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Dr. Richard De Smet and Sankara's Advaita

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I HAVE had the privilege of meeting Dr. Richard De Smet in Shimla at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, when we both participated in a Seminar organized by the Institute in 1989. We had opportunities of discussing Sankara’s Brahman and the Christian concept of God at that time without being able to fully understand each other’s position. That has been at the back of my mind all these years, and I was happy when Bradley Malkovsky asked me to write on Dr. De Smet’s view of Sankara’s Brahman for the Bulletin. I thus got an opportunity to revisit that topic again and have done so in what follows. Needless to say that, because of the limitation of space, I have not been able to do full justice to the topic.

Before I venture to write something on Dr. De Smet’s approach to the ontological understanding of the Brahman-concept in Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta (hereafter Advaita), I would like to state what I understand by comparative work. In order to do a comparative study of two different religions or theologies, either in a religious or theological sense, it is not necessary to somehow fit the ontology and epistemology of the two systems being studied to appear as if they mean the same thing. In such an approach there is injustice done to both the systems and one ends up trying to, sometimes, fit round circles into square pegs. It is wise to acknowledge that religious and theological schools that rise and grow in different cultural milieus can have a rationale of their own and the best we can do, as scholars, is to understand and appreciate the dynamics of that growth in their own setting. There is a historical dimension to every growth, and we sit on the shoulders of our predecessors such that a comparative study can only “pretend” to be an independent, objective approach. A corollary to that is the question as to whether the judgment of another philosophy/theology/religion will be acceptable to the other, when the approach is generally based on the values, concepts, even the vocabulary and language of the one who studies the other, which the other need not or does not recognize.

In Dr. De Smet’s case we know that he was working through the languages in which the original material of the two schools he studied was available as for instance, Sanskrit for Sankara’s Advaita and English or any other language for the other

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Assuming his competence in these languages, he still had to transcend the arena of translations and somehow be able to creatively intuit the meanings of the foreign concepts that he intended to compare and which come with a lot of previous cultural and intellectual baggage.

So there are a number of obstacles to overcome if indeed we can do an honest, comparative work between two schools of thought, from two very different cultures. Because of the above limitations it is easy to concur with B.K. Matilal’s understanding of comparative work (though he was speaking with reference to comparative philosophy) as “the task of explaining and translating classical Indian philosophical texts in a western language”. Since Sankara’s Advaita is closer to philosophy than to theology or religion this is relevant for our purpose and would come closest to what I would count as doing a comparative study.

When we take up the question of De Smet’s comparative study of Christianity and Advaita, all the above thoughts crow people’s mind. As a Christian theologian, it became important for De Smet to somehow find parallels between Advaita, the paramount philosophical/theological school in the mind of the Hindus in general, and Christianity, for, in common with other theologians, a deeper theological exchange between followers of these two spiritual paths was possible only when misconceptions could be cleared away.

De Smet’s primary loyalty to Christian theology and his love for Sankara’s Advaita expressed movingly as “From Sankara I learned to focus on the non-dualistic creative presence in me - and in all creatures - of the absolute Brahman as my constant Ground and Cause and thus Supreme Saksin and Atman”, goaded him to find parallels between these two systems, one of which is out and out a theology with belief in a personal God, who created everything out of nothing, and the other not a theology in the strict sense of the term, maybe not a philosophy as well in the accepted sense of the term in the west, but perhaps a hermeneutic unraveling of the acosmic (nisprapanca) meanings hidden in the Upanisads.

While in Christianity God is the Supreme, ontological Absolute, Sankara’s Advaita “has no room for gods or deity, excepting as a provisional posit. It has no room for God except in the context of a (metaphysically) ignorant person’s inquiry about the cause of the universe which unknown to him is only an unreal appearance (and so is not in need of a creator).” Thus we are conscious of the diametrically opposite ways of thinking of the Ultimate, Ontological Entity, as well as the different views of Creation/Manifestation, that such divergent views entail.

