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Soviet-U.S. Relations 1917-1957, as Reflected in Soviet Anti-American Graphic Propaganda

William Frederick Alsop Jr.
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SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS 1917-1957, AS REFLECTED IN
SOVIET ANTI-AMERICAN GRAPHIC PROPAGANDA

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of History and Political Science
Butler University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
William Frederick Alsop, Jr.
April 1968
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The main sources for material used in this work are three. The library of the Russian Area Specialists Training Institute, Oberammergau, Germany, to which school the Marine Corps posted me from 1956 to 1958, provided my basic research ideas and material in German, English and Russian. Because of the school's proximity to Munich, I was able to supplement my research with additional books and other papers from the Institute for the Study of the USSR in that city.

In the years 1961-1963, while a naval attaché in Finland, I frequently used the facilities of the Universitets Biblioteket, library of the University of Helsinki. This institution's Russian collection is one of the non-Soviet world's most extensive, and is a "must" for any definitive work concerning printed Russian media.

Finally, three visits to the USSR in the years 1957-1962 enabled me to gain impressions and verify opinions which have been stated in this thesis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II: PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET UNION</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda and the Soviet Heritage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Public Opinion and Propaganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III: GRAPHIC PROPAGANDA</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Symbols</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV: THE APPARATUS OF PROPAGANDA</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censorship and Control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of TASS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1917-1945</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsarism and America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-1919: World War and Intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1927: War Communism and NEP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1939: Gathering Strength</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-1945: Second World War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1945-1953</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1947: Dissolution of the Alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-1953: The Cold War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VII: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1953-1957</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Stalin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drawings and Political Cartoons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maps and Charts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Photographs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>PRESS AND PUBLISHING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children's Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motion Pictures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Films</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Animated Cartoons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>PLAYS AND DEMONSTRATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children's Plays and Puppet Shows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lectures and Speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstrations and Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>OTHER FORMS OF PROPAGANDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Posters and Banners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exhibits and the Circus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII</td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOTNOTES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Examples of Soviet Graphic Propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transliteration Table for the Russian Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

(Illustrations follow page 198)

FIGURE

1. Wall Poster, 1919. "The Entente under the mask of peace."


7. Magazine Cartoon, 1947. "The USSR is preparing to attack America!"


FIGURE

15. Wall Poster, 1952. Korean War: "In Answer." "The people will always expose the evils that are being concealed from them."


20. Newspaper Cartoons, 1957. After the launching of the first Soviet earth satellite ("Sputnik").
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A "national psychology"—popular attitudes within a country—often has far-reaching political, economic and military implications for other, even distant countries. When this national psychology is favorable, other countries may benefit through increased trade, free cultural exchange, and the knowledge that, as there is no imminent danger to them, more money may be budgeted for non-military expenditures, thus enriching and developing those lands. If the psychology is unfavorable, then trade will be limited, with repercussions on the domestic economies of all nations involved; fear of invasion or air attack will cause military budgets to soar, thus hampering the development of these countries.

In the words of Archibald MacLeish, writing in 1949 for the Atlantic Monthly:

Never in the history of the world was one people as completely dominated, intellectually and morally, by another as the people of the United States by the people of Russia in the four years from 1946 through 1949. American foreign policy was a mirror image of Russian foreign policy; whatever the Russians did, we did in reverse.

In view of such events which have so influenced our lives in recent years, it would seem, therefore, that it is desirable for any nation to develop a favorable psychology toward another nation. Statesmen throughout the years have devoted millions of words and countless
deeds to this end; however, it is all too clear that within a sovereign nation it is the national government itself which holds the trump card. If that national government is disposed to be friendly, its assistance to another power in favorably propagandizing its own citizens can make the task relatively simple. If, conversely, the national government is inclined to be unfriendly or hostile, then the task of the first power can be exceedingly difficult, even insurmountable.

In the world of 1968 it is an accepted fact that there are national governments which vary greatly, with diverse views on the relative freedom of information which the masses—the public—is to be permitted. In the United States, we pride ourselves on freedom of the press as one of the freedoms which constitute the foundation of our progressive culture and represent a basic fairness to the individual. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, became shortly after its establishment a dictatorship which based itself on certain ideological principles which were repugnant to the Western world. It has operated within the framework of these principles for fifty years, with minor digressions and convolutions, but never a change in its ultimate goals.

These principles of communism, unacceptable to most of us, nevertheless constitute beliefs to which well over one-third of the world's population is committed by its governments, and which represent goals which have consistently shaped the domestic and foreign policy of these governments. As the influence of western thought was early deemed dangerous to the citizens of the newly constituted Soviet Union, the information flow was first cut off from other nations, then regulated information fed back into the stream by the Soviet government. The next
step, taken quickly thereafter, was a permanent campaign of "sovietization" which, since 1917, has praised everything Soviet and villified the West. That this could be waged at all is due to the nature of the government itself, and the traditional characteristics of the Russian.

It is a simple matter to use the Soviets' own words to condemn them of falsehood in the light of what we know about the actual machinations of their government; yet, as obvious as the guilt of misrepresentation is to us, the fact remains that the Soviet people are not favored with many-sided analysis of the news. For them there is but one interpretation of every event: the official interpretation as handed down from on high by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to its Department of Agitation and Propaganda, and through the press media to the citizen. Therefore, what is blatant misrepresentation to us is too often accepted as complete truth by the Soviet man.

The attitudes of people in a democracy are, within limits, ascertainable from a careful and scientific analysis of the press of that country. If one were to apply the same researching methods to the news media of a dictatorship such as the Soviet Union, the results would be unrealistic and unproductive, if a similar picture was to be the goal. As the Soviet government has a unique control over its people, it may safely be assumed that any study of the Soviet press would result in a clear picture, therefore, not of those attitudes which the people of Russia have, but of those attitudes which the government wishes to develop within the confines of the USSR. That there may be advantages to having such knowledge is obvious to any student of the Soviet Union, both as an aid in analysis of past events and as a basis for predicting with some accuracy future developments.
The present study is an attempt to bring into focus one of the many bases of Party power over Soviet citizens. It is no great revelation that the Soviet government has long indulged in anti-American propaganda, but the continuity, elaborateness and virulence of this "crusade of hatred" demands further study. It is essential that such study be undertaken parallel with an appraisal of Soviet-American relations since 1917.

In outlining the chronological development of the anti-American libel campaign, some space will be devoted to methodology, technology and apparent purposes of the Soviet propagandists. Space limitations preclude an elaborate study of Soviet propaganda as a whole; however, the selected theme--graphic propaganda--includes within its scope many aspects of the whole and thus is representative of the broader subject.
CHAPTER II

PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET UNION

Propaganda and the Soviet Heritage

The ideological heritage of Marxism-Leninism serves as the basis for the situation of prolonged internal tension and hostility to the outside world which has characterized Soviet life since the Revolution. The Russians have Lenin to thank for the concept of the increasingly hostile capitalist world; this concept has proved an invaluable foundation for continuing to justify at home an indefinite postponement of social improvements, a massive police system, and Russia's cultural and human isolation from the Western world.

From the time of the Intervention, when many of Lenin's erstwhile opponents rallied to his cause in the face of a foreign armed threat, the Bolsheviks came to appreciate the practical political value to them of a hostile external world. Since the 1930's they have, moreover, buttressed the ideological conception of capitalist encirclement with memories of external hostility taken from pro-Bolshevik Russian history.

A critic in Literaturnaya Gazeta even found anti-Americanism in Pushkin's writings. That author described Europeans who visited the United States:

They saw with astonishment democracy in its most disgusting cynicism, in its cruel prejudice and intolerable tyranny . . . Greed and envy on the part of the voters, timidity and servility on the part of the administrators . . .
Perhaps the only vital function of ideology in the Soviet state is a rationale for the acceptance of a condition of internal siege—necessary for the maintenance of the regime's domestic authority, but explained to the Russian people in terms of the encircling world's inexorable designs on the USSR.

The historic rise of the Soviet communist dictatorship to power on a tide of exploitation of mass grievances early taught the Soviets the value and power of propaganda as a weapon. The lesson was well absorbed, and has resulted in the past fifty years in a continuing campaign to mobilize mass sentiment for the purpose of enrolling support for the regime. This function has been taken always with great seriousness, and it is interesting to note that, though the history of the Party is replete with instances wherein policy was reversed or leadership abruptly changed, the basic evaluation of the usefulness and indispensability of propaganda has remained the same.

Lenin's conception of a vanguard of communists to lead the proletariat presented the firmest basis for setting up a powerful propaganda apparatus. Only in this way could success be assured. Through a complex network of educational agitation and propaganda activities, and through complete control of all media of mass communication, the Communist Party leadership today relentlessly pursues its acknowledged objective of winning doctrinal ascendancy over the minds of Soviet man. Party agitation and propaganda insinuate themselves into every element of the Soviet social structure, and with the total lack of competition they have attained a large measure of success.
Public opinion, being highly sensitive to deeds and events, is generally determined, therefore, by events rather than words. The function of the Soviet propaganda machine since its inception has been to create an endless series of "events" which, when portrayed with fiery descriptions and unflagging succession, have resulted in an unmistakable definition of the nation or object selected. Generally speaking, this has been the "West," with the United States since 1947 the leading contender for the Soviet unpopularity contest.

The goals of the Soviet regime have been the stability of Soviet Russia, the collapse of capitalism throughout the world, and the eventual communization of the world. At no time in history has the regime wavered from these aims, although at times its publicized foreign policy has de-emphasized certain aspects of them. Such periods were the years of NEP (New Economic Policy: 1921-1927) and the Second World War (1941-1945).

One of the main instruments used in world politics today is propaganda. The tradition of the free press in the democracies sometimes results in a lack of uniformity and accord which is confusing to analysts in other nations; however, the total control exercised by the Soviet government over all forms and aspects of propaganda has enabled it to attain the most all-pervasive and most homogeneous system of opinion control in history. This has been done by saturation propaganda and also by denying all competition from sources with divergent points of view.

Some analysts maintain that public opinion, as we know it, does not exist in the Soviet Union. This is undoubtedly true, if public
opinion as we know it is considered; however, that even the Soviet regime considers the importance of "what the people think" as a factor in determining its domestic, and to a lesser degree, its foreign policy is obvious. If nothing more, it is a curb on bald aggression. Thus, the tremendous emphasis on the use of internal propaganda in the Soviet Union. This may be illustrated by a glance at the existing governmental structure of the USSR, based on the Constitution of 1936. Admittedly, the Supreme Soviet is but a rubber stamp for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, but why go through all this trouble merely to soothe public opinion? In the words of Fainsod:

Dictatorships ordinarily prefer not to reveal themselves in all their stark nakedness. By assuming a constitutional disguise, they clothe the realities of arbitrary power in the protective garb of tradition and legitimacy. They pay Constitutionalism the ultimate compliment of borrowing its facade to conceal the authoritarian nature of their governing formula.²

The national elections in the USSR, though entirely lacking in any free choice of candidates, serve a purpose also, according to the late Andrei Vyshinsky, because they show "that the entire population of the land of the Soviets are (sic) completely united in spirit."³

Article 125 of the 1936 Constitution safeguards freedom of speech, press, assembly and of street processions and demonstrations. These rights are, however, prefaced with the proviso that they are to be exercised only "in conformity with the interests of the working class, and in order to strengthen the socialist system."⁴ In other words, they cannot be utilized to challenge or criticize the primacy of the Party leadership.

It has been stated that, as the Soviet system of government allows less scope for the pressure of public opinion to be felt, the result has
been that the apprehensiveness of the Russian people has exercised no marked influence on Soviet policy. This statement, taken at face value, can be very misleading. Surely the pressure of raw public opinion as such in the Soviet Union does not constitute the all-powerful lever on policy that it does in the United States; however, the seeming fear of the potential opposition of the masses in the USSR has at times caused marked changes to come about. Admittedly, there have been times when public opinion was blatantly ignored, such as the time of collectivization, but when Nazi Germany attacked Russia in 1941, much was done to assuage public opinion. Within a few months, the entire thematic structure of Soviet propaganda had radically changed to suit the new needs.

The Soviet press through the years has been filled with "vindications" of actions which have shocked the entire world. That such justification is necessary is, in itself, an admission that no government can operate long and successfully without some measure of public support. It is also typical of the methods which the Communist Party has used in maintaining its control over the thinking of the people. Every negative quality represented in the Soviet system, every hardship, is justified to the masses in some way.

The hardships of the Soviet people are described as sacrifices which are required for the building of a better socialist world. After all, the public is told, the lot of the masses elsewhere is much worse than their own. Moral indignation and contempt for the decadence of bourgeois civilization is stimulated by playing on the intrinsic pride of the Russian individual; every opportunity is used to hack away at the character of his "enemy": the Westerner. Parallel with this, emphasis
is given continuously to symbolic expressions of the unity of the Soviet people.

As an instrument of policy in the competition for political power, propaganda has long been recognized as an effective weapon. When used under circumstances in which barriers are constructed against the flow of communications from opposing courses it is, of course, doubly effectual. As with all mechanisms, the efficient use of propaganda requires certain technical skills. The skills appropriate to propaganda are those which can manipulate a one-sided flow of symbols so as to modify the behavior of a designated audience in ways favorable to the purpose which the propagandist serves. What has been a handy crutch for governments in the past has become under the Soviets an adjunct to power, an indispensable weapon of the weighty bureaucracy which governs the Soviet Union. As Stalin declared in 1926, "... the confidence of the working class is gained not through force ... but by the Party's ... readiness and ability to convince the masses of the correctness of its slogans."

The rise of the propaganda function is a phenomenon which is associated with the growth of mass societies. Certainly, the development of propaganda as an art would not have been possible to the extent prevalent today without the coincidental development and improvement of modern means of communication. Concurrent with this has been a change in the nature of propaganda. Mass politics makes it impossible for an individual or a group of individuals to maintain face to face contact with an audience. Instead, modern "mass media" are used as the channels of intercourse, and as a result the type of propaganda used is simply that which
is characteristically unilateral, indirect and symbolic. It is evident in recognizing this fact, that the need for the propaganda specialist has now entered the picture.

The Soviet leadership has in recent years developed and encouraged a sizeable reservoir of trained specialists, largely Party members, who man the government’s agitational, educational and propaganda posts. These specialists are well paid members of the Soviet bureaucracy who share in comfort enjoyed by the Party elite and range in type from the workers of "Agitprop," writers, dramatists and leaders of the theatre and film industry to artists. These are generally conceded to be in one of the top income brackets financially and on the top level socially. Their propaganda machine has been described by one writer as "Bolshevism's greatest achievement." In a lively sense, the Communist Party’s twelve million members in the Soviet Union are all propagandists.

Methodology

The primary methodology of Soviet propaganda is based on boldness and repetition, the blending of facts and symbols into propaganda themes, and the attempt to associate these themes in the minds of the audience with emotional reactions which the Soviet government wishes to stimulate and maintain. This can be easily illustrated by a haphazard glance at communist propaganda of any year since 1917; indeed, any editorial comment on an event or action is invariably slanted to reveal the communist "perception" of such an event. Such "perception" naturally consists of an intent to channel the reader's thinking along lines of orthodox Marxist-
Leninist doctrine, as the interpretation given to an event by Communist writers reflects such applied doctrine. The propaganda of current interpretation of this dogma, or "Party Line," is always subordinated to whatever basic tasks confront the Party at that particular stage.  

Used frequently in Soviet propaganda is ridicule and humor; satire (the "art of the opposite approach"; shock (atrocities, gory scenes, brutality); falsehood; half-truths (editing speeches, "doctoring" photographs); exaggeration; "just plain folks" Khrushchev and Bulganin's tours); appeals of power ("we want peace, but if they dare threaten us..."); size ("the Soviet Air Force is the world's greatest"), and skill ("who but Soviet technologists could have sent the earth satellite on its orbit?"); and affective language ("capitalist interventionists," "Nazi looters," "imperialist warmongers").

The Soviets take advantage of perceived "antagonisms" and contradictions among capitalist nations. Much of their propaganda consists of deliberate efforts to incite one against the other, and to increase any tension that may be present. These contradictions are portrayed as nullifying any hope of unity of purpose. Nationalist aspirations of underdeveloped lands are exploited heavily by current propaganda, and the sympathy of the Middle Asian peoples within the USSR is played upon in a Moslem version of Pan Slavism. There is a constant attempt to arouse indignation and anger over Western moves by careful reporting of alleged methods used. Thus is de facto justification and popular assent gained for Soviet policy counter-moves. The symbols "democracy," "sovereignty" and "socialism" are manipulated at will by the propagandists to mobilize opinion. Lenin's line that Soviet democracy is a thousand times more
democratic than bourgeois democracy is maintained with sanctimonious hypocrisy; in contrast, the United States is said to have merely "formal" democracy, since the bourgeoisie control the real power: the means of production.

