The National Philosophy Test—II

The response to our first National Philosophy Test was almost unbelievable. Not one letter of protest! This avalanche of implied acceptance deserves a reward, and here it is.

Just like the other national tests, we wanted to use the “cool” medium of TV. Alas, we couldn’t find a sponsor interested enough in philosophy to cough up $60,000 per minute for his message in order for us to get ours across. Thus, here in the “hot” medium of print we shall try once again to jolt your memory, tickle your judgment, and try your patience.

This test has to do with the philosophy of Plato. There are many Platonists today, believe it or not, who swear by and extend his philosophy in a world somewhat different from the barefoot-in-the-agora days of Socrates. We are loath to deny the contemporary validity of much of what Plato asserted and questioned. But in the minds of many of his modern lieutenants, Plato has assumed the stature of a god, from whose lips nothing ever issued except sweet reason and pure objectivity. This test, we hope, will dispel any such illusions for all time.

Below are fourteen quotations. Nine of them are genuinely Plato’s. The other five, scattered at random, are purposely contrived nonsense. Your job is to distinguish between the genuine and the counterfeit.

Score yourself as follows:

1 right—you read a lot of Plato!
2 right—you should change your reading habits
3 right—this is your lucky day
4 or more right—are you an outpatient?

You will find the answers on page 125 of this issue. (And while you’re doing the test, you might also try figuring out what is wrong with the scoring suggested above!)
Yet once more let us consider: If the one is both same and other, as we have described, and is neither unity nor multiplicity, and rests in time, must it not, inasmuch as it is one, at times partake of being?

The truth is that the intemperance of love is a disease of the soul due chiefly to the moisture and fluidity which is produced in one of the elements by the loose consistency of the bones.

Therefore, if the one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things.

Nor, Theodorus, can we say the whole is not in the parts—neither in their sum nor in a few of them. For if it partakes of all, it must exist in one; for if there was any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts.

Of the men who came into the world, those who were cowards or led unrighteous lives may with reason be supposed to have changed into the nature of women if. the second generation.

If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?

Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones only.

When sounds are rough and obscure, and contain many tones, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, corresponding as
they do to the harmonic evidences of our other senses, which have natural pleasures associated with them.

9

Does not like always attract like?

10

Such was the origin of legs and hands, which were for this reason attached to every man; and the gods, deeming the front part of man to be more honorable and more fit to command than the hinder part, made us to move mostly in a forward direction.

11

The demiurge formed the soul from the indivisible and unchangeable, and also out of the divisible and material, from which he compounded a third and intermediate essence, partaking as it did of the nature of the same and of the other, and this compound he placed in the mean between becoming and being.

12

And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in an illusory and less real pleasure?

13

My answer is that all things material, remedial, and instrumental, are given to us with a view to regeneration, and that each generation is separate from, and for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the whole of essence is relative to the whole of being.

14

Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the one; for if they were, they could not be other than the one.