In this paper, I try and focus on three published papers of De Smet, entitled “Advaitavada and Christianity” (1973) (hereafter “Advaitavada”), “Origin: Creation and Emanation” (1978) (hereafter “Origin”), and “Forward Steps in Sankara Research” (1987) (hereafter “Forward Steps”), where he engages in a comparison of some concepts in Advaita and Christianity, with a view to arriving at a convergence. I would have liked to have more of his publications for this study, but, unfortunately, these were the only ones which were readily available. So if there are other views and revisions presented in any later papers, I plead guilty for not consulting them, for in spite of my best efforts, I did not succeed in procuring them. But I have had access to the excellent paper on “The Personhood of Sankara’s Para Brahman” (1997) by Malkovsky as well as the volume of papers published (2000), in commemoration of the passing away of Dr. De Smet in 1997 edited by Malkovsky. From these sources I can surmise that De Smet did not change or modify his basic stand from his early publications regarding his understanding of the concepts in Advaita, based on which he made the comparative studies.
If my reading of De Smet is right, then the main concern he had was with the Nirguna nature of Brahman as pure Consciousness that could not permit the attribution of a creative function to It. Since only a person having 'personhood' can have a relation of creativity to the world, Christian theologians in general, and De Smet in particular, who is our focus, try to find attribution of personhood to the Nirguna Brahman. De Smet services a number of devices and uses some selective readings from Sankara’s works to arrive at the conclusion that it is possible to posit personhood to Brahman and thus link it with the manifested world. My task is to see how far De Smet has succeeded or not in this enterprise.

As a preamble to this exercise we need to be clear about some points. Firstly there is in place a strong hermeneutic tradition set by the Purvaminamsha school, which is followed by Sankara as well, in his approach to the interpretation of the Prasthanatrayi (Brahmasutra, Upanisads and Bhagavadgita). These principles, though well known, can suffer repetition as I will take recourse to them in my explaining Sankara, whenever it is relevant. These are the six hermeneutic principles collectively known as the sadlinga. The first is upakramopasamharaikya which is important, for it denotes an uniformity of meaning between the start and finish of a sentence, a section, a chapter etc. The second principle is abhyasa or the repetition of the theme being discussed in the work; the third is apurva or a new conclusion sought to be brought about; the fourth is phala or the fruitfulness of such a conclusion; the fifth is arthavada or agreeing or criticizing it in the work; and the sixth is upapatti or the method of argumentation. Sankara also uses the reasonings known as upakrama-parakrama where the initial statements carry more weight than the later ones, as also apachcheda-nyaya, which allows the negation of the previous statement in case the subsequent one contradicts it. Sankara uses these hermeneutic devices to interpret the Prasthanatrayi in accordance with his Advaita stance.

Given this importance to the exegetical tradition of interpretation we cannot afford to ignore Sankara’s methodological approach to the understanding of each of the sections (adhikarana) in Badarayana’s Brahmasutras (BS). His commentaries on the BS as well as the Upanisads (UP) and the Gita are very often preceded by a preamble to the concerned section, where he states his thesis and prepares the reader for what follows in the subsequent sections of the particular chapter. He upholds the principle of ekavakyata or the first exegetical principle of consistency of the main thesis throughout the entire work and frequently refers to it in the body of the work and in separate sections. It is always useful to come back to these initial introductory portions in Sankara, in order to make sense of some very difficult points that are raised in the course of the commentaries.

