidarity, to pursue this task. This Committee's draft legislation was eventually submitted to the Sejm (Poland's legislature) in
May 1981. Work on the new law continued in the Sejm and its committees, in consultation with the trade unions, until the declaration of martial law, when such work was suspended.²

Early in 1982 the trade union legislation issue was revived, but the authorities quickly made it clear that there would be some changes in the draft legislation. The Minister of Justice, Zawadzki, asserted in early February that there would be changes in several directions: to ensure that the unions would not be transformed into political parties; to deal with the ‘problem’ of union activity in administrative agencies; and to guarantee that strikes would not become ‘instruments of terror’.³ Later that month the Committee on Trade Unions of the Council of Ministers presented for public discussion its ‘Proposals on the trade union movement’.⁴ These proposals contained largely general considerations about the nature of the future trade union movement. Trade unions should be self-governing and independent of state and administrative agencies. They should support socialist democracy and fight against bureaucratic elements of governance. They should have the right to appropriate government information in order to take positions on social and economic questions and policies. They should do their own independent research, have their own press, and have access to the mass media. Trade unions should have the right to strike, but only as a last resort, and strikes should not take on ‘a political character’.

Concern that the new unions should not be political was perhaps the distinguishing feature of the new proposals, and of the government’s position in the early months of martial law. As Trybuna Ludu wrote on 19 February 1982, ‘it is the party, or rather political parties, and not the trade union movement, which are the instruments representing the interests of various classes and nation-wide interests’. Trade unions, even the most ‘progressive’ ones, should represent only one category of interests, the employees’ interests. Apart from this restriction on politicization of the unions in the proposals, they were remarkably open and suggested, on paper at least, the possibility for the re-emergence of genuinely independent unions, if not of Solidarity itself. Indeed, a number of writers even rejected the idea that the new unions could be entirely non-political.⁵ It seemed that few of the issues concerning the new trade unions had been predetermined.

In fact, it was not entirely evident at first that Solidarity would not be allowed to re-emerge in some form. In a new column initiated by the Warsaw daily Życie Warszawy under the title ‘What kind of unions?’ a number of letter-writers complained about the regime’s attacks on Solidarity, expressed support for the suspended union, or wrote in favourable terms about Solidarity’s accomplishments. Some even asserted that they still considered themselves members of the union. One female employee of a large factory wrote that ‘some 90% of the employees belong to Solidarity’ and argued for ‘more than one union’ in each workplace; she and her colleagues, however, ‘do not imagine ourselves belonging to any other union than Solidarity’.⁶ Even the ‘Proposals’ of the Council of Ministers recognized the positive aspects of the Solidarity experience, arguing that its ‘uncompromising position, criticism and good intentions led to many positive changes in our country’. And
in the spring of 1982 an official but secret public opinion survey asked specifically if people favoured the reinstatement of Solidarity. Apparently, some 70% did, and the results were therefore never made public. But the fact of asking such a question suggests that the regime had not yet ruled out the possibility of allowing Solidarity to re-emerge. The debate over the new trade unions was so wide ranging that one proposal in the party daily Trybuna Ludu even suggested that there should be separate unions created for workers and for the intelligentsia. The underground newspaper Tygodnik Wojenny responded on 5 June 1982 by suggesting that two parties be created, one for the likes of Siwak (a worker-member of the Politbureau) and one for Olszowski (an intellectual).

However, after the popular demonstrations on 1 and 3 May 1982, both sponsored by the Solidarity underground, the regime’s position toward Solidarity became more hardline. Articles in the official press and government and party leaders increasingly focused on the negative aspects of the Solidarity experience, and of the Solidarity underground. The Minister of Trade Union Affairs, Stanisław Ciosek, referred to Solidarity as a ‘political opposition’ which threatened the very existence of the state. He asserted in September that he had not met with the interned Solidarity leader Wałęsa since February, and that any involvement by Wałęsa in the new trade unions ‘depends on him’.

The New Trade Union Law

With the new Trade Union Law of 8 October 1982, Solidarity (and all former trade unions) were formally abolished. According to the underground Temporary Coordinating Committee of Solidarity, the new law had little relationship to the 1981 draft, having been thoroughly revised by the Council of State in the autumn of 1982 ‘without any negotiations or consultation with Polish society’ or even with the advisory Socio-Economic Council of the Sejm. Of the 75 articles of the December 1981 draft, 55 had been significantly changed.

According to the new statute, the new unions were to be ‘independent of the administrative and economic organs of the state’; on the other hand, they were to be based on the principle of the social ownership of the means of production, to recognize the Constitutional provision for the leading role of the party, and to respect the constitutional bases of the foreign policy of Poland. These provisions, all mentioned in the first three articles of the statute, provided those elements the regime complained were missing from Solidarity’s charter and its actions. The functions and scope of the new unions were carefully delimited: they were to defend the labour interests (interesy zawodowe) of their members and to ‘represent and defend the rights and interests of workers in the area of working, social, living and cultural conditions and wages’, and to cooperate in the planning for the social and economic development of the country. The unions also had the right to express opinions on legal acts or decisions ‘affecting the rights and interests of working people and their families’. While other ‘political’ activities were not specifically proscribed, neither were they mentioned as an appropriate activity for the unions. Their functions were to be
restricted to those of a trade union, as the regime had wanted Solidarity to behave.

