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Keynote Address

World History, the Social Sciences,
and the Dynamics of Contemporary Global Politics*

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ABSTRACT
This article argues that the discipline of world history, with its interdisciplinary ties to the social sciences and its incorporation of the cultural insights of recent historiography, makes an ideal tool for conveying the complexities of the contemporary world in a “user-friendly” way. It argues further that one particular global structural analysis, from the author’s world history textbook Frameworks of World History, exposes a deep pattern that helps explain many of the central conflicts in contemporary global politics. By highlighting the tension that has existed between individual communities, or hierarchies, and the networks that connected those communities, a tension going back as far as the modern human species, the article exposes the deep roots of the central conflict between today’s global network and its cultural value of capitalism on the one hand, and modern hierarchies and their central value of nationalism on the other. The cultural aspect of this analysis offers a possible route forward from the problems and repressive politics that flow from this central conflict.

KEY WORDS World History; Frameworks of World History; Networks; Hierarchies; Nationalism

The disciplines of world history and the social sciences are closely tied together, through their genealogy as academic disciplines and thus their continuing interdisciplinary connections, and through their shared mission within liberal arts education. This article

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I am indebted to Beth Swift, the Wabash College archivist, for the information about and photos of early Wabash faculty.
will examine both of these connections, the former fairly briefly in order to establish some common ground, and the latter at greater length in order to put the shared mission in the context of global historical patterns and their current expressions in global politics.

**ACADEMIC HISTORY**

The relationship between history and the social sciences as academic disciplines can be illustrated conveniently, if a bit one-sidedly, from the history of the faculty at Wabash College. The college was founded in 1832, and its early faculty taught broadly from their home bases in classics (Latin and Greek were significant components of the earliest curricula) and the natural sciences and mathematics, reflecting the emerging dominance of science in the intellectual world of the mid-19th century, a topic we will return to in a moment. The iconic figure here is Edmund Hovey (Figure 1), cofounder of the college and its first professor of natural sciences. This state of affairs remained true for much of the rest of the century. Indeed, though Charles White, the second president of the college (and Hovey’s brother-in-law), taught history, the first professor hired specifically to teach history was Charles Augustus Tuttle (Figure 2), who joined the college in 1892, sixty years after the college’s founding.

*Figure 1. Edmund Hovey*
The History Department at Wabash now sits in Division III, The Social Sciences. About half of the history departments in the United States are grouped with the social sciences, and about half with the humanities. Honestly, the discipline can fit comfortably in either place, but its placement at Wabash is because of Tuttle, because he taught not only history but also sociology, political science, political economy, and economics, the latter being the field where modern citations to his work still appear most frequently. In other words, he was a one-man Division III (In fact, we don’t even teach sociology these days), and the division’s departments, except for psychology, all trace back to Tuttle. Thus, history sat firmly with the social sciences at Wabash.

This academic history suggests that the relationship between history and the social sciences is genealogical, stemming from history; however, although history, a field that could look back to the Greek classics in the persons of Herodotus and Thucydides, did precede the social sciences, their mutual influence is far less one-sided. To see this, we need a quick review of some basic historiography.

Classical Historicism

The “modern” academic profession of history traces back to the decade of Wabash’s founding, the 1830s, when Theodore von Ranke began teaching at the University of
Berlin. Ranke was determined to put history on the same scientific footing as the natural sciences, or, put another way, to remove it from the realms of literature and rhetoric it had occupied up to then, even when practiced by Enlightenment-era rationalists such as Edward Gibbon and David Hume (see, e.g., Arnold 2000). Doing so entailed setting standards of professional training, for which purpose Ranke invented the seminar, and an emphasis on objective analysis of primary sources, especially “official” documents such as state records and the writings of state leaders. This emphasis emerged from and supported the content of Ranke’s objective of scientific history: a focus on the decisions of the great leaders who were taken to have shaped the history of the nations of the day. Such histories in turn served a deeper purpose: the invention of “nations” (for Ranke, the not-yet-extant German nation, which would “naturally” fall under the political leadership of Prussia, whose capital at Berlin housed Ranke’s university) through the promotion of national histories and thus national identities. Historians have come to call this combination of great man history—purportedly objective and scientific in method but deeply imbued with nationalism and its close ideological cousins racism, sexism, and classism—classical historicism, and this style of history set the mold for the future development of the academic history profession, as can be seen in the continued domination of national divisions in both flagship professional organizations (e.g., the American Historical Association) and their associated journals (e.g., The American Historical Review).

The problem for the discipline of history was that this style of historical analysis was obsolete almost as soon as it came into being. Prussia in the 1830s was still largely preindustrial in its social, political, and economic landscapes, but the coal smoke of change was already in the air, and industrialization advanced rapidly through the 19th century across much of western Europe and the United States. (We’ll return later to where that change came from.) The transformations of society, politics, and economics wrought by industry can be summarized neatly under the keyword “mass”—mass politics, mass society, mass production and consumption—all producing reams of data, a vast expansion of the number of political actors, and the formation of industrial classes of people; industrial society organized around mass proved ill-suited to analysis by the sources and methods, focused on the decisions of an elite few, of classical historicism. But because the same forces of professionalization and specialization that shaped the unchallengable scientizing of historical method also led to a hiring system that tended very strongly to conservative reproduction of the interests and methods of the established masters of the field, the discipline of history proved very slow to adapt to the changing landscape.

