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The McCarthy Campaign in Indianapolis (1968)

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McCarthy Campaign in Indianapolis (1968)

by Carlotta B. Anderson

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is about the primary campaign of Senator Eugene McCarthy in the State of Indiana in 1968. It will focus its attention on Indianapolis, the largest city and the capital of the state, and an area where the Senator did quite poorly. (1) Though some magazine articles, newspaper stories and books have been useful, this paper is basically the campaign as viewed by 20 participants. Without their cooperation, it could not have been written.

It is hoped that papers such as this one, in combination, may add to our knowledge about how individual citizens working together try to influence politics in America.

(1) Indianapolis News, May 15, 1968, p. 20 - McCarthy received only 19% of the vote in Indianapolis; 29% statewide.
Chapter One

The McCarthy effort in Indiana was an outgrowth of previous local organizations in the state. Unlike the Kennedy effort, it could have been described as "grass-roots," at least in some respects. In order to explain its development, it is therefore necessary to look closely at the groups responsible for McCarthy's entry into the Indiana primary.

A national campaign called "Negotiations Now" reached Indianapolis and many other parts of the state. This was the first peace-oriented effort, one which could be termed "moderate" in its politics and approach. More radical organizations, with limited followings -- such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a pacifist group, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, a women's peace group -- had already been in existence in Indianapolis for the previous six to seven years. (1)

However, in the fall of 1966 Hoosiers for Peace, the Indiana arm of Negotiations Now, was formed. The new group was a closely-knit, state-wide organization which set an initial goal of collecting signatures on petitions provided by national Negotiations Now. The only decision-making body of the organization was a state-wide steering committee which one joined by invitation. Originally this committee had twenty-two members, but this number expanded as time went on. The members voted on whether or not to invite
particular persons to join; a few were rejected, usually on the ground that they were too radical. Hoosiers for Peace feared that any radical tinge might impair their ability to reach out into the conservative Indiana community. (2) This group's leadership in Indianapolis came largely from the Department of Social Concerns of the Disciples of Christ. (3) Though their success was largely on the campuses, they were able to involve a couple of prominent businessmen.

The organization's overall goal was to communicate to the business and "liberal" communities an awareness of the need for opposition to the war in Vietnam. (4) Negotiations Now petitions were circulated primarily on college campuses, among faculty members, and in the religious and peace communities. They were circulated by individuals who already knew each other through their work, organizational activity, or on a social basis. Though petitions were passed out at various political meetings, a door-to-door effort was never organized. Of 6,000 signatures collected, 2,000 were those of professors. (5)

In late November of 1967, Hoosiers for Peace sponsored a speech by Senator Vance Hartke in Indianapolis. (6) The size of the audience -- at least 800 persons -- and its obvious enthusiasm had an exhilarating effect upon many who were present. This was an important meeting, in that it convinced many individuals that a "peace campaign" might in
fact be launched in the Democratic primary in Indiana. (7) As things turned out, the Hartke meeting was the last major effort organized by Hoosiers for Peace. While petitions calling for immediate negotiations in Vietnam were circulating across the country, an idea for a new organizational tactic had begun to develop.

In the late summer and early fall of 1967 a group called "National Dissenting Democrats" had formed -- a group which spoke of organizing opposition to Lyndon Johnson's renomination as the Democratic party's candidate for president of the United States. (8) A founding member of this group, Curtis Ganz, of Washington, D. C., had met Robert Fangmeir of Indianapolis at a national planning session of Negotiations Now. In the fall of 1967, Ganz had started to work for Dissenting Democrats. In October he contacted Fangmeir and asked for names of those who might be willing to attend a meeting in Indianapolis to discuss the possibility of opposing President Johnson in the Indiana primary. (9)

At this initial meeting, ideas were exchanged and Hartke's possible candidacy considered, but no local organization was formed. In addition to setting up this meeting, Ganz remained in Indianapolis for a few days to speak with certain individuals, one of whom was attorney Don Fasig. (11) While advising against a challenge to Johnson in Indiana, (12) Fasig suggested Ganz contact the
Reverend James Armstrong (13) and attorney Sig Beck (14), two persons he knew who might be sympathetic, and who were also close to James Beatty, chairman of the Democratic Party in Marion County. (15) Ganz spoke informally with both these men. (16)

In mid-November, "a small group of political science professors, clergymen, and disaffected Democrats unhappy with the administration's Vietnam policy" gathered to form an organization which "as yet had no name." (17) Their first meeting was in the basement of the Merchants National Bank and Trust Company located at the corner of 38th Street and Washington Boulevard in Indianapolis. The Reverend James Armstrong convened this meeting, and among those present were: Harvey Lord, dean of students at Christian Theological Seminary; Don Fasig; James Beatty; Dr. Frank Lloyd, a Marion County Democratic ward chairman and one of the city's most prominent Negroes; James Bogle, professor at Notre Dame; Robert Toal, professor at Purdue; James Dinsmoor, an Indiana University professor and former "peace candidate" in the 1966 Seventh District Democratic Congressional primary; Robert Fangmeir; Vern Rossman; and Dallas Sells, state president of the AFL-CIO. (18)

The main speaker of the evening was Allard Lowenstein, a professional organizer from national Dissenting Democrats, who had come to discuss the aims of his organization. The discussion centered around several important
questions: Could the nomination of President Johnson be realistically opposed? Could those who challenged him expect support in Indiana? Could they even find a candidate in Indiana? (19) Those present agreed to form an organization, and, as soon as possible, to approach Senator Hartke to sound out his availability as a candidate in the state primary. James Bogle was selected as chairman, since he was willing to take a leave of absence from Notre Dame and devote his full-time efforts to organizing the new group. His first job was to organize a contingent from Indiana to go to the Conference of Concerned Democrats in Chicago, December 3 and 4. (20) James Armstrong was selected as vice-chairman, and Robert Fangmeir, treasurer.

The "professionals" at the meeting would not return to the anti-Johnson effort again until the formation of still another group called "Citizens for McCarthy," which was organized following McCarthy's surprise showing in the New Hampshire primary. (21) Professors and churchmen, some of whom had been among the leaders of Hoosiers for Peace, formed the core of this newest group in November, 1967.

When the Conference of Concerned Democrats (as Dissenting Democrats now called itself) convened in Chicago at the end of November, among those attending from Indianapolis were Lord, Fangmeir, Toal, Bogle and Rossman. This proved to be a significant meeting, first because
McCarthy acknowledged his availability as a candidate, and second, because the Indiana delegation caucused and decided to form their own organization, rather than affiliate with Concerned Democrats. There were two reasons for forming Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative -- hereafter referred to as HDA. Hartke rather than McCarthy was their first choice for a candidate; and they believed Indiana provincialism called for an indigenous organization within the state. The goal of HDA would be to provide a base of power sufficiently convincing to persuade either Hartke or McCarthy to run in the Indiana primary.
Footnotes for Chapter One

(1) WILPF was an organization of approximately 50 to 60 with a mailing of 200, FOR an organization of approximately 25 with a mailing of 100. These figures are for Indianapolis only. WILPF also had state branches in Bloomington, Terre Haute and Lafayette.

(2) Sue Craig, interview, August 29, 1968, at her home in Indianapolis. Mrs. Craig was a former member of the steering committee of Hoosiers for Peace, former president of the Indianapolis chapter of WILPF.

(3) Vern Rossman and his wife Dee were among the founders of the group and considered by many the backbone of the group, also Barton Hunt the chairman, Robert Fangmeir, the treasurer, were all from the Department of Social Concerns. They also had the sympathetic support of such individuals in their department as A. Garnett Day whom they could count upon.

(4) Craig interview, Russell Heritage and Charles Argast, both prominent businessmen, did quite a bit of public speaking on their behalf.

(5) Dee Rossman interview, July 16, 1968, at her home in Indianapolis. Mrs. Rossman was a former steering committee member of both Hoosiers for Peace and Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative and a part-time staff person for Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative.

(6) This meeting was organized by Dee Rossman.

(7) Robert Fangmeir interview, June 15, 1969 at his office in Indianapolis. Mr. Fangmeir was a member of the steering committee and treasurer of both Hoosiers for Peace and Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative. He also reported that he felt that prior to this meeting most of the people there had assumed themselves as an infinitesimal minority in their opposition to the war.


(9) Fangmeir interview.

(10) Rossman interview.

(11) Don Fasig is a former ward chairman in Indianapolis, a lawyer, former assistant prosecutor for the city of Indianapolis, and a political ally of the county chairman, James L. Beatty.
Rev. James Armstrong was the pastor of the Broadway Methodist Church. He was James Beatty's minister, friend and political ally. He had been involved in politics in Indianapolis for some time.

Sig Beck is a prominent lawyer in Indianapolis. He was one of the founders of Non-partisans for Better Schools, a liberal group which has succeeded in electing two members to the Indianapolis School Board. He is also a close ally of James Beatty.

James Beatty had been the Democratic County Chairman in Marion County for over three years. He ran for mayor in the 1967 Democratic primary against his own incumbent mayor, whom he felt to be too conservative and a tool of the conservative faction of the party. He was opposed as county chairman by Governor Roger Branigin and other state leaders. He lost the first battle and won the second.


Ibid, p. 20.

Rossman, Fasig and Fangmeir, interviews helped compile this list.

Harvey Lord interview, June 16, 1969, at his office in Indianapolis. Mr. Lord was on the steering committee of Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative and was the organizer of their convention.

James Bogle interview February 13, 1970 in Indianapolis. Mr. Bogle was invited to the meeting by Lowenstein, who he knew through Americans for Democratic Action (ADA).