A politically inept spokesman talking in a misleading, warlike tone can be assured that his words will be skillfully exploited by Moscow. For example, the utterances of a prominent American legislator who in 1945 asked a group of United States soldiers if they didn't want to keep on going to Moscow were widely reported in the Soviet Union. The increased frequency with which the Soviet propagandists have reprinted American cartoons and photographs with new or mutilated captions, and the effectiveness of using our own words against us presents a problem. For example, the number of times the Soviets have reprinted the photograph showing a Negro slum in Washington, D.C. with the Capitol in the background has been considerable. This was originally taken from an American magazine over fifteen years ago.
CHAPTER III

GRAPHIC PROPAGANDA

Definition

All propaganda relies in great part on creating thought images; after all, we usually think in images, rather than in words. Graphic propaganda then, as an attempt to reduce symbols to their most easily identifiable bases, may be considered to be a shortcut to Man's consciousness. Certainly it requires fewer words to convey the impression intended; it requires less attention by the recipient, and is therefore more suited technically to certain types of propaganda, such as posters, billboards, as well as any event which involves mass movements, such as parades. The graphic arts include some of Man's earliest attempts at communication of ideas (drawings, sketches) and some of his most complex and recent (television and motion pictures).

Even in a society enjoying a common language, the same words may not stimulate the same thought or intended meaning. In the Soviet Union, with its multiple ethnic groups and languages, there exists a far greater problem in mass communication than has the United States, with its nearly homogeneous language group. Graphic propaganda can be used as an aid to bridge this gap, particularly with an illiterate or poorly educated rural population, such as constitutes a large percentage of the Soviet people.
In its simplicity, it is eminently suitable for use by the Soviets, whose basic method of repetition demands non-complexity.

Graphic propaganda is, however, an intrinsic part of the overall propaganda effort of the Soviets and must be studied in context with it. As not all desired propaganda goals are readily accomplished by graphic means, it is sometimes imperative that another method be used. The reader will do well to keep in mind that a propaganda effort, as with all other broad ventures, can be successful only when all component parts operate in harmony. As the Soviet anti-American propaganda effort unfolds in these pages it will become increasingly evident how thorough and all-encapsulating it has been and continues to be.

Graphic propaganda includes within its scope any form of propaganda which relies for conveyance of its message primarily upon visual images. Some of its forms are purely graphic in nature; i.e., cartoons, wall posters, placards; others are more complex and may include two or more types of propaganda, such as motion pictures, television and lectures, which affect both the sense of sight and the sense of hearing. Other forms of graphic propaganda are book illustrations, banners, circuses, parades and demonstrations, billboards, artwork of all types in galleries, slides, handouts, plays and tableaus, puppet shows, theatre marquees, exhibits, photographs in magazines and newspapers, maps, schemes, diagrams and charts, vignettes, illustrations, ornaments and illustrated headings.

It is readily apparent that this vast assemblage of media lends a veritably unlimited assortment of tools to the professional propagandist. Fully as apparent to the researcher is the degree to which the Soviets have utilized this bonanza. Since the early days of the Revolution in
1917 they have given ever-increasing emphasis to the importance of graphic propaganda.

The Symbols

As previously stated, successful propaganda requires the clever manipulation of symbols. What these symbols represent must always be clear in the minds of the propagandized masses. The Soviets were fortunate in being able to take over from the previous regime a mass of misconceptions, prejudices and preconceived ideas about the United States. Some of the positive ideas—the admiration for America's technical ability, the wonder at its progress—the USSR managed in time to turn to its own favor by developing within the new Soviet man a defensive attitude concerning his own abilities. A new hatred of "the West" as a monster which wanted to maintain the subservience of the Russians and Russian technology was created. National pride was nurtured and strongly promoted by the Soviets. Those prejudices which were anti-American to begin with, the Soviets took over wholesale. These have been kept alive through the years of communist dictatorship by the artful use of propaganda. Several years' exposure to such propaganda enabled Admiral Stevens to write in 1953 that he had "seldom been aware of anything but distortion, dishonesty and deliberate misrepresentation in the picture of America which the Soviet government gives to its citizens."¹

As is true in the case of almost any great country in the world, there are certain recognizable symbols, figures and characters which are unmistakably identifiable with the United States. Basically, these
include the Statue of Liberty, Coca-Cola, Uncle Sam, Wall Street, the
Ku Klux Klan and the Dollar. Perhaps unknown to the majority of stay-at-
home Americans but evident to almost any foreigner are many other symbols
which are fully as legitimate a trademark of the American abroad. These
include the bow-tie, the gaudy-colored necktie, the white-belted and
helmeted military policeman. Many other symbols, though not specifically
American, are frequently associated with the United States. In this
category are included the man in the silk hat and cutaway coat (Wall
Street and the capitalist), derby hat, dark glasses, pipe or cigar, whisky,
money-bags, and so on.

A main propaganda theme in the USSR has long been that the masses
of the American people, led by the progressive elements under the banner
of the Communist Party, urgently want peace, but that their dreams are
frustrated by the scheming and designing of a ruthless few. These latter
are invariably the capitalists, in some guise or other. Depending on the
period in history, these "few" and privileged have been portrayed as
greedy speculators in Wall Street, Ku Klux Klansmen, militarists, the
culturally barren, gangsters, seedy bureaucrats or brutal oppressors.
In the propagandists' book it is a simple thing to tie in the activities
of any of these groups with any other, and it can be done on short notice,
as a sudden change in the Party line dictates.

It is noteworthy that the lines drawn between the "good" and the
"bad" are so clearly defined that even the least alert will quickly
choose between the two. Natural sympathy for the underdog comes quickly
to the fore when the two types are displayed side by side. Invariably,
the "bad" (the few) are caricatured as fat, evil-looking individuals,
while the "good" (the many) are shown as thin, pale and clean-cut, with sincerity and determination on their pleasant faces. The masses of alleged homeless, hungry and destitute unemployed Americans come from the latter group.

To the Soviet eye, the average American is beset with a myriad of difficulties, problems that compound one another and condemn him to a life of subservience and dependence on the whims of the capitalist few. His world is a world of the Depression years; the apple barrel on the street corner and the haunted look of the chronically worried are portrayed as typifying America. Ever present in the background are the hovering figures of the club-wielding policeman or the revolver-bearing sheriff, and always the threat of violence and terror. Invariably, to offset the poverty represented by an unshaven man sleeping on a park bench, multi-million-dollar skyscrapers tower in the background and well-dressed, fat elite drive past in chauffered limousines, oblivious to his suffering. Photographs of strike incidents are used to illustrate either the internal struggle of labor versus capital or American disorganization and chaos, depending on the whim of the propagandist.

Thus is the world of the past evoked to serve the purpose of modern propaganda. Situations that have not taken place for decades are represented as happening daily, and events which are isolated or instances of poverty and degradation as reported in the American press are seized upon and reprinted as examples of life under the capitalist system. These include child brides, illiteracy, etc. The "two Americas" are vividly contrasted in Soviet propaganda, such as in two photographs printed side by side in Sovetskaya Latviya in 1957; a medal-winning
The poodle "gives a champagne party" for thirty dogs, attended by servants, while an unemployed, moneyless man jumps from the top of a building to his death. "Such are the two Americas: millionaires who don't know what they want and unlucky unemployed, ending their lives through suicide . . . ."2 Another article devoted to "Fifth Avenue, New York" illustrates its opulence on one hand, while men "without a spark of hope" while away the night on park benches nearby.3 The hovering specter of crisis is depicted as the "inescapable sputnik of capitalism." 4 "Racism—an ideological tool of the warmongers"5 has been interminably a successful theme in the USSR, with the Negro's unhappy role in American life portrayed in vivid terms. The "Lynch Law," lack of equal rights, his poverty and his hopeless conditions are contrasted with the integrity and simple desires of the Negro. Bound Negroes are shown being dragged to a tree for lynching by the Ku Klux Klan, 6 and by a posse which is warned by a policeman, "Tell the gentleman that they'll have to move their autos from the road, or I'll have to fine them for obstructing traffic."7 Anti-Negro rioting in Little Rock in 1957 was well-publicized in the Soviet press. Photographs and remarks of fellowtraveler Paul Robeson were used frequently in articles to support Soviet theses. 8 At times, the plight of American Indians, Mexicans, Japanese and other minority groups in the United States has been the subject of propaganda. To support their "racist ideology," American scientists are accused of preaching Mendelian genetics. 9

American political institutions are condemned as false and merely a facade for gangsterism, costly campaigns in which politicians are bought and sold, elections won by bribery of the voters or threats on
their lives. The Soviets claim that both parties are the same, with the same objectives, so there is no real choice for the voter to make. Krokodil, immediately after the 1952 presidential campaign, showed the GOP elephant and the Democrats' donkey being herded into a common stable ("Wall Street") by a capitalist.

Armament and militarization are two of the most common themes. The profit-hungry capitalists, monopolist greed and the need for maintaining the munitions industry at top productivity form the presumed basis for such propaganda. The Marshall Plan, NATO, SEATO and other such milestones in United States foreign policy have been attacked regularly in the press. American ties with "Fascist scum" (Franco, Salazar, etc.) and the Nazis in particular (the new German Bundeswehr, "rehabilitation of war criminals") are associated with the resurgent militarism of the United States. American officers are shown as supervising the refitting of brutal Nazis, as arm-in-arm with Nazi generals, being the direct descendants of Himmler, and as black-marketeers.

American overseas bases are the subject of much propaganda, along with the alleged excesses of "G.I.'s" at these bases. Native populations are shown resenting American "occupation" of their homeland, while "puppet" governments serve the needs of the United States. Krokodil cartoons showed an apprehensive British lion being immobilized by heavy concrete weights ("United States military bases"), while a cigar-smoking American officer says, "Just a few more—and then you can be perfectly assured of your safety!"

A rude soldier sprawls in a chair in a foreign home where he is billeted. The room is a shambles, mirrors and pottery shattered, a
machine gun pointing out the window. The "Yankee," a cigar between his teeth and a whisky bottle in his hands, mutters, "It's strange! Everywhere I have been, they don't like me!..." The ghost of Beethoven observes American drunkenness, jazz bands and militarism and sadly comments: "Though I was born in Bonn, there's no place for me here now!"

The individual American soldier is depicted as a purely negative type. Tainted with cowardice, laziness and irresponsibility, lack of training and education, drunkenness and debauchery, venality and corruption, he fits the needs of the Pentagon, which does not want him to be any different, for then he would not fight the "peaceloving" communists. A full-page article in Krasnaya Zvezda ("Where the American Occupiers Make Themselves at Home") was illustrated with three photographs of drunken, learing soldiers in West Berlin: "Here they are, 'Defenders of Western Civilization!'" An American soldier gluts himself with milk while an emaciated French mother and her children stand by: "To your child's health, Madam!" "Drug addicts in the United States Army" was the subject of a Soviet officer's letter in Krasnaya Zvezda.

Atomic and other nuclear weapons have remained the symbol of the USA, although the Soviet Union probably has them in similar quantity. They are shown as representing the American threat to world peace, as their destructive power has given the United States overconfidence in its aggressive power. Uncle Sam has been shown with an A-bomb for a beard; A- and H-bombs are shown scattered under the table in an "occupied" apartment, are object for adoration in a church by "bombworshippers," and are being served as "imported food" for the hungry rearmed Germany. A wealthy capitalist sits before his fireplace, "at last contented" because he is surrounded by casks of gunpowder and huge bombs.
Courts of law are a mockery of justice, as criminals with money do not go to jail. At a trial, Krokodil portrays a witness taking the oath on a Bible, which is then opened and money poured into the witness' hat. Court judges are bought and sold, and as the police force is in the pay of the capitalists, there is no real justice. The policeman is invariably shown as the enemy of the average citizen, but as the confidant of the wealthy criminal. "Collusion of court and criminal" is attacked in one cartoon which shows the judge bargaining with the accused. In another ("When the police don't meddle in the affairs of the press"), a policeman turns his back and smiles while Ku Klux Klansmen pillage and burn a "Workers' Newspaper Office."

American lack of culture is a theme that has been constant for at least three decades; it appears to be used as a "filler" when no particular emphasis is being given to another topical campaign. Associated with this are the symbols Hollywood, tasteless music and art, comics, juvenile delinquency, moral degeneration, sensational sex and gangster movies and novels, faddism ("rock 'n roll"), immodest display of the body (bathing "beauty" "Queens"), the ballyhoo of advertising and its offensiveness, seedy affectation and preoccupation with materialism, barbarity and vulgarism in American literature. Above all is the reminder that in the "Land of the Dollar" money can buy anything, including a man's self-respect. An article, "Perverted Amusement" in Komsomol'skaya Pravda in October, 1957 portrayed a young American girl smashing a new automobile with a sledgehammer. In a raffle "for one dollar, if you have the lucky ticket, you win the right to smash this beautiful machine with a hammer."
A cat howling on a rooftop is heard by a mother and her daughter:
"You're right, it's Elvis Presley. But how'd he ever get up there?" Mickey Spillane's Mike Hammer is dissected in "American Don Quixote," as a cartoon shows him complete with roadster, armament and blonde. Mickey Spillane's Mike Hammer is dissected in "American Don Quixote," as a cartoon shows him complete with roadster, armament and blonde.

"Gangsters of the Pen steal, loot, murder "and then 'write their memoirs' in America." A cigar-smoking child is jailed for murder, but the "chief criminals ('TV,' 'Hollywood,' and 'Comics') hide themselves." 

A gangster questions a boy co-worker: "Hallo, Jimmy; how did last night's raid on the cashier's office go?" "Just as it says [in the comics]." A photograph of children "shooting" blindfolded youths while playing "firing squad" was hailed in Ogonyók as "the upbringing of murderers." 

American youth is portrayed as wallowing in a morass of criminality and despair from which there is no hope of escape under present conditions. As in all nations the youth is the "hope of tomorrow," but with his environment of poverty, and lack of hope for future improvement coupled with the hostility and tension created by the American militarists and businessmen, his lot is miserable, indeed. Progressive youth, enlightened by proper leadership and education, can still save America; thus is the door always open for cooperation with the communists. All the abnormalities attributed to the American way of life are cited as reasons for the position of young people. 

In the Fifties, Soviet propagandists began to pay increasing attention to the teenagers of America, concurrently with a noticeable upswing in the Soviets' own problem of juvenile delinquency. The convenience is obvious in being able to blame American "faddism" and decadent influence as a basis for their own difficulties.
The "Press in Chains" is another theme which has seen long service to the propagandists. According to their interpretation, the American press is the lackey of the capitalist and merely serves his bidding; nothing is printed which has not been approved, and thus the press is sterile. The mass of the people are dupes of this cunning and corrupt press, which draws their attention from the realities of the class struggle. A postwar play, The Russian Question had this as its central theme, and Moscow often portrays the capitalist as controlling government policy and thinking. Ogonyok in 1948 printed an article, "Randolph Hearst, King of the Yellow Press," with a center illustration showing Hearst lying in bed amid all his wealth. In the article, Charles Beard, American historian, was quoted as saying, "There isn't a variety of vice and crime which Hearst would not use to make a profit." Vyshinsky declared that by Hearst's orders his newspapers "carry on a bloodthirsty agitation against the Communist Party, the revolutionary workers' movement and the USSR."  

Krokodil portrayed the "capitalist press" as a blowsy prostitute accepting the arm of a fat capitalist—"at your service"—while he proffers money. Western journalists are seen as "news falsifiers"—vines which grow when watered by American dollars—by Krokodil, as a "sordid concoction... marked 'Made in U.S.A.'", and as speaking "with an American voice." Similarly, the Voice of America radio was dismissed as "those ugly sounds which pollute the atmosphere."

At every opportunity, the vices and shortcomings of the United States are contrasted devastatingly with the advantages and morality of
the Soviet system. As long ago as 1920, Sovetskaya Pravda declared, "If we compare the conditions of life in Russia with the conditions of life in the West, we have to state that our position is brilliant." 52

Lack of subtlety may be called almost a trademark of Soviet propaganda of the past. Impressive though it is from the standpoint of volume and universality of coverage, there is none of the subtlety which earmarks cartoons of such masters as David Low (Manchester Guardian) or the photographs of David Douglas Duncan. A capitalist is called a capitalist and is caricatured in the form manner, according to Party demands.