Instead, new academic disciplines arose to answer the challenge of analyzing the evidence created by newly industrializing societies. Within the same academic atmosphere of professionalization, specialization, and prestige of the methods and image of natural science (whose discoveries, especially in industrial chemistry, were doing so much to advance industrial growth), the result was the emergence of the social sciences. Marx, of course, led the way, and though he proposed his theories (for which he too claimed the validity of science) as an approach to history, this proved far too radical for that stodgy field, which would begin to accept Marxist influence only in the next century,
and Marxism instead occupied the emerging and contested ground of economics (over against but actually closely akin to classical Smithian economics), political economy, and politics. The sociology of Max Weber followed, along with the invention of psychology at various points by figures such as William James and Sigmund Freud. It was these fields, cousins to rather than descendants of history, that C. A. Tuttle brought to Wabash along with his historical expertise.

Social History

Continuing social change and the political conflicts over identity that were created by industrial change (implicated in histories of national development) meant that history could not remain trapped in its 19th-century mold forever. “Social history,” characterized by what has been widely called a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach to the past, emerged in different forms by the early 20th century: the American Progressives, for example, exemplified by Charles Beard, who famously analyzed the economic class interests of the Founding Fathers and the Constitution they wrote; and various German and French schools of social history, including the roots of the French Annales school. Soon after, Marxist analysis finally gained traction (and became the officially sanctioned view of history in the Soviet Union), and social history blossomed and became the dominant brand of history in the 1960s, when a generation of historians from far more diverse backgrounds entered the profession (Iggers 1997).

When social historians began writing, they naturally turned to the methods of analysis already developed by social scientists, creating “social science” history as the methodological corollary of social history’s topical focus. Thus, borrowing from sociology, political science, economics, and even psychology, historians learned to incorporate statistical models and to use big data drawn from a whole new class of government (and other) documents to supplement older narrative sources. This focus on aggregates of thousands of small pieces of data rather than on the actions of a few leaders, events, or cases therefore had the further methodological result of driving at least some history away from narrative exposition of stories and toward thematic analysis of trends, and even (for the Annales school) of stasis—toward synchronic rather than diachronic history, in other words.

Many traditional historians were uncomfortable with such developments, of course, and justified their resistance by claiming that history was meant to get at the individuality of stories and events from the past—stories that inevitably undermined any grand generalizations that a social science model might attempt to capture. But social historians could answer such charges by claiming that they were simply doing “better science”—a defense that resonated with the scientific professionalism built into Ranke’s invention of modern historical method. Social history, while challenging some of the topical foci and philosophical assumptions of classical historicism, therefore maintained significant philosophical continuity with it, and still operated largely within the earlier school’s nationalist frame.
World History and the Question of Culture

I have so far been talking about the discipline of history generally. It is time to bring the specific subdiscipline of world history, within which I have built (at least part of) my career, into focus. To begin with, we must recognize that the desire to encompass as much of the world as possible in histories has deep roots, undoubtedly because the more universal a history could claim to be, the more authority its conclusions could lay claim to. Thus, medieval monks who wrote histories, even ones largely focused on recent events in their own locality, often framed them as “universal” histories, beginning with Adam and Eve and summarizing biblical history before transitioning to “modern” times. Ranke himself claimed to write universal history, the claim to universalism here being at least in part a product of the scientific method (or at least the image of scientific method) that Ranke wished to create for his discipline. Natural science, especially since Newton, aimed at discovering laws of nature that were universally true—Newton’s law of gravity, which united the previously separate physics of earthly phenomena (why do objects fall to the earth?) and cosmic motion (why do planets apparently “circle” the sun in elliptical orbits?) provided the model. (Ironically, the fact that Newton’s law accounted for observed fact but potentially separated that reality from transcendant causation, failed to impress Ranke, whose “universal history” exposed, he said, God’s plan, connecting Ranke more to medieval monks than to modern scientists.)

Ranke’s universal history was almost exclusively a history of Europe and European nations, as in no other region of the world, as he saw it, was the progressive change necessary to true history happening. (Marx’s “Asiatic mode of production” viewed the world the same way.) The next generation of world history saw explicit attempts to encompass the globe geographically. The two best known—the early-20th-century German historian Oswald Spengler (Spengler 1932) and the mid-20th-century British historian Arnold Toynbee (Toynbee 1957)—divided the world into cultures or civilizations that they treated (explicitly, in Spengler’s case) as biological organisms with “natural” lifespans and patterns of growth and decay (yet another reflection of the scientific pretensions of the historical discipline). The result was world history as classical historicist grand narrative, with civilizations or cultures replacing great men and nations as the central actors in the drama. While both were immensely influential, the rise of social history and the Eurocentric assumptions underlying their narratives sent both into eclipse by the 1960s, when the new wave of social history came to dominate the discipline.