Lord interview. Fasig remained somewhat involved though his name wasn't used. Some never returned -- Sells, Dr. Lloyd and others.

Ibid.

Bogle interview.
Chapter Two

By January of 1968 Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative was a functioning group. Its minimal staff consisted of James Bogle, chairman and organizer and Dee Rossman, who was hired part-time to (1) get mailings to Democrats across the state, and (2) organize a convention and dinner in March. (1) HDA's immediate goals were to find a candidate and to expand its base sufficiently to encourage that candidate to run. (2)

At this early stage HDA had some important assets: A mailing list of 6,000 names taken from the "Negotiations Now" petitions, and a very dedicated if somewhat inexperienced group of leaders. Its major liability was that it was exclusively an educated, white, middle-class group with a strong tinge of do-goodism. There was no representation and no real commitment from the black community, poor whites, labor, businessmen or professionals (lawyers, doctors, accountants, etc.). (3) There were few students initially involved in the group. And HDA was viewed askance by many people in general sympathy with their stated aims. (4)

When HDA began to function, it appeared as though everything was going "well." Bogle traveled around the state setting up new chapters of HDA; on January 17, he told the Indianapolis Star that HDA had "2,000 members in 52 Indiana communities." (5) Soon the organization was
placed on a membership basis, with dues of five dollars.
Dee Rossman put the 6,000 "Negotiations Now" names on cards and began to classify individuals according to the work they might do. (6) A budget of $40,000 was drawn up which proposed to pay for billboard advertisements, TV time, and the operation of a first-class political organization (which would be, hopefully, somewhat competitive with the regular Democratic Party). (7) A fund raising and recruitment mailing was sent to the 6,000 individuals named on the petitions. All of these activities were to culminate at the dinner and convention in March.

The plans and even the press releases went far beyond reality. HDA chapters with large memberships actually existed in only three communities, the university towns of Bloomington, Lafayette and South Bend. (8) Though Bogle spoke with numerous individuals and small groups, he was often unable to follow through, once such contacts had been made. (9) Dee Rossman received four or five new names to add to her list, but often they lacked the necessary addresses. Bogle was seeing many people, but not keeping good notes on his travels. By March, HDA was claiming 60 local chapters, but this figure was a myth. (10)

In Indianapolis there was substantial work done among faculty members of the various universities, (11) but altogether, many people were missed. No large meeting was ever held in order to discover who might be interested and willing to volunteer their services. In Indianapolis, HDA remained the steering committee. "People were ready to go,
but they were told that HDA was still planning."(12)

However much planning HDA may have been doing, it still did not have a candidate. Hartke had given no answer to earlier inquiries. Finally, in desperation, Bogle, Armstrong and Fasig(13) flew to Washington to confer with Hartke. At this meeting it was made clear that Hartke would not run. His staff promised, however, to raise some money for the group.(14) McCarthy was now the man HDA would have to convince to run in Indiana.

The lack of experience of the HDA people was also slowing the progress. Even the group's membership cards had become a problem and a source of delay. The original cards did not have a union label on them, a fact which Pat Welch, the County Chairman's secretary, caught immediately. And the cards had no perforated part which could be kept for records. They had to be reprinted. Though 100,000 envelopes had been ordered for a mailing, only 10,000 were ever used. "The other names just never materialized because no one had the lists that everyone talked about."(15)

March 28 was the filing date for petitions requesting that a candidate's name be placed on an Indiana primary ballot. At a meeting on February 29 it was reported that there were no petitions printed,(16) since there was disagreement about the necessity of preparing petitions "this early." Dee Rossman went ahead on her own and had them
printed; later, she picked up the petitions only to find that HDA could not pay the $70 bill. Next, it was discovered that the petitions had not been printed in compliance with Indiana law. (17) By the March 5 steering committee meeting, the petitions were finally ready. This delay and lack of organization almost kept Senator McCarthy off the ballot in Indiana. (18)

The original proposal of a $40,000 budget turned out to be an unrealistic goal. In its report to the Indiana Secretary of State, HDA announced a total expenditure of $14,804.18. Though most of this money was collected for HDA, much of it came in late in the McCarthy campaign, and was transferred to Citizens for McCarthy. (19) There seem to have been some differences in vision concerning HDA's financial needs. On the one hand, people talked in terms of a $40,000 budget; and on the other, the HDA treasurer stated that no unusual amounts of time and energy were spent fundraising, since HDA was "not a large financial operation." Although the latter turned out to be the case, it certainly was not what many had envisioned. In fact, simply finding enough money to keep Bogle going turned out to be one of HDA's most crucial problems. (20)

What money HDA did collect, came in the way of small contributions in response to mailings (usually five to ten dollars), although there were a few $100 contributions. The largest sums came from the active chapters.
One $800 donation, for example, was received from the Bloomington chapter. (21)

Plans for the March dinner were also hampered by a lack of funds. Because the organizers could not afford any advertisements, "the entire job had to be done by telephone." (22) According to Pat Welch, one of the main organizers of the dinner, all that one could do was to call those individuals who might be sympathetic.

During the month of March attention focused on Senator McCarthy. He had to be convinced to run in Indiana. Bogle was frequently in Washington, and his attitude was "Go, go, we can do it in Indiana." He conveyed this attitude to staffers in Washington and in Indiana. (23) In Washington, McCarthy's national headquarters was informed that HDA had 8,000 to 10,000 members. (24) Bogle also found good use for the results of a telephone poll conducted in Indiana. The poll found McCarthy with about fifty per cent of the vote in a race against Branigin; and it predicted approximately the same showing against Johnson. The figures with regard to Branigin particularly impressed McCarthy. (25)

It would therefore appear that Bogle played an important role in getting McCarthy to come to the state; he has been criticized for this. (26)

While admitting that his expectations may have been exaggerated, Bogle answers such criticism by noting that at the time the telephone poll was taken, Johnson had not dropped out of the race nor had Kennedy entered. He
claims that his projections would not have been unrealistic had McCarthy's sole opposition been Branigin, acting as a legitimate stand-in for Johnson.(27)

Then came Tuesday, March 12, election day in New Hampshire. The results there had quite an effect in Indiana as well as across the nation. Though it was already fairly certain that McCarthy would run in Indiana, this clenched it, and on March 15 the Indianapolis Star made the official announcement: "McCarthy to enter Indiana primary."(28)

People now began to rally to the cause. On the Monday prior to the New Hampshire primary only 185 tickets had been sold for the HDA dinner the following Saturday where McCarthy was to speak (an astoundingly low number, considering that McCarthy thought at the time the HDA had a membership of from 8,000 to 10,000). There were 575 in attendance at the dinner on Saturday night, and many had to be turned away.(29)

At the same time ticket sales were booming, the professional politicians, already somewhat sympathetic with McCarthy's aims, were at work. That week a meeting was held in Indianapolis at the Broadway Christian Center. It was attended by James Beatty, former Marion County Democratic chairman Judson Haggerty, a number of Negroes, and many prominent Indianapolis liberals. Those present discussed new organizational forms, and considered the possibility of hiring a professional campaign coordinator.(30) The meeting represented the potential of a powerful coalition in Indianapolis behind McCarthy.
The Minnesota Senator's moral victory in New Hampshire also had its effect on the HDA convention for which final plans were made during the week of March 11. The convention would begin Friday night, prior to the dinner, and would extend all day Saturday. The idea of the convention was to provide political education for the participants from all over the state, and to establish an organizational structure. (31) There were to be workshops on various urgent problems; these groups would report to a plenary session, which would then pass resolutions and take action (32) - a fairly typical procedure for political conferences and conventions.

However, the night before the convention, HDA's state steering committee spent the entire evening debating whether or not to call off the entire affair. The Indiana Democratic Party's state committee was also meeting that weekend in French Lick. Now that McCarthy had won in New Hampshire, some people felt that HDA's presence at the party's meeting was more important than the convention. Harvey Lord, the coordinator of the convention, who had spent weeks putting it together, however, refused to cancel the convention. (33)

It was decided that the convention would go on, but HDA leaders chartered a plane and flew to French Lick. Once in French Lick, Armstrong and Bogle addressed the county chairmen. They proposed four alternatives to the war: "(1) Stop the bombing of the North; (2) deescalate in the
South without withdrawal; (3) promote free elections, and
(4) involve the United Nations." Those who went to
French Lick on McCarthy's behalf all pledged to support the
Democratic nominee, whoever he might be, though they were
known McCarthy supporters. There was no action taken upon
their suggestions.

Meanwhile, back in Indianapolis, with only a few
hours until convention time, Harvey Lord was busy finding
secondary people to run the workshops. With the
leadership in French Lick there was no one to meet McCarthy
at the airport, although a student rally and press conference
were planned to accompany his arrival, McCarthy reached
Indianapolis over an hour later than expected, however, with
police escort, he was given a hero's welcome by the many
students who were willing to wait in order to see the man
who had done, what many of their parents had claimed was
impossible.

The dinner that night was a turning point for the
leadership of what had now officially become the McCarthy
campaign in Indiana. Many of those active in HDA would now
play a much less prominent role in the campaign organization.
HDA had begun with plans for the dinner and, with the excep-
tion of getting the petitions collected for placing McCarthy's
name on the ballot, it ended with the dinner.

Senator McCarthy was now considered a viable candi-
date by many prominent Indianapolis liberals. Leo Zeckler
and Merle Miller (38) approached Al Edelson (39) that night and suggested that, as individuals "with large financial contacts" they should get together and help. (40)

HDA had brought McCarthy to Indiana, but it was neither ready or able to run the campaign. Though its organizations in Bloomington, South Bend and Lafayette were to continue to run their own shows, elsewhere, other organizations took over.