One of the shortcomings of the bulk of Soviet propaganda is that it lacks the skill and attention to detail which would make it more plausible to those who are accustomed to it. Some of the purported incidents, the descriptions of events, are so obviously incredible as to raise immediate doubt in the mind of the reader. The Soviets rely on repetition of a limited number of basic themes to create habits of thought, simultaneously excluding competing thoughts, as their government excludes competing parties. Such a method has been aptly named "the buckshot method" of propaganda.

On the other hand, Soviet cartoonists are exceedingly clever and capable. Their work reflects the wry humor of the Russian turned to political advantage. Most of the selected themes strike directly at the heart of the matter, and often the master cartoonists in Krokodil have managed to create a cartoon which is memorable by virtue of its simplicity and boldness. An excellent example printed in 1954 portrayed the head and shoulders of the Statue of Liberty, with two policemen peering...
out from inside, their cruel faces forming the pupils of the statue's "eyes." The policemen's billy-clubs (hanging outside the corners of the "eyes") form two large tears: Liberty is weeping for justice in America. Very effective propaganda!

Techniques of cartooning used are, as might be expected, many and varied. All the old tricks of political cartoonists have been used and continue to crop up in print at intervals. Many old themes have been used again and again; sometimes in the raw, other times with modifications. An excellent example of this is the cartoon which shows Uncle Sam watering the seedbed from which pop the bayonets of resurgent militarism; this was used with little change in 1936, 1947 and 1954 in Krokodil.

A few of the devices commonly used are: the teetering "house of cards" composed of members of a coalition or alliance; unstable figures supporting one another, with those on the bottom being stepped on (alliances); a marionette dangling by strings held by Uncle Sam or Wall Street ("puppet" governments); reflections in a mirror which show similarities to the past (Hitler, etc.); Wall Street juggling the law, the White House, or militarists; Uncle Sam's hat (or a military cap) used as a nest for eggs which hatch "espionage," "terror," or "diversion"; holding dogs on leashes (controlling governments, individuals); the wagon being pulled by statesmen in yokes; feeding money to swine in troughs (statesmen); sawing down a tree which represents the UNO, peace, etc.; the firebrand-bearing madmen teetering on a precipice; blowing up balloons (the "A-bomb threat," the "Hungarian Question") which explode and dissipate; and roads which fork and are marked with signs, i.e. "to Peace," "to War."
An innovation which is really not new, but which was being used more frequently and with more finesse in 1957 is the device of taking an article or series of photographs from the Western or American press and reprinting it in part with comments and captions supplied by the Soviets.\textsuperscript{54} These articles which appear in the Western press are basically of two types: those about the USSR which are reprinted with sarcastic and amused observations by the propagandists (playing on the people's pride), and those concerning the United States which show us in a bad light. The original captions are often sufficiently anti-American to justify their retention, but just as often the Soviets draw their own conclusions in additional comments.

Photographs from \textit{Life} were reprinted in "Life Speaks Untruth" in \textit{Ogony\v{z}ek}.\textsuperscript{55} Beside the original American photographs were those of the same persons, objects and places taken by Soviet cameramen from more advantageous angles and under different conditions. The captions of these ridicule \textit{Life}'s original article. A \textit{Newsweek} article concerning anti-Americanism throughout the world was reprinted in part, with the least complimentary quotes given prominence and put into context with an "explanation."\textsuperscript{56}

"'Mechanics Illustrated' Claims the Right to the Moon"\textsuperscript{57} reprinted the American author's demand, "Let's claim the moon—now! We can beat the Reds with this plan to shoot our flag to the moon by rocket." Under reproduced drawings from the article, \textit{Ogony\v{z}ek} emphasized that, though Soviet scientists always preferred to work for peaceful aims, "the people in the U.S. in all walks of life see 'aggressive plans of the Soviet
Union. Under the banner heading, "Imperialism Develops Murderers and Rapists," Komsomol'skaya Pravda reprinted photographs from Newsweek which showed a smiling family group. The caption describes how two of the women were later murdered by a fourteen-year-old son. A young American boy in another photograph plays with "an automatic gun and guided missile launcher, which shoots and explodes like the real thing." A cartoon from The Christian Science Monitor showed a rat ("inflation") nibbling at the "U.S. Dollar buying-power."
Organization

The Department of Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop), which controls all propaganda within the Soviet Union, is immediately responsible to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Fanning out under it in the organizational structure is the subordinate propaganda control apparatus, numerous Agitprops on a smaller scale.

Inkeles describes the functions of this department as

... general responsibility for moulding and mobilizing public opinion in the Soviet Union so that it will most effectively support and facilitate the achievement of those long and short-range ends which the party leadership has defined as the goals of the nation as a whole.

The present Agitprop was created in 1939, having been proposed at the XVIII Party Congress "to concentrate the work of party propaganda and agitation in one body and to merge the propaganda and agitation departments into a single ... administration." As the Politburo determines the tactical line of the Party on major questions, its close control over Agitprop insures a "unity of voice" of Communist propaganda on any given issue. Agitprop, a policy staff, acts in the capacity of planner, director and watchdog of all communications media. For internal propaganda the flow of direction is from the Central Committee, directly to Agitprop
to Pravda, and thence to the internal media: the Home Service, *Izvestiya*, Mosfilm Studio, etc.³

The internal organization of *agitprop* is elaborate, consisting of fourteen subsections in 1957: propaganda (administrative); agitation (administrative); central (Moscow) press; local (provincial) press; publishing houses; films (Sovfilm); radio; fictional literature; art affairs; cultural enlightenment; schools; science; party propaganda and mass agitation; VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries).⁴ Within these agency subdivisions, the assignment of key personnel is rigorously controlled by the *agitprop* administration.

Since 1939, directors of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda have included Zhdanov, Shepilov and Suslov, all important members of the Central Committee of the Party. Its head in 1957 was F. V. Konstantinov. The post of director has served as a stepping stone for many to other high government and Party posts.

The second largest component of Soviet expenditures as revealed in the annual budget in the postwar years has been financing the so-called "cultural and social measures." Under the heading of "education" in the budget is included also the cost of political propaganda, all newspaper and book publishing; therefore, no factual information on exact expenditures for propaganda is available as such. An estimate by Evans in his study of world-wide Communist propaganda activities gave the amount spent by the USSR and its satellites in 1953 for such purposes as over three billion dollars.⁵ This source credits the Soviets alone with spending over 935 millions for broadcasts, news services, films and the
financing of agitators; 56 millions to train propagandists; and 85 millions for domestic book and magazine publishing; while the satellites were estimated to have spent another 481 millions. The director of the United States Information Service in 1957 estimated that the Soviets were producing 100,000 trained propagandists and agitators per year."  

Censorship and Control

The Soviet press is not a free press, nor is it a commercial enterprise in our sense of the term. It is an industry which is formally controlled by the government, but which is actually the organ of an exclusive political party. Instead of reflecting public opinion, it is designed and primarily intended to mould and shape it. To fulfill this function, the government exercises monopolistic control over all press media, all books and periodicals published in the Soviet Union. Indeed, this control extends to all paper and newsprint manufactured in the USSR, as well.

Censorship and control over all publication is exercised by the Party in two ways: formal and informal. The former is the most effective and all-pervasive; this is carried on both before and after publication of any material by branches of the Main Office for Literature and Publishing Business (Glavlit). Its charge under law is to carry out "all kinds of political and ideological, military and economic control of printed matter, manuscripts, photographs, pictures, etc., designed for publication or circulation, and of radio messages, lectures and exhibitions." There is a Glavlit in each Soviet republic and a central Glavlit in Moscow.
Facilities for printing are confined to Party, government and government-controlled organizations. Printing offices of any kind, including mimeographing or hectographing processes "may be opened only by government agencies, cooperatives and public organizations." All agencies, including governmental agencies except the Communist Party, Izvestiya and the Academy of Sciences (which maintain internal controls of their own) are controlled by Glavlit and must account strictly for all paper and type metal used.

Informal control over publication is exercised mainly through individual members' adherence to the Party line. As practically all key positions in the industry are held by Party members or candidates, the self-restraint they practice serves to perpetuate their good standing in the Party—and thus ensure their political future.

A former Soviet writer described the method of controlling thematic planning in the nation's press:

Every once in a while the Central Committee sends out a directive telling the editors what they must emphasize—things like ... settlement of the virgin lands, when to criticize the United States, when to talk about "peaceful coexistence," and so on. Practically all directives are secret and are concerned with aspects of major policies.

The Role of TASS

By Lenin's decree on December 1, 1917, the former Tsarist Petrograd Telegraph Agency was designated "the central information organ under the Council of People's Commissars." Over a period of years, this agency developed into the huge structure which is now called TASS.
(Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union), and which scours information from and provides information to almost forty percent of the world's population. TASS's importance is further emphasized by the fact that, together with correspondents in Pravda, Izvestiya, Trud and Komsomol'skaya Pravda, it is the sole provider of news to the press of the satellite nations. It is thus in a position to "control" news in these countries, and this it does as a matter of policy.

The head of TASS in 1955, N. G. Pal'gunov, in a booklet entitled The Bases of Press Information: TASS and Its Role, explained TASS's function as "not to disseminate information which, by its content and nature is like a mere photographic process . . . but information which, based on Marxist-Leninist theory, provides an analysis of events." Pal'gunov further emphasized the difference between Western and Soviet editorial procedures in his definition of the function of information as "agitation with facts."

TASS is subordinated to the Council of Ministers and the Party leadership. Its organization consists of four main staffs: the offices of Foreign Information, Information for the Foreign Press, Union Information, and the Local Press. In addition, there are four editorial offices of supplementary information: Radioinformatsiya, Pressbyuro, Fotokhronika and Pressklishne.

The Office of Union Information (RSI) "gathers and adapts information about life in the Soviet Union, transfers it into print and manages a net of TASS correspondents in the autonomous republics, krays and oblasts of the RSFSR." The Office of Information for the Local Press (RINP) "prepares information for republic, kray, city and rayon newspapers . . . for expeditious transmission to the periphery press."
Presskliche TASS, which was absorbed in November, 1954 by Fotokhronika TASS, provides "photo-information and illustrations in the form of prepared matrices for immediate printing," and thus enables the small local newspaper to improve its format with illustrations, which are costly to engrave.

Fotokhronika TASS provides editors with "indispensable chronicle photographs" taken throughout the USSR and the world. In 1955, 25,000 separate domestic photo-subjects were covered. Fotokhronika TASS also provides the editors of central, republic, kray, and oblast newspapers with prepared captions for the photographs to insure uniformity and correctness. While such a procedure is perfectly in accord with those methods used by Western press services (e.g., Associated Press), the advantages of such a system to the propagandists are self-evident.

Some idea of the capabilities of TASS may be gained from the revelation on December 6, 1957 that within ninety minutes of the failure of the United States to launch its first earth satellite ("Vanguard"), TASS in Moscow had the story "on the wires" to its subscribers; that is to say, the Soviet and satellite press. Alert to the propaganda significance of such an event, the news agency displayed "remarkable agility ... in moving the story toward publication." In a rare follow-up story a half-hour later, they added quoted explanations of the failure as issued by American scientists.

Among the reasons given by Pal'gunov for TASS's careful pursuit of foreign information was: "To contribute to the unmasking of Fascist propaganda, to counteract the propaganda of racism, national discrimination and superiority, xenophobia, and the propaganda of national hatred."
CHAPTER V

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1917-1945

Terrorism and America

The United States and Russia coexisted reasonably well in the early Nineteenth Century because the two powers had common foes (primarily Great Britain) and common problems (such as freedom of the seas). Neither nation was particularly aggressive, in spite of the effects of Pan-Slavism and Manifest Destiny in that century. Above all, neither power saw much of the other, and each could expand without impinging on the other's domain.

An astute observation by the American Secretary of State Seward in 1861 is worthy of note:

Russia and the United States may remain good friends until, each having made the circuit of half the globe in opposite directions, they shall meet and greet each other in the regions where civilization first began.1

1917-1919: World War and Intervention

When the United States belatedly entered the Great War in April, 1917, it found a badly mauled Russia as an ally. President Wilson's continuing attempts to keep Russia in the war ran counter to the efforts of the Bolsheviks to consolidate their power with promises of "bread,
land and peace," and open hostility of American diplomats and statesmen to their regime was not soon forgotten. An active anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaign was even waged by a group of Americans. This has since been depicted by the Soviets as an effort to take advantage of the precarious position of the newly formed Soviet government and thereby to gain a favored position for certain economic groups in the United States.

Such an important personage as Ambassador Francis was involved in an attempt to discredit the Soviet regime by "proving" in purchased documents that Lenin and Trotsky were, in fact, German agents. These and other attempts to emasculate the Soviet regime were not appreciated and have not been forgotten by an eternally suspicious regime. "American hypocrisy" has been the subject of much Soviet propaganda, both then and since that time. Izvestiya in late 1917 reported:

The American president Wilson, adopting the tone of a Quaker preacher reads . . . a sermon . . . but the people know the Americans came into the war because of the interest of the New York Stock Exchange.

The intervention of 1918-1920 came about as the result of no clear policy, and was implemented in a series of half-hearted political and military steps. This resulted only in deepening Soviet distrust and hatred of the United States. In history's light the affair was a tragic farce; indeed, intervention was delayed from February until July, 1918, until the Wilson government could find a suitable anti-Bolshevik with whom to cooperate. Nevertheless, M. Veltman, in his 1922 work, Soviet Russia and Capitalist America admitted that although America supported Whites and even the Poles, the United States was the last nation to intervene and was on the whole, the least dangerous of Soviet Russia's
enemies. Another Soviet writer, I. Maisky declared the following year "that during early 1918 United States policy was more favorable to Soviet Russia than that of the Entente."  

It may be presumed that the Soviet government did not consider the United States as immediate an enemy as Britain or France, and thus its propaganda attacks were reserved largely for the latter. A typical cartoon printed in a book published some years later showed top-hatted, fat capitalists providing the motive power for Kolchak, et al, in the war. In fact, the position of the United States during the entire period prior to the Second World War was rather paradoxical in Soviet policy. As America was remote geographically, it did not pose a threat to the Soviet Union; yet, as the center of world capitalism, it was the greatest potential enemy of the Russians and world Communism.

At the time of the Intervention, Soviet propagandists rarely attacked the Americans as such; rather, the "capitalists," often with clearly identifiable French or English symbols took the brunt of the attack. It is interesting to note, however, that renovated Intervention propaganda of the post-Second World War period is viciously anti-American in content, and features Uncle Sam in the role of the chief malefactor of the time. How well this fit into Soviet propaganda needs of the 1950's is obvious.

Much of the propaganda in the early years of "militant Communism" was viciously anti-West in content. As the Bolsheviks were confident at that time of early world revolution, they proclaimed the strictest Communist internationalism and the fight against imperialism. The conclusion is inevitable that the propaganda campaign then waged did
damage to a considerable degree the Soviet citizen's impression of America. Such posters as one by Deni, "The Entente--under the mask of peace," showed an evil capitalist hiding behind a mask; this could be interpreted as depicting any one of the three Big Powers.

The volume of revolutionary propaganda was tremendous, as is suggested by the fact that in the State Public Library in Leningrad about 100,000 various posters, placards and appeals of the period have been preserved. However, as there was no institutionalized system of propaganda and agitation in the Soviet Union prior to 1920, coordination and uniformity were lacking and the effort was often a hit-or-miss affair.

1920-1927: War Communism and NEP

Events coincidental with the Intervention—the attempt on Lenin's life and its aftermath of the "Red Terror"—created in the United States a long-lingering "Red Scare," which was evidenced in deep public distrust and fear of the Bolsheviks. Its effect was reported by the Soviets in 1921:

Russian workmen, emigrants who have returned from America ... state that the Russians in America are suffering great hardships. They experience there all the horrors of prison life. Workmen are arrested for participating in Party conferences; torture is resorted to when they are being cross-examined. Many unions are obliged to work in secret.

The mass deportations of aliens in 1919-1920 were a direct result of the hysteria created by the "Red Scare." It was inevitable from such a national attitude that non-recognition of the Soviet regime be the
popular desire of the time. Soviet reaction was voluminous external propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy, in expectation of early world revolution.

Lenin, who in August, 1918 had warned the American workingman of the "beasts of prey of Anglo-French and American imperialism," now stated angrily:

Either the Soviet government triumphs in every advanced country of the world, or the most reactionary imperialism triumphs, the most savage imperialism which is out to throttle the small and feeble nationalities and to reinstate reaction all over the world.

The election of Warren Harding to the presidency in 1920 initiated a period of turn-away from Europe and Asia, and a preoccupation with our domestic policy which has since been interpreted widely as "isolationism." At no time in this period was rapprochement with this revolutionary country which appeared to be a menace to the internal institutions of the United States seriously considered. A period of semi-hostility and half-hearted unofficial relationship was thus initiated; this persisted throughout the decade.