Unions were to be formed from the bottom up and, temporarily at least, would only be allowed at the enterprise level. Unions could be formed by a ‘founding committee’ of at least thirty employees who would put together a statute and submit it to a court for registration of the union. If the union did not attract at least fifty members within three months of registration, the court would dissolve the organization. Workplaces were required to grant unpaid leave to union functionaries. Unions had the right to strike and other legal forms of protest, but only as a last resort and only after other means of resolving the dispute, including arbitration, had failed. The decision to strike had to be approved by a majority of the workforce, not just by union members.11

The trade union legislation provided for multiple unions in a single workplace, and for national level organizations, but these were all prohibited during the ‘transitional period’. Factory-level unions could be formed from 1 January 1983. National-level organizations were allowed beginning in 1984; inter-union associations and organizations could be formed in 1985. As we shall see, this time schedule was eventually accelerated to allow earlier formation of these union organizations above the factory level. The new law would also have allowed more than one union in a given factory beginning in 1985; this time limit, however, has been extended repeatedly. The regime has expressed growing hostility to the idea of ‘trade union pluralism’, and the amended trade union legislation passed by the Sejm in July 1985 allows the government to postpone indefinitely the provisions for multiple unions at the workplace.12

Along with the new trade union law, the regime established a Social Consultative Commission, which included ‘unionists representing all strands of the labour movement from before December 1981’,13 to provide advice on the activation of the new unions. Among other activities, the Commission developed a model statute for new unions, set up a school and training programmes for union activists, and encouraged the development of similar commissions at provincial level. Once the unions were firmly established, the national Commission was dissolved (February 1984).

Reactions to the New Legislation

The Solidarity underground rejected the new trade union structure, called for a boycott of the new unions, and demanded the implementation of ‘trade union pluralism’ at the enterprise level. In early 1982 Solidarity leaders (and the underground Temporary Coordinating Committee) called for the reinstatement of Solidarity based on its 1981 Charter and Programme. By the end of the year, though, in apparent recognition of the futility of this demand, Solidarity’s underground statements called simply for ‘free trade unions’ or trade union pluralism, and pledged to struggle ‘for the realization of the programme and the ideals of Solidarity’14 or ‘the right of Solidarity to exist and act openly’,15 without specifically mentioning the old organizational structure and charter.

Indeed, the new statutes did contain a number of provisions that would have
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prevented the re-emergence of Solidarity. First of all, that name was prohibited. The Model Statute for trade unions specified that trade unions could only use such words as ‘independent’ and ‘self-governing’ with the words ‘The Trade Union of the Employees of . . .’. The branch form of organization pre-empted the regional form of organization of Solidarity. And the temporary injunction on either multiple unions in the workplace or on a national level of organization prevented the powerful, unitary movement that Solidarity was.

The authorities clearly hoped to avoid a repetition of the 1980 events, and to make the new unions appear independent and attractive enough to persuade many workers to join. As the trade unions minister, Ciosek, argued, ‘it is not possible to normalize social life in Poland without resolving the union issue’. The regime’s line was that ‘we should reject both the state paternalism of the 1970s and the political adventurism displayed by “Solidarity” after August 1980’. Officials and academics were unanimous in condemning the pre-1980 unions for not adequately representing the workers, for acting in a ‘domineering’ manner, and for allowing the party to ‘violate their organizational sovereignty’. A sociological survey on the old trade unions, conducted before 1980 but not published until 1983, revealed that only a third of union activists thought that the unions defended or represented the interests of workers.

On the other hand, officials often admitted that Solidarity had made positive contributions to Polish life by representing the workers, promising a better life, and restoring dignity to individuals by making them the subjects rather than the objects of political activity. These principles, it was asserted, would be retained in the new trade union structure. The editor of the party monthly Nowe Drogi argued in the December 1982 issue that Lenin conceived of trade unions as fulfilling two functions: to defend the working class against tendencies toward bureaucratization of the socialist state; and to contribute to decision making in the plant and ‘also in the political arena by sharing in governing the state’ (emphasis added). This phrase suggested an enhanced role for the trade unions, perhaps even a greater one than Solidarity had enjoyed. But the dominant line was that the unions should avoid politics. The media frequently reported interviews with workers who contended that the new unions should be self-governing, independent of the authorities, and representative of workers’ interests. But they should avoid ‘playing at politics’ and the ‘manipulation of the bottom by the top’.

Evolution of the New Trade Unions

Almost immediately after the publication of the October 1982 law, trade union founding groups were formed in various enterprises. In the FSO Warsaw motor vehicle plant, for example, which has 16,000 employees (and had some 13,000 Solidarity members), seven workers took the initiative immediately after publication of the law. By the second half of November they had attracted 42 members, enough to constitute a founding group. This group applied to the local court for registration, which was accomplished by 7 December. On 11 January the 60 members elected a Provisional Council; by the end of January there were
200 members. In the FSO factory, as in many others, employees seemed to divide into three groups: those who were willing to join the new unions, those who opposed their formation and membership in them, and those who adopted a 'wait and see' attitude. The size of these last two groups accounted for the rather slow development of membership in the early months of 1983. By the middle of 1983 some three million people had joined the new unions, but membership rarely exceeded 20% of the workforce in any enterprise.

The popular perception was that the founding groups were usually formed by members of PRON and OKON, the pro-regime organizations established after martial law. This was confirmed by a number of trade union leaders, but it was not always the case. In the large enterprise of the Warsaw Municipal Transport Workers (MZK), where I interviewed the leaders of the new trade union, the initiative was taken by young workers who had been leaders of the ‘autonomous’ trade unions during the Solidarity period. When they recruited members, they used the argument that if they did not take the initiative, the new unions would be dominated by the ‘old bureaucrats’ who had been in control of the unions before 1980. Occasionally, even former Solidarity members initiated and led the new trade unions, though these people had rarely been Solidarity leaders or activists. In a meat-processing plant in Gdańsk, for example, the newly-elected board members of the trade union consisted of eleven members. Six were workers, five were supervisors, and four were party members. According to the chairman, who himself had been a member of Solidarity, most of the board members and of the entire membership had been members of Solidarity. Most of the trade union leaders around the country, however, had not held any trade union posts before, either in Solidarity or in the old trade unions.