However, it is an interesting and perhaps even significant footnote to such developments that HDA, in altered form, still exists today. The leadership of the New Democratic Coalition, with Robert Toal of Lafayette as its chairman, is by and large the old HDA grouping, with some new people picked up as a result of the McCarthy campaign.
Footnotes to Chapter Two

(1) Rossman interview.

(2) Bogle interview.

(3) Rossman and Lord interviews.

(4) Merle Miller interview, July 20, 1969 in Indianapolis. Mr. Miller who was chairman of Citizens for McCarthy, expressed the view that "they were third party people" and that he would never get involved with that dead-end approach. Al Edelson interview, August 16, 1968 expressed a similar reaction; he too was active in Citizens for McCarthy. Pat Welch interview, July 25, 1968. She said that at Thursday luncheons (the weekly meeting of the Beattyites), she was "looked at askance" for being involved. Miss Welch is the secretary to James Beatty and was active in HDA.


(6) D. Rossman interview.

(7) Bogle and Rossman interviews. Bogle in his interview commented that the $40,000 figure was unrealistic, both in terms of what was needed (they needed much more) and in terms of what they could raise (much less).

(8) Lord interview.

(9) This seemed to have been due to three factors: lack of time, money and, to some extent, organizational understanding, at least with regard to what commitments such as "I'll see what I can get going" means. In every interview I have had, if Bogle's name came up, he was reported lacking in his ability to organize things on a day-to-day basis.

(10) Rossman and Lord interviews. Both said that Bogle overstated their strength considerably. According to Rossman, there were twenty-five groups at the most, many of which were not viable. The sixty at best represented the number of groups Bogle addressed.

(11) Lord interview. A faculty group was formed in Indianapolis. They got together 100 names for an ad, spoke at teas arranged by housewives, and sponsored one meeting where Andrew Jacobs of the 11th District spoke.
Craig interview. In addition to these comments, Sue added that she was never at any time invited to a meeting, and that the only task that she could obtain, was that of selling tickets to the dinner. She had been president of the WILPF in Indianapolis for four years, and had also been on the steering committee of Hoosiers for Peace, and served as a Democratic precinct vice-committeeman.

Fasig in his interview said that he worked with Bogle and Armstrong early. He was to be their liaison with the Democratic Party regulars. It had been agreed by his friends in the party that he should play this role. However, he did not want to surface at this early date because of how it might reflect upon his political allies within the party.

Fasig and Bogle interviews.

Rossman interview.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Fangmeir interview. Mr. Fangmeir had the financial report in his office at the time of the interview.

Fasig interview.

Fangmeir interview.

Welch interview.

Fasig interview. Fasig actually went so far as to say "if he (Bogle) hadn't lied to the national about our strength, they probably never would have come to Indiana." However, Fasig went on to say that the McCarthy campaign turned out to be a "real shot in the arm" to Indiana politics. In addition he was surprised at how poorly Brangin did in the primary.

Herzog.

Bogle interview.

Those who felt that McCarthy should not have entered the primary were quite critical and seemed to feel that he might not have entered had he been given a
more accurate report about the strength of HDA. These people included Don Fasig, Sylvia Zazas and Arthur Herzog in his recent book, McCarthy for President.

(27) Bogle interview.


(29) Welch interview.

(30) Bogle interview. Bogle saw this as an attempt of Indianapolis people to take over the campaign.

(31) Lord interview.

(32) Ibid. - An 18 page platform dealing with such topics as "International Consequences of the War," "Loss of Hope for Democracy Abroad," "Our Cities," "Business and Finance," and others was produced by the convention.

(33) Ibid. Harvey Lord and Dee Rossman are the two best examples of this.


(35) Lord interview.

(36) Ibid.

(37) Lew Zeckler is an architect and builder in Indianapolis.

(38) Merle Miller is a name partner in the largest law firm in Indianapolis, long a prominent Democrat.

(39) Al Edelson is a businessman and longtime Democrat in Indianapolis.

(40) Al Edelson interview, August 15, 1968 in Indianapolis.

(41) Ibid.
Chapter Three

Senator McCarthy's "children's crusade" came to Indiana to face a situation considerably different from those in New Hampshire and Wisconsin. The challenge in Indiana proved to be far more complex, resembling a more typical campaign, with real opponents (two now), fighting it out more on the basis of style and personality than on issues.

When the New York Times analyzed McCarthy's victory in New Hampshire, it found a number of factors had contributed to his success. First, anti-Vietnam war feeling had been intensified by the success of the Tet offensive waged by the Viet Cong in late January of 1968. Second, voters were considerably antagonized by the newly-enacted surtax. Third, McCarthy's student volunteers, who went door to door through the cold, were able to convey their deep convictions about the war to the people. Fourth, the McCarthy forces had better voter lists to work with than did the regular Democrats supporting the president. Robert Craig of the University of New Hampshire had turned over to the McCarthy students a recent study of the New Hampshire voters. Most important, however, according to the "Times" was the dislike of Johnson. He was viewed by the public as a "wheeler dealer" who failed to give the whole truth; in contrast, New Hampshire voters believed "Senator McCarthy gave
it to them straight." (1) A Louis Harris poll supported this conclusion. Harris found that if Vietnam had been the central issue in the minds of the voters, McCarthy would have received twenty-two per cent of the vote rather than forty-two per cent. (2)

These factors were greatly altered by the time of the Indiana primary. For two reasons, the war could no longer be considered the major campaign issue. First, President Johnson had announced that he would seek negotiations with the North Vietnamese, and that peace talks would begin as soon as possible. (3) Second, with the entrance of Robert Kennedy into the primary, there were two candidates who could be considered "anti-war."

Furthermore, the appeal of student workers would be less valuable in Indiana, since there would now be two real crews of students out canvassing. In addition, Hoosiers proved to be less receptive to the idea of "out-of-state" students talking to them about their politics and their vote. (4) And so far as voters' lists went, the McCarthy people in Indiana had very poor lists to work with, if they had them at all. (5)

As it turned out, the "most important factor" was eliminated when Lyndon Baines Johnson withdrew his name from consideration as a prospective candidate for reelection. There was no longer the promise of a "David and Goliath"
clash. The night Johnson withdrew, McCarthy is reported to have said, "I feel as if I've been tracking a tiger through long jungle grass and all of a sudden he rolls over and he's stuffed." (6) The entire theme of the campaign had to be changed now and all the materials rewritten. This slowed the first few weeks of the Indiana campaign considerably, because while the national staff had no new materials (leaflets, T.V. spots, etc.), at the same time they would not allow local groups to put out their own advertising for fear of conflicts of issues. (7) According to a number of sources, it was not until Oregon that the McCarthy forces were able to hit their stride again. (8)

It was the day of the Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative dinner for McCarthy, March 16, that first Senator Kennedy and then Governor Branigin announced that they would also run in the Indiana primary. Both of these men had large, well-oiled organizations behind them. Branigin commanded a truly formidable organization, since Indiana is a patronage state, and the man in the statehouse controls approximately 23,000 jobs. (9) Only one county chairman in the state refused to endorse the governor, and that was James Beatty in Marion County, who never endorsed any candidate. Otherwise, Branigin was reportedly very popular throughout Indiana. (10) In addition, it was anticipated that the governor's conservative approach would suit the political climate in Indiana. The New York Times analyzed the voters as follows:
A large majority of the one million-odd Democrats in this state tend to fall in one or more categories: organization-oriented, conservative, hawskish on Vietnam, Southern in outlook rural or resentful of Negro social and political advances. (11)

Branigin was further favored by the support of the Indianapolis Star and the Indianapolis News, the two largest newspapers in Indiana.

The Kennedy organization was also impressive. It featured "50 professionals and 2,000 volunteers," (12) and most of the professionals were seasoned workers. (13) One McCarthy supporter put it this way: "Everything about the Kennedy headquarters seemed efficient and well-planned; they had banks of phones manned by self-assured young people. When we managed to put up one poster in a neighborhood, it would immediately be covered with Kennedy posters, while a sound truck broadcasting Bobby's name went merrily by." (14)

The McCarthy organization came into Indiana in trouble. The New Hampshire campaign had been well financed, with at least $200,000 spent on television and radio time. It was expected that the Kennedy effort would now tap many of McCarthy's financial sources. The McCarthy contingent arrived without a finance chairman, although it was to have numerous individuals in that position during the Indiana campaign. (15)

Perhaps most important, the McCarthy staff and strategy were in flux. The senator's most talented staff coordinators, Richard Goodwin and Allard Lowenstein, had
already left to work for Senator Kennedy. In Wisconsin there were staff disaffections, including the resignations of press secretary, Seymour Hersh and chief assistant, Mary Lou Oates, over disagreements about the best campaign strategy. (16) Also some of McCarthy's best assistants returned to school after the Wisconsin primary. (17) As top staff men, he was left with a couple of Minnesota colleagues, a shoe manufacturer, a Wall Street financier, a television producer and a former public relations man for the Americans for Democratic Action. "Theodore White's books were about as close as any of them had ever come to a national campaign," wrote Steven Roberts. (18) The new situation required a reassessment of strategy. However, according to Jeremy Larner, no such reevaluation was forthcoming. Larner commented on the staff and strategy after Wisconsin: "The men who occupied the key position on the national staff were nervous because there was no campaign strategy. There were non-meetings with McCarthy where he would nod his head and say nothing to every specific proposal. Finally he would say that we would go on pretty much as before, but how was that? . . . Goodwin had been the one person who could hafway hold things together and he was leaving now. . . ." (19)

Among McCarthy's Indiana supporters there was less enthusiasm now that Johnson was out and Kennedy in. In Indianapolis, Merle Miller, the chairman of Citizens for McCarthy, was not sure whether he should remain involved now
that the president had removed his name from the race. Miller believed McCarthy had achieved his original goal. (20) Miller did, however, remain as chairman of Citizens for McCarthy. Others were tempted to defect to Senator Kennedy; their original ardour had cooled. Don Fasig remained active in the McCarthy campaign because he had made a commitment, and felt the reliability of his political reputation required that he stay. Fasig stated that there were many others who stayed for basically the same reason, even after Kennedy's entrance. (21) Armstrong, who had been one of the earliest organizers of the McCarthy effort, became less active. (22) The coalition of people who met at the Broadway Center just after McCarthy's victory in New Hampshire never met again. Many of those individuals joined the Kennedy camp. Even some of those who remained officially within the McCarthy Camp were suspected of being Kennedy spies within the organization. (23)
Footnotes to Chapter Three


(3) Indianapolis Star, April 2, 1968.