The great famine in Russia in 1921-1923 brought into play the generosity of the American people; however, Soviet gratitude was rare, and often officials tore down posters and otherwise prevented the people from realizing who was the benefactor. Nevertheless, the ARA represented the most constructive aspect of American-Russian relations during the early 1920's.

Coincidental with these events, the Department of Propaganda and Agitation was created within the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party. With formal control introduced for the first time, Bolshevik propaganda could now be geared fully to political needs.
Harding's Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, adamantly maintained the Wilsonian policy of hostility to the Bolsheviks, declaring: "This government can enter into no negotiations until these propaganda efforts are abandoned."¹⁸ Little coordination existed between the economic groups which engaged in trade with the Soviets and the small circle of men who viewed recognition as the first step toward a collaboration which would secure world peace. The isolation of Russia from the rest of the world resulted in her non-participation in the security system of the 1921 Washington Conference on armaments.¹⁹

In 1922, the Soviet government evidenced to the world its opportunistic nature when it aligned itself with Germany in negotiating the Treaty of Rapallo. Officially, this was due to fear of renewed military intervention by France, inspired and supported by Britain; however, it can be assumed that the Soviets had not forgotten Lenin's injunction to play off the world capitalist powers against each other. A hostile American press was gained by the Soviets in the following year, when the execution of Monsignor Butchkavitch after alleged tortures incensed Roman Catholics throughout the world.

The onset of NEP (New Economic Policy) in 1921 had led to a general relaxation throughout the world, as the optimistic saw Soviet Russia going the way of growing capitalist nations, and the naive predicted that Communism in Russia was disintegrating. In fact, the internal weakness of the Soviet Union simply dictated a cautious policy to prevent its collapse, and this period of return to semi-free enterprise
took enough domestic pressure off the government to allow it to consolidate and recover from the disastrous effects of seven years of war.

In 1924, the United States government shifted its emphasis to Soviet propaganda, rather than economic considerations, as the official basis for the dispute between the USSR and the United States. This move was mainly as a result of the world-wide propaganda of the active Comintern, which had been formed in 1919. The resignation of Hughes at this time helped pave the way for a new flurry of interest in recognition of the Soviet Union; however, the State Department remained firmly opposed to such a move.

After the death of Lenin a lessening in anti-West propaganda was noticeable, as under the tutelage of Stalin less emphasis was put on the world revolution. The damage which had already been done was too deep set, however, and in the decade of the 1920's occurred the schism of the world into two mutually distrustful blocs whose experience seemed to confirm each side's prejudice regarding the other.

The ascendancy of Stalin to the leadership of the Party and his methodical consolidation of power signalled the end of NEP in that year. The attitude of the Soviet government was well illustrated by a bas relief of a revolutionary fighter erected at the corner of one of Moscow's important streets which bore the inscription, "Let's break off with the Old World!" 20

In spite of the mutual distrust and hostility of Soviet Russia and the United States, America continued to represent a model of technological progress to the average Russian. The influx of American idealists, engineers and technicians, especially in the late years of
the 1920's, helped create much good will for their country and tempered the anti-Americanism felt by the Soviet citizen at the time. Soviet propaganda was described then by an American visitor as "perfectly futile," and lacking cleverness of technique. The writer, a public relations expert, was told by the Soviet government "that as a government it is conducting no propaganda against any foreign country, least of all against America."

The period 1921-1927 saw the introduction of what was to become flexible tactics for the Soviets: the "united" or "popular" front, which was Communist phraseology for a sudden switch in the Party line from standard revolutionary tactics. From 1925 until August, 1939, the entire foreign policy of the Soviet Union was directed toward peaceful cooperation in varying degree with the capitalist powers. This took the form of innumerable commercial treaties and non-aggression pacts with any country that cared to join.

1928-1932: Gathering Strength

The Stalinization of Russian which began in 1928 was accompanied by an ever-increasing emphasis on the alleged danger of new foreign interventions. A parallel theme was the constant danger of internal subversion by counter-revolutionaries with foreign ties. Such a propaganda campaign was designed, of course, to promote national unity and Party centralism and to prepare the Soviet people for the tremendous sacrifices required of them in the era of industrialization and collectivization.
The capitalist was portrayed as first sneering at the "Five Year Plan," then crushed by its success.\textsuperscript{22} It was at this time that the real events of the Intervention were "reinterpreted" and changed, then went into eclipse as the United States began slowly to emerge as the arch-criminal of the period 1918-1920. This period of reintroduction of old-style Bolshevik revolutionary tactics also saw repressive censorship used to an inordinate degree in the Soviet Union.

The Stock Market "crash" at the end of 1929 and the resultant world-wide depression had a considerable effect on American-Soviet relations. In 1930, Antorg (Soviet trading organization in the United States) published a list of companies which had technical aid agreements with the USSR: forty-three were named, including some of the largest in America. United States businessmen had been conducting trade with the Soviet Union since the early 1920's, and in the early depression years the Soviets were the only big customers for many American manufacturers.\textsuperscript{24} However, opposition to mutual trade was still considerable, as the American Federation of Labor complained of "dumping" on the domestic market of "slave-labor-made" goods by the Soviets.\textsuperscript{25}

The ills of capitalist America were widely publicized in the USSR, as articles described its nightmare of unemployment, creeping poverty and industrial paralysis. Some publications contrasted the continued well-being of such capitalists as J. P. Morgan in the midst of starvation; such propaganda was intended at least partially to offset the negative effects of brutal collectivization and the famine which resulted from it.
Disarmament had been a popular cause in the 1920's, but as one of its chief proponents, the United States was severely criticized by the Soviets and others. In a cartoon of 1929 in Krokodil, "Chamberlain Discovers America," the English statesman is shown lifting Liberty's skirts to expose a battleship bristling with guns. The commentary claimed that "the Kellogg Pact poorly serves the cause of peace and certainly does not interfere with an increase in American armaments." 26

President Hoover was very blunt in his antagonism to the Soviet government, and in an interview published in the San Francisco News on August 13, 1931, acknowledged that his goal was the destruction of the Soviet Union. 27 The groups which demanded recognition, however, were gaining supporters as fear of the "Reds" waned among the rank-and-file in the United States. In the Senate, debates were recorded on the threat which Russian embassies might pose as potential centers of espionage if the Soviet Union was recognized. 28

The growing American interest in the Soviet economy after the mid-1920's consisted of trade, concessions and contracts for technical assistance; the presence of large numbers of Americans friendly to Russia had created a lasting effect on the people of the USSR. Good will and admiration for America's technology might have been a decidedly positive factor in Russian-American relations, had the Soviet government not almost entirely ignored it publicly. Emil Ludwig in an interview with Stalin in 1931 made the observation that there appeared to be much admiration for everything American among the Soviet people. Stalin went out of his way to assure him that such was not the case. 29
Hoover was assailed by the propagandists anew in the presidential campaign of 1932. *Krokodil*, in a cartoon, "American Capitalism's Campaign Position" depicted him in a tuxedo, well-groomed, waving his silk hat: "America flourishes anew!," while another view shows him from the back, his clothing torn and ragged, held together with pins.\(^{30}\)

Upon ascendancy of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency in March, 1933, proponents of recognition of the USSR conducted a concerted campaign to gain their objective. The attack of Japan on Manchuria in that year, and the resultant deterioration of the situation in Asia now signalled the need for cooperation with the Soviet Union to maintain stability in the Orient.\(^{31}\) Also, the sharp reduction in exports to the USSR (103.7 to 12.5 millions of dollars) as a result of domestic agitation over alleged unfair Russian labor practices made itself felt on the economy when business was most needed.\(^{32}\)

The official stumbling blocks to recognition had always been the repudiation of the Tsarist debt by the Soviets and the subversive propaganda which they had carried on in all nations since the Revolution. When Roosevelt agreed to recognition of the USSR in late 1933, the terms included agreement by the Soviets to discontinue all anti-American propaganda and also to drop claims against the United States which arose from the Siberian expedition in 1918-1920. The decision to grant recognition was basically a product of domestic pressures and was given at least tacit approval by the public.

*Izvestiya* greeted this move with an editorial asserting that the growth of the Soviet Union's political and economic importance had "compelled" the United States to recognize her.\(^{33}\) The depression of
1929-1933 had increased confidence among Communists that the capitalist system was disintegrating and it inflated the prestige of the Russians in world affairs. Propagandists claimed that the United States had sought recognition mainly to help save American capitalism from disaster by providing new markets, and thus little good will was gained within the USSR by the move.

Soviet propaganda was toned down considerably for several months after the initial "feelers" for recognition were sent out. Some friendly remarks can be detected in a survey of the press; however, the government's concern in this period was primarily domestic and in an effort to counterbalance the negative effects of the First Five Year Plan, its line was generally one which portrayed America in the worst of lights. A visitor in 1932 remarked that "the real distinguishing feature of Russia today is the state of revolutionary tension in which the country is being constantly maintained." The intervention scare continued chronic in the press right up until the Second World War.

Russian-American collaboration in the Far East did not materialize as new events created new quarrels and tensions. The Soviet Union had a long-standing interest in China, and the Soviets envisioned a situation in the Pacific in which conflicts between Japan and the United States would take the pressure off Siberia and facilitate Soviet expansion into China. For the time being, "the desire of the United States to conquer China economically" was blamed for the failure of China and the USSR to resume normal diplomatic relations.

The Soviet Union in 1934 swung away from its twelve year alignment with Germany, primarily as a result of the rise of Hitler to power.
and the increasingly menacing attitude of the Third Reich. In the same year it joined the League of Nations (despite having called it "a league of imperialist robbers"), and Soviet propaganda now became violently anti-fascist in content. Undoubtedly, the complete lack of solidarity among Great Britain, France and the United States and the isolation of the Soviet Union at the time were fundamental in the successful rise of Hitler to the leadership of Germany. At the same time, frequent armed clashes with aggressive Japanese troops in the Far East heightened antagonism between the two powers.36

The presence of American Communists at the Moscow congress of the Comintern in 1935 enraged Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who protested this breach of the 1933 agreement. Rejecting the protest, the Soviet government disclaimed any association with the activities of the organization. During the entire period the United States continued to be concerned over Soviet (Comintern) propaganda;37 however, the debt issue remained the primary source of friction and was caricatured in the Russian press as reflecting American greed.

United States relations with the USSR continued on a non-friendly basis as considerable friction developed between Ambassador Bullitt and Maxim Litvinov at this time. Molotov declared in a speech in January, 1936 that it was impossible to ignore the anti-Soviet press campaign being developed in the United States by pro-fascist circles.38 The Soviet publication World Economics and Politics in August declared:

Fascist tendencies have undoubtedly grown in strength under the Roosevelt regime and Roosevelt has made no serious attempt to fight the forces of reaction. All this has brought home to the broad masses of the American proletariat that they have nothing to hope for from the old political parties...
The Soviet press was equally guilty of incendiary reporting. In this period the specters of racial discrimination, brutal suppression of strikes by police, and rampant gangsterism were placed before the Russian public with increasing frequency. A typical cartoon was one printed in Krokodil ("The dream of an American bandit") in 1936, which showed two gangsters talking in an alley: "I've been dreaming about this child for so long, and now, at last, he's born!" "Congratulations!" "Hold your congratulations; I haven't kidnapped him yet."

In 1936, under the new ambassador, Joseph Davies, relations continued to deteriorate between the two countries. The onset of the Great Purge trials further alienated public opinion in the United States. The USSR's support of the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War aroused mixed emotions throughout the world. Although Americans generally favored that side in the conflict, the all-out support which the Soviet government was giving the Loyalists alarmed many people.

In the period 1936-1939 the Communists again switched to "united front" tactics to gain external support for their regime. In doing so, they followed the dictum of President M. I. Kalinin, who said, "Each historical moment requires its particular form of agitation and propaganda." The words of Stalin at the XVIII Party Congress in 1939 reflected the ever-increasing emphasis of the Soviet government on propaganda: "... if our Party propaganda for some reason goes lame ... then our entire State and Party work must inevitably perish."40

By the Spring of 1939, relations between Moscow and Washington were as poor as at any time since recognition in 1933. Isolationism in the United States had made great headway, along with wishful thinking
by many Americans that they could stay out of the "European War." As Washington seemed to retreat farther and farther away from the possibility of a united stand against fascist aggression, the Soviets became increasingly disillusioned, this may be detected in Soviet pronouncements as early as June, 1938.41

Negotiations concerning an Anglo-French-Russian alliance against Hitler completely broke down in 1939, and the consistent unwillingness of the United States to assume responsibility or throw its weight on the side of order in either Europe or the Pacific resulted in a complete turnabout by the Soviets. On August 23, 1939, it was announced to the world that a German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had been signed by representatives of both nations in Moscow.

1939-1942: Second World War

On the whole, the period between the start of the Second World War and the German attack on the Soviet Union was one of the worst chapters in Russian-American relations. Adhering to the sudden and decisive change in the Party line immediately following the signing of the German-Soviet Pact, all pretense at friendship with the Western Allies was dropped and a mass of accusations and abuse was poured into the news media.

The United States was singled out for particularly harsh attack for her allegedly hypocritical attitude toward the "Second Imperialist War." Moscow claimed that the United States was professing to conduct a policy of neutrality, while at the same time rendering assistance to
Great Britain and France, not for humanitarian purposes at all, but rather, to increase the profit of the bourgeoisie in America. Britain was pictured as on the verge of disintegration, while her creditor (Uncle Sam) was often caricatured as striving in ludicrous ways to salvage his invested capital and at the same time to inherit as much of the crumbling British Empire as possible.

In 1940, the following cartoons appeared in Krokodil: John Bull is depicted lying on his deathbed while Uncle Sam is anxiously exclaiming, "He must not die; he owes me too much!" Another portrays a ship (representing Great Britain) sinking. John Bull is desperately trying to save suitcases, which are labelled "Canada" and "Australia." Uncle Sam calls to him from below, where he is in a lifeboat. "Sir, throw down your trunks; you will feel lighter!" A "philantropic" Uncle Sam is shown in a third cartoon accepting gold from Western militarists. "I'd be happy to sell you armaments. But I beg you, please don't hurt anybody with them."

The policy of the Soviets, so blatantly hypocritical, was obviously due to increasing American interference in European affairs, and the desire of the Russians that the United States adhere to its previous "policy" of isolationism. The moves of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, were so blundering as to further crystallize American public opinion behind the Allies.

The attack of the Red Army on Finland on November 30, 1939 aroused anti-Sovietism in the United States to a pitch unattained since the 1920's. When the gallant Finns not only defended themselves, but on occasion met with what appeared to be spectacular victories, the
American public went wild with approbation. Reacting quickly, the United States placed a "moral embargo" (December 2, 1939 - January 21, 1941) on certain goods to the USSR. This embittered the Soviets, and only their embarassement of their own initial losses and mistakes prevented them from making their displeasure felt more strongly. Sumner Welles remarked that "by the Spring of 1940, official relations between the two countries were only nominal."45

The sudden annexation of the Baltic countries in June, 1940 was a hard blow to supporters of the Reds. That month may be looked upon as the height of political antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States in the period before the war. The State Department declared that the United States was "opposed to predatory activities" as well as to "any form of intervention on the part of one state, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other state, however weak."46

The American press supported the stand of its government strongly, while the Soviet press viciously attacked the United States for its alleged hypocrisy. Molotov stated publicly that although there are certain persons in the United States who are not pleased with the success of Soviet policy in the Baltic countries, we must confess that we are little concerned over this fact ... 47

On August 1, he reported to the Supreme Soviet: "I shall not dwell on our relations with the United States, if only because there is nothing good to say about them." Such smug self-assuredness reflected anew the Soviet confidence in its policies and contempt for the words unimplemented by actions which characterized American policy throughout this crucial period.
The United States had not lost faith in the possibilities of gaining Soviet friendship. Records show that in early 1941, Sumner Welles, Secretary of State, repeatedly warned the Soviet envoy in Washington that according to reliable information, the Nazis were about to attack Russia in early summer. This obvious attempt to bring about a rapprochement with the Soviet Union failed utterly when the Russians concluded later that year a neutrality pact with Japan.

When the Nazi armies crossed the borders of the Soviet Union on the morning of June 22, 1941, they appeared to take the Russians completely by surprise. After the early shock and confusion, the Soviet propaganda machine was rewired to a new soundtrack: what had been a capitalist war became overnight a "war of liberation" from fascist invaders bent on world domination and enslavement of all free peoples.