A new school of world history was part of this development. Exemplified most famously in the work of William McNeill, whose Rise of the West (1963) deliberately responded, in its title, to Spengler’s iconic work, The Decline of the West, but also in the work of the Greek-Canadian scholar L. S. Stavrianos (Stavrianos 1971), the new world history saw a vast leap in complexity of analysis, partly through consideration of processes that transcended “civilizational” boundaries, and partly through the incorporation of comparative and “bottom-up” perspectives inspired by more local social histories. This new focus in turn entailed a logical turn to social historical methods.

This style also raised for world history the question that history as a whole began to ask in the 1980s: What about culture? What has since come to be called the cultural
turn arose from the influence of literary critical studies on theories of history, as historians not only brought culture into focus as a topic of study but also began questioning some of the fundamental philosophical assumptions regarding the accessibility of the past, the reliability of sources and narrative as a method (Hayden White [1990] famously asked whether there was a difference between historical narrative and fiction, since both necessarily involved imagination), and in general problematizing the objectivity of the “science” of history and the social sciences. This, too, had deep roots; in 1846, Jacob Grimm had written a defense of the “imprecise sciences” of history, philology, and law grounded in his nationalist view of the centrality of German culture to these fields. Perhaps because cultural difference as a central fact of world history was unavoidable, world history met the crisis of the cultural turn somewhat more readily than did history as a whole, and it began to incorporate cultural analysis into its methodological tool kit.

We therefore arrive roughly at the present day, with world history as a field tying all of the liberal arts—social sciences, humanities, and even, via Big History, the natural sciences—together. What I propose to do now is turn this analytical package back on itself and examine liberal arts education and its purpose in the context of world history.

WORLD HISTORY AND THE LIBERAL ARTS

I’m going to assume that one of the central purposes of a liberal arts education is to teach something like global citizenship to our students. As Wabash College says in glossing its mission statement, “Wabash also challenges its students to appreciate the changing nature of the global society and prepares them for the responsibilities of leadership and service in it.” The unquestioned assumption behind this purpose is that global citizenship is unproblematically a good thing, that it instantiates the belief that we’re all in this together, that divisions and misunderstanding cause trouble in the world. My analysis will not question the “good” part of this assumption but will point out that it is far from unproblematic.

I will start with a story. A month or two before the 2016 election, which brought these very questions of divisiveness versus inclusion into sharp relief, I heard an NPR report wherein the reporter interviewed a Trump supporter in rural South Carolina and asked him why he was planning to vote the way he was. His answer (which I must paraphrase from memory) was because Trump’s nationalist agenda recognized the fact that “multicultural society can’t work.” This raises some questions for us: Why does he hold this attitude? How can it be overcome? And what’s the role of the liberal arts in doing so?

I will claim first that our informant holds this opinion in the face of abundant evidence to the contrary. This evidence lies in the existence of functioning big cities, where not only does multiculturalism work but support for it, according to opinion polls, is strongest. This is especially true in what are often called world cities: places such as New York, London, Berlin, Buenos Aires, Mumbai, Tokyo, and so on.

So can we just take our informant to a big city and show it to him to convince him he’s wrong? Sadly, no. Chances are he’ll feel lost, threatened, perhaps scorned if he’s just dropped into a big city. This is because he’s got a view of the world that makes sense of
the world for him, and that view—what I will call his cultural frame values—makes big cities appear both dangerous and nonfunctional. What he needs is a friendly tour guide who can not only show him the sights but also show him how things work and make the city comprehensible, and in that way show him and include him in on how multiculturalism really does work in urban society.

I think, because the academic history of world history has built social science, humanities, and even natural science perspectives into its analytical tool kit, that the discipline of world history is ideally situated to act as the guided tour of the metaphorical big cities of global human geography, history, and contemporary politics. I cannot claim it is the only discipline that can do so, but its inherent interdisciplinarity makes it a potentially effective one. Making the tour effective means not just exposing students to the cultural differences of the world—a “cabinet of curiosities” approach that in fact does little to build appreciation for diversity and connection—however. Instead, our ideal tour guide needs to teach understanding of the underlying structures and patterns of world history (which will be a largely social science-driven analysis, including cultural patterns within that analysis), with the results made into an attractive story (which is where the humanities move from object of analysis to contributor). In short, we need an analytical world cities tour guide that acknowledges that things aren’t simple and obvious and that antiglobalists aren’t simply stupid but are grappling (from a different perspective) with the same problems that we are.