(4) New York Times, May 5, 1968, I, 61 and a letter written by Mrs. Barbara Eberly of Ann Arbor, Michigan, July 28, 1968. She was a student who worked for McCarthy in both Wisconsin and in Indiana and wrote in response to a request that she compare the two campaigns. She wrote the following: "We were received in Wisconsin with open arms. The people there seemed flattered that we would come so far to tell them about a political candidate. Indiana was so secretive. You would have thought we were after classified information. Of course, Gordon St. Angelo and Branigin didn't help much with their, "treat them like you would any tourist" advice. And the announcement that we were paid $10.00 a day didn't help either." This was further substantiated by Charles Heckster, co-chairman of Youth for McCarthy in his article "The Children's Crusade" Commonweal, Vol. LXXXIX, No. 1 (October 4, 1968), p. 13.


(7) Pollack.


(13) Edelson interview.

(16) Kenworthy, E. W., New York Times, March 27, 1968, p. 1. Sources told Kenworthy that the reasons for the resignations were (1) McCarthy's refusal to discuss problems in the cities in terms of white racism, (2) McCarthy's ignoring of research papers and speeches prepared by Goodwin's staff, and (3) internal staff problems, i.e., confusion as to lines of authority.


(18) Ibid, p. 166.


(20) Miller interview.

(21) Fasig interview.

(22) Bogle and Gross interviews.

(23) Bogle interview.
McCarthy's campaign was officially launched in Indiana that night of March 16 when he spoke at the HDA dinner in Indianapolis. As it turned out, the occasion marked the beginning of a two-week period of confusion. Many felt it was time for new local leaders to take charge, but exactly who they would be, and what functions they would have, was unclear. A national staff made up of "professional" workers would soon be coming to town; everyone awaited their ideas and direction, but they were late in coming, and when they arrived they were often confused themselves.

Citizens for McCarthy, which had been conceived the night of the dinner, had yet to be formed. Armstrong, who had been quite active in HDA, was convinced that the campaign needed a new type of local leadership at this point. He believed it was necessary to attract people with previous political experience and individuals with contacts among the more wealthy and powerful Indianapolis citizens. Armstrong and a new recruit to the cause, Al Edelson, called friends, both political and personal, whom they knew to be sympathetic to their aims. They arranged a meeting at the Edelson home on March 22. Invited were E. Kirk McKinney, Thomas M. Scanlon, Irving Fink, Pat Ulen, Sylvia Zazas, Sigmund Beck, Don Fasig, Mrs. Winifred Smith
Alexander Moore(9) and others. It was clearly an Indianapolis-dominated committee.

At this first meeting of Citizens for McCarthy, few of the group's functions were clearly defined. First, the members agreed to provide a local letterhead from which to operate. Second, they would initiate a local fund-raising drive for McCarthy's Indiana effort. They also decided upon some officers. Merle Miller would be the chairman although he was in Florida at the time and did not know until several days later that he had been "nominated" chairman; E. Kirk McKinney agreed to serve as treasurer if this would be his sole responsibility during the campaign; and Tom Scanlon was placed in charge of fund raising. It was also decided that any other projects the group might undertake should be coordinated with the McCarthy national organization, which was unrepresented at the meeting at Edelson's. As Edelson was to remark later, the difficulty with such a group was that it may well have represented money, power, and experience in the community, but that signing one's name to a letterhead doesn't necessarily mean work.

Meanwhile, what was to be the role of HDA? Many people who had put in long hours of work for that organization were asking this question. Armstrong's initial idea was that Citizens for McCarthy would be the fund-raising group, and that HDA would continue to function as the "community liaison." However, representatives of
the two groups never met to work this out, and it remained nothing more than an idea. As the official fund raiser with an impressive letterhead, Citizens for McCarthy emerged as the dominant organization in Indianapolis. (15) This meant that a number of people in HDA were never to be in leadership positions again in the McCarthy effort, and this created a certain amount of resentment. (16)

One person who did manage to survive the shift between organizations was Bogle, but the manner in which he made such a transition was not without its complications. Armstrong wanted to find a professional person in the state to run the campaign for Citizens for McCarthy; (17) Bogle wanted to retain leadership of the Indiana movement, and he made his availability generally known. Even though Armstrong wanted a more professional manager, he did not have a person ready to take the job. Finally, on March 31, the night of President Johnson's withdrawal, the Citizens for McCarthy people met with Bogle and Toal, (18) and Bogle was made "campaign manager." (19) The next day Merle Miller returned from Florida to discover that he was chairman of Citizens for McCarthy, and that a press conference was scheduled for 2 P. M. that day. (20) The announcement made to the press was that the "new organization would run the whole Indiana operation." (21) It was never really clear how much responsibility the Citizens for McCarthy group and Bogle did, in fact, have.
An interim headquarters was set up at the Essex House prior to the arrival of workers from the national organization. Don Fasig was in charge of this project. Initially, things were chaotic. No one had expected that the entire national McCarthy staff slated to work in Indiana would be housed in Indianapolis. More satisfactory headquarters were needed, but no one seemed to know where to look. Pat Welch and James Armstrong approached Sylvia Zazas and asked her to do the job. Mrs. Zazas cites this assignment as an example of how totally unprepared she was for the magnitude of the campaign. Neither she nor anyone else had been given any indication at that time of what the staff's needs would be; by the time she found out, it was too late. She rented the Old Tavern Room of the Claypool Hotel, thinking she had found a sufficiently spacious place, only to discover that it was only about one-sixth as large as what would be needed as a base of operations for the Indiana staff. Luckily, the incoming McCarthy people had connections in Texas which got them the entire second floor of the Claypool Hotel for office space. However, the hotel was closed to guests because of a recent fire, and could not put up their staff. There were thirty new people to house for the entire campaign. By the time Mrs. Zazas was given the specific assignment, the Branigin staff had reserved all the extra rooms in the Sheraton-Lincoln, and the Kennedy
forces were in control of the other two major hotels in town, the Marott and Stouffer's Inn. (25) Finally, after much negotiating, the Warren Hotel was offered, but it was subsequently turned down by McCarthy's staff. (26) As a result, the workers had to be scattered in various places, although space was obtained in the Marott for the national headquarters. (27)

The entire operation in Indianapolis kept waiting for word from McCarthy leaders who were concentrating all their efforts in Wisconsin. The Indiana supporters felt in limbo, fearful to make arrangements without the approval of the national staff, and yet panicky about the passage of valuable time. For example, a statewide meeting of students was held during this period, but it proved inconclusive because no one knew what the national workers would do when they arrived. (28) No one with any authority was sent nor were instructions forthcoming. (29) Finally, in desperation, Kirk McKinney, Don Fasig and Ted Pollack (30) chartered a plane to Milwaukee. They talked to McCarthy staff people and explained that they had to know the national organization's plans if they were to set up any sort of apparatus within which the national staff could function in Indiana - but there were no plans to transmit. (31) Meanwhile, everyone waited, "ready to give themselves over to the pros." (32)

At the close of the Wisconsin primary, they came. But they did not bring with them the expertise and precision
that had been anticipated. First, they were very young; a local participant later commented that one of the national staffers they had awaited so eagerly subsequently became a freshman at Bloomington. (33) Secondly, there were no clear lines of authority. Harvey Lord had already ordered bumper stickers made and when the national McCarthy staff arrived, they wanted the stickers. Lord asked for the money first, or at least a commitment from someone in charge of finances. No one seemed to know who that would be. There was no one with the authority to purchase bumper stickers! What Lord did not know was that as soon as the national staff arrived, a dispute arose over who would control the finances. Ultimately, Curt Ganz had to fly to Washington to speak with McCarthy in order to settle the matter. (34) Many of the staffers had nebulous authority in other areas as well, a fact explored in more detail in chapter five.

The Indianapolis people found that in this early period they were giving advice rather than receiving direction. Edelson reported that they received "eleven calls a day wanting advice that ranged from where to buy staples to 'Will you call a financial meeting?'" (35) There was no direction at all with regard to the news media. Bogle complained that even though local workers had built up considerable public interest and momentum with frequent
press conferences and news stories, once the national staff arrived "there wasn't a statement issued to the press for a week and a half." (36)

There are a number of theories about why many workers of the national McCarthy staff seemed to be so confused (37) during this early period. Whatever the reasons, the confusion had a demoralizing effect on certain crucial Indiana people, and it seemed to set the tone for the McCarthy campaign in Indianapolis if not elsewhere.
Footnotes to Chapter Four

(1) Fasig and Rossman interview.