Formation of National Unions

Under the October 1982 law national trade unions could be formed only after 1983. In April 1983, however, the State Council issued a resolution allowing for the immediate formation of national trade union organizations. The impetus for this change was not explained, but may have been an effort by the regime both to stimulate the growth of trade union membership, and to create an atmosphere of a ‘return to normalcy’ in the country. The new resolution provided for national union organizations to be composed of workers employed in a given branch of industry or a given kind of employment, prohibiting once again the regional organizational form of Solidarity. Workplace unions which wanted to form a national organization were to elect representatives to a founding group. This group would consult with unions in other relevant workplaces. If more than half of the trade unions in a given branch or profession favoured a national organization, then the founding groups were to elect a founding committee and adopt a statute. Until 1984 all such federations had to be approved by the Council of State. After that time, as stipulated in the October 1982 law, they were free to federate without such special permission. These new federations grew quickly, numbering over 100 by the middle of 1984 and leading to a bewildering array of organizations. Federations were formed in quite narrow
industrial groups, including for example the Federation of the Potato Processing Industry, which united 19 of the 22 factories operating in this industry. The Trade Union of Employees of Religious Institutions, registered in March 1984, brought together organ players, religious instructors and other lay employees of religious institutions. This federation, like a number of others, numbered less than a thousand members, less than some factory level unions.

The vertical integration and centralization of the trade unions proceeded even further in 1984. In early 1984 the chairmen of a number of federations organized a Council of Chairmen of National Trade Union Organizations, whose chairmanship rotated monthly from one federation chairman to another. This was simply a forum for exchanging information and opinions, and had no formal or legal status. Not all of the federation chairmen even participated in this council. This council was dissolved in November 1984, to be superseded by the more formal Council of Trade Unions’ National Agreement (OPZZ), which consisted of representatives from each of the federations and delegates from some 400 enterprise unions. Alfred Miodowicz, a steel worker and party member, was chosen to head the new organization.

To confuse matters even further, in June 1984 a number of federations merged to create ‘unions’ (unia) or confederations. Three federations in the mining industry, for example, joined to form a confederation of Labour Unions in Mining, though the purpose or functions of this new creature were not made clear. Even to informed Poles, this complicated organizational structure was confusing. A journalist on the official Rzeczywistość (24 June, 1984), hearing from a trade union official about the various kinds of unions, federations, confederations and councils, complained that ‘it all sounds slightly woolly’.

The reasons for this rush to centralize and for the Byzantine organizational structure of the new unions are a bit puzzling. Probably the best explanation is that the regime was concerned about the lack of resources, activity, and membership of the factory level unions, and hoped that the national organizations could be imbued with some respectability. Soon after the formation of the federations, the regime encouraged them to study and advise on the new price rises being considered by the government. The unions did play such a role, lobbied for and achieved price rises less substantial than those proposed by the government. All this was billed in the official press as an example of the power and influence of the new unions, and gave them the appearance, at least, of activity and accomplishments. This was more than could be said of the factory-level unions at that point, and may have stimulated more workers to join the unions.

The authorities took other measures to ensure the continued growth of the unions. In March 1984 the Council of State adopted several amendments to the October 1982 law that relaxed some of the requirements for trade union membership and organization. The original law provided that any union that did not maintain a membership of at least fifty would be dissolved. In early 1984 this threat faced some 3500 trade unions. The amendments postponed that requirement of minimal membership until the end of 1985. They also provided for ‘cottage workers’, private craftsmen and others who were not ‘employees’ of
any plant and thus not eligible for trade union membership under the original law, to join trade unions in those plants with which they had contracts. This also allowed for an expansion in the total number of trade union members. With these changes, and with the continued growth of membership, the regime was able to claim in the middle of 1984 that the unions had 4.5 million members, and that unions existed in 90% of workplaces in the socialized sector of the economy.

Activities of the New Trade Unions

Enterprise Level

The October 1982 trade union legislation defined the scope of activity of enterprise union organizations to include taking positions on individual matters of employees; taking a position vis-à-vis the director and the self-management body on personnel matters, including work schedules, awards, vacations, and social, living, and cultural needs; cooperating with the director in raising the professional qualifications of employees and developing ‘rational operations’ in the enterprise; supervising the observance of labour regulations, particularly those concerned with work safety and hygiene; and addressing the problems of pensioners. To allow this activity, the factory director was required to provide the trade unions with ‘office space and technical means’ and to grant unpaid leave to trade union leaders.

The legislation addressed the rights of trade unions, even if fairly narrowly prescribed, without mentioning any corresponding duties. This lacuna was soon pointed out by a number of party and government officials, who argued that the trade unions also had a positive obligation to ‘cooperate in combatting phenomena which hinder the overcoming of the economic crisis, such as poor discipline, low productivity, and poor organization of working time’.25 As noted above, a frequent complaint by the regime about Solidarity was that it had only attempted to defend the workers’ interests, without contributing to raising labour productivity, etc. With the new unions, the rights were to be balanced by an appropriate set of obligations.