To come back to the paper “Advaitavada” mentioned above, De Smet tries to set up an analogy between the Advaita Nirguna Brahman and the God of Christianity, using mainly the passage 4.3.7. from the Brhadaranyaka Up. (Br. Up.) for the understanding of Brahman. De Smet tries to establish an analogical reading of the God of Christianity including that of Trinity and Sankara’s Advaita concept of Brahman. This is one of the pet obsessions of De Smet, for he again comes back to it in his paper “Origin.” In the “Origin” paper he uses Aquinas’ description of God as ‘eminently Esse (Be)’ and the Taittiriya Up. statement of Brahman being ‘satyam, jnanam, anantam’ (Truth, Consciousness, Infinite). He talks about this again in his “Forward Steps” where he tries to argue for the identical ontological status of the Christian God and Advaita Brahman, using a three level language for approaching both these transcendent realities. Thus in “Forward Steps” he believes that Sankara, when he uses the three levels of adhyasa.
(superimposition), apavada (negation) and paramartha-laksana (indication by the supreme sense), is actually talking about a three level language which can then be taken to indicate for both Christian God and Brahman their transcendent nature beyond the primary meanings of ordinary language (vyavahara), Upanishadic language which is metaphysical and metempirical language which absolutizes words. This almost sounds like the sphota theory of the grammarians who absolutize Word as sabdabrahman. But this not the case in Sankara, and his opposition to the sphota concept is well known. De Smet might find the three levels of adhyasa, apavada and paramarthata a satisfactory tool to explain the Christian God, but in Sankara that is not the use to which adhyasa and apavada are put to.

Let us now look at Br. Up. 4.3.7 which Smet uses in “Advaitavada” for this comparison. Sankara in fact has only two categories to which he applies the methodology of adhyasa and apavada, i.e. Brahman (Atman/Self) and the not-Self. In Br. Up. 4.3.7, Sankara uses the two devices mainly for an epistemic purpose and to extend the scope of adhyasa to explain how the Self functions at a lower level of reality. The main point here is the identity of Brahman with the intellect, the symbol of consciousness. Sankara is concerned with the way the reflection of consciousness functions and illumines the aggregate of body and organs. He has already declared in many places the distinction between the relational and non-relational view of Reality, after stating it as his main thesis in the Introduction to BS 1.1.1 (thus recalling to mind the second hermeneutic principle of abhyasa). He has discussed his methodology of adhyasa and apavada in BSBh 2.3.6 as well as in the Gitabhasya 13.14 and consistently maintains his main thesis in his commentaries on the Prasthanatrayi. He adds one more level when talking about error in the world and dream experiences.

To interpret the three or two levels of Reality as if they refer to just linguistic categories is not fair to Sankara’s Advaita. Adhyasa is an overriding concept in Sankara’s Advaita and it cannot be used selectively to explain some things while leaving out other things in the system.

We also find Sankara talking about two kinds of knowledge, and that can only make sense when the levels they deal with are two levels of reality. Br. Up. Adhyayas (chapters) three and four are together called the Yajnavalkyakanda, and they have to be read together as one unit, along with Sankara’s commentaries, to understand how Sankara presents his two-level reality. Thus in his commentary on Br. Up. 3.4.2 he clearly states his two-level reality which in turn only reiterates what has already been said in 2.4.12, 1.5.3, and in other places. That Brahman and Atman are One and is the Higher Reality, while the world and the selves in it belong to a lower reality, is the contention of Sankara. De Smet mentions in “Advaitavada” based on BSBh II.1.9 and TU. II.6.1 that “we cannot go on repeating without ado that Sankara professes the identity of the individual soul with the Absolute.” While De Smet uses TU II.6.1 which translates as “From that Brahman or from this Atman came into existence Akasa” to arrive at his conclusion, it is a position difficult to maintain especially when Sankara says in his bhasya on the same TU 2.1.1 “From That (Brahman) or from this Atman came into existence Akasah” (emphasis mine), i.e. since the word Self (atman) is used with regard to Brahman Itself, it follows that Brahman is the Self of the cognizing individual. Sankara’s commentary on TU 2.1.1 which De Smet refers to, only confirms Sankara’s conviction about the identity of the Self (atman) with Brahman and not otherwise. Repeatedly in that commentary, Sankara speaks of this identity. It is a long commentary, and I give below two of his statements there to that effect. Thus he says (1) “though the individual Self is intrinsically identical to Brahman...
(2) “thus even though Brahman is one’s Self it can remain unattained through ignorance”\textsuperscript{19}; from these two combined with the statement that “From That Brahman or from this Atman came into existence Akasah it becomes clear that Brahman is identical with the individual Self.”\textsuperscript{20} So, in Advaita, there is no distinction between Atman and Brahman and, therefore, it is not possible to acquiesce with Smet in this regard.