In his speech on November 6, Stalin introduced the phrase, "Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition." Roosevelt and Churchill quickly became key figures in allied lands who represented leadership among the "progressive forces" seeking to help the Soviet Union. The press gave great play to these and other leaders, but only in the first months of the war did it report world news which involved the common man in the United States. Thus, by such personal presentation of news was the way paved for ominous questions in the minds of the Russians: "What will happen if these friendly leaders lose power in the allied countries?"

Until the end of 1941 (the Battle of Moscow) American war news occasionally was featured on the front page, with an infrequent picture of American equipment or of President Roosevelt; however, after that time such items disappeared entirely. Land-Lease was far too obvious
to be ignored; yet, the Soviet government attained the remarkable record during the war of never according in any major policy statement more than carefully qualified recognition of its value to the Russians. Not even in his speeches of July and November, 1941, when survival was in the balance, did Stalin suggest that American aid was a factor to be considered. 51

Throughout the war, by clever and well-planned symbol manipulation the Soviets succeeded in achieving tremendous influence over public opinion in the United States. This was evidenced in many ways, notably in the millions of dollars privately donated by Americans to the Russian cause, and by such pro-Russian films as North Star and Mission to Moscow, which gained wide popularity in the United States. Concurrently, the method of presentation of the story of the Allied aid to the Soviet Union was calculated to sustain the morale of the Russian people when the government needed support (especially in the first year of the war) without arousing fraternal emotions or stimulating dangerous ideas. When the full potential of the Soviet land was brought into play, and the need of American help diminished, even the minimum of recognition previously accorded was often omitted entirely.

The "Coalition War" was given considerable play in the press. Stalin's assertion that ideology and institutional differences were no bar to cooperation among countries soothed American fears by generating popular support among the American public. Every major event in the development of the coalition was greeted by the Soviets with a fanfare of publicity.
At the same time, practically no attention was given in the Soviet press to American domestic politics and activities. After years of attacks on "racism," etc., this is particularly noticeable in retrospect by its omission. However, even that information which was divulged to the Russian people often was filled with glaring inaccuracies. An author in 1944 saw a Soviet film strip on America which stated that Michael Gold and Richard Wright were the two leading American authors.52

Even during the first, critical months of the Russo-German war, the basic, traditional themes of Soviet propaganda concerning capitalism were only muted and never completely disappeared. The attitude of the Soviets at the height of their display of "friendship" with the Allies at this time may be characterized as one of suspicion and reserve. A careful survey of Soviet news media of this period will provide an impression of failure to attack, rather than positive support of the West. Nothing in Stalin's speeches or in the great volume of Soviet wartime propaganda could be construed as repudiating the basic aims or principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

The retrospective role of the United States in the Second World War, as revealed to the Soviet public in such books as Voroshilov's Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR, printed in 1951, has further reduced the American effort to one of purely self-interest. The Allied failure to make a landing on the continent in 1942 and 1943 has long been attacked as a deliberate desire to weaken the Soviet Union while the Allies waited for the Russians to destroy the German war machine on the Eastern Front. Voroshilov states:
... only after it became obvious that the crushing blows of the Soviet Army were unavoidably fatal were the Churchills and the Marshalls compelled to hurry the opening of the second front.

... their secret and not-quite-secret hopes that the Soviet State would be enfeebled, bled white in its single combat with Nazi Germany were completely dissipated ... 53

Thus was the role of the United States minimized after the war. Also distorted were its motives for having participated, for the Soviets claimed that the Americans wished to eliminate its world market competitors and establish a dominant economic position on the earth.
In the Second World War the Communist Party had seen how close it had come to disaster through unpreparedness. Its preoccupation with survival was manifested in the postwar period in reconstruction of the Soviet Union's war-torn industries and continued rapid expansion of the war economy. After the tremendous sacrifices made by the exhausted Russian people during the war, it was evident that the new demands would require new motivations, as the old incentive of "defense of the motherland" had been eliminated with the defeat of the German Army. Too, the Party desired to tighten its monolithic control over the Russian people to check the disintegrative tendencies which had arisen in the Soviet system due to the laxity and strain of the war emergency. An additional reason for continuation of bread rationing was a most serious crop failure in 1946, which was admitted later to have been worse than that of 1921.¹

The new sacrifices of the Soviet peoples were extolled by propagandists as hardships required for the building of a better world. The lot of the masses elsewhere was pictured as worse than their own, and thus contempt was instilled for the "decadence of bourgeois civilization." Thus also was the bogey of foreign imperialist attack revived.
It was not coincidental that the United States was selected as the chief target of these postwar xenophobic thrusts of the Soviets, as that country, in gaining victory, had appeared as the logical leader of any anti-Soviet opposition that might develop. It had taken the place vacated by the Nazis as the "spirit of evil" in the "foreign horror" spectacle.

As early as 1944, authoritative publications such as Planned Economy and War and the Working Class asserted that the inevitable tendencies of the American capitalist system previously held in check by the war were reasserting themselves. Russians were reminded that the war had been fought by Americans primarily because of self-interest, and not for altruistic reasons; the role of the Soviets as leaders in the war to save humanity from Fascism was frequently contrasted with that of America. The Master Lend-Lease agreement signed in 1942 had the unfortunate wording that the aid granted to Russia was done so as her war "against aggression is vital to the interests of the United States of America." The value of such a phrase to the propagandists is evident.

The Soviet people were reminded that the Americans had maintained diplomatic relations during the war with the "fascist beasts" Vichy France, Spain and Argentina. The specter of Fascism was kept alive after the destruction of Germany as a useful interim aid to the government to prevent the people's dissatisfaction from becoming a lever on policy. The prewar Communist concept of two worlds in rivalry was now revived under the new alarm bell of "vestiges of fascism" and "microbes of Hitlerism" which the Soviets claimed were still present in the West,
particularly in the United States. The Soviet government now demanded the "moral," as well as the political destruction of fascism.

It mused retrospectively that the death of Roosevelt, a "friend of peace," was the "great divide" in history; with the loss of his friendship to the Russian people the future seemed perilous. The new president, Truman, was accused of having rejected his predecessor's policy:

Under the pressures and in the interests of monopoly groups, . . . ministers of the Roosevelt cabinet were gradually replaced by conservative figures. Reactionary forces took measures also against the . . . working classes.  

It was in his election speech of February, 1946, that Kaganovich reiterated the phrase "capitalist encirclement" for the first time since before the war. Two months later a lecturer in Moscow declared that "the USSR is surrounded by capitalist states which are constantly sending in streams of diversionists and spies." Molotov's speech at the opening of the San Francisco Conference in 1945 reveals more in retrospect than was read into it at the time. He warned that if agreement on the United Nations was not reached, the peoples of the world would soon repudiate their governments and the USSR would take the lead in finding "other means" to assure the peace and security of the world. This muted threat and doubletalk became the embodiment of Soviet policy in the two years 1946 and 1947.

In a speech on February 4, 1946, Stalin bluntly restated the classic Leninist doctrine that capitalism leads to war. This was the opening gun for a rash of articles and editorials based on the premise that the entire present period in history is an era of the "general crisis
of capitalism." The views of the economist, Eugene Varga, as set forth in his book, *Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War* were widely accepted at that time. Varga maintained that an economic crisis of the 1921 variety would overtake capitalism within a few years, caused by the sudden end of the war and the inability of the United States to utilize fully its huge industrial capacity developed during the war. The unemployed millions in the United States would create a sharp political economic and political problem which would weaken that nation and force it to pursue a relatively unaggressive policy toward the USSR in the foreseeable future. The Soviet press emphasized that America's only hope was to collaborate with the Soviet Union to open up new markets and thus end unemployment; the only alternative course was a reactionary one which would benefit only the forces of Fascism.

In a study of news taken from American sources and reprinted in *Pravda* throughout 1946, one of four main themes was found to be industrial strikes, unemployment, inflation and the inevitability of an economic crisis.

Soviet postwar policy, predicated on the Varga thesis, confidently gave the nod to expansion westward. Beginning with Poland and Rumania in 1945, the Soviets had acquired by 1948 a buffer of seven "satellite" nations which it completely dominated. Yugoslavia coincidentally fell under the power of Tito, and Finland was forced closer into the Soviet orbit through a defensive alliance with the USSR. During this period Manchuria was prepared for the Red Chinese by a Soviet army of occupation.
Signs of stiffening resistance to the Communists could be detected, however, as under strong world pressure the Soviet Army evacuated northern Iran in 1946. Turkey, with American backing, refused the Russian demand for return of Kars and Ardahan. The famous address by Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, in that year ("An iron curtain has descended . . .") was given a big play in the Soviet press and created the first of the "war scares" which the government has used to keep the Russian people keyed up since the war. Yet, the Soviets were confident perhaps until early 1947 that their objective--withdrawal of the United States forces from Europe--would be realized.

By the middle of 1946, a war-fear psychosis tied in with the reports of the Soviet Army's activities was gaining headway in some circles in the United States. Former Governor George Earle of Pennsylvania stated publicly and not too tactfully that we should attack Russia with the A-bomb "while we have it and before they get it." People were realizing that the Soviet Union had joined the United Nations, not in good faith, but in an effort to dominate it to safeguard her own interests, as well as to use it as a global sounding board for Communist propaganda. The Soviet delegation brought futility into the Security Council by routine use of the veto. Within a few months after the end of the war, the United Nations had become an organization of two blocs--the East and the West.

Every counter-move by the United States in this period was officially interpreted in the USSR as further evidence of its retrogression to fascist designs, and was seized upon as a basis for continuation of
the Soviet war industry, maintenance of its huge army, and further strengthening of the military and economic might of the Soviet Union. The phrases, "dollar diplomacy" and "atomic diplomacy" became more frequent after the failure of the London Conference in October, 1946.

A Moscow commentator in December accused the United States of having an "atomic psychosis," through which "certain 'atomic maniacs' believe that by the atomic weapon the United States will guarantee peace to the world. Professor Urey, for example, states that the United States may be compelled to apply the atomic weapon to assure peace . . ."  

The American "atom mania" was ridiculed in the press with photographs from the United States bearing the captions "atomic cocktail," "atomic blonde," etc. The Soviets claimed, however, that such diplomacy had failed utterly, and during this period the destructive potential of the atom bomb was minimized in domestic press coverage.

Much attention was given in the press to United States overseas bases and its other military and naval activities throughout the world. In June, 1946, there began a violent campaign publicizing a "ring of such bases" which the Americans were creating around the USSR for the purpose of using them as "springboards of attack." This was a carbon copy of the prewar fear of "the West" as expressed by Stalin in his speeches in the late 1920's. Special emphasis was given to the charge that the United States was trying to organize China and Latin America as its own military preserves.
The appointment of General Marshall as Secretary of State and General Walter B. Smith as Ambassador to Moscow was interpreted by the Soviet press as proof positive of the coalition of military and Wall Street which was directing United States foreign policy. These "facts," pointed out by the propagandists to the Russian people, were only a part of the growing anti-American spirit which pervaded the press of that nation.

Beginning publication in June, 1946, Kul'tura i Zhizn conducted a continuous campaign which attacked all phases of American culture. Andrei Zhdanov's ideological housecleaning commenced in the autumn of that year, and almost at once destroyed all vestiges of former praise of Western culture. In the following year, Soviet intellectuals were under heavy pressure to eliminate from their thinking all traces of "subservience to bourgeois culture" and "cosmopolitanism."

Spring, 1947, appears to mark the turn of the tide in postwar Russian-American relations. Soviet aggressiveness in Eastern Europe and her opportunism in the state of "favorable chaos" which then existed in Southeast Asia and Europe has finally aroused the American public to a realization of the danger world communism represented. On March 12, President Truman urged the United States to support the free peoples of the world in their efforts to escape Communist engulfment; this developed into a policy commonly known as the "Truman Doctrine," and represented the first effective American resistance to Soviet expansionist
pressure. In March and April, the United States took a firm stand on the German question at the Moscow Conference, and in June, Secretary of State Marshall announced at Harvard his plan for European recovery through systematic American economic aid.

Thus began the new policy of containment of Communism and rehabilitation which has been maintained to this day. Against the European Recovery Plan (ERP), the Soviets mounted the most gigantic propaganda offensive in history. Called by the Soviets "the enslavement of Europe by the United States," the Marshall Plan nevertheless became a reality in April, 1948. Under the Truman Doctrine, military aid was immediately dispatched to Greece and Turkey to assist those countries in maintaining their independence.

It now became apparent to an off-balance Moscow that diplomatic maneuvering was producing diminishing results, and thus a shift in theme was made by the propagandists from conventional relations to Marxist-Leninist analysis of international affairs. The Molotov Plan was announced in Europe as the eastern equivalent of the Marshall Plan, and in the spring and summer of 1947 the USSR reasserted her domination of the world communist movement. The previous tactics of the "united front" were dropped and the traditional system of tightly disciplined, highly indoctrinated cadres was reintroduced. At a conference of economists in May, Professor Varga's theory of the economic crisis of capitalism was denounced officially.

In September at the United Nations Assembly at Lake Success, New York, Andrei Vyshinsky delivered the first in a series of inflammatory
speeches against American "war-mongering." He further claimed that Wash-
ington was opposed to the reduction of armaments. Thus began the new
Soviet diplomacy, which was more suited for the fish market than the
diplomat's table. Its vituperativeness marked it from this time until
the death of Stalin.

The Soviet concept of the world as two armed camps, one repre-
senting the rising forces of socialism and the other the decadent forces
of capitalism came into being in the summer of 1947; however, it was in
September that Andrei Zhdanov gave the phrase its official iteration
that established it as a Soviet thesis. At the conference which estab-
lished the Cominform, Zhdanov praised the USSR and the "new democracies"
as leaders of the "anti-Imperialist" and "anti-Fascist" forces, while
opposing them were the United States and its "satellites," France and
Great Britain. The intention of the latter camp was to "strengthen
imperialism, to hatch a new imperialist war, and to combat socialism
and democracy."\(^{11}\)

Domestic discontent was diverted by sensational "spy scares,"
beginning in 1947. The evils of racism, unemployment, and the corrupt
press in the United States were frequently publicized with lurid and
fantastic reports. Articles by an American author concerning living
conditions in the USA, and a series by Ilya Ehrenburg on racial and
ethnic minorities were published. Ehrenburg claimed that the United
States had created a racial hierarchy in which Anglo-Saxons comprised
the top aristocracy, while Puerto Ricans and Negroes were on the bottom
of the class structure. *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* referred to a previous
article by Olga Mishakova, a top Communist youth leader, to the effect that many American women, losing their wartime employment, had been forced into prostitution to make a living. Trud quoted in an article, "The Unvarnished Truth Regarding America," Yu. Zhukov's statement that in 1944 seventy percent of American families could not meet their living expenses.

In the United States a new "Red Scare" had been created by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which uncovered increasing evidence of Soviet espionage. The two "worlds" drew farther and farther apart in what came to be called "the Cold War."

In 1948, Soviet domestic anti-American propaganda became worse. The campaign to insinuate imperialist America into "Intervention" literature and historiography now began in earnest, reaching its height three years later. In its hysteria, the press accused the United States of actively encouraging and supporting continued Japanese aggression in the Soviet Far East as late as 1922. Hardly a non-technical book or magazine was published in this period that did not contain a section devoted to anti-Americanism. In the diverse forms this propaganda was encountered, it often was completely out of context with the book, itself.

The theme of all-out political, economic and ideological struggle between the two camps (symbolic of the old and the new, the bad and the good) was communicated by every means to the people. Ambassador Smith stated in September, 1947, that the violence of these attacks surpassed that of Soviet propaganda against Nazi Germany. M.A. Suslow, head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, declared on January 21, 1948,
that "the American imperialists are clearly seeking to take the place of fascist Germany and Japan."

In February, Czechoslovakia fell into the Soviet camp, and in April Marshall Plan aid began in Europe. Cartoons in Krokodil and the daily newspapers were invariably on the theme, "the new American threat to peace," or its "designs against the independence of Europe." In its propaganda the USSR became the champion of war-torn nations trying to retain their sovereignty against United States economic and military pressure. When ERP continued to operate successfully, the Soviet line of attack became one of claiming that the American capitalists were using the program to dump poor quality goods at high prices. It was alleged that such policies flowed inevitably from the predatory nature of that nation's capitalism. Ogonyok caricatured "the disembarkation of the 'American horse fleet' in Western Europe" as tincan "steeds" gallop down to the dock bearing the signs, "Eat Horsemeat!".

In June, the Soviets blocked all roads leading from the West into Berlin, and thus the Berlin airlift came into being. Under tremendous pressure, this succeeded in supplying the beleaguered city until May of 1949, when the Soviets gave up the blockade with considerable loss of face. Coincidentally with this, sixty American bombers flew to English bases, to remain there indefinitely.