At the enterprise level, however, the mission of the new unions was not at all clearly understood, and the substantive activities of the shop-level unions were minimal during their first two years. Press reports in 1983 and 1984 on the functioning of individual unions revealed that, with few resources and low membership, they were able to carve out only rather small niches of activity for themselves. Membership dues were used mostly to provide benefits and allowances for births, deaths, and other extraordinary family events. As one factory trade union chairman revealed, ‘many factory organizations cannot afford clerical help with their paperwork, to say nothing of paying their chairman as a full-time union official’.26 Some press accounts asserted that some unions also participated in plant decisions on plans and production, but there was little concrete evidence of this, and by 1984 there was little mention of such activities. Both Solidarity and the old branch unions had organized and
subsidized holiday trips and summer camps for children, but even these activities seemed to be out of the financial reach of the new unions. In 1983 and 1984 such activities were not arranged by the trade unions but subsidized out of the factory social fund, which was controlled by the factory director. By the middle of 1984 some of the national trade union organizations were arranging summer vacations for children, but this did little to bolster the prestige, morale, or drawing power of the factory level unions.²⁷

In my discussions with the leaders of the trade union of Municipal Transport Workers (MZK) in Warsaw in the summer of 1984 they acknowledged that most of their work to date had been organizational rather than substantive: creating the organization, electing a leadership, establishing offices, and attracting members. This latter task had proceeded well at first, as about 3800 employees of the workforce of 12,000 had joined by the summer of 1984. But enrolments had stagnated since then, and they were recruiting only 150 new members a month, compared with a goal of 300. A major problem was the lack of resources and demonstrable accomplishments of the union. Most of these were in the area of social and wage matters and social benefits. The union often interceded with city government officials in an effort to secure housing for their workers. There had been some discussion with the director of the factory about the wage system but, as the chairman of the union complained, they could only give their opinions to the director, who eventually did whatever he wanted. In this factory the union had little influence on factory-level decision making. The union did dispense family benefits and emergency aid to members, but these benefits were relatively small and infrequent. The union also arranged some excursions for workers, but because of costs, these were mostly in the Warsaw area. Sometimes the union subsidized the purchase of tickets to cultural or sports events, but even here the MZK union ran into budgetary problems. The union had wanted to purchase tickets for the ‘Iron Maiden’ rock music concert, but could not afford them. Instead, they subsidized the purchase of tickets for the Chinese Circus, for which ticket prices were only a few hundred zlotys.

Even with these limited kinds of activities, the unions often encountered problems. An article in the weekly Polityka (7 April 1984), for example, discussed an incident at a tyre factory, where the union had decided to purchase scarce supplies of coffee for distribution to union members only. This occasioned widespread protest from non-members, who complained that the factory store, run by factory funds, was providing goods to a chosen group, and claimed that the coffee had been acquired by illicit means in the first place. After much discussion and a suggestion by the factory director to cancel the sale, the union leaders decided not to relent, for fear of damaging the union’s credibility among its members.

Further efforts to enhance the image and role of enterprise trade unions were made in amendments to the trade union legislation passed by the Sejm in July 1985. The revised trade union bill made the workplace trade unions representative of all workers instead of simply their members. It also gave the unions more say in the distribution of enterprise social, vacation and housing funds and in personnel and wage matters.²⁸ At the same time, the new legislation dealt a further blow to those hoping for trade union pluralism by giving the Council of
State the right to extend, apparently indefinitely, the restrictions on multiple unions in the workplace.

Resource Problems

As the coffee incident illustrates, the biggest problem for the new factory-level unions was a resource one. The unions had very few resources or benefits that could attract members, and until employees began to join and contribute dues, this would be a continuing problem. Under the October 1982 law the new unions were to acquire the assets of the former trade unions, including Solidarity and the branch unions. But until national level unions were formed, the workplace unions would get only those former union assets remaining at the factory level. In most cases, this was not very much. Of Solidarity dues, for example, 60% were sent on to a higher level. At the MZK in Warsaw, the new union inherited some money, but mostly office furniture, an old copying machine, a broken television, and not much else. As the new trade union chairman there pointed out, Solidarity deliberately damaged much of their property when martial law was declared, to prevent the government from getting it.

During 1983 many unions did not even have enough resources to pay their officers, who often worked on a voluntary basis. The resource crunch in 1983 was compounded by the fact that during that year assets of the former trade unions were to be used for all of the employees in a workplace, and not just union members. By 1984 only union members, who paid dues equivalent to 1% of their salary, were eligible for union benefits. This was a source of considerable controversy, as former Solidarity members complained that their contributions were being 'stolen' by the new unions. By 1984 enterprise-level unions were able to begin paying their officers, but this often exhausted a good portion of their resources. At MZK, for example, there were five full-time union officers, each on the union payroll. The factory director was obligated only to provide unpaid leave to union officers, not to pay their salaries, as had been the case before 1980. This new procedure was ostensibly to ensure the independence of the new unions from the factory management, but it also further strained the resources of the new unions.

The resources of the former trade unions were much more substantial at the national and regional level, but these were to be administered by a government commission and eventually distributed to national union structures. According to the government, these assets included over 20 billion zlotys worth from the branch unions, one billion zlotys from Solidarity, and 30 million zlotys from the autonomous trade unions. Even when national-level federations were set up, though, the government encountered difficulties in the distribution of these assets. As the chairman of one federation told me, his federation had inherited five vacation homes from the old branch unions. The Solidarity resources had not yet been distributed, in part because of the difficulties in distributing resources from regional level organizations to the new national organizations based on industrial branches. Even the property of the old (pre-1980) Central Council of Trade Unions was a problem, since this was a centralized structure at the national level, to which there was as yet no equivalent in the new system.
The Trade Unions and Enterprise Self-Management

To add to the list of difficulties faced by the new trade unions, there was a considerable amount of tension between them and the reactivated institutions of self-management. Enterprise self-management, including the election of factory directors by the workforce, was provided in a law passed by the Sejm in September 1981. Self-management was suspended with martial law, but revived on a limited basis in July 1982, and fully with the suspension of martial law in December 1982. By the middle of 1984 self-management institutions existed in 90% of state enterprises.