The rest of “Advaitavada” dwells upon the making of man in Christianity and goes on to talk about the attainment of the “beatific vision” through the grace of God and how the individual “ceases to conceive itself as a being separate from God. This...demands no annihilation of its dependent existence...”\textsuperscript{21}. De Smet tries hard to restate Sankara’s position as follows: “The too little known anthropology which Sankara develops around the notion of the human ego as a reflection of the inner Witness opens up towards a conception of man as a totally dependent and contingent being which is yet strongly integrated” \textsuperscript{22}. We can with confidence state that there is a world of difference not only in the way humans/Selves are perceived in Advaita, but also in the nature of liberation, in the means to liberation and in the identity repeatedly proclaimed by Sankara’s Advaita between Brahman and Selves. All these are points of dispute and taken together leave us sceptical about the comparison between the two Ultimates and related issues.

In “Origin” De Smet also discusses the notion of Creation, keeping the three linguistic levels in the background. While the Christian God creates ex nihilo, in Sankara’s Advaita the universe exists in Brahman before its manifestation.\textsuperscript{23} Christianity starts with God and then explains the universe as created by God. Sankara’s philosophical inquiry starts with the world in order to somehow explain it. He therefore resorts to adhyasa to retain the Absolute, Nirguna, intrinsic nature of Brahman. In his introduction to this adhikarana (topic), Sankara states that this way of mentioning the origin etc. of the universe is only a hermeneutic effort to clarify TU 3.1; in other words there is no direct involvement of Brahman with the world. Thus it is not possible to agree with De Smet when he says “...the mind is ready to climb to the level of eminence (the Dionysian Hyperoche or Sankarian paramarthapatti) and to say, for instance, with Aquinas : Creation is the emanation of the whole universe by and from the universal Cause...”\textsuperscript{24}. De Smet also wants to eliminate the weak sense of “production” as “mere manifestation” [of the universe]. This is too tall an order. Manifestation is not Sankara’s formulation at all. This understanding is part of the Vedic tradition and is a basic tenet of practically all schools of religious thought in Hinduism. Therefore Sankara believes in a cyclical origin, sustenance and dissolution of the universe and also that successive creations/manifestations take place as a result of virtue and vice and come into existence like the earlier ones.\textsuperscript{25} Sankara discusses this elaborately in BSBh 2.1.10; therefore it cannot be wished away and certainly not in Sankara’s Advaita.

At another level De Smet, in the same paper, uses the “satkaryavada” (the pre-existence of the effect in the cause) to valorize St. Thomas’ statement of “a creature as pre-existing in God is the divine Essence itself”\textsuperscript{26}. There is a considerable mixing up of categories in this statement. Sankara nowhere states that Brahman is the locus of the Atman, which, by the way, is also not a creature as understood by Aquinas, but always and consistently Sankara maintains Atman’s identity with Brahman. I have also a problem when De Smet argues for understanding time at two levels (1) Universal time as an abstraction and (2) “concrete time [which] is co-created with the universe since, being a property of its being, it does not precede it but rather follows from its essential mobility and evolving changeability. Whether it starts from a first instant or is beginningless
depends entirely on the Creator’s free decision and cannot be settled by any deductive process. There is again a category mistake in this argument. All this can make sense only in the context of “Creation talk” and the “notion of the first instant of the universe”. De Smet also says that ontological origination does not itself imply temporal beginning even if the reverse is true. It is obvious, as already mentioned, that all this can only make sense in a Christian context, where there is a positive temporal origination of the universe. For Sankara the whole discussion of the origin of time or the universe, whether ontological or temporal is irrelevant, as it is within the domain of avidya.