By the middle of 1946, two worlds were indeed in evidence, as the Soviet Union and the United States drew farther apart. What had seemed to be differences in opinion now showed up as irreconcilable contradictions in policy. At that time, the State Department reported thirty-
seven Soviet violations of Russian-American agreements, mainly the Yalta and Potsdam Pacts. 17

The Progressive Party leader, Henry Wallace, in the 1948 presidential campaign declared irresponsibly that the United States—and not the Soviet Union—was the aggressor, and that a Wall Street-ridden America was out to "enslave the world." Such rich propaganda material was quickly seized upon by the Soviets and exploited as representing the real sentiments of the American people.

In autumn, the Soviets commenced another shift in propaganda direction. It being obvious that threats and subversion were at least temporarily unsuccessful, Moscow began a "peace offensive" which manifested itself in widespread activities. In 1948 and 1949 a series of peace and cultural conferences were held in New York, Paris, Prague, Wroclaw, and other cities under the banner of "mobilization for peace." The expression of the desire for collaboration with the peace-loving peoples of the world and the constant reiteration of the feasibility of "coexistence" marked this period.

American opposition or alleged opposition to this "battle for peace" was condemned as evidencing the aggressive tendencies of the ruling circles in the country, and cartoons of the time used the theme, "We are for Peace!" to satiety. When the Soviets advanced unacceptable proposals for disarmament, Russian propagandists declared that American warmongers feared the collapse of their industries as a consequence, had they accepted. Moscow's unwillingness to agree to a principle of free international inspection caused all atomic control discussion to be suspended in 1948; however, in the USSR this suspension was attributed to
adamant United States aggressive aims.

If the Soviet hate campaign was virulent against ERP, it reached the proportions of near editorial apoplexy when negotiations commenced in the West in late 1948 for a defensive alliance of North Atlantic nations. From autumn, 1948, until April, 1949, when the North Atlantic Pact was ratified by the U.S. Senate, the Soviet press was filled daily with the most violently anti-American cartoons, photographs, articles and editorials. On January 29, for example, two full pages—one half the press—of all Soviet newspapers were devoted to an official statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs against this treaty. Andrei Gromyko attacked the treaty in the United States in addresses on April 13 and 15, and Jakob Malik continued the attack for over a year. In the three issues of Krokodil for May, 1949, twenty of a total of forty-two cartoons printed were on anti-American themes.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was looked upon in the West as symbolic of democracies forced together into a defensive alliance by the Communist threat; in the USSR it was condemned as the chief instrument of the Anglo-American drive for world domination, and as a hysterical attempt of American capitalists to solve their domestic economic problem. The Soviet Union immediately countered by setting up a Communist regime in East Germany, and in February, 1950, the Chinese-Soviet Treaty was signed.

The explosion of the first Russian atomic bomb in August, 1949, paved the way for an entirely new propaganda campaign based on the premise that America's "atomic blackmail" was at an end. TASS's
communique was held as suddenly deflating the United States "atom monopoly balloon." The Soviet Union now posed as an even stronger "sentry for peace," and could warn the "Imperialist warmongers" that irresponsible adventurism would lead to their destruction.

From 1948 to 1953 Ogonyok frequently printed on its inside cover a full-page "satirical panorama" which ridiculed supposed events such as a "New Year's Reception on Wall Street," showing the specter of crisis, Chiang Kai-shek, Franco and others sitting around a table (shaped like a "$") with militarists and capitalists. Others included "Spring in the Dollar Jungles," and "Spring Parade of the Warmongers.

In 1951, an entire issue of Collier's devoted to "a preview of the war we do not want" contained imaginary descriptions and drawings of what the Third World War would be like. The logical foe—the USSR—was depicted unmistakably, and drawings showed the destruction of Moscow by atomic bombs. The Soviet press capitalized on this "evidence" of American "militarist-adventurist" thinking with a photo-montage in Krokodil showing a wolf wrapped in a shawl which concealed bayonets, bombs and an issue of Collier's magazine.

A slight increase in unemployment in 1949 signalled more intensive coverage in the Soviet press of American economic conditions. This persisted through the years following, usually with solemn "surveys" of the production, inflationary spending and income of Americans, accompanied by descriptions of the decadence and parasitic privileges of the wealthy, and the dreadful poverty, degradation and humiliation of the worker. This followed the theme of the poor growing poorer, and the
rich growing ever-richer from enormous profits. A series of full-page articles printed in Vechernaya Moskva in 1950 proclaimed, "Capitalism bears the workers to unemployment, poverty and hunger." A fat capitalist, his spouse and their Mexican hairless dog sit smugly by, while behind them slumps a saddened "Liberty" with padlocked lips. In the background loom the specters of "Hunger," "Poverty," and "Unemployment," as always; in the text the virtues of the Soviet system are extolled in comparison.

The "destitution and ruination of American farmers" was the subject of an article in 1952. A few years later, a full-page article, "At What Expense They Grow Fat," numbered among its illustrations a photo-montage which showed a vise squeezing humans flat; on top applying pressure is a figure with the face of the U.S. dollar.

On June 25, 1950, Communist forces from the north invaded South Korea. When the United Nations voted North Korea an aggressor and in vain demanded withdrawal of its forces, it was forced to call upon its member nations to halt the invader. The United States responded, and within a matter of days was at war with the North Koreans. As the Cold War became a hot one, anti-American propaganda in the USSR became intense and less discriminating, and the press vilified the United States in every conceivable fashion. It was no longer directed mainly at the "American capitalist"; there was now a systematic effort to stir up hatred for the entire American people for the first time. This was especially true of the repetition of atrocity stories concerning the behavior of American troops in Korea.
Soviet propagandists developed the theme that the United States had planned and started the war by inciting the South Korean government to invade North Korea. To support this claim, they published photographs purporting to show American preparations for the war. One depicted John Foster Dulles with American military advisors to the South Korean Army at the 38th Parallel in June, 1950, examining maps of North Korea. American troops were described in action in Korea as burning peaceful cities and villages with napalm, making use of bacteriological weapons and killing thousands of prisoners. This is nothing to the American monsters; they want to put our whole planet to the torch, to cover the whole world with millions of corpses, to drown the whole earth in rivers of human blood.

Atrocities allegedly committed were described at length in the press, along with photographs purporting to give proof of the claims:

American soldiers... drove the inhabitants to a certain place. All the women were then raped. the women who had resisted the ravishers had a wire put through their noses by the Americans and were led by this wire through the village. The monsters gouged out the eyes of many women and hacked lumps of flesh out of their bodies. The butchers disemboweled many pregnant women who fell into their hands.

The campaign alleging American use of germ weapons in Korea and China commenced in January, 1952. From that time until the end of hostilities eighteen months later, the Soviet press was filled with articles, photographs and cartoons based on this theme. Such movements as the "World Peace Council Appeal" signed at Oslo on April 1, 1952, purported to show the indignation of the "peoples of the world [who] are against germ warfare." General Van Fleet's remarks in a private interview were distorted and given wide publicity as "Van Fleet admits use of germ warfare."
Krokodil published cartoons showing Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Trygve Lie shooting tubes of "germs" into Korea, shouting, "The USA doesn't use bacteriological weapons!!". Again disclaiming use of such weapons in a speech, Acheson, with the body of a flea, is pictured concealing bottles of germs behind a speaker's podium. The American flag is shown lifted high by the militarist in Korea in another cartoon. The stars are insects, and the stripes germ-filled testtubes.

Ogonyok printed a two-page spread of photographs entitled, "The Facts Convict," showing micro-photographs of insects and germs allegedly dropped by the Americans in Asia.

From February, 1952, until the armistice the Soviet press was filled with gory and detailed accounts of alleged atrocities perpetrated by the Americans against North Korean and Chinese prisoners. At first done largely through the fiction of "escaped POW's," this coverage was extended at Panmunjom and reached its climax when the actual major exchanges of prisoners were made in 1953.

Communist correspondents filed hundreds of "eyewitness" stories and photographs which were intended to serve as a counter to United States charges of Communist atrocities. One such account by Wilfred Burchett quoted a prisoner who "told how the butchers cut off pieces of his arms and legs."
CHAPTER VII

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1953-1957

After Stalin

In 1953 the United States was portrayed as wanting to continue the war in Korea because of tremendous profits. Although the election results of the previous November had "indicated a universal demand" to "put an end to the war," the fear of an economic crisis was cited as making peace unthinkable to the American munitions maker. Cartoons showed the capitalists waxing fat while United Nations soldiers froze and died on the front.

A world rapidly going fascist was seen by propagandists, who lamented that

the misanthropic ideas and practices of racist lynchers, geopoliticians and neo-Malthusians, who demand the extermination of millions of people are being disseminated more and more widely in the USA.2

An editorial in Trud under the title, "The Beastial Visage of American Imperialism" declared:

The dollar imperialists are working madly to fan the flames of a new world war. They wish to enslave the peace-loving peoples, to suppress liberty whenever possible and to implant fascism. The magnates of Wall Street are turning themselves inside out to turn back history, to establish the bloody "American way of life" throughout the entire world.3

After the discovery of the "doctors' plot" by Stalin in 1952, Soviet propagandists levelled all guns at "saboteurs, wreckers and spies" in a vigilance campaign which lasted until that leader's death a year
later. Pravda warned that "the imperialist bosses try to develop as extensive subversive activities as they can in the countries of the democratic camp." ⁴

In a book, On the Enemy's Trail, a young Soviet "exposes the intrigues of the American intelligence service, which is the chief source of sabotage and espionage throughout the entire world." ⁵ It is revealed that the enemy agents plan to spread over the Russian steppe "the grubs of an especially voracious locust, bred by the American Bertridge in a West German 'Institute'." ⁶

The theme of espionage was greatly accelerated at the time by a seemingly endless array of "captures" of alleged spies, who were invariably discovered to have been in the pay of American intelligence and who were parachuted into the USSR. ⁷ Their detailed "confessions" made fascinating reading, and the photographs of the alleged spies and their equipment were widely reproduced. One of the most sensational of the spy trials was that accorded I. Slansky, et al., who were accused in November, 1952, of operating an American intelligence conspiratorial center in Czechoslovakia. Krokodil caricatured a beady-eyed agent who tirelessly copied plans, while behind him weaved the serpent of "espionage, terror and diversion." ⁸

The "spy scare" continued unabated throughout this period, with hardly a month passing without some new alleged capture being publicized in the press. Ogonyek in 1957 devoted several articles to agents of United States intelligence who had been apprehended in preceding months. ⁹ Cartoons showed such spies as "money thrown into the air," as they were
captured by alert Soviet border guards while they parachute to earth. A press conference with an exhibition of "spy equipment" took up half of Pravda and Izvestiya on February 7, 1957. An illustrated page in Sovetskaya Moldaviya "unmasked" the anti-people activities of the Negovist sect, and their "ties with the American imperialists."

Concurrent with the espionage campaign the Soviets waged a battle against leaflet-carrying balloons in 1953-1956. These were claimed to be launched by American intelligence units in Germany, and the Soviets protested against this "violation of sovereignty." Later declarations marked these balloons as "equipped with apparatus for taking aerial photographs for intelligence purposes," and were condemned as "a gross violation of international law." Krasnaya Zvezda published multiple photographs of alleged aerial photo apparatus suspended from the balloons, and cartoons ridiculed American claims that these were only intended for meteorological observation.

The Soviet press from January until April 1953 was filled with anti-American themes. Some idea of the rising crescendo of accusations may be gained from a random glance at the press in the weeks before Stalin's death. Articles find the United States deep in intrigue in India and Indonesia as well as guiding Israel in its Zionist "doctors' plot," controlling Finnish trade unions, "taking over" Iceland, and revealing designs on Manchuria. An illustrated article by "the American journalist Stetson Kennedy" alleged that an estimated 5,388,211 persons were engaged in forced labor in the United States. These included Mexicans, Negroes and native-born Americans. The theme of racism was tied in with photographs purporting to show a scene in a
Georgia prison camp after drunken guards had shot and killed eight prisoners and wounded twenty-three.22 Another photograph shows "a common scene in the USA--members of the Ku Klux Klan have lynched two Negroes."23

The Intervention was called to memory in a Soviet Far East newspapers series of illustrated articles by "former partisans," who described American atrocities committed during the occupation of the Vladivostok area. According to "an eyewitness account," the Americans

seized two fifteen-year-olds and made short work of them, poking out their eyes, cutting off their fingers and then stabbing them with bayonets . . . . Boiling water was poured over the partisans once an hour. They were beaten unmercifully . . .

"Remember this, Comrades!," the newspaper appeals to its readers, "and may the sacred feeling of hatred for invaders never leave your hearts!"

Photographs included one showing "a jumble of bodies, hands and feet of Soviet people who were victims of the April, 1920 provocation."24

What has been termed "the new look" in Soviet propaganda was not immediately apparent after Stalin's death in March, 1953. There was a period of seeming hesitancy, when the old "hard" Stalinist line was dropped almost entirely for several months, then gradually reintroduced in modified form, tempered with less blatantly crude attacks on the United States, but with a perhaps more intelligently planned campaign. The period of confusion within the political structure of the USSR in 1953 was clearly reflected in the propaganda of the time.

Increasing signs of a pending Red coup in Guatemala caused United States officials to express their concern over "Communism in the Western Hemisphere." This resulted in a Soviet protest against "American interference in Guatemala's internal affairs"25 and culminated the
following year in claims that the United States had "planned intervention as long ago as 1952," and noted that it had "attacked Guatemala" with military forces. In the summer of 1954, a revolution eliminated the Communist government, but not before the Soviet press had printed a series of violently anti-American articles. A cartoon linked the "recovery from illness" of the New York Stock Exchange with "conspiracy in Guatemala."

A pending agreement between Spain and the United States for construction of air and naval bases on the Iberian peninsula brought a cry of "Fascism" from the Soviet press. At the end of May, Pravda sneered: "... the treaty will undoubtedly lead to a further sharpening of antagonisms between Atlantic Bloc members." The inclusion of Japan in those nations receiving aid from the Mutual Security Agency gave rise to cartoons whose theme was the rebirth of the Samurai spirit in Japan and revanchism among the fascist militarists.

The conclusion of an armistice in Korea in July was followed by seemingly endless claims of American truce violations, together with luridly detailed reports of atrocities committed against Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war.

The continuing Indo-China War was now exploited by propagandists as "a second Korea," and increasing United States assistance to the French was interpreted as "American intervention" by Pravda.

During the summer, and until its defeat the following year by the failure of the French government to ratify, the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty was the target of a main Soviet propaganda attack.
Denounced by the Soviets as a "tool of aggression" and the vehicle for resurgent German militarism, the European Army concept was strongly supported by the United States. Western moves to integrate West Germany into the European defense system appeared to have been a failure when the French rejected EDC in August, 1954, but succeeded just before the year's end when the French National Assembly approved treaties admitting a rearmed Germany into NATO. Moscow fought these moves bitterly, threatening dire consequences, and announced its intention to form a united military bloc of its own with its European satellites. This was accomplished in 1955, when the Warsaw Pact was signed by the USSR and East European countries.

Another cooperative venture, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which Vronsky called "a screen behind which renascent West German concerns are gathering strength," was successfully established for the purpose of welding heavy industry together in several western countries into a productive whole. Soviet propaganda hacked away at the ECSC steadily from its inception, as it was to attack the Common Market in later years.

Foreign Ministers of "the Big Three" (United States, Great Britain and France) met at the Washington Conference in July, 1953, to discuss certain outstanding problems of the time, notably EDC. The USSR claimed "deepening contradictions between the USA and its allies," and by way of protesting the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the talks, reminded them that "the consistent Soviet peaceful policy overturns, one after the other, the barriers raised by the enemies of international cooperation.
in the way of settlement of disputed international questions."

The meeting of government heads of "the Big Three" at the Bermuda Conference in December was defined as a further attempt by the American diplomats "to step up the notorious 'Cold War'." When delegates agreed to a second conference in Berlin, the Soviet press interpreted this as "effective resistance by the British and French to American pressure." The Cold War remained intense in 1954, but the "hot war" in Indochina was settled by a truce in the summer. This was above all a year of conferences, with propaganda brought to bear heavily in support of Communist diplomacy at the conference tables. Soviet propaganda continued to picture the USSR as seeking relaxation of international tensions, while picturing the US as bent on disturbing and obstructing peaceful settlements.

"Peaceful coexistence" received renewed emphasis, and after July took on the proportions of a major campaign; yet, the atom-bomb rattling by Moscow and Peiping—in the latter's repeated threats to invade Formosa—made it increasingly evident that any conceivable 'coexistence' would still be marked by hostility and intense rivalry. Reiteration of the doctrine of "two camps" and continued vilification of the United States filled the press.