The main problem was the lack of clear definition of the functions and responsibilities of the trade unions and self-management. Even some of the scholarly or journalistic articles that attempted to define the differences often left the matter fuzzy. An article in Sztandar Młodych on 9 December 1982, for example, said that the trade unions should take positions on matters affecting the material and working conditions of the labour force, and that the self-management bodies would concentrate on problems affecting the activity of the enterprise and its results, and the creation of conditions that help meet the needs of the labour force (emphasis added). This formula seemed to give self-management bodies the only functions delineated for the trade unions.

Self-management bodies sometimes competed with the trade unions in another way—by attracting supporters of Solidarity. Solidarity members were by no means unanimous in their opinions toward self-management, with some opting for boycotting these bodies as they boycotted the trade unions, and others arguing for attempting to use self-management bodies to challenge the new trade unions and to pursue Solidarity goals. The results were that in some enterprises Solidarity members boycotted both institutions, while in others Solidarity supporters boycotted the trade unions and joined self-management. The ensuing tension was recognized indirectly even by the authorities. Trybuna Ludu expressed concern on 6 June 1983 that the self-management bodies, in competition with the trade unions, might ‘paralyze’ the unions. A Łódź newspaper asserted that ‘everyone who regarded the new independent and self-governing unions with distrust naturally began to gravitate toward the reactivated self-management bodies. Differences in interests appeared’. This trend, however, was not universal. An official public opinion poll on self-management, conducted in February 1983, found that self-management had only ‘meagre support’ in society, with less than a quarter of the workforce expressing active support for the concept.

Activities of National Unions

There seemed to be two main reasons for the regime’s decision to accelerate the formation of national-level unions in the spring of 1983. The first was the slow development, lukewarm support and meagre activities of the unions at the enterprise level. Given all of the problems mentioned above, the success of the new unions was probably less than expected, and led to the creation of national-
level unions that would be more visible, more involved in major economic issues, and better able to dispense resources. Secondly, the regime apparently wanted a sounding board for its new economic plans, social policies and other legislation. The fragmented labour movement did not allow for this.

The Jaruzelski regime recognised the weaknesses of the new trade unions almost from the beginning. In a speech to workers in Katowice in February 1983 Jaruzelski spoke in favour of expanding 'the forms and possibilities' for trade unions to voice opinions on legislation affecting workers' interests. Shortly thereafter the government passed a ‘Resolution on Consultation with Trade Unions’ obliging state administrative authorities to solicit the opinion of the unions in matters concerning the rights and interests of workers, including working and wage conditions, social welfare, and culture. This would have been impossible given the tens of thousands of unions; the next month, the first federation came into being.

The federations varied widely in size, but generally represented several hundred factory-level unions. Typically, a congress of delegates from various unions in the same branch would form a federation and elect a governing board of fifty or so, a small bureau, and a chairman. The federations receive 10–20% of the dues collected by the workplace unions, though about half of this goes back to the factory organizations. With these funds, the federations support their own staff, finance instruction courses for unionists, organize holidays and summer camps for children, and publish books, pamphlets, and magazines on trade union and consumer issues.

During 1983 the activities of the national-level unions and their representatives were highly visible. The government announced that it would consult with the trade unions on the new price increase proposals, and on the 1984 economic plan. In August 1983, on the third anniversary of the August 1980 Agreements, Jaruzelski met with trade unionists from around the country at the Baildon Steel Mill in Katowice. Jaruzelski proclaimed that the new trade unions were the inheritors of all that was best in the trade union movement, ‘and all that was healthy and creative in the workers’ protest against the distortions of socialism’. He asserted that the trade unions were necessary to ‘point out evils’ and ‘signal in time the dissatisfaction of the workers and prevent another crisis’.

A ‘Second National Meeting of Representatives of Labour Unions’ was held in May 1984 at a factory in Warsaw. This meeting was attended by chairmen of the national labour unions (mostly federations), chairmen of the unions in some 200 of the largest factories, and party and government leaders, including Jaruzelski.

The government seemed to want a more reliable ‘transmission belt’ of information and dissatisfaction from the workers, but it also wanted to integrate the new unions into the political system and domesticate them. When the government announced that the trade unions would be represented on the Sejm Socioeconomic Council, the Price Council, and the Commission for Economic Reform, the new union structure increasingly came to resemble the old Central Council of Trade Unions.

On the other hand, the authorities recognized the right of the unions to criticize the government and its policies, and the unions took on this role over
the government's proposed price increases at the beginning of 1984. The position taken by the unions on this issue was played up in the official press as an example of the independence of the unions, and the price increase was eventually scaled down, apparently as a direct result of such pressure. During 1984 the unions also lobbied for increases in pensions, modifications of the tax system, and for an organized holiday fund, work safety, garden plots for workers, loan funds, and other issues. All of this activity fell within the non-political parameters set by the government, and also fitted the regime's argument that the workers were primarily interested in economic issues, not political ones. As Stanisław Ciosek, the Minister for Trade Union Affairs, contended, 'the interests of the working class are uniform; they all want the same thing—an improvement in the standard of living'.