(2) Kirk McKinney. Interview at his office, October 1, 1969. Mr. McKinney is president of Jefferson National Insurance, long active in Democratic Party politics (his father ran unsuccessfully for governor). He was treasurer of Citizens for McCarthy.

(3) Mr. Scanlon is a partner in one of the largest law firms in Indianapolis and is the attorney for the Indianapolis Star. He was the finance chairman in 1964 for Citizens for Johnson and Humphrey.

(4) Mr. Fink is an Indianapolis attorney prominent in the Jewish community.

(5) Mrs. Ulen was vice ward chairman of the 22nd ward and in her own words a "maverick" precinct committeeman for many years.

(6) Mrs. Zazas had long been active in Democratic Party politics. Though she held no official position at that time, she is presently vice chairman of the Marion County Democratic Party.

(7) (previously described)

(8) Winifred Smith is a member of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and has long been active in the church community.

(9) Alexander Moore was at that time the principal of Attucks High School, Indianapolis's all-Negro school.

(10) McKinney interview.

(11) Miller interview.

(12) Edelson interview.

(13) Lord and Rossman interviews. Both felt that HDA was overlooked and that their full resources were never again utilized. It should be noted that none of the HDA leadership in Indianapolis were involved in the leadership of the Indianapolis campaign (this includes James Armstrong).
(14) Lord interview. Mr. Lord referring to a conversation that he had with James Armstrong.

(15) It should be noted that this did not occur everywhere. Citizens for McCarthy really only functioned in Indianapolis and in the outlying areas it largely picked up its names from HDA (Duke in Terre Haute; Toal in Lafayette; Dinsmoor in Bloomington; and Bogel in South Bend).

(16) D. Rossman is a good example. She felt that there was a great deal of ground work done by HDA (a good deal of what she had done herself) which was never used. H. Lord referred to the convention where none of the standing committees or the platform were ever utilized. Mr. Lord went on to say that both the Citizens group and the national staffers "shoved the old HDAers out."

(17) Rossman and Fasig interviews. Both of these individuals reported this. James Bogle referred to a similar situation only earlier.

(18) Edelson interview.

(19) The term "Campaign manager" was used by the Indianapolis Star. What this meant was not at all clear. Was a fund-raising group to have a campaign manager? What was to be this person's role when "national" arrived? Though everyone hesitated to act in many other ways, they did hire a CAMPAIGN MANAGER. I believe this is indicative of the confusion on the part of the Indianapolis people both about Citizens for McCarthy and about their role in the Indiana Campaign, for though they expected national to take over, they still expected to be consulted on strategy and intimately involved in the campaign as it progressed.

(20) Miller interview.


(22) Sylvia Zazas interview, October 1, 1969 at Marion County Democratic Headquarters. Others (Fasig, Lord and Edelson) also agreed that during this period everyone was frantic - feeling the pressure of an impending campaign but not knowing what to do.

(23) Zazas and McKinney interviews.
Zazas interview.

Ibid. According to Mrs. Zazas, she suspected that Branigin bought up space in order to keep it away from the McCarthy staff, since his staff had many more rooms than she felt represented their numbers. In addition, they knew that the Kennedy people tried to get the Claypool out from under them as well.

Ibid. Mrs. Zazas strongly suspects that the reason the Warren was turned down was that its manager wanted to be paid in advance and the McCarthy people did not have the ready cash.

McKinney interview.

Lydia Gross, interview on November 1, 1969 at my home. Miss Gross was the assistant student recruiter and coordinator in Indiana. She was also a secretary to Mr. Bogle and was quite close to him during the campaign.

Fasig interview.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Lord interview. Mr. Lord felt that HDA had laid the ground work of an organization. They all viewed themselves as amateurs and were anxious to have experienced people come and develop what they had begun.

Ibid.

Fasig interview.

Edelson interview. Mr. Edelson felt that while he was frequently asked for the most petty requests, he and others like himself who had had considerable experience in Indiana politics were not called upon to assist in the formulation of strategy for winning in Indiana.

Gross interview.

Mrs. Zazas seemed to feel that although they had been led to expect a strong operating organization in Indiana, they did not find one, and that they had to reevaluate their entire strategy when they arrived.
Lydia Gross claimed just the opposite; in her opinion the McCarthy people were accustomed to walking in and running the whole show and ignoring the local people, but that Indiana had too much of a grass roots organization for them to do that. Mr. Fasig felt that it was due to their having no lines of authority; this was confirmed by Jeremy Larner in his article in Harpers. Others (Ted Pollack, Arthur Herzog in McCarthy for President, and James Bogle) saw the problem as one more related to the entrance of Robert Kennedy and the absence of Lyndon Johnson.
Chapter Five

SETTING UP THE ORGANIZATION

From the beginning, the organization of McCarthy campaign in Indiana was divided into departments, each headed by a permanent staff worker and a local counterpart. (1) The departments were press relations, finance, office management, labor, farmers and students. The state itself was divided into eleven areas which roughly corresponded to the eleven congressional districts. Activities in each of these areas were coordinated by a national staff representative, assisted by a local worker. In Marion County, for example, Jan Goodman, a member of the national staff, and Sylvia Zazas, an Indianapolis resident, were in charge. The local worker, assumed to be less experienced, was in a somewhat subordinate position. (2) Finally, there was a state coordinator in charge of overseeing the entire Indiana campaign operation.

Most of the legwork of the McCarthy effort was to be handled at the grass roots level. In the various storefront offices, activities were to be coordinated by one McCarthy staff person and one local worker. The storefronts were to provide the contact between the campaign and its individual supporters within a defined geographical area; each storefront was in charge of a specific portion of its district - approximately three wards, though this varied somewhat. In Indianapolis, for example, all the storefronts
received the names of existing contacts in their area. They had the original HDA lists, the names of the precinct committeemen and vice-committeemen whom they were to contact, and the names of those persons who had signed petitions or attended the HDA dinner. (3)

The storefronts were also intended to serve as publicity arms for the McCarthy organization. Storefront workers were to make and distribute posters and fliers in order to publicize various local events, and to work the telephones on McCarthy's behalf. They were responsible for organizing rallies in their areas at which various visiting dignitaries, such as Paul Newman, would speak.

In addition, the storefronts were scheduled to serve as distribution centers for newly arriving students. At such centers the students would be shown maps of the area and given canvassing assignments. The overall strategy of activities in these centers was to be the responsibility of the area coordinators.

Operating alongside but functioning quite separately from this main organization would be Women for McCarthy. This group would have its own mailing and telephone lists and would handle its own finances and publicity; (4) it even had its own national newsletter. Women for McCarthy was also to be headed by a national staff worker. (5) The group planned to carry out its own activities, the major one being a luncheon honoring Mrs. McCarthy.
Meanwhile, the national organization, situated at the Marott Hotel was making plans for future campaigns, raising money nationally, and scheduling McCarthy for appearances around the country.

Ideally, then, the preceding paragraphs describe the organizational structure of the McCarthy campaign in Indiana. However, along with organization must go a fundamental strategy to guide day-to-day activities. A debate over strategy which began in Wisconsin was to continue in Indiana. This debate revolved primarily around the role of the black community in the campaign.

No one really believed that McCarthy could get a large portion of the Negro vote, but many individuals whose commitment to civil rights was as great as their commitment to peace in Vietnam felt that campaign spokesmen should announce strong support of Negro grievances, and that they should address themselves more frequently to the black community.\(6\) The approach finally adopted was the so-called "rural strategy,"\(7\) described in the New York Times as follows: "Since the Negro vote is lost to McCarthy they (the campaign managers) will be concentrating the campaign in the smaller cities and towns where it is believed there is both anti-war and anti-Bobby sentiment."\(8\) This strategy meshed with a tactical plan evolved in Indiana - that the McCarthy campaign should especially attempt to woo the Branigin supporters in their rural strongholds.\(9\) In
Indianapolis this meant that major efforts would be directed toward white suburbia. Such theoretical planning, however, did not work out in practice for the McCarthy forces.

HOW THE ORGANIZATION ACTUALLY FUNCTIONED

Leadership. The Indiana campaign was not at all well organized. At the close of the Indiana primary, on May 8, 1968, James Armstrong wrote a letter to Senator McCarthy which said in part: "There must be strong professional coordination of strategy, of scheduling, worker training, and deployment of staff. Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative could hardly wait for your 'team' to arrive in Indiana from Wisconsin. We knew that the arrival of the McCarthy 'forces' would set our amateur house in order ... but if anything the disorder increased as Primary Day approached."(10) This lack of organization was observed on many levels by different campaign workers.