The Berlin Conference of "Big Four" foreign ministers in January was a failure, as no agreements were reached on German unification and an Austrian peace treaty. Pravda commented that results would have been better if the American delegation had shown a desire to work for peace; "it is well known, however, that the United States delegation . . . had
orders directly to the contrary."  

The Geneva Conference from February to June failed in its attempts toward a political settlement for Korea, but ended the Indo-China war through partition of that country. The Soviet Union used the conference as a sounding board for its charge that the United States "intervened" in Asia, and Trud quoted an Italian newspaper to that effect: "The western world must realize once and for all that it will never again succeed in imposing its leadership and will on those enormous masses in whom a new consciousness has awakened." Pravda declared that American foreign policy had envisioned increased participation in the Indo-China conflict deliberately to forestall a peaceful solution there; Dulles' departure from Geneva was seen as a "United States defeat," his policy "kaoed," while "United States plans fell like a house of cards." America's "Hand of Friendship" was shown as studded with bayonets and cannon.

Likelihood of an intensification of Communist attempts against Southeast Asia continued to focus world attention on that part of the earth, and on September 8, 1954, the United States and seven other nations met at Manila to sign a defense pact. Destruction of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) thus established became another major Soviet propaganda goal. In answer, the Communist Bloc in Asia met the following spring at the Bandung Conference.

The United States was continually attacked for its support of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, especially after the signing of a formal defense pact, and was accused of using countries of Asia as "military springboards" for future attack on the Soviet Union. Failure of SEATO was
predicted by Pravda, which claimed "contradictions between members of the bloc," and declared "the aggressive plans of the imperialists are running against an insuperable barrier—the determination of the Asian peoples to frustrate the conspiracy against peace ..." 142

In the United States the "witchhunt" conducted by Senator McCarthy and associates against Red infiltration into government in 1953-1954 was condemned and ridiculed in the Soviet press as representing the hysteria of a crisis-fearing nation, "which must be diverted from the crisis and real issues at hand." 143 The "war hysteria" of Dulles 144 and other statesmen, and the desire of "the fascist ruling element" in the United States to destroy opposition reached its zenith in mid-August, when Congress adopted a bill which, in effect, banned the Communist Party of the United States. The Soviets attacked this law as "not only aimed against American Communists and the American Trade Union movement, but also against all Americans whose views do not conform to those of McCarthy and other reactionaries." 145

Book banning was condemned in a cartoon in Krokodil ("In Wall Street's Light") showing two policemen shining flashlights on books, "Gorky...Twain...Tolstoy..." which are "to be confiscated! And better, not to be published!" 146

After the death of Stalin, Eugene Varga's views on a pending crisis in American capitalism became popular once again. At first, he cautiously quoted and distorted Western sources and data, such as the Boston Herald's lament:

On all sides we hear that real peace would knock the props
out from under us. America would suffer such a serious economic crisis that mortal danger would threaten our system. We cannot stand peace. Our fear of a crisis is almost as strong or just as strong as the fear of world war, itself.\textsuperscript{47}

Varga renewed his attacks after Eisenhower's State of the Union address in January, 1954:

The increase of production in the USA continued for quite a long time after over-production was already present. In pursuit of maximum profit the capitalists increased production more and more \ldots \textsuperscript{48}

In contrast, the "new trend in American propaganda" to admit the success of the Soviet economy, but to try and minimize fear of its potential was brought out.\textsuperscript{49} Parallel with this, American backwardness in education of engineers and technicians was frequently compared with the healthy standing of the USSR.\textsuperscript{50}

A propaganda campaign which was aimed at showing the existence of an American "iron curtain" was inaugurated at this time, and has continued to the present day. The Russians complained that the United States government feared the entry of Soviet musicians and artists, while discriminating against them and setting impossible conditions (e.g., fingerprinting) for their admission to the United States. Dmitri Shostakovich, in an open letter to the editor of the New York Times, lamented the loss to America from such an attitude.\textsuperscript{51} Pravda printed an open letter to American veterans of the meeting on the Elbe, pointing out the defects in such a system.\textsuperscript{52} A cartoon in Krokodil depicted the great success of artists and sportsmen in establishing cultural ties everywhere in the world except the United States, where hysteria prevented their entry.\textsuperscript{53} A cartoon ("With Professional Pride") showed "FBI
"workers" surveying their filing cabinets of fingerprints of "students, peace-lovers, scientists...": "It's nothing that respectable people won't give us their hands, since we already have their fingerprints."

In 1955, when Khrushchev and Bulganin took over the Party leadership, the tactical shift in Soviet propaganda which began after Stalin's death was completed. The unspeakable vituperation and invective of former years had largely disappeared from the media, although cartoons and photographs in Krokodil and the press continued to hammer away at NATO and the ills of capitalism in America.

The United Nations through this period continued to serve as a forum for Soviet propaganda concerned with disarmament and nuclear weapons. President Eisenhower, in his "atoms for peace" proposal at the 8th General Assembly (1953) had created a tide of world opinion favoring such a step. In 1954, Vyshinsky introduced a resolution for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, substantial reduction in armaments and the establishment of international controls to enforce such measures. As before, nothing concrete came of such proposals. An American plan for an "atomic pool" was condemned by Pravda in January, 1955:

... aggressive American circles have directed all their efforts toward stockpiling atomic bombs, which they regard primarily as a means of intimidation and blackmail, as a tool for imposing their policy on other states.

In May, the Soviets switched from their adamant policy on disarmament and control of nuclear weapons to a softer line which came to be called "The Geneva Spirit." When the Soviet government made minor concessions to peace before the summit meeting, it threw the West temporarily off balance. The return of Porkkala navy base to the Finns,
demobilization of 640,000 Russian troops, and foreign aid and trade overtures to several countries made positive propaganda for the Communist world, and a campaign was soon underway which contrasted Soviet goodwill and American "cynicism." By making trade overtures, the USSR sought to picture itself as an advocate of normal economic relations between countries. By increasing the travel—particularly of trade and "cultural" delegations—between Communist and Free World nations, they sought to rid the Soviet Union of the "iron curtain" onus.

Moscow centered its attack on the "vicious theory of peace through a 'policy of a position of strength'," which was said to be the foundation of Western policy, and declared it to be a "dead policy." 57

When the Foreign Ministers Conference met in Geneva in October nothing constructive was accomplished. For the Soviet people this was immediately laid to the stubborn, uncompromising attitude of the United States. Referring to disarmament talks, Pravda accused Washington of maliciously preventing agreement or settlement of the problem. 58 The poor results of the conference were laid to the "meddling of the business circles and manufacturers connected with armaments production" by Krokodil, which portrayed the Cold War as having been chilled through at Geneva. 59

Soviet propaganda during this period followed distinct patterns. In a study of the major themes of Moscow radio broadcasts in 1955, it was revealed that "aggression-intervention," which occupied up to twenty percent of the themes through the spring, had been almost entirely dropped by the summit meeting. Conversely, the theme "big power relations" grew greatly in proportion and utilized up to sixty-two percent
of the radio time by November. The high points for all propaganda for
the year were, as may be expected, July and November.

When Bulganin and Khrushchev toured India at the end of the year,
their anti-American demagoguery signalled the official end of the soft
"Geneva Spirit." In their efforts to identify the West with colonialism
and the USSR with Asian nationalism, they reintroduced most of the old
recriminations and diatribes against the United States. On November
24, at Bombay, Khrushchev declared:

... we have never renounced, and will not renounce our
political line charted for us by Lenin. ... That is why I
tell you gentlemen who are expecting the Soviet Union to
change its political program: wait for pigs to fly. And you
know when pigs fly.61

In retelling past history, Khrushchev claimed that the West wanted
"to stage a comeback, and organized World War Two. They threw against
the USSR the huge armed forces of Hitlerite Germany ..."62 The net
result of the tour was a clear indication that the Communist "new look"
was simply one more in a succession of zig-zag tactics used by the
Soviet propagandists in seeking their basic objective of world domina-
tion. The hoped-for rapprochement between the two blocs, envisioned
by many before the Geneva meeting, was dashed in the disillusionment
that greeted the year 1956.

At a session of the Supreme Soviet at the turn of the year, the
two Soviet leaders attacked the United States and Eisenhower in terms
which were stronger than anything heard in the USSR since the days of
Stalin. The revival of belligerency included virtual threats against the
West with the new Soviet H-bomb and intercontinental rockets, and

85
apparently sprang from increasing Soviet concern over South Asia. A rash of cartoons in the press showed the Americans "manifesting colonialism in another form" in the garb of SEATO, and being knocked aside by newly independent peoples who rejected the "economic help" offered them.

Dulles' "Brink of War" article in *Life* was condemned in *Pravda* as reflecting his "adventuresome policy," and the world was cautioned that "peace was ensured not because aggressive U.S. circles brandished weapons, but as a result of the rebuff... [they]... received throughout the world, a rebuff which has placed them in a position of dangerous isolation."

Internal discord was seen in SEATO, and the efforts of the United States "to bring South Vietnam into the Southeast Asian military bloc and ultimately to replace French influence in Indo-China by American rule" were publicized. A cartoon in *Gudok* showed a Vietnamese being forced at gun-point by an American-guided official to vote for Ngo Diem. In "A Friendly Meeting in Indo-China," the United States militant enters a native hut and kicks out the French militant.

On April 23, the Soviet commandant in Berlin informed the press that on the preceding day an American "spy tunnel" had been located under the border of West and East Berlin. Photographs of this alleged spy-crossing point and wiretapping station were featured in the newspapers and on television. *Ogonyok* also printed a two-page "exposé" with a detailed sketch and photographs. This tied in well with the endless reports of American-trained saboteurs and spies apprehended by
Soviet police in border republics.

October and November, 1956, were crucial months in Soviet propaganda, as important world events happened in rapid succession. The invasion of Egypt by French, British and Israeli troops was loudly condemned on the radio and in the United Nations by the Soviet government, and in this the USSR found itself aligned with the United States.

Premier Bulganin sent a series of letters to the heads of governments of the United States and the three "aggressor" powers on November 6,72 condemning their actions and demanding immediate cessation of hostilities. This was backed by threat of armed intervention on November 10, when TASS informed the world that the Soviet government would not oppose the "many citizens who had volunteered . . . to expel the aggressors from Egyptian territory."73 Only on December 8 did the Soviet government revoke its threat to use Russian "volunteers," as the warring powers had started to withdraw their forces from Egypt.74

The close ties of American business and oil interests in the Near East, and sympathy of Americans with Britain and France were the subject of caricatures in the press which showed Uncle Sam playing the part of the sanctimonious bystander, while innocent Egypt was looted. By the end of the year, the Soviet propagandists claimed that the CIA had had foreknowledge of the invasion and had reported this to the White House, but that nothing had been done to prevent it.75 Thus, the United States was linked as an "aggressor" in the Suez invasion, as it was later in the Arab-Israeli War in 1967.

The sudden Hungarian revolt in October, its spectacular early
successes, and its eventual crushing by overwhelming Soviet military force brought a new low point in Soviet world popularity. From the beginning, Soviet propaganda tied in the USA and its attempt to sabotage the Soviet Union's efforts in satellite countries with the uprising. On October 28, five days after the main revolt, Pravda declared: "... support for the reactionary underground forces in the countries of Eastern Europe has long been one of the guiding principles of the United States ruling circles."76 Two months later, declaring American support of the revolt to be "a crude violation of the sovereignty of free states," Pravda asserted that "recent events in Hungary have clearly shown that American intelligence agencies were directly connected with the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Budapest."77

The inflammatory anti-American propaganda which filled the pages of the Communist press for the next few months may be attributed partly to an attempt to offset the effects of the news of the revolt on the Russian people, and partly to go on the offensive as the best defense against charges that the Soviets were morally guilty of a terrible offense in so ruthlessly suppressing a popular uprising against an unpopular regime. The United States took the lead in bringing before the United Nations a resolution condemning the USSR for its aggression in Hungary. The Soviet delegation countered by raising "the question of aggressive actions by the United States which create a threat to peace and security."78

Although the United Nations in 1957 published a report which clearly marked the Soviet Union as the aggressor in Hungary, the Soviets had sufficiently recovered their international composure by then to lampoon
the action as efforts by capitalists to inflate a balloon ("the Hungarian question"), which was rent with so many holes that it collapsed at once. 79

It was obvious to all by this time that hopes aroused by the "Spirit of Geneva" were dead; a resumption of the Cold War seemed inevitable. The acceptance of the status quo in Asia had lessened the danger of a general war; however, the emergence of the USSR as a major power in the Middle East now posed new problems. The weakening of the Atlantic Alliance through the abortive Suez invasion and its aftermath, which was a by-product of these new developments, represented an even greater danger.

Tension did not lessen appreciably in the Middle East, due to the Russian drive for influence in that area and Soviet expansion of its foothold by supplying Egypt and Syria with arms and economic aid. The American response was dramatic: on January 5, 1957, in a special message to Congress, President Eisenhower proposed a "doctrine"—a promise that on request the United States would go to the aid of any Middle East country threatened by Communism. Despite the limited effectiveness of this broadening of the policy of containment, the "Eisenhower Doctrine" served as a prime objective of Soviet propaganda attack during the year.

The doctrine was immediately said to "increase the danger to peace in the Near and Middle East and violate the peaceful principles of the United Nations." 80 The United States was seen as aspiring to the role of "policeman" of the Middle East, 81 while it "grabs the riches of . . . the region, which are slipping out of the hands of the British
A cartoon in Literaturnaya Gazeta pictured the "lamp of the Eisenhower doctrine in the Near East" as a lighted bomb, and Sovetskaya Latviya portrayed a saddened John Bull being invited to sit down (in a coffin) and drink (oil) from a tiny aperitif glass while Uncle Sam sits on his moneybags and drinks whole waterglasses full.

A hulking American militarist equipped with handcuffs, pistol and oil can approaches Arab oil wells, telling "The Arabian Tales of Wall Street" through an oil funnel as he walks: "I am a friend of the Arab peoples, and I won't infringe on their wealth...".

On March 18, disarmament talks opened in London with what appeared to be fair chances of success. However, the alleged insincerity of the United States delegation to the United Nations Commission on Disarmament was mocked in Krokodil by a cartoon showing an American officer holding nuclear weapons under one arm and bow and arrows under the other. He extends the latter weapons with the comment, "We agree to conduct negotiations on the banning of this type of classic armament."

The United States was accused of setting "far-fetched conditions" and obstacles to end the nuclear arms race. In a note on disarmament on May 14, 1957, the Soviet government declared:

Only in the Soviet Union and in some other states have laws against the propaganda for war been passed. The absence of laws against propaganda for war in other countries creates a favorable ground for fanning militarist fever and war hysteria.

Premier Bulganin again showered notes on West European nations, threatening their "liquidation" if they permitted the United States to stockpile nuclear arms in their lands. Eisenhower denounced these
threats as "completely indefensible,"90 and later reminded the world that threats "have been a part of Soviet activity for a long, long time."91 In the same week, Khrushchev was quoted as saying: "That [the USA wants war] I consider to be an indisputable fact."92

The Soviets negotiated with seeming earnestness for five months, then reverted to their former adamant demands which ended the talks in a deadlock on September 6. The launching of the first earth satellite the following month gave them a further psychological advantage which admitted of no need for immediate concessions.

With the coming of spring blossomed forth a revived peace offensive, the "Berlin Peace Appeal" for the cessation of nuclear tests throughout the world. Tied in closely with the then-current disarmament talks, this campaign portrayed the Soviet leaders as realists and humanitarians who well understood the dangers of nuclear fission and its byproduct, "fallout,"93 while the United States was attacked as an evil experimenter whose recklessness might cause disaster for the entire world. Through appeals by scientists, many of whom were American citizens, the danger of unrestricted nuclear tests was driven home and the anxiety of the Soviet people increased. The question was stimulated in their minds, "Why won't the Americans listen to reason?" by such cartoons as that taken from the Philadelphia Inquirer and reprinted to illustrate a half-page diatribe against the United States in Literaturnaya Gazeta. Ridiculing American claims that it had developed a "99% clean" bomb, the caption asks, "Even so—who'd want to live with it?"94

Khrushchev on May 22 made a prediction that the Soviet Union
would in a few years "catch up to and surpass the USA" in the per capita production of certain staple farm commodities. This led to a rash of comparisons on charts and graphs, and hundreds of photographs and drawings which inevitably showed the United States lagging behind in production. The fierce pride of the Russian worker was carefully nurtured by incessent propaganda which rubbed in the tremendous advancement of all things Soviet, and the disparagement of what had previously been acknowledged to be American technological superiority. Khrushchev, himself, seemed eager to imbue the Soviet people with his personal dynamism, and the line taken by the propagandists played up the factor of a "new awakening" of the Soviet man to his environment.