Membership in the New Unions

Ciosek's contention seems a dubious one, given the widespread distrust of the new unions, and the appeal by the Solidarity underground for a boycott of these and other official institutions. During the first months of 1983, at least, the boycott was telling enough to cause Ciosek to acknowledge that it had been effective, and that it had reinforced the 'natural reserve' that many workers had felt toward unions generally. In the meantime, the leaders of the Solidarity underground called on workers to set up social aid committees independent of the unions and to insist on non-union holiday and credit funds in their factories. Eventually, the Solidarity position focused on the issue of trade union pluralism. In May 1983 Lech Wałęsa and leaders of other unions from before martial law addressed a letter to the Sejm in which they pointed out the provision in the October 1982 law for multiple trade unions in the workplace. ‘The good of a socialist state’, they argued, ‘can only be worked for from a solid foundation of genuine compromise, taking into account the views of various social groups’. The reinstatement of trade union freedom and pluralism would promote ‘genuine national agreement’. Underground Solidarity also argued against the transfer of funds from the banned trade unions to the new ones until more than one trade union was allowed in each plant.

As time went on, however, the possibility of multiple trade unions at the factory level seemed increasingly distant. As early as the middle of 1983 the press began to suggest that ‘pluralism’ could be a disguise for ‘counterrevolutionary activity’. By the summer of 1984 government spokesmen were rejecting the notion of pluralism out of hand. Jerzy Urban asserted that pluralism ‘has not passed the test’ and was not in the interests of the working class. In his interview with me, Ciosek declared that trade union pluralism would divide, weaken and destroy the unity of the labour movement. When I asked him about the large number of people who were not participating in the new unions, he cavalierly dismissed them: ‘if you can’t have what you like, you have to like what you have’.

The regime may have felt that this hard line toward Solidarity and trade union pluralism was possible because of the relative success of the new unions in
attracting members. At the end of 1983 the new unions had over three million members, which was close to the number officially predicted when the new law came into effect. By mid-1986 there were 6·1 million members, with unions operating in over 90% of enterprises in the socialized economy, and 133 national federations. There was, of course, a great deal of dispute about just what these figures meant. Solidarity supporters pointed out that the new unions had far fewer members than Solidarity had in 1981. Government spokesmen asserted that these numbers were adequate, given the mood of society. Officials sometimes adopted the rather convoluted argument that the reason for the smaller numbers was that the new trade union movement was a more ‘voluntary’ type of activity than it had been either in 1981 or before 1980.

Figures on the composition of the new trade unions were extremely hard to come by in the first years of the unions’ existence. The regime was obviously sensitive to the charges that the figures on the size of the membership were inflated, and that union rolls were dominated by retired people and party members. This was the widespread perception in Poland in 1984, and Radio Free Europe picked this up, suggesting that a third or more of the membership consisted of retired workers. As the unions have grown and become more institutionalized, however, more data have become available.

One of the most sensitive membership issues has been the number of workers in the new unions. In 1983 news reports suggested that 80% or more of the newly recruited members were workers, although it was often admitted that there was little interest among young workers in particular and technical personnel. By the middle of 1984, however, a Politbureau report stated that only 60% of the members were workers, and by 1986 that figure was down to 38%.41 If one compares these figures, it is clear that very few workers joined after the first wave in early 1983. Worker participation in the new unions is particularly low in the large enterprises and among skilled workers, a key category ideologically. A national survey conducted in 1984 (‘Polacy ’84’) showed only 19% of skilled workers belonging to the unions, compared with 26% of unskilled workers.42 Among occupational groups, the new unions tended to do better in those where Solidarity was weak and vice versa; they did relatively well among farmers (in the socialized sector) and unskilled workers and poorly among skilled workers, in the health services, cultural establishments and the universities. In the latter, the unions were particularly weak. A Polish Press Agency report in October 1983 indicated that there were no unions at all in 40% of the universities. During my own visits to universities in the summer of 1984 most academics did not even know if there was a union in their university or, if there was, who belonged to it or led it.

In terms of regions, the new unions seemed to do best in the smaller cities and in those areas with smaller enterprises, and worst in the big cities, especially along the coast, and in those areas where Solidarity had been most active, especially Gdańsk and Wrocław. The one exception to this pattern was the coalmining region of Silesia. Both the official press and semi-official (e.g. Przegląd Katolicki) press indicated that about half of all miners were joining the new unions, far above the national average of 20–30%. This may be explained
by the large amount of resources and attention the martial law regime lavished on the miners. Mining, and the export of coal, was the top economic priority after December 1981, and miners' salaries were elevated well above the average in industry. Probably, additional resources were made available to the new unions in the region as well, rectifying the major weakness of the unions and making membership more attractive.

The most sensitive and controversial membership issue concerned the number of retired people in the new unions. Under the October 1982 law people on old-age or disability pensions were entitled to join the unions at their (former) workplace. Pensioners made up a good proportion of the early recruits to the new unions, and local reports acknowledged that 'a significant percentage' of the members in mid-1983 were from this group. In 1983 there were rumours that retired people would lose their pensions if they did not join the new unions, and many probably joined for that reason. But retired people had also not been much involved in Solidarity, and were probably not swayed as much by Solidarity's appeal to boycott the new unions. In fact, during the Solidarity period, support for that union was inversely proportional to age. After martial law, according to one survey, older people were twice as likely to believe martial law was 'justified' as were younger ones.43

Regardless of the reasons why retired people joined the new unions, the figures remain in dispute. Solidarity supporters and others have claimed that up to 50% of the new unionists are pensioners. Almost every employee I talked to in Warsaw said that almost half of the members of the new unions were retired. Radio Free Europe Reports claimed on 11 January 1985 that of the five million members, 'almost a third' were retired people. The chairman of the union at Warsaw’s MZK cited figures from his enterprise showing only 19% were retired, but said this was quite low compared with other workplaces, where they often made up half of all members. Official figures from 1986 indicate that retirees now account for 14% of union members, compared to 9% in 1978.44 Evidence from surveys supports the official figures.