First of all, there was a great deal of confusion about who was in charge of the campaign. No one seems to have been clear about this. On the one hand James Bogle was the "campaign manager" for Citizens for McCarthy, but on the other hand there was also a national staff; its members were locked in a power struggle, which made even less clear the question of who was in charge. Curt Ganz and Blair Clark were vying for position at this level.(11) In addition, Richard Grandjeans, a national staff worker, was reportedly in charge of Indiana.(1) Among those individuals interviewed
for this paper, there were varying responses to the question of who was in charge. Merle Miller, chairman of Citizens for McCarthy, commented that Bogle "ran the whole show." Others seemed to feel that either Ganz\(^{(12)}\) or Clark\(^{(13)}\) was in charge. The most common observation, however, was that the organization was leaderless.\(^{(14)}\) Everyone was disturbed about the fact that no functioning chain of authority existed within the entire campaign organization.\(^{(15)}\)

There seem to have been conflicts of authority at other levels as well. Armstrong went on in his letter to say: "There appeared to be a great deal of internal warfare and jockeying for position. Budding Secretaries of State and cabinet members were falling all over one another."\(^{(16)}\) The coordinators of the various areas (finance, press, etc.) spent a great deal of their time bickering with each other and frequently failed to coordinate at all.\(^{(17)}\) Professional organizers had to be shipped to Indiana from New York to save the Simon and Garfunkle concert from financial disaster; the two persons in charge of that event were so busy fighting each other that no one had been out publicizing the concert.\(^{(18)}\)

There are at least two theories about why this infighting occurred. After the Wisconsin primary, according to Bogle, it appeared for the first time that Eugene McCarthy might in fact become President of the United States. As a result, many individuals who had previously been entirely issue-oriented now became position-oriented also. There was
now a new importance to having top staff positions in the McCarthy organization. There was the chance of obtaining real political power, or so people thought. Al Edelson analyzed the situation somewhat differently by comparing the McCarthy and Kennedy organizations. Edelson considered the Kennedy campaign to be highly disciplined, well-structured and non-ideological; it possessed definite lines of authority, and when orders were given they were followed, with no questions asked. In contrast, the McCarthy organization, according to Edelson, was made up of people unused to being abruptly ordered around. They all wanted to be chiefs, and as a result were quite short on Indians. (20) Whatever the reason, there seems to be little doubt that the result was chaos. In his book, McCarthy for President, Arthur Herzog summed it up this way: "Behind the smiling posters of the candidate in Indiana, the campaign was breaking up into warring groups." (21)

In addition to problems of authority, there was some question concerning the competence of those in charge. The age and experience of those running the campaign brought criticism from many. Armstrong, in the letter previously mentioned, referred to this factor: "The 'children's crusade' is the greatest thing about your campaign. This is the 'new politics' you refer to. However, I know of many 'old' people (thirty and beyond) whose enthusiastic response was blunted by the flippant disorganization of headquarters and storefronts.
that reflected little, if any, maturity. Use these youngsters and rejoice in their enthusiasm, but this dare not be 'their' campaign; not if you are to be President of the United States. Seasoned maturity needs to be recruited, used where such leadership can be visibly helpful, and relied upon where certain kinds of decision-making and policy-making are called for." (22) Edelson referred to the national staff as "eager, intelligent, young, and not competent for the job at hand." (23) Another person put it this way: "The young people who ran things were capable people, but they were neither pros nor from the area. (24) This opinion was not, however, unanimous; Sylvia Zazas, for example, felt that the "staff people were far superior to their local counterparts." (25)

Local McCarthy supporters, who did not seem to have much contact with Ganz, Clark, or Grandjeans, had little to say about them. But James Bogle certainly was not popular in Indianapolis. He emerged as the scapegoat of the campaign. It was said that he was a spendthrift, (26) irresponsible, (27) and a glory-seeker. (28) However, it is also true that Indianapolis people had little contact with Bogle. As a matter of fact, many claimed they had met him only briefly, and did not know what he did with his time. (29)

There was also criticism of Senator McCarthy's personal role in Indiana. His frequent failure to arrive at various events on time may have been beyond his control, but
many commented that he did not appear to think that it mattered. Kirk McKinney, for example, arranged a fund-raising cocktail party for the senator. The honored guest was two hours late and did not seem to consider it important. Needless to say, McKinney was irritated. On another occasion, all the Democrat precinct committeemen and vice-committeemen in Marion County gathered to meet Senator McCarthy. He was a couple of hours late and reportedly, once again, rather cool about it all. He came in, shook a few hands, did not put himself out at all, and then left. In addition, the Senator refused to involve himself in inner staff disputes which plagued his organization in Indianapolis. However, Senator McCarthy was reportedly not well during the Indiana campaign.

Recruitment and Use of Manpower. If an office reflects anything about the effectiveness of a campaign, trouble should be spotted at that level rather quickly. One volunteer had the following to report about a day she spent at state headquarters. She was requested to come and help, but she passed the entire day going from one job to another, never doing any of them. First she was to type for a writer; he never got his article written. Then she was to drive some students somewhere; after waiting for them, she discovered they had found a truck. "It was like that all day," she said. Kirk McKinney claimed that it was "disheartening to visit there" because of such disorganization.
or forty people would have a meeting trying to figure out McCarthy's itinerary, when one competent person should have sat down and done it. McKinney suggested that ten Kelly girls could really do the job, but was told that the "vitality of the organization was in its volunteers." A student who had worked in Wisconsin also remarked, in a comparison of the two states, that in "Indianapolis the central headquarters was a mess." In the meantime, the volunteers were discouraged because they felt that their efforts, even when utilized, did not fit into any coherent scheme of things. Volunteers were not properly set to work because, "no one knew what to do with them," yet the campaign was perpetually short on manpower.

Students were more difficult to recruit than in Wisconsin or New Hampshire; in Indiana there was a definite decline in their number. According to Lydia Gross, assistant coordinator for students in Indiana, there were three reasons for this: (1) the time of the Indiana primary was closer to final examinations; (2) Kennedy's entrance into the race; and (3) President Johnson's withdrawal.

The students' disaffiliation and growing lack of enthusiasm was particularly noticeable at the storefront level of operations.

The students were the ones who could leave school, pull up stakes, and work for subsistence pay. However, most of them were from out of town. Though the plan of organization
was to have one local student and one from out of town, in practice at least five of the storefronts were run by two national staffers. (39)

Local older people were rarely involved in the inner workings and decisions of storefront operations. Bill Conours, a local worker, age 20, who served as coordinator of the East Washington Street storefront, commented that one of their problems was how to keep local volunteers busy on anything but licking envelopes and pasting stamps. (40) Sue Craig, a long time peace activist who had been on the board of Hoosiers for Peace, had worked in HDA, and was also a Democratic vice-committeewoman, visited the storefront near her when it first opened and was told there was nothing for her to do. She was only called once by the coordinator in her area, a week and a half before the election, and asked to contact committeemen. It is true that she was contacted a second time "because the press was coming and they needed people around to look like they were working." But after the press left, so did Mrs. Craig, "because there was nothing to do." (41)

Since local people were not given sufficient opportunity to help with storefront activities, a great deal of responsibility and work was left to the coordinators. To find a suitable place of operations, they looked in busy areas for offices that would be visible to the public. After decorating the rooms, they began organizing for something specific; such as Paul Newman's visit. The popular Hollywood actor was scheduled to open all of the storefronts in
Indianapolis with a personal appearance. In preparations for this event, fliers were distributed, although most of the storefront areas were huge and could not be thoroughly covered by two people. The coordinators also telephoned all of their local contacts. Unfortunately, they had no sound trucks to use, nor were any other means of announcing the event used.

The Newman rallies were not a success. In the black section of town the response was poor (about a dozen people came to the College Avenue storefront); in the white areas the response was better - 50 to 100 persons - but they were mostly high school students.

Once the storefronts were opened, most of their work was in preparation for canvassing. All of the names on the voting lists from James Beatty's office were pasted vertically on large pieces of cardboard. Beside each name were four or five categories to check (definite, not sure, no, etc.). The coordinators also had to find places for the canvassers to stay and food for them to eat (sandwich-making was a main function of many a local volunteer). Once the canvassers had gone through an area, it then became the job of the storefront to follow through. Workers called or visited those whose responses were favorable or uncertain.

The storefronts were also responsible for organizing informal "coffee" get-togethers in their areas. Bill Conours organized at least ten of these. Storefront workers served
coffee at the plant gates of various factories, distributed fliers, and talked to people about McCarthy.

One of the best storefronts in Marion County was the one directed by Rose Davis in Barrington (45) (a small ghetto on the far southside of Indianapolis.) It was successful because it became a neighborhood center and all sorts of people felt welcome to come there with their problems. However, Mrs. Davis became frustrated by her inability to transfer this enthusiasm to the McCarthy campaign. (46)

Because the storefront coordinators had so much to do they sometimes neglected areas that the local people felt were important. In some areas committeemen were not contacted at all, or only very late in the campaign. In Bill Conours' area workers contacted "as many as possible." But this was an almost overwhelming task: to organize approximately three wards with a staff of two in only a few weeks. A great deal of the responsibility of the campaign was in the hands of a few very inexperienced people.

On election day the storefronts were responsible for manning what polls they could, and for finding people with cars available for driving individuals to their voting places. Here their lack of contact with local people hurt considerably. Many polls were never covered and some people who would have been willing to be at the polls were never asked. (47) The storefront coordinators had far too many
responsibilities and little back-up manpower. Their shortcomings were due mainly to a poor division of labor.

In addition to the storefront contacts, the women had their own organization, Women for McCarthy. Women for McCarthy was also somewhat leaderless. Midge Miller, who had come from Wisconsin to organize the group, was suffering from overexertion and fatigue, and left the campaign for a rest after being in Indiana for a week or so. (48)

One of the original ideas of Women for McCarthy was to have informal neighborhood teas. However, the workers did not have the necessary contacts to make this tactic work. (49) In being a part of Women for McCarthy, many women were at the same time cut off from other activities in the campaign. (50) A great deal of Women for McCarthy's effort in Indiana was centered on a fund-raising brunch for Mrs. McCarthy. Hundreds of volunteer manhours went into compiling the mailing list for this event. Each of the 4,000 names collected was placed on an index card, and as many invitations sent out - but only 175 attended the luncheon. Sylvia Zazas, commenting on this disappointing showing, felt that the 175 names could have been obtained by a few individuals putting their heads together, since most of those who attended were already committed and their names were on existing mailing lists. Sue Craig, in criticizing the luncheon, believed that the manpower should have been used in the precincts. On the other hand, Pat Ulen, one of the luncheon organizers, said that receiving an invitation to a gathering in honor of Mrs. McCarthy may well have been as
effective as a knock on 4,000 doors. However, many of the women willing to address envelopes were not so willing to go out and knock on doors.