On May 25, all major Moscow newspapers carried stories on some aspect of what the Soviets claimed to be "imperialist" activity spawned in Washington with the complicity of dictators and militarists throughout the world for the benefit of the five Rockefeller brothers and fifty-nine other American families. Following closely on the heels of N.S. Khrushchev's prediction, it signalled the opening of a drive to attack the American capitalist anew.

Each newspaper carried a main anti-American theme. For example, Pravda carried news of the anti-American riots in Taipei, Formosa; Izvestiya found Ngo Dinh Diem plotting with Eisenhower "behind the back" of the people of Vietnam to further reduce their living standards through military appropriations; Sovetskiy Flot described how United States military control was being extended over military forces in South American countries, rendering them literally subdivisions of the American forces.
Komsomolskaya Pravda presented two full pages of photographs purporting to be scenes which contributed to the profits of the Rockefellers and others, who were "always in blood up to their knees."

Included were a picture of a pipeline in the Middle East, of six African Negroes behind bars, of Polish concentration camp victims of World War II, of a Negro lynching attended by Whites wearing clothes of the 1920's, of riots in Jordan, and of a man leaping from a New York skyscraper because of his poverty.

At a diplomatic function two weeks later, A.I. Mikoyan denied that there was any new element of harshness in the press attacks on the United States. When asked by a newcomer to Moscow whether the verbal assault had "always been this way," he answered affirmatively.96

An anti-American riot on Formosa which resulted in partial destruction of the United States Embassy there was publicized widely in the Soviet press. Cartoons showed a bandaged official (with an A-bomb in his pocket) hiding in the ruined building together with a pleading Chiang Kai-shek,97 and an American soldier showing the mark of a hand ("Yankee, go home!") on his face ("A Formosan slap in the face").98

Trud showed "bandits in the form of American soldiers" who allegedly beat, stole from and murdered helpless Koreans.99 Krasnaya Zvezda printed an "illustrated roundup" of the unpopular activities of "American occupiers" throughout the world.100 The shooting of a Japanese woman by an American soldier, Girard,101 resulted in a long court trial and much agitation concerning "extraterritoriality"; this provoked a series of caricatures on the old theme of American soldiers committing
crimes without being punished because they are American.

An accelerated anti-American press campaign mounted in virulence in June, as Krasnaya Zvezda began publication of a series of half-page articles devoted to a grossly distorted and falsified United States history. Purporting to show the world that the American claim that it "developed without aggression and wars" was false, the articles were nothing more than a rehash of the worst slanders of the 1940-1950 period served in chronological order. The tenor of the articles may be gathered from a poem by an alleged American author, Richard Davidson, entitled "The Lynch Law," which was used to illustrate the state of terror in which the Negro lives:

Where down through the prairie to the sea
The River Mississippi flows,
In the beautiful Southern skies
A pair of young Negroes hang.
Slowly up
Slowly down
Their bodies sway in the gentle breeze.
Blood on the tree
Blood on the ground
Bloody drops here and there,
Everywhere...

The twelfth anniversary of the first atomic bomb attack on Japan was commemorated by Komsomol'skaya Pravda and Sovetskaya Kul'tura with full-page illustrated features showing destruction wrought at Hiroshima. Tied in with the Youth Festival and mass demonstrations for peace were articles by visiting Japanese survivors of the attack.

At intervals through the years, Soviet propagandists have seized upon an element of the American way of life and have levelled all guns upon it for a period of weeks or months. During the Sixth Moscow Youth
Festival in July and August, the Soviet press subjected American foreign correspondents to abuse and denunciation for their coverage of the event. Having lifted press censorship for the festival days, the Soviets almost daily attacked one or more reporters verbally with generalizations that they were working "under instructions" to smear the festival and the Soviet Union's campaign to portray itself as the leading advocate for peace and friendship in the world. "The American correspondents care not a fig for objectivity," stated Sovetskaya Rossiya. "They are black with rage and green with fury trying hard to belie and smear the Moscow Festival by hook or by crook." The Soviet press called the correspondents "hired propagandists," "messed up in their lies," "foaming with rage," and "malicious."

American press coverage of the Youth Festival was condemned in the USSR as defamatory and false. Krokodil had foreseen this in a cartoon on its back cover in April--three months before the event--in which a detective is asked by a press correspondent: "The Festival is nearly here, Chief. How are we to present it?" The Chief snaps, "Lie about it!" Articles by members of the American student delegation, such as one by Sally Belfredge, lauded the Soviet Union and Red China, and lamented the "stupid and blind policies of the United States in not recognizing China."

Racial tension and occasional riots or disturbances in the United States, such as the Clinton, Tennessee, riots of 1956, were sure to be news in the USSR; however, the outbreak of violence in Little Rock in September, 1957, received all-out anti-racist propaganda in the
Soviet Union. A beast-like Ku Klux Klansman was caricatured in Sovetskaya Estonia as "persecuting the Negro youths and girls 'daring' to study in the same school with whites."\textsuperscript{111} A photograph of a Negro hanging in effigy with the sign, "Nigger, this could be You" underneath was published widely in the press with the text translated,\textsuperscript{112} as were photographs of "troops operating against school children,"\textsuperscript{113} and "bayonets against Negroes."\textsuperscript{114}

Vice President Nixon is shown smilingly embracing a Negro representative from Ghana, while a photograph beside this shows a Negro girl being subjected to indignities by a contemptuous mob.\textsuperscript{115} The same photograph was used to illustrate an article concerning the lack of rights of an American Negro under the "Lynch Law."\textsuperscript{116} In a drawing taken from The Worker, a Negro child takes "Democracy's" hand to show her "reality" in Little Rock.\textsuperscript{117} Krokodil portrays "Education--American Style," in which two Negro children are assaulted by gun- and club-wielding men. "You want to go to school! Well, we're ready to teach you!"\textsuperscript{118}

As early as April, a Soviet "scare offensive" was in the making in the Middle East. The deterioration of the situation in Jordan and Syria led to Soviet requests that the United States and its allies abjure force in the crisis.\textsuperscript{119} In alarm over the pro-Communist shift of the Syrian government and its menace to pro-Western neighbors, the United States announced its intention on September 5 to fly arms to Jordan.\textsuperscript{120} Five days later, Gromyko opened a propaganda offensive against the United States for allegedly inciting the Turks against Syria. From this time
until the end of the year, nearly all newspapers carried cartoons on this theme. Turkish soldiers are caricatured as being fired as shells at Syria by Uncle Sam, as firebrands of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and as an American periscope shouting threats at Syria. A huge bomb ("American military assistance to Turkey") is tied to a Turk's neck as he is being hurled off a cliff, and while the United States government declares, "All is quiet in the Middle East," a hoodlum in the night uses a battering ram ("The Eisenhower Doctrine") with a Turkish "warhead" to batter in Syria's door.

Photographs showing "Turkish troops with American weapons" on maneuvers on the Syrian border, and Marines on "Operation Deep Water" in the "Turkish foothold of the Pentagon" were published in the military newspapers in the USSR. The Russians held maneuvers in the Caucasus, and Marshal Rokossovski was appointed as head of that military border district. On September 13, Bulganin accused Turkey of poising troops on Syria's borders for what he termed a United States-masterminded attack. On October 7, in an interview with an American correspondent, Khrushchev asserted the Soviet government had uncovered "proof" of a "secret plan of aggression" to overthrow the regime and exploit Syria's natural resources. On October 18, following a denial by the State Department, TASS communicated details of an "attack plan," but by November 5 the war scare was wearing thin, and on January 3, 1958, it was acknowledged that the threat was ended.

What may be looked back to as the beginning of a new era in Soviet propaganda occurred on October 4, when the first Soviet earth
satellite was put into orbit. Surely, because of the tremendous blow to American prestige throughout the world, the public reaction to such a scientific achievement had far-reaching effects within the United States. A cartoon in Sovetskaya Kultura showed the "Fall of the Propagandists," as the shining "sputnik" tears through a paper held in the hands of an American businessman. On the paper is printed: "American science is first in the world!" 131

Few newspapers were published in the Soviet Union within a week following the successful launching that did not contain at least one cartoon showing assumed American reaction to the event. "The Voice of America" is asserted to have lost its voice in wonder, 132 a capitalist strikes himself on the head in surprise, 133 United States officials are pictured as not believing the news, 134 or watching the "sputnik's" progress through "military eyes" (gun barrels). 135 All the world wonderingly watches the satellite overhead; 136 the "sputnik" passes over the United States and calls down to the American satellite, "Fly up to me!," and is answered, "I still cannot." 137

After the launching of the second satellite on November 3, Izvestiya gloated over American "hysteria," and asserted that the achievement proved conclusively that the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States, not only in rocketry, but also in industry, education and culture. 138 A cartoon portrayed the first "sputnik" as having struck a blow at American technics, but the second "sputnik" as having knocked it out. 139 The Atlantic Alliance was soon threatened by a "wind over NATO," 140 and by delegates at meetings who spend "all their time looking
at the heavens."141

A full page of foreign cartoons in Literaturnaya Gazeta jibed at the United States' futile efforts to launch a satellite on December 6: "Sputnik in the heavens; 'Spate-nik' on the ground."142 The "Vanguard" rocket was shown as worm-eaten,143 and "Jupiter" as being buried beside the graves of other American rockets which had failed, too.144

Frequent allusion was made to the small size of the American satellite, as compared with those of the USSR. A cartoon in Komsomol'skaya Pravda pictured a sturdy weight-lifter (USSR) balancing two huge weights ("Sputniks"), while a wizened Uncle Sam attempted to lift a grapefruit-sized sphere.145 The much-vaunted United States satellite is shown bursting in the "Exploding Sensation,"146 and in "The Career of an American Sputnik."147 Thus was the illusion that the United States is technologically unchallengeable shattered, as the United States is declared to be capable only of shooting "rockets--from its mouth."148 This seems in retrospect to be only a logical extension of Soviet propaganda which began to claim in the early 1950's credit for almost every scientific discovery and invention.

The political as well as the military significance of the new earth satellites was soon obvious, as Soviet propaganda began to take on tones of confident belligerency. The new technics, together with the intercontinental ballistic missile which they unveiled a few days previously appeared to be merely instruments of "rocket diplomacy," which the Soviets might use to cow the world into submission. A new bid by Khrushchev to the United States for "peaceful coexistence"149 was seen
as a move to split the NATO allies, and in answer on October 25, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister MacMillan called for a summit NATO meeting to deal with the Soviet missile challenge.

As the preparations commenced for a NATO meeting, the Soviet propaganda assault reached a new crescendo of verbal and printed attack. The "doctrine of mutual dependence" was mocked as an American maneuver to "rope in" the other nations and tie them together for easy control. Khrushchev with tactless vigor and sharp verbiage lashed out at NATO and warned the members of the alliance that they would suffer, should the United States use bases in their countries to attack the USSR; however, his blundering threats and tactlessness emphasized more than anything else the element of common danger which served to instill in the NATO members a new spirit of cooperation.

On December 10, Moscow did a turnabout and opened a new peace offensive as the heads of government of NATO nations gathered in Paris for their conference. A few days later, in letters to Western leaders, Bulganin called for an end to mutual recriminations and propaganda attacks. "It is time," he said, "to take measures to discontinue the propaganda in the press and radio which evokes mutual distrust, suspicion and ill-will." A look at the press for the final weeks of 1957 would give no indication that there had been any lessening of the usual program of condemnation of the United States, however. Criticism continued to mount on the results of the NATO conference, the deepening economic recession in the United States, and the need for vigilance against American-inspired espionage.
The celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow in November may be said to have been the high-point of the new Khrushchev policy of "feeling his oats." Regarding himself as the conqueror of outer space, having consolidated his domestic political power, he felt entitled to speak, not only from a position of strength, but from a position of superiority over the United States and the West. From that self-assumed position, he mocked at American technological backwardness and undertook, in effect, to dictate the terms of coexistence. Khrushchev threatened a Soviet walk-out from the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and in the same breath called for another "summit meeting" for the ostensible purpose of outlawing war, ending the armament race and establishing competitive but peaceful coexistence.

After a week of meetings in the Kremlin, a joint declaration of "basic laws" and "unity of aims" was signed by twelve Communist states, and a "peace manifesto" was published at the end of November. The first called for a revival of the "popular fronts" between Communists and other political groups "to win state power without civil war." Emphasis was on Soviet leadership, and it is believed that a modified version of the Cominform was created at that time.

The end of the year evidenced no lessening of the propaganda directed against the United States. A glance at the press during the last few weeks of 1957 revealed savage attacks on practically every theme previously mentioned.

Photographs depicting "the American rearmament of Germany" filled over half of Komsomol'skaya Pravda on December 3; the suffering American
taxpayer was seen burdened with the cost of arms and inflation,\textsuperscript{154} while representation in Congress was asserted not to include the farmer or the worker.\textsuperscript{155} The A-bomb was worshipped by the wealthy, the militarists and clergy as "their God"\textsuperscript{156}; the United States was accused again of subversive activity in the satellites\textsuperscript{157}; of coveting France's North African oil discoveries\textsuperscript{158}; and so on, \textit{ad infinitum}. 
Drawings and Political Cartoons

In newspaper, and especially in magazine publishing, drawings of various types are widely used. For periodicals in the USSR, artists use pen and ink, watercolor washes, black ("Italian") pencil, and watercolors in single tone color. In such publications these drawings will be seen in diverse forms, as this branch of art seems to allow for the widest application of creative ability, with widely varying results. As is true anywhere, an artist's style often is recognizable without difficulty through easily discernible "trademarks"; however, the subject matter is all too often unimaginative and follows a rigid pattern. Original, creative thought is usually absent, as Soviet "planning" seems to have denied the artists the possibility to be truly imaginative; all work must be "functional" and useful to the Soviet state.

In G.F. Volchek's work on illustrations in the Soviet press, he states: "Drawings, as in all forms of illustrations in Soviet periodicals, should and must be used only in a realistic setting." This, apparently, has been interpreted to mean that there is no place for "art for art's sake"; instead, the eye perceives a monotonous procession of portraits, genre scenes and architectural achievements in the press. Frequent use is made of sketches to illustrate stories, essays and biographies.
A typical example of the illustrated article is "The Sad Fate of Abe Lincoln," in which Lincoln comes back to life amid modern surroundings in America. Offered a job in Hollywood to work on a film called "The Plague from Overseas," he encounters many unpleasant adventures. Eventually, he ends up in a district where, for trying to protect the rights of a Negro voter, he is lynched by a mob. The series of illustrations ends with one showing the corpse of Lincoln hanging beside that of a Negro. Drawings in Brodyagi showed a Negro boy being hounded by a sheriff's posse and kicked to the floor by rifle-carrying Whites.

Every Soviet illustrator is cautioned to remember that, in the words of Lenin, "art belongs to the people; further, "it must unite feelings, thought and will of the masses, and raise their spirits."

Political cartooning suffered a decline in the West after the invention of methods of inexpensive photographic reproduction in newspapers, and to this day has remained primarily an adjunct to the editorial page. It is a fact that in those countries where photo-reproduction is poor and technically substandard—and this includes the Soviet Union—more use is made of line drawings of many types. Pen and ink and watercolors are used almost exclusively, no doubt because of poor reproduction qualities of other art methods. The crude caricatures of early Revolutionary days were soon supplanted by skillful cartoons drawn by professionals, such as Deni and Moore; these, in turn, have given way to "Kukryniksy," Ganf and Yefimov, as well as a myriad of lesser known, but talented artists.

Volchek described political cartooning as an art which "helps to
unmask the intrigues of enemies of the Soviet land ... [and] calls for searing with fires of satire all that hinders the forward movement of our society." Volchek insists that in work which involves international themes, "caricaturists must work in close contact with international journalists." He then reminds readers that "under such circumstances a caricature must not turn into an unrealistic picture pierced with empty sneering."

Cartoons are a medium of communication understood the world over. Such simple presentation of facts is easily comprehensible even to the illiterate, and thus has universal appeal. A Soviet caricatrist is reminded that

a cartoon must be on a concrete example of the survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of the people, and not just to ridicule its defects "in general." Soviet caricature is not mockery, but a means of education, a very powerful means of struggle with all that interferes with Soviet construction.

In the USSR of the past three decades, the publication most noted for its cartoons, both of a political and sociological nature, was Krokodil, a thrice-monthly humor magazine published by Pravda. Krokodil boasted the work of the best-known Soviet cartoonists. The master was acknowledged for years to be "Kukryniksy," a portmanteau for three artists, M.V. Kupriyanov, P.N. Krylov and