The proportion of party members in the new unions is also disproportionately high. A number of workers told me there had been a party resolution requiring members to join the new unions. There probably was no such mandate but, as Ciosek admitted, there was naturally some 'political pressure' on party members to join the new unions. He claimed that about 20–25% of union members were also party members, but his own more detailed figures revealed the figure was closer to 30%. The 'Polacy '84' survey showed 40% of party members belonging to the unions and party members constituting 28% of the total trade union membership.

By 1986, a Polityka article implied that 70–75% of party members were now in the new unions. Ciosek also said that there were twice as many party members in the governing boards of the unions as in the mass membership, suggesting a clear majority for the party in those leadership positions. The party leadership claimed that the party should recognize the independence of the unions, and not use 'bureaucratic methods, pushing people around, and issuing orders and directives as in the past'. Party assistance ‘must never assume the form of a
command’, and a party plenum instructed party secretaries to avoid combining leadership positions in the party and the trade unions. Nevertheless, independent trade union work does not diminish the party’s leading role. Indeed, the party seems to have played a major role in initiating the new unions in individual workplaces and, given the representation of the party in the union’s leadership, continues to play an influential, if not dominant, role.

Despite the TKK appeal for a boycott of the new unions, a considerable number of former Solidarity members joined them. It should not be very surprising that some of the members of the new trade unions had been members of Solidarity, given the overwhelming majority of employees who had belonged to it in 1980–81. Jerzy Urban suggested in mid-1984 that 60% of the new trade unionists had been in Solidarity. It is hard to ascertain the true figure, though, since the government did not collect such data, and applicants to the new unions were not required to declare past affiliations. Both Ciosek and the MZK union chairman declared that they did not care about such affiliations, and did not ask about them. Nevertheless, Urban’s figure is probably too high. The ‘Polacy ’84’ survey revealed that of the trade union members, 33% had been in Solidarity. On the other hand, only 18% of those who had been in Solidarity joined the new unions. Another survey revealed that Solidarity representation was even stronger among the trade union activists, among whom some 56% had been in Solidarity. The extent of involvement of Solidarity members in leadership positions in the new unions is difficult to determine, though there are occasional references in the press to trade union chairmen who had been in Solidarity. In Warsaw’s MZK, of the five paid staff members on the union’s governing board, one had been in Solidarity, three in the autonomous unions, and one in the branch unions. However, few, if any, former Solidarity leaders are members or leaders of the new trade unions. Rather, those less active members of Solidarity are becoming involved in the new unions.

This is supported by the age make-up of the new unions, which seem to be drawing from the older, and presumably less radical, members of Solidarity. In the Lublin survey only 7 of the 135 members of the new unions were in the 18–27 age bracket; this was 5%, compared with 16% of Solidarity’s (declared) membership and 23% of the entire sample in that age group. The boycott of the new unions by the younger workers may not be so thorough in the future however; Solidarity opinion polls and publications have increasingly advocated the involvement of Solidarity members in the new unions if Solidarity is not reactivated.

Solidarity members joined the new trade unions for many reasons, just as non-Solidarity members did. Critics of the new unions often claimed that the only people who joined the unions were party members, retired people, or opportunists, or because of the benefits attached to membership or the pressures on those who did not. All of these factors may be true, but they should not be very surprising. Party members are politically active in all organizations, and many even became involved in Solidarity. Retired people and others who join for the benefits are responding to the same stimulus that attracts people to any organization, East or West. As Mancur Olson has pointed out, in fact, generally
people will not join an organization unless there are specific benefits available from membership that are not available otherwise. Even so, the attraction of benefits cannot have been very substantial, given the limited resources of the new unions, especially after 1983. In the first year of the operation of the new unions, people who remained non-members for longer than three months after the inauguration of the new unions lost their 'union seniority'. After the middle of 1983, however, with that deadline past, this could not have provided much of an incentive. Perhaps in the future, as the unions do gain more financial leverage, the financial incentives will increase.

Besides these reasons, however, there were a number of others. Many people joined just because other people did. A Polish television programme on the new unions in June 1984 showed a reporter interviewing women in a textile factory about why they had joined the union. Most seemed taken aback by the question, and some did not know how to answer. One lady dodged by responding 'we all joined from the beginning. I was a member and will be'. Another responded that 'I'm not prepared to answer such a question', but when pressed on the issue, said she saw other people joining, saw the activity, so she joined. The Lublin survey also showed a variety of responses to the questions of why people joined, or did not join, the new unions. The responses appear in Table 1.

As the table shows, while most non-members thought people joined the unions for material and social benefits, the members themselves identified a broader range of reasons, including particularly a tradition of activity in unions (including Solidarity) and a belief that the new unions could defend the interests of workers. Activists were even more likely to believe in the efficacy of the new unions. Few people, either members or non-members, thought that pressure or threats were a major factor in people joining the unions. A separate question asked people who had not joined if they had been 'encouraged' or 'discouraged' from joining; only a quarter said they had been encouraged and 72% responded 'neither'.