De Smet comes back to the Creator notion of Christianity in a discussion of the nature of the effects of creation. In his paper “Origin” he ties the creatures to the idea of upadhis in Advaita, and one need not quarrel with that. But it is difficult to agree with his conclusion of the “creatures’ total dependence on their Creator” in the context of Advaita. De Smet brings in the concept of grace in Advaita (I will touch upon that briefly later), combining it with the unsubstantiated theory of creation in Advaita. When De Smet quotes BS II.1.25 and translates it as the “Supreme Atman...creates...”, it is important to recall Sankara’s introduction of Isvara in the act of creation, preservation and destruction in BS I.1.2. Thus, he says “It is not possible to imagine any other than this kind of qualified Isvara ‘for the creation of this kind of qualified universe’. He clearly establishes that, according to him it is Isvara, and not Brahman, that is associated with janma (origin), sthiti (maintenance) and laya (destruction) of the universe. As for II.1.25 which is used by De Smet to undergird his creation hypothesis, Sankara has already stated as a preamble to this topic before II.1 that “the omniscient omnipotent Sarvesvara is the cause of the universe...” and using the principles of both upakramopasamharaikya (unity of meaning in the section), abhyasa (repetition of what has already been introduced) and upakrama-parakrama (where initial statements in general carry more weight than subsequent ones) we have to understand that here also it is Isvara that is indicated. The debate is furthered in II.1.27 by stating that Brahman remains unchanged and beyond phenomenal actions, and all this is imagined through ignorance.

Many statements from the BS and the Upanisads that De Smet uses to compare Christianity and the Advaita of Sankara are difficult to reconcile precisely because of Sankara’s own devices of avidya (adhyasa), nirguna/saguna Brahman, maya etc. There are statements both in the BS and the UP which can be profitably compared to Christianity, but those would be closer to Visistadvaita or Dvaita and not Advaita. Thus, we have to disagree with De Smet when he states that “we can now with St. Thomas define creation adequately and eminently (paramarthatah) as the intelligent and freely willed emanation of the whole reality or positivity of the universe from the pure Esse”.

In the same paper “Origin” there is mention of tadatmya, and De Smet’s understanding of it, based on BS II.1.14, is as follows. “...the non-difference implied by tadatmya does not eliminate distinction but stresses the ontological character of the creature’s dependence as well as the Creator’s transcendence.” BS II.1.14 has been explained at length by Sankara. The sutra in translation reads, “There is ananyatva (non-difference) of those (cause and effect) because of the texts on origin etc...” The examples that Sankara brings in here are spaces within pots and jars being non-different from all-pervading akasah, and water in a mirage being non-different from a sandy desert. In his commentary Sankara stresses the “elimination of distinction” between the Self and Brahman. Sankara again brings in Isvara in this context, who alone can be associated with creation etc., and reiterates the identity or non-difference of the Selves with Brahman.
Continuing the discussion on tadatmya, De Smet uses TU II.6.1 and Sankara’s commentary on it to substantiate his claim. He translates one line of this really long commentary as “names and forms in all their states have Brahman alone as their Atman, but Brahman has not its Atman in them (i.e., tadatmya is not mutual).”\(^\text{32}\) There is a misunderstanding of the word tadatmakam here by De Smet. I translate below the text in question:\(^\text{33}\)

Thus it is because of Brahman alone that nama and rupa have their being in all conditions; but Brahman is not of their nature [but Brahman does not consist of them, according to Gambhirananda]; they are said to have their being in Brahman in essence, because they are “no more” [cease to exist, according to Gambhirananda] when Brahman is eliminated. By these two limiting conditions, Brahman is the agent of all empirical experiences such as knower, knowable and knowledge etc., and all that it entails.