In sum, many local people—especially students and housewives—felt rather frustrated at the end of the McCarthy campaign in Indiana. They knew that their talents and time could have been put to better use in a well-organized campaign. However, organizational problems and lack of time meant that their abilities were never properly utilized.

STRATEGY

In theory, at least, there was a strategy for the McCarthy campaign—a rural strategy, and a strategy which said "Go after the Branigin votes." However, in Indianapolis such plans were never really put into practice. In most cases no one was informed of any strategy. (52) In fact, the strategy as carried out seemed to be almost the reverse. One would have thought it was a Kennedy rather than a McCarthy organization. Because, regardless of the conclusion that the Negro vote could not be won, the McCarthy forces still tried to win it. Of the twelve storefronts (in Marion County the thirteenth was the storefront for the county coordinators Jan Goodman and Sylvia Zazas), six were in predominately black areas—119 West 34th Street, 729 Indiana Avenue, 29th and Clifton, 19th and College, 30th and Sherman, and 1741 A Minoquin (the Barrington storefront). In Marion County the percentage of Negroes is slightly less than twenty per cent, yet fifty per
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cent of the storefront manpower was concentrated on Negro areas. Why this occurred is not exactly clear, though part of the answer is connected with the very concept of a storefront. Of necessity, a storefront must be situated in a congested, low-rental area, if the campaign is to be able to afford "visible" space. One McCarthy staffer gave other reasons for the concentration of storefronts in black areas. First, she said that the person in charge of the Negro community, Mr. Rosenthal, was a go-getter, and picked some of the storefront locations himself. Second, she felt that it was all done so hurriedly that there was probably little planning involved: "You got the storefronts where they were the most easily available."(53) However, regardless of the reasoning, when one considers the wide and varied responsibilities of the storefronts and their crucial role in contacting the people, the inescapable conclusion is that they were misplaced in terms of the overall strategy of the campaign.

The storefronts were not the only area where there appeared to be a concentration of activity in the ghetto, despite a strategy to the contrary. One of the first projects of both the Kennedy and McCarthy forces in Indiana was the registration of unregistered voters. Bill Conours was one of the new full-time McCarthy people who was qualified as a registrar.(54) According to Conours, registration activities of the McCarthy workers were concentrated in the
ghetto. He reports having left his storefront empty on a number of occasions in order to spend the day registering black voters. He also spent some time registering voters at Indiana University's Indianapolis campus and at the Butler University campus. So far as he knew, the McCarthy campaign had every intention of concentrating considerable effort in the black community. According to Conours, this continued until the last week of the campaign, when the workers realized it was a lost cause and halted most of their efforts in the ghetto.

Money was also put into the ghetto. Though the amount is undetermined, there were paid workers in the third ward of Indianapolis on election day. (55) Despite all of this activity in the black areas, some campaigners continued to feel that the McCarthy effort was not concentrating enough of its effort there. (56)

However, the evidence seems to indicate that in Indianapolis a policy of deemphasizing the black population would have been the wisest in terms of votes. There are a number of incidents to illustrate this. McCarthy's first speech in Indianapolis following the HDA dinner was in the black community. (57) "It was a fiasco." The turn-out was embarrassingly small and McCarthy was as a result reluctant to return. (58) Then on April 18 a luncheon was arranged at the Fall Creek YMCA, at which McCarthy addressed a gathering of black leaders in Indianapolis. Though the meeting did not
go badly, it received poor publicity in an article by Kenworthy of the New York Times. This was the final blow - the strategy at the upper levels would no longer be to court the black vote. (59) What remaining events were scheduled in the Negro community of Indianapolis continued to fail. Bandleader Benny Goodman, in Indianapolis for a concert at Clowes Hall, agreed to tour the city with his band on a truck on Indiana Avenue. (60) He and those accompanying him were taunted and stoned until fear of physical harm drove them from the streets. (61) Finally, in the Third Ward, where there was registration, canvassing, a storefront, and a ward chairman who tacitly supported the candidate, (62) the disappointing returns for McCarthy bore out the harshest prognosis of the hopelessness of a McCarthy effort in the ghetto.

There was confusion on many levels of the McCarthy organization; as a result, a great deal of hard work came to naught. The best plans laid in any political effort, particularly one so dependent upon volunteers, are bound to go astray. But when there is little or no clear direction or leadership, as was the case in Indiana, such irresponsibility cannot help but affect the results at the polls.
Footnotes to Chapter Five

(1) Zazas and Fasig interviews.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Sara Chenoweth, interview August 10, 1968. Miss Chenoweth was a full-time volunteer in Indianapolis. She worked closely with the Women for McCarthy. She was nineteen at the time.

(5) Pat Ulen, interview on September 25, 1969. Mrs. Ulen worked for Women for McCarthy throughout the campaign.

(6) Lord interview.


(10) Armstrong, James, Letter addressed to Senator McCarthy, May 8, 1968. A copy of this letter was given to me by Al Edelson. I don't know how many copies were circulated, however, James Bogle had seen the letter.

(11) Bogle interview.


(12) Conours, Pollack, Bogle interviews. Bogle referred to the contest for leadership between Clark and Ganz, which he said Ganz temporarily won in Indiana.

(13) Fasig, Gross, Larner, Ulen interviews.


(15) Void.

(16) Armstrong letter.
Mr. McKinney had so little faith in his fiscal responsibility that he notified the various airlines that Citizens for McCarthy would not underwrite Mr. Bogle's tickets. This was because he felt the planes that he had chartered were not necessary.

Mrs. Zazas gave as one example a meeting in Lawrence Township, Marion County, of over fifty people (many precinct leaders) where Bogle was to speak and never arrived.

Numerous individuals reported this. Mr. Bogle did appear as the sole spokesman for the campaign effort frequently throughout the pre-primary period.

This was specifically stated by Pollack, Conours and Ulen.
Gross interview.

This information was obtained from a list of the storefronts and their coordinators provided by Sylvia Zazas.

Conours interview.

Craig interview.

Conours interview.

Ibid., Conours was one of the staff people who accompanied Mr. Newman on his tour and therefore saw it at first hand.

Zazas and Conours interviews.

Zazas interview.

Ibid.

Ulen interview.

Lord interview.

Craig interview.

Ulen interview.

In addition to others, this was even true of Ted Pollack who handled a good deal of the local advertising for the campaign.

Gross interview.

Conours interview.

Fasig interview.

Lord interview.

Bogle interview.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Pollack interview.
Indianapolis News, May 15, 1968, p. 20. The returns in the 3rd Ward were as follows: Branigin 224, Kennedy 2,848, and McCarthy 157. The McCarthy storefront in the 3rd Ward was located at 19th and College. He did particularly poorly in the precincts close to this location (a very poor area). In precinct 6 at 2101 N. College the returns were Branigin 9, Kennedy 210 and McCarthy 6. In precinct 7 at 1702 N. Park the returns were Branigin 4, Kennedy 141, and McCarthy 0. Also, interestingly, McCarthy and Branigin did their best in the same precincts.
The Indiana campaign was financed largely from outside the state. Actually, Citizens for McCarthy fell short of the original expectation that it would be a large fund-raising organization. Only one person, a very busy Mr. Tom Scanlon, was assigned the task of raising money. According to the organization's report filed with the Secretary of State of Indiana on June 19, 1968, the citizens committee raised a total of $22,851.58.\(^{(1)}\) This included $3,000 sent to them by McCarthy supporters in Detroit, indicating that $19,851.58 was raised locally. However, McKinney, the treasurer, pointed out that some local money was sent directly to the national organization.

The money raised by Citizens for McCarthy was strictly in the form of individual donations. The group held no money making events. Altogether, 479 individuals contributed; forty of those were in the $100-plus bracket; five individuals gave $1,000 or more.

The Citizens for McCarthy accounts were kept separate from those of the national organization. All of the local group's funds were disbursed by McKinney, who kept a tight reign over everything. He insisted on authorizing all expenditures, and would pay only those bills that he had authorized.\(^{(2)}\)
The largest disbursements made by Citizens for McCarthy were to Pollack and Associates, a local firm which handled part of the advertising. This firm received $5,197.26 for advertisements in the Indianapolis Star and Indianapolis News; $300 for television spots in Muncie; and $700 for radio time in Indianapolis. The next largest expenditure was for the Women for McCarthy's luncheon for Mrs. McCarthy. This cost $1,002.50: $240 for postage, $384.74 for invitations, and $378.80 for food. (There is no report concerning how much the luncheon collected, but it was a definite loss.) Finally, $266 was paid to Hoosier Air Lines for the use of chartered planes. These were the group's major expenditures.(3)

The activities of Citizens for McCarthy were, however, a very small part of the overall campaign. The national organization disbursed $302,590 in Indiana. Its largest expenditure was also for advertising - $170,000 to Carl Ally, Inc. Other major expenditures were $87,590 for "operating expenses," $25,000 to Pollack Associates for the newspaper supplement which appeared in the Indianapolis Star the weekend before the primary, $12,700 in wages for staff, $3,165.91 for rental of rooms and $7,200 in "cash payments to workers." Another $5,000 was sent ahead to Oregon.