**Conclusions**

Both the critics and the defenders of the new trade unions are prone to
exaggeration. Contrary to the claims of the critics, many people have joined the unions out of hope rather than cynicism. On the other hand, the membership and activity of the new unions have not lived up to the claims of the authorities. The biggest problem for the new unions is attracting active people to their rolls, and maintaining some independence in the face of pressure from management, the party, and the authorities. As Ciosek has admitted, ‘the trade unions are absolutely essential to getting the country out of the crisis, because it is only together, with the active participation of the working class and working people, that we can effectively undertake concrete joint action on this subject’. However, it is young workers, the driving force of the economy, that are the most reluctant to become involved in the new unions.

This reluctance is apparent even in official public opinion polls, and frequently discussed in party meetings and other fora. In mid-1983, for example, the official Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS) surveyed 269 union activists (42% of whom had been in Solidarity) and workers in four large industrial plants who had not yet joined the new unions. This survey revealed substantial reservations about the new unions, even among those who had joined. Only 19% of non-members accepted the decision to establish a new trade union movement; 68% of the trade union activists did—but this suggests that almost a third did not. Furthermore, fully a quarter of the new union activists favoured reactivating all the old trade unions, with the proviso that there be some changes in Solidarity. In the opinion of both activists and non-members, the major obstacles to further membership growth in the trade unions were disbelief that the unions would genuinely represent the interests of the workers and lack of trust in the new organizations. Another CBOS survey in 1984 revealed that, even among members of the trade unions, only 37% expressed confidence in them! The weak support for the unions, even by those that joined, suggests how difficult was the task of attracting members and promoting an image of independence and vigour. The legitimacy of the new unions was further weakened by criticism from abroad, and particularly from the International Labour Organization. A critical Report from the ILO’s Commission of Inquiry on Poland led the Polish government to withdraw from the organization in 1984.

The reluctance to join the new unions was part of a broader phenomenon—the reluctance of people, especially young people, to become involved in any political activities. With the imposition of martial law, the authorities attempted to establish a number of outlets for the political energy generated by Solidarity: workers’ self-management organs in workplaces, the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), the new trade unions, etc. But none of these have attracted much support. Those institutions most closely associated with martial law and the Jaruzelski government, for example PRON, are widely distrusted and condemned. Despite the regime’s attempts to revitalize the Polish United Workers’ Party, membership steadily declined from over 3 million in 1980 to a little over 2 million in 1985. The number of new ‘candidate’ members in the party in 1983 and 1984 was the lowest since 1958. But even the relatively autonomous institutions, such as the self-management organs, are largely ignored. An official public opinion poll in 1984 on the role people ascribe to self-
management found that ‘self-management seems nonexistent to the people we polled’. Furthermore, many people seem to have turned away from political involvement altogether; an early 1983 poll found nearly three quarters of the sample confirming ‘that the people are mostly interested in being well-governed’ rather than in participation. Numerous polls have shown as well that few people know about or care about the government’s decentralizing economic reform, whose very success is dependent on the participation and support of the workers.

All of this is a fairly natural outcome of the events of 1980–82. Periods of great social upheaval in any country tend to be followed by periods of withdrawal and depression, and the declaration of martial law in Poland certainly gave cause for these feelings. The continuing economic decline, and the lowering of the standard of living, have contributed to a sense of resignation, apathy, and attention to personal and family matters. In such an atmosphere it would be extremely difficult to motivate workers toward any political activity. Even the Solidarity underground has experienced this problem. Given the lack of resources of the new unions, the conflicts over jurisdiction with management, self-management organs, and the party, and the dubious parentage of the new unions, it should not be surprising that their membership and activities have not matched those of Solidarity. Indeed, it may be more remarkable that they exist at all.

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1 For the text of the Agreements, see A. Kemp-Welch, trans. The Birth of Solidarity; The Gdansk Negotiations, 1980 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1983).


3 Życie Warszawy, 10 February 1982.

4 Rzeczpospolita, 22 February 1982.

5 For example, an article by Professor Ratynski of the Higher School of Social Sciences in Trybuna Ludu, 20 May 1982.

6 Życie Warszawy, 28 April 1982.

7 A survey was conducted at the end of March 1982 by the government’s Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej and the Polish Academy of Sciences. I saw the questionnaire before it was administered, but not the results. This figure was mentioned to me by several people who did see them.


10 The legislation, with commentary, appears in Gerard Bieniek, Jan Brol and Zbigniew Salwa, Ustawa o zwiazkach zawodowych (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1983).


14 For example, see ‘The Declaration of Solidarity’ (December 1982), translated in Radio Free Europe, Poland Under Martial Law: A Selection of Documents (Munich: 1984).
Recognizing this problem, the authorities attempted to provide the factory-level unions with additional benefits to bolster the attractiveness of membership. In 1985 the unions (along with youth organizations) acquired a virtual monopoly on tourist trips to socialist countries.

Perhaps it was only a matter of economy, but it seemed inauspicious that the Warsaw bookstore for the new unions used receipts bearing the imprint ‘Instytut Wydawniczy CRZZ’ (Publishing Institute of the Central Council of Trade Unions—the pre-1980 union structure) with the ‘CR’ casually scratched over. In 1985 the national trade union organization (OPZZ) set up its headquarters in the same building that had housed the old CCTU.

A pilot survey of 697 employees in the city of Lublin, conducted in July 1983 by the Institute of Sociology of the University of Warsaw (hereafter ‘Lublin 1983’). The question here, ‘was martial law justified’ was answered ‘decisively yes’ or ‘rather yes’ by 71% of those aged 58-64 and by only 38% of those 18-27.