Now the word tadatmakam is a compound (samasa) and an adjective qualifying Brahman, and the part tat stands for namarupa and not for Brahman. Atmakam means “made up or composed of, of the nature or character of” etc. Therefore nam tadatmakam cannot be translated as “Brahman does not have its Atman in them” as De Smet does. It is like the word rasatmakam in vakyam rasatmakam kavyam (A sentence that has the character of rasa is literature).\(^\text{34}\) Tadatmakam indicates that Brahman is not of the nature of namarupa and not that Brahman has not Atman in them. Sankara also makes reference to the topic under discussion by drawing our attention to the introduction to this whole section in the TU and indicating that the topic under discussion is that the Self is imagined to enter the very cavity (of the heart). He thus makes use of the hermeneutic principle of ekavakyata and also reiterates (abhyasa) that the topic being examined is the knowledge of Brahman.\(^\text{35}\)

I have spent some time explaining this at length because it is also quoted by Malkovsky in his paper titled “The Personhood of Sankara’s Para Brahman.”\(^\text{36}\) As this paper is concerned mainly with De Smet’s arguments I will not engage Malkovsky’s points raised in his paper.

So the tadatmya or the unique identity between Brahman and Atman is what Sankara repeatedly emphasizes. He uses the example of the mistaken identity between the rope/snake or shell/silver in order to illustrate this unique relation. The relation between the rope and snake is neither difference, as we cannot relate two different terms as snake and rope as “This is snake”, nor non-difference since the rope is empirically real while the snake is only apparently so; therefore there can be no relation of identity between “two levels of being”. It is, therefore, a unique relation known as tadatmya. If, in the above, the rope is denied the snake “Is not”; but if the snake is denied (due to realizing one’s mistake) the rope “Is”. Thus, if we apply the same understanding to TU II.6.1, Brahman is the same as the rope, and therefore It underlies everything; but Brahman as namarupa does not underlie them, i.e. is not of their nature, since once namarupa is transcended through knowledge it vanishes and Brahman alone “Is”. This is another example of adhyasa and also made clear in Br. Up. IV.3.7 and Sankara’s commentary on it with which De Smet starts the argument in “Advaitavada” and mentioned earlier.\(^\text{37}\)

Since the question of grace occurs in all the three papers under consideration I will briefly touch upon it here. De Smet uses BS 2.3.41 and Sankara’s commentary thereon for support of Sankara’s acceptance of divine grace, both in “Origin” and “Forward Steps”\(^\text{38}\). One has only to read the entire commentary on 2.3.41 to know that Sankara does not support what De Smet believes he
does. The commentaries on 2.3.41 and 2.3.42 have to be read together to make sense. Firstly, it is Isvara, and not Brahman, whose anugraha (grace) is under discussion. Secondly, Sankara continues the same topic in the next sutra and says “(Isvara) is however dependent on the jiva’s efforts, so that injunctions and prohibitions are not meaningless and other defects do not arise.” In his commentary Sankara clearly states that Isvara makes the jiva act now in accordance with its past karma, and He directed him earlier in accordance with what he did earlier, and so on. So, since samsara is without beginning, this is without fault. We can thus see that it is difficult to read divine grace in Advaita. Grace has to be showered on one without any pre-attached conditions, and that is not the case in Sankara’s Advaita.

This brief examination of the above papers of Dr. De Smet has shown that he has not been able to make a case for either the personhood of Sankara’s Advaita Brahman, nor for the origin of the seen universe, both of which differs radically from the Christian God and from creation ex nihilo. De Smet tried hard to find parallels between Christianity and Sankara’s Advaita, but he was dealing with two entirely different systems of thought. Just as in the understanding of Christianity one has to look at all the aspects of its theology, so also, in order to correctly comprehend Advaita, it is necessary to read Sankara’s commentaries as a whole in order to arrive at an understanding of Advaita in all its dimensions. Selective use of a line here or there cannot help in the long run. This, in no way belittles the sincere efforts of Dr. De Smet who genuinely sought parallels in the two systems. While new interpretations are always welcome they have to be in conformity with the understanding of the scholar they seek to interpret. Gadamer’s insightful observations regarding what hermeneutics entails is true of all such exercises.