In addition to funds paid by Citizens for McCarthy and by the headquarters of McCarthy for President, a total
of $1,246.48 was listed as "Gross Proceeds from Fund Raising." The assumption is that this money was raised mainly at the Simon and Garfunkel concert (the only really successful fund raising event in Indianapolis)(4) with some additional money coming from smaller events, such as the Old-Fashioned Picnic(5) and the luncheon for Mrs. McCarthy.

In all, then, the McCarthy campaign in Indiana was certainly not under-financed. In 1967, James Davis wrote in his book, *Springboard to the White House: Presidential Primaries: How They Are Fought and Won*, that it took "perhaps as much as $200,000 to run in one primary."(6) John Kennedy only spent $100,000 in the West Virginia primary in 1960.(7) The McCarthy headquarters alone reported spending $321,599.86 in Indiana. Though this may be considerably less than the $494,000 they reportedly spent in Wisconsin,(8) it certainly is not meager.(9)

Confusion and over-spending were an important part of the financial problems in Indiana. There never seemed to be enough cash available when it was needed.(10) This was due to an internal fight over the control of the money.(11) The New York Times on April 27, 1968, reported the following situation: $25,000 was still owed in New Hampshire; $100,000 in Wisconsin; the eighteen salaried staff people in Indiana had not been paid during the preceding few weeks; the 220 full-time, non-salaried staff, each of whom received $5 a day for meals plus room allowance, were paid the previous
week for the first time in two weeks; and the organization did not know if it would have transportation money for out of town canvassers. (12)

The only person interviewed for this paper who seemed to feel that finances were not a serious problem was Pollack. He received his money directly from Howard Stein, who had raised his own separate funds for advertising. (13)

According to McKinney who had served as treasurer for many a political campaign, "most campaigns overspend, but this one did greatly more than normal." The telephone bill of $85,000, which remains unpaid today, is the most notorious example of overspending in the campaign, (14) but there were also lost cars and lost equipment, to cite additional examples. (15)

Thus, although eventually there was a large amount of money spent in Indiana, the campaign operated in a constant state of financial crisis.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

The area of public relations was one of the weakest features of the campaign. Part of the problem was poor scheduling. First, there was no one person in charge of scheduling throughout the campaign; it was a job that tended to shift about. (16) Second, there were numerous "off again, on again trips because of differences bound up in policy decisions." (17) Third, "those who made out the schedules
planned too many engagements because there was no one with the authority over them to say no." (18)

There were constant reports of late arrivals and last minute cancellations. (19) One such incident occurred in Indianapolis in Bill Conours' area. The staff at the East Washington Street storefront spent a full week of their time planning for a rally and speech to be given by the Senator at the Eastgate Shopping Center. They were very excited because they felt that in the particular white middle-and working-class area where they were situated, a personal appearance would be very important. An hour or so before the event Conours heard the rumor that the speech had been cancelled. He rushed to the headquarters, where the report was confirmed. Subsequently he was unable to convince anyone to reschedule the appearance. Nearly 1,000 people came to listen to the senator, who unfortunately never arrived. (20)

On those occasions when McCarthy did speak, reporters were handicapped because they were not given advance texts. All of the press release transcripts filed in McCarthy headquarters after the primary - with two exceptions - included places where "inaudible" had been written into the transcript. This practice was changed after the Indiana primary. (21)

There was considerable disagreement among McCarthy's top staffers concerning what type of television spots would be best for Indiana. Many people were unhappy with the television spots prepared by Carl Ally, the New York advertising
agency handling McCarthy's national campaign. They felt that the advertisements were too sophisticated for Indiana. Merle Miller, chairman of Citizens for McCarthy, whose name appeared on all of the advertisements in Indiana, was one such individual. Because his name was being used, he interjected himself into the debate. 

Bill and Kay Nee, advertisers from Minnesota led the charge against the Ally firms "too sophisticated" approach.

The Ally firm agreed to make required changes; a new film was to be prepared and sent to Indiana. Larner relates that the new commercials "mysteriously disappeared," and attributes this to some sort of a conspiracy. Actually, Pollack was perhaps central to this. He reports that the films were both on hand, and that he was asked to call the television station, cancel the old film, and request that the new one be shown in its place. The station, however, would not make the change without authority from Ally in New York. "They called New York and got some underling who said no change." The old spot ran, and Ally was fired during the Indiana campaign.

Trouble in other areas can be withstood, but when such confusion crops up in the crucial area of the press relations, particularly television, which received the bulk of the campaign funds, such inefficiency hits at the very heart of a campaign. It is easy to see why many people associated with
the McCarthy effort felt uneasy. They seemed to be surrounded by confusion - money was never available, and top staffers frequently did not even know where their candidate was.
Footnotes to Chapter Six

(1) Reports filed with the Secretary of State of Indiana and loaned to me by Kirk McKinney.

(2) McKinney interview, op. cit.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Bogle interview, op. cit.

(5) The Old-Fashioned picnic was held at 46th and Meridian. There was an auction of posters and paintings, a rock band, and speeches by Mary McCarthy (the Senator's daughter) and others. Hot dogs and beer were sold. The crowd was small, but according to the Edelsons, some money was raised.

(6) Davis, James, Springboard to the White House: Presidential Primaries: How They are Fought and Won (New York, 1967), p. 156.


(9) Davis, op. cit. As an example of meager campaign funds, Davis notes that Hubert Humphrey "in the early stages of the West Virginia primary was financed by a $2,000 loan." p. 157. It should also be noted that the Indianapolis Star editorial of April 25 predicted that Kennedy would spend $600,000 in Indiana. (The Indianapolis Star, however, was not a reliable source during this campaign.

(10) Fasig interview, op. cit.

(11) Herzog, op. cit., p. 133. Herzog described the conflict between Quigley (Mrs. McCarthy's brother), who became alarmed about the large amounts of money being spent and the fact that "just anybody could obligate the campaign," and the national staff people, who felt they needed the money now and found that "since money came only in spasms, there was no way to plan to keep costs down - it was typical of them to have literature printed on weekends, at overtime rates, because money had not arrived until Friday." p.134.
In his book Herzog points out that Stein's method of creating independent sources of income outside the mainstream of McCarthy money was soon emulated by others who wanted to avoid Quigley's control.

McKinney interview, op. cit.

Gross interview, op. cit.

Ibid. One example of this was a change in strategy in the last week which called for a switch from appearances in the small towns to a concentration of effort in the northern part of the state.

Miller interview, op. cit.


Conours interview, op. cit.

Larner, op. cit., p. 68.

Herzog, op. cit., p. 132.

Larner, op. cit., p. 67.

Pollack interview, op. cit.
CONCLUSION

A good deal of what happened to Senator McCarthy in Indiana can be viewed as the results of a campaign which, although adequately financed, was basically run by young amateurs. In Indiana they were confronted with a tough non-ideological political battle, which they came into with an "undefeatable complex." (1) James Q. Wilson, in his book The Amateur Democrat, analyzes and defines the amateur in politics in a way that is useful in understanding many of the problems of the McCarthy campaign.

Who are the amateur reformers? "For the most part they are young, well-educated, professional people, including a large number of women. In style of life they are distinctly middle and upper-middle class." (2) This certainly applied to the Indianapolis people involved. (3) Wilson goes on to analyze the limitations of such a group within the Democratic Party. "In general there are six major groups within the Democratic Party which for a variety of reasons are not attracted to the club movement. These are the Negroes, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, organized labor, big financial contributors and the professional politicians... the orientations of the clubs to the intellectual middle-class means that the political style and rhetoric of the organization are not felt congenial by groups which in total represent the bulk of the electoral support of the
Many of the McCarthy strategists realized their weakness in reaching many of these groups early. For example, the one area in New Hampshire where they did poorly was in its industrial and largest city, Manchester. In Indiana Kennedy's entrance made their task even more difficult as he had positive appeal to exactly those groups the McCarthy campaign style failed to excite.

But most significant in terms of the internal workings of the McCarthy campaign in Indiana, the issue was gone. Wilson in further analyzing the amateur says that he is "one who finds politics intrinsically interesting because it expresses a conception of the public interest . . . he sees the political world in terms of ideas and principles rather than in terms of persons." Every person interviewed for this paper, with one exception, was in this campaign because of their unhappiness with President Johnson's handling of the war in Vietnam. With that issue diminished and another "anti-war" candidate in the race, it could not help but affect their dedication. But perhaps more important, with the issue gone and the prospects of potential power increasing, the national staff did in fact turn from issues to personality and the inner power conflicts within the organization now became paramount. The professional politician used to such conflicts, while participating in them, is still able to do the job at hand. But the McCarthy staffer, frequently allowed
the power-plays to dominate their energies. This resulted in a lack of direction for the campaign. What lines of authority there had been in the McCarthy campaign were all in contest. As a result, such crucial questions as: How to best utilize local talents; How to implement a strategy on all levels, once it was determined; and how to disburse funds were never properly dealt with.

Considering Senator McCarthy's opponents and the campaign's organizational shortcomings, only the continued dedication and commitment of a large number of students and many others could be responsible for the 29% of the vote McCarthy finally received in Indiana.
Footnotes to the Conclusion

(1) Bogle interview.


(3) Though attempts were made, the Indianapolis people were never able to involve either Negroes or union people. It always remained an organization of white college graduates or students.


(5) *New York Times*, May 15, 1968, p. 26. According to this article, in six of the labor wards in Manchester the president received 71% of the vote. President Johnson carried Manchester by 70%.


(7) The one exception was Al Edelson.
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