FRAMEWORKS OF WORLD HISTORY: A TEXT WITH A MODEL

I must now ask the reader’s indulgence while I introduce my own foray into creating such a tour guide: *Frameworks of World History: Networks, Hierarchies, Culture* (Morillo 2013). It attempts a global, comparative analysis using a social science approach in so far as it is built around a visual-conceptual model of the key structures of human history as I see them. This model allows me to highlight commonalities among different societies and processes transcending single societies. With the establishment of a sort of baseline of commonalities, significant differences stand out more and invite further analysis. Pedagogically, the model can serve as an analytical tool for understanding primary source readings, and it conversely generates hypotheses that can be tested against the source evidence and that serve as theses that give the entire book an argument (a particular concern of mine, as one of the first things we teach our students when they write papers is to have a thesis, and yet the first history book many of them encounter, their textbook, usually does not have one).

The model consists of three main pieces, representing the three main structures within which all humans have lived their lives: first, networks, the horizontal structures of connection between separate human communities; second, hierarchies, the vertical structures of power and organization within different human communities; and third, culture, represented as a structure in the model by what I call cultural screens and cultural frames. A brief explanation of each will set up our analysis.

Networks are the most straightforward and conventional of these structures. (They form the focus of the world history *The Human Web* by William McNeill and his son
Networks consist of connections of trade, migration, religious missions, and so forth—the connections that spread people, goods, and ideas beyond their points of origin. Networks can be represented straightforwardly diagrammatically. Figure 3 shows a fairly simple network of mostly short-range connections between undifferentiated nodes. (All diagrams are from Frameworks.)

**Figure 3. A Simple Network**

Hierarchies are more varied (and their variety also introduces some variety into networks, as hierarchies become large, complex nodes in more sophisticated networks), as they represent the internal organization of the many communities that humans have lived in throughout history, ranging from the simple bands of our ancient hunter-gatherer ancestors and the simple tribes that emerged when bands coalesced around favored locations, through more complex chiefdoms and, finally, complex state-level societies that have come to dominate human history since they first emerged in Mesopotamia and Egypt nearly six thousand years ago. Figure 4 represents the common structure of such state-level hierarchies during the long agrarian era, when agriculture formed the dominant source of wealth.

Figure 4 represents a number of significant characteristics that were so common as to be nearly universal among preindustrial societies. The first is that such societies were built around inequality and exploitation of two sorts: (1) class power, or the dominance of a small elite (who were rich because of their power, as opposed to modern elites, who are powerful because of their riches) who used their power (backed by specialists in the use of force) to draw upward and concentrate the meager surpluses that agrarian economies generated from the producers of wealth (farmers who were subjected largely to various degrees of unfreedom) and (2) gender power, whereby the males (ultimately, the rich males) controlled the other producers of wealth, the females who (re)produced the labor force. (An interesting pattern revealed by this model is a consistent
inverse relationship between the rigidity of class and gender power—that is, the more loosely class power was enforced in a society, the more rigidly gender power was enforced. The classic example is the contrast between democratic Athens with its fairly broad male participation in state power and functions, but cloistered and powerless women, and monarchical Sparta with its very narrow military elite, serf-based economy, and relatively public and independent female population.) What this pair of inequalities reveals about preindustrial hierarchies is that they were built not to promote freedom or innovation but to secure stability and that, ideologically, their fundamental stability was grounded in naturalized patriarchy.

**Figure 4. Agrarian-Era Hierarchy**

![Traditional Hierarchical Societies: The Socio-Political Pyramid](image)

The mention of ideology brings us to the third structure within which humans have always lived their lives: culture. I represent the key functional operations of culture with a metaphorical image of a screen (like a movie screen) and the frame surrounding it (Figure 5).

The screen itself represents the cultural space where political, social, and cultural arguments, competitions, and discussions take place: individuals up through large cultural groups project images onto the screen, so to speak, as a way of constructing identities and proposing meaningful claims about the world. The other part of the structure—perhaps the more significant one—is the cultural frame around the screen. This represents the unspoken agreements that (almost) everyone in a particular society holds, the
fundamental values or assumptions about how the world works that not only contain the screen (and thereby limit the images that can plausibly be projected on it) but also act as a lens through which the world outside the society is viewed. The most profound clashes between cultures are always grounded in a clash of fundamentally different frame values. The overall “function” within any society of the cultural dynamics represented by the frame and screen is to create identity and make the universe meaningful.

Figure 5. Cultural Frames and Screens

FRAMEWORKS ANALYSIS OF OUR PROBLEM

This brief outline of the three major structures that have defined human history allows us to see what the Frameworks model says about the social sciences and liberal arts more generally in the context of current political conflicts.

A Constant Theme: Network-Hierarchy Tension

The central fact to take note of is the relationship between the three major structures. In particular, world history shows us that although networks and hierarchies connect with each other and often reinforce each other in important ways, there is a constant tension between the two structures that arises from the divergent purposes, and consequently the
different cultural values, of the people who live primarily within networks and those who live primarily within (and especially those who control) hierarchies.

A brief overview of the key characteristics of the two structures reveals why their intersection was tense. Networks were horizontal structures. That is, they connected separate communities or societies without necessarily placing one over the other. This is because they were also cooperative. This is clearest in the case of the economic aspect of network connections: Trade is by definition a consensual exchange of goods in which each party perceives itself as having received fair value in return for what it gives away. But the cooperative, or at least noncoercive, nature of networks also applies to the other sorts of exchanges that flowed through them. Networks were also extensive, connecting communities that could be widely separated geographically and politically. Finally, they were (especially later, after the rise of state-level societies) focused on urban centers. The tentacles of trade and cultural exchange, of course, reached into the countryside of farming villages and pastoral lands, but the great centers of exchange tended to be cities.

Hierarchies, in contrast, were vertical structures, as the name implies. The essence of a hierarchy was the ranking of social groups above and below each other. This is because they (especially complex hierarchies) were coercive structures, which is another way of saying that they were political rather than economic. The coercion might take many forms (it might be well justified, disguised, consented to, and so forth), but the central feature of a state or even the distributed power of a simple community was that it enforced individual compliance with orders, laws, or informal norms—; that is, it made cooperation work in an unequal environment. Hierarchies were intensive; a hierarchy focused its coercive power over the specific area under its control, and additions to that area tended to be contiguous. Finally, hierarchies were based in rural production. They might have urban centers—and indeed, cities were central to most (though not all) state-level societies—but the role of cities as centers of exchange in networks differed from the role of cities as centers of the concentration of power and of people who wielded power, embodying the basic network-hierarchy tension in a single location. The fundamental conflict is that hierarchies were built to ensure stability (and thus keep the powerful in power), whereas networks existed to promote the flow of goods and ideas.

In this fundamental way, they were diametrically opposed to each other, and yet networks profited from the stability created by hierarchies, and hierarchies profited from the wealth generated by networks, while hierarchy elites benefited from the status goods that networks (especially trade in long-distance luxury goods) provided to them. The visible result in historical patterns is what I call the merchant dilemma: Hierarchy elites wanted the goods that merchants delivered but didn’t trust merchants themselves, viewing merchants as subversive of hierarchy stability and of proper social order. (Merchants could accumulate wealth that was not tied to control of land and people, clearly a perversion of the proper bases of social and political power.)

The result was that almost every agrarian hierarchy with any significant merchant activity used a variety of institutional and cultural mechanisms to limit or denature the threat posed by merchants. They would sequester foreign merchants in defined quarters of major international trade cities (including the western European tendency to “foreignize” and ghetto-ize their own Jewish merchants); they often regulated domestic merchants heavily,
sometimes prohibiting them from going abroad, sometimes forcing them into government-controlled guilds; and great merchant families who accumulated too much wealth could find all of that wealth suddenly confiscated by the state. The most effective mechanisms used to limit the threat of merchants, however, were forms of cultural co-opting that brought merchants into the hierarchy values of the society, meaning that merchant wealth ended up reinforcing hierarchy values instead of subverting them. Examples of this included Chinese merchants who adopted Confucian morals (and therefore tended eventually to invest their family riches in the education of a son to be a state bureaucrat); the Hindu caste system, which saw merchant wealth as a fulfillment of caste dharma unconvertible into political power; and Islamic values that, because of the career of Mohammed himself, also tended to channel merchant wealth into investment in the religious laws and structures of society. Such mechanisms were most effective because they made merchant communities basically self-policing while putting the fewest restrictions on merchant activity, maximizing the wealth generation that the hierarchy could profit from. (An important side note here: despite the restrictions on their Jewish merchants which became restrictive enough to mostly kill off Jewish merchant activity, western European hierarchies largely failed to control, co-opt, or otherwise denature their growing merchant communities, with significant long-term implications that I will return to below.)

Although both networks and hierarchies became more complex and powerful over time, their relative importance shifted. This changing relationship provides another basis for world history chronology. Down through the high agrarian era, or to about 1500 CE, the world consisted of hierarchies connected by networks: The experience of hierarchies was primary. Between 1500 and 1800, as previously separate networks connected, the balance shifted toward greater equality (Figure 6). After 1800, as industrialization gave huge boosts to productivity and transportation capacity, the world increasingly became a global network divided into hierarchies: a world where network effects are arguably primary. Naturally, the stronger that networks became relative to hierarchies, the more difficult managing network challenges became for hierarchy elites. Today’s conflicts over massive global migration are the most obvious symptom of this.

Figure 6. Network vs. Hierarchy Influence
I must make a distinction in this chronology: The last era (the period since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution) is, like almost everything across the agrarian-industrial divide, qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from what preceeded it. Not only did industrialization supercharge the global network, but phenomena such as the merchant dilemma were translated across the divide into different problems, even while the basic tension between networks and hierarchies continued. To understand this, we must take a quick look at the causes of the Industrial Revolution in terms of the Frameworks model.

The Industrial Turning Point

Explaining the Industrial Revolution, of course, is one of the thorniest and most argued-about problems in world history, and I am under no illusions that my explanation will win universal agreement. One reason this is such a difficult problem is that explaining how the Industrial Revolution happened is so closely tied to explaining why it happened where it did, which slides inevitably into problems raised by Eurocentrism and the subsequent 19th- and 20th-century history of imperialism, “western dominance” (remember The Rise of the West), and the notion of progress bequeathed to us by that history.

Although a full explanation would exceed the limits of this article, the Frameworks answer starts from the assumption that because Agrarian hierarchies were built to promote stability, resist change, and protect the interests of the traditional elites (generally, priests, scribes, and warriors), industrialization should not have been an expected outcome in human history. Remember, industrialization promotes change, undermines stability, and generates new elites (mercantile and then industrial) whose interests do not always coincide with those of the traditional elite. Thus, as the European economy expanded after the Black Death of 1348 and joined up with an increasingly global network, mercantile network values (including market economics) began to infect the way these hierarchies were run in a few western European hierarchies, whose elites generally had failed to invent ways of co-opting or controlling network practitioners (mainly merchants) and thereby solve the merchant dilemma. This is reflected in the emergence of mercantilist theory and policies, and in cultural developments such as the rise of science (which, like mercantile operations, depends on rational analysis assisted by quantification). Within the particularly weird structure of the British hierarchy and its massive global network flows, this infection produced the innovation of joint stock companies. These created an institutional connection between hierarchy governance and network activity, backed by capitalism as a network-generated value system that cemented these new network-hierarchy institutional ties.

The result was hierarchies that adopted network values and therefore promoted and amplified network activity rather than regulating and suppressing it. This created an environment in which market economics instead of birth status underpinned social organization—in other words, in which wealth led to power rather than power leading to wealth—and thus in which capitalist industrialization could take hold. Network-hierarchy relations were increasingly institutionalized in a multinational corporate sphere connected
to a state that became a professional economic managerial organization. This new hierarchy structure is represented in Figure 7, which should be contrasted with the agrarian pyramid presented earlier (Figure 4).

**Figure 7. Industrial-Era Hierarchy**

![Industrial Era Hierarchies](image)

Given that this new structure emerged from a hybrid of hierarchy and network structures and values, one might think that the old tension between hierarchies and networks would have disappeared. One would, however, be wrong. That tension simply moved and, like everything else in industrial-era hierarchies, became a subject of mass politics, which is where it continues to sit now. The next section lays this out in terms of the *Frameworks* model.

*Networks, Hierarchies, and Modern Cultural Frames*

The fundamental point is that networks and hierarchies are still built to do opposing things. Networks promote fluidity—the flow of goods, ideas, and people for which hierarchy boundaries are barriers to profitable transactions—and hierarchies are built to promote stability, which the massive flows of the modern global network can undermine. Whereas in the agrarian era, the binary division between networks and hierarchies was reflected in a binary division between the elites of hierarchies and network practitioners, however, the more complicated, multipart construction of modern hierarchies creates new possibilities for political alliances and conflicts.
Specifically, the threat to stability in hierarchies is now concentrated in the social sphere. The corporate sphere, as the key institutional locus of network activity, is the key generator of threats to stability. The state, as a professional managerial organization, is where the natural political conflict between promotion of stability, on one hand, and promotion of profitable flows, on the other, must be decided. Where the state’s policies fall becomes the key question, as significant 19th-century analyst of the consequences of industrialization saw. As Karl Marx said in *The Communist Manifesto*, “To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it [the Bourgeoisie] has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood.”

When we talk about political competition, we enter the realm of the projection of screen images within cultural frame values, so our question now is, What competing frame values are available to mediate the tension between the needs of hierarchies and the needs of network activity? Marx’s Bourgeoisie and Reactionists give us a good place to start.

**Networks: Capitalism.** The frame value of the bourgeoisie and of the modern industrial network, especially of the corporations who dominate it, is capitalism. Note that I mean here capitalism as an ideology, as a set of ideas about how the world is constructed, rather than the actual economic system of capitalism (whose smooth operations depend on acceptance of its ideology). The set of ideas subsumed under capitalism as a frame value includes private property, profit as a good thing, and a materialist view of the world, including human value. The problems created for democracy by treating corporations as people reveals the ideological side of capitalism quite clearly. Ideological capitalism is closely associated with more obviously ideological positions such as liberalism, neoliberalism, and communism (also a materialist, economically based ideology that arose in dialogue with early classical economics; the deep ideological opposition between capitalism and communism very much has the character of sibling rivalry, as will become clearer when we examine nationalism below). More complicatedly, capitalism is closely associated (intentionally) with the ideology of market economics. I insist on distinguishing the two, however, as their conflation is an intentional ideological move designed to legitimize capitalism. Capitalism as an economic system, in my view, requires only three conditions: private ownership of capital, division of capital and labor, and that the benefits of doing business (profits) accrue to the owners of capital. Capitalist enterprises operate all the time—and very happily—in nonmarket economic settings (viz, regulated monopolies such as utilities), and free markets do not need capitalist participants. Distinguishing the two as different and not even always mutually supportive (what else is state regulation to limit monopolies about?) is critical for useful historical analysis of the growth of capitalism, but is, I recognize, not standard among economic theorists.

The results of a capitalist-framed network tend toward promotion of the universal and unhindered flow of goods, services, and, indeed, people, and toward the creation of a universal, egalitarian, and economically based creation of identity for people everywhere. These results can be read in progressive terms and arguably are progressive in some cases. The practical problem is that the economic operations of capitalism effectuate the idealistic results of network activity only for some. Indeed, the concentration of capital inevitably
created by capitalist economics actively undermines egalitarian ideals and highlights the conflict between property rights and human rights built into basic capitalist values.

Hierarchies: Nationalism. I take it as given that nations are not “real” but are cultural constructions created around the promotion of nationalist ideology in all its various forms. Nationalism is thus the fundamental frame value of modern hierarchies, as is visible in the fact that the paradigmatic form of the modern state is almost universally accepted to be the nation-state. Since the invention and widespread diffusion of the ideology of nationalism beginning just over 200 years ago, the most powerful versions of nationalist ideology have been ethnically based. (Yes, ethnicity is also a cultural construct.) Nationalism is thus closely associated with a number of other ideological positions, including racism, fascism, and a wide range of populisms as well as (usually) close association with constructions of gender and gender roles that are claimed to be natural and/or traditional. Nationalism also aligns closely with religious fundamentalisms, including evangelical Christianity.

The result of the promotion of nationalist ideologies is the creation of structures designed to promote stability, meaning, and identity, though crucially for only some people within the area occupied by a “nation” of people, given that, as is inevitable in ideologies of identity, defining a group requires an “other,” more or less explicitly. (Even the perhaps attractive-sounding “populism” carries this problem: Who are “the people” that Donald Trump’s—or any other—populism appeals to?) Note also that, similar to how the operations of capitalist economics undermine the potential egalitarianism made possible by that same economic system, the political stability and order promoted by nationalism disproportionately benefit a small group of leaders already in positions of power, whose deployment of nationalist rhetoric is clearly intended to enhance and cement that power. These are Marx’s Reactionists.

The Relationship of Capitalism and Nationalism. Capitalism and nationalism constitute the two most influential and thus important ideologies in the global history of the past 200-plus years. Crucially, they are fundamentally hostile to each other, reflecting and re-creating the network-hierarchy tension of the agrarian era in new form, and despite the apparent resolution of the structural tension between them that the corporate sphere seemed to resolve. This hostility runs deep and has multiple expressions.

Capitalism is inherently international (see Marx above), a result of the constant search for new markets and resources built into capitalism’s predatory economic model, as well as unifying, as expressed in today’s global market. Nationalism is inherently anti-international because of its divisive us-against-them outlook on the world.

Capitalism tends toward peace. (I’ll give traditional leftists a moment to catch their breath here.) There are exceptions—the vast global arms trade most prominent among them—but actual war is, for the most part, bad for business. The “McDonald’s corollary”—that no two countries both with McDonald’s, like no two countries both with democracies, have gone to war—expresses this underlying dynamic even if it is empirically open to question. A quick reading of the works of Heinrich von Treitschke
is enough to show that nationalism is inherently inclined toward conflict and, ultimately, war.

At a deeper philosophical level, capitalism is essentially a materialist view of the world (which is the main reason that communism and capitalism are variants of each other). Nationalism is essentially a spiritually or morally based outlook (which is definitely not a positive characteristic, at least in my view). This accounts for the tendency of capitalism and nationalism to simply talk past each other—they are not on the same mental field of battle most of the time.

Finally, capitalism, at least at the most basic level, views everyone equally, if only as potential cogs in an economic machine—but note the fundamentally economic logic of equal pay for equal work and of nondiscrimination policies as they affect both hiring and attracting customers. This is one aspect, along with capitalism’s role in spreading industrial capitalist economics at the expense of “traditional values” (see the decline of blue laws—a trend sadly slow to reach Indiana—as a paradigmatic case), of capitalism as inherently “modernizing.” Nationalism, for all its role in creating “modern” nation-states, is inherently anti-modernizing. Consider the central goal of nationalist-inspired state policies. Nationalist leaders generally want the benefits to the nation (really, the state) of industry and global network activity, without the disruptive social effects (labor strife, erosion of “traditional” values, and so on) that inevitably accompany them, accounting for the repressive politics that this paradoxical set of desires entails. This desire for industrial-military might without industrial social effects is, in fact, the central paradox that characterizes Fascism.

As a source illustrating this fundamental conflict in world views between capitalism and nationalism, one cannot do better than the pronouncement by Steve Bannon on 23 February 2017 denouncing the “corporatist, globalist media” for being “adamantly opposed to an economic nationalist agenda,” which embodies the new network-hierarchy tension of the industrial era and points to the potential incoherence of the notion of “global (capitalist?) citizenship (nationalism?).” So what are the alternate frame values within which we can narrate our big, conflicted global city and make “global citizenship” coherent (and in the process make global politics perhaps less fraught with nukes and Nazis)?

One possibility, of course, is science, including social science. The value here is that debates about values can be useful and potentially productive—but debates about “facts” and their “alternatives” are not. Ultimately, we’re all perforce global inhabitants, so we’ll all be global citizens together or we’ll all be underwater in our separate identities. Though I think science (by which I really mean the scientific method as an approach to understanding the world) is absolutely necessary to the survival of our modern global world, it has two drawbacks in this particular battle of frame values. First, although science is unbeatable in explaining the “how” questions it is designed to answer, it isn’t so good at answering “why” questions—questions about the existential meaning of things that many scientists in fact consider irrelevant to their jobs. This was the problem that Galileo faced in the 17th century: He could show the evidence that the earth orbited the sun but could not explain why that should be true, which made his story emotionally unsatisfying. Not until Newton could science provide a (still religiously
tinged) explanation of heliocentrism with elliptical orbits. Second, because of its lack of “why” answers and its necessary tendency to produce nuanced, complex answers that can be difficult to convey succinctly—never mind that science never produces final answers but just keeps narrowing the possibility space of right answers—science often makes a bad storytelling frame. An example from social science illustrates this: How well have economists been able to tell the true story of the benefits of immigration against the false—but easy and emotionally powerful—stories about “stealing our jobs and murdering us” that constitute our immigration debates?

So, is there another frame value left to us?

The Hidden Option: Democracy. Oh, right, that value! Whether democracy remains a frame value in current American politics or has been reduced to a screen image by authoritarian attacks, foreign interference, and the fundamentally antidemocratic world view of evangelical Christianity is, sadly, now open to question, I’m afraid, but let’s be optimistic and run with it in hopes of reestablishing its position among our central frame values. Democracy is based on universal Enlightenment values of human equality, dignity, and human rights. It has the advantage of being able to operate at both the local and the global level. In other words, it can accommodate individual identities in a context of Enlightenment-inspired universal rights, guaranteeing minority rights within majoritarian mechanisms. It can therefore potentially locate a notion of citizenship more globally than can nationalism and more humanistically than can capitalism—not to mention that democracy blends excellently with science, its Enlightenment cousin and itself a largely democratic process, and with material forces via its economic cousin, free market economics.

The question is, If this is all true, why is democracy not a more obvious answer? I think the problem is that democracy’s potential opponents (and even some of its erstwhile friends) have disguised its real identity by associating it with other values.

First, democracy has been deliberately conflated with capitalism by the latter’s proponents, via neoliberalism among other ideologies (note the common formula “liberal capitalist democracies”). I should not have to point out that though they can be associated, democracy and capitalism are far from the same thing and (as the distortion of democratic politics by corporate money demonstrates beyond doubt) can be pretty seriously opposed to one another. The growing result of this conflation has been to discredit democracy by association with the growing influence of global corporate elite rule—a charge that seems to have done Hillary Clinton serious damage in her campaign against the “populist” image projected by Donald Trump, for example.

Second, democracy has been conflated, again deliberately, with populism and with nationalism. (Note that calls for elections, at least in form, often appeal to the principle of “national self-determination,” eliding the problematic and constructed nature of “nations” noted earlier.) Such confusions, usually deliberate on the part of populist and nationalist leaders—such as Russia’s Putin—to legitimize their own positions, have too often led democracy down self-destructive authoritarian roads, a result for which democracy somehow takes the blame. Such attacks often then conflate democracy further with the evils of multiculturalism expounded by ethnic nationalist politicians.
So, if democracy is to serve as the basis of new narratives of the meaning and value of our global city Earth, it needs to be rescued from these adulterations.

CONCLUSION

I do not mean to suggest, simply by naming democracy as a potentially useful frame value, that the problem I have described admits of an easy solution. Telling a good, attractive story about global citizenship and about the metaphorical global city we inhabit has to confront deep tensions in the global system of networks and hierarchies. Individual human communities have always sought stability, while the network flows they inevitably participate in have always tended to undermine stasis, if not stability. Our modern capitalist and nationalist expressions of this problem evolved from agrarian-era tensions that lasted for millennia. The tension is global, not just the creation of a few crazies in the United States, and the past couple of years have shown how wide open to political exploitation by demagogues the tension is.

The tension between networks and hierarchies is not only hard but also complex. In the terms I have set out here, focused on the educational mission of the social sciences with the wider liberal arts, it’s a problem of culture—of framing a true story to make that story comprehensible and attractive—but also of politics, economics, and the topics of social science research generally—including world history, the path I have followed to analyze this problem. Other, deeper, thinkers than I have taken shots at this target before. As one of them once put it, offering his own solution, “Workers of the world, unite; you have nothing to lose but your chains!”—a call the implications of which we don’t usually think deeply enough about.

We have to figure out how to tell that story in order to make the “global city” of today, with its long and fascinating past, look a lot less threatening and more like something everybody will want to be a citizen of.

At least, that’s what I think world history tells us.

REFERENCES