Historical understanding, ...is the action of subjectivity purged of all prejudices, and it is achieved in direct proportion to the knower’s ability to set aside his own horizons by means of an effective historical method...Is it the case ...that the knower can leave his immediate situation in the present merely by adopting an attitude?

Shaped by the past in an infinity of unexamined ways, the present situation is the “given” in which understanding is rooted, and which reflection can never entirely hold at a critical distance and objectify.

Only a neutralized, prejudice-free consciousness guarantees the objectivity of knowledge.

Dr. De Smet was a Christian theologian and though sincere in his approach to Sankara and in his efforts to understand Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta, could not rid himself of his “prejudices”. His efforts, therefore, to reinterpret Brahman, tadvamya, adhyasa, and other Sankarian terms and concepts, in order to bring Sankara’s Advaita closer to Christian theology, have not yielded the desired result, in my view.

Notes

3. Bradley Malkovsky, "Introduction: The Life and Work of Richard V. De Smet,

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8. Cf. note 2, above.


13. Br. Up. 4.3.7. in translation reads: "Which is the Self? This (purusa) which is identified with the intellect is in the midst of the organs, the (self-effulgent) light within the heart (intellect). Assuming the likeness (of the intellect) it moves between the two worlds; it thinks as it were, and shakes, as it were. Being identified with dreams, it transcends the forms of death (ignorance etc.)." (Translation by Swami Madhavananda, The Brhadaranyakopanisad with the commentary of Sankaracarya, Almora: Advaita Ashrama, 1950.)

14. Commentaries on BS.I.12; Chand Up. 3.14.2; Br. Up. 2.3.6; 4.4.15; Kena Up. 4.4; Taitt. Up. 2.4.1; 2.

15. B.S.Bh. II.1.4; IV.3.14.

16. Commentaries on Mund.Up. I.1.4 and 5; Br. Up. 3.5.1; Chand. Up. 6.2.1.


18. paramarthato brahmasvarupasyapi satah asya jivasya...

19. evamavidyaya atmabhutamapi brahma anaptaṁ syat.
20. ‘tasmadva etasmadatmanah’ iti
brahmanyeva
atmasabdaprayogat
vedituratmaiva brahma.
22. Ibid., p. 239
23. B.S.Bh. I. 2. 22.
25. B.S.Bh. I. 3. 30; II. 1. 10
27. Ibid., pp. 272-73.
28. na ca yathoktavisesanasya
jagato
yathoktavisesanamisvaram
muktva
anyatah...sambhavayitum
sakyate.
29. avidyakalpitarupabhedabhuyu-
pagamt; avidyakalpitena ca
namarupalaksanena...tattvanyat
vabhyanantarvacaniyena
brahmaparinamadisarvavyavah
araspavataram pratipadyate;
paramarthikena brahma
parinamarthikena ca rupena
sarvavyavaharatatiamparinata
mavatisthate.
31. Ibid., p. 279.
32. Ibid., p. 279.
33. atah namarupe sarvavasthe
brahmaivaatmavati. na
brahma tadatmakam. te
tatpratyaakhyane na sta eti
tadakmaze ucye. tabhyam ca
upadhibhyam
jnatinynajnanasadadarthidasarv
asamyavaharahabagbrahma.
34. Sahitya Darpana 1, cited in
V.M.Apte’s The Practical
Sanskrit-English Dictionary
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
35. kinarthamasthane carca.
prakto hyanyo vivaksite’sya
vakyarthah asti. sa smartavyah
– brahmavidapnoti param ..
37. Cf. note 13 above.
Steps,” p. 37.
39. kritprayatnaapeaksatu
vihitapratisiddhavaiyarthadibh
yah.
40. api ca purvprayntamapeksya
idanim karayati purvataram ca
prayatnamapeksya
purvamakarayaditi
anadivatsamsarasyeti –
anavadyam.
41. David Linge, "Editor's
Introduction" to Hans Georg
Gadamer, Philosophical
Hermeneutics, Translated and
Edited by David Linge
(Berkeley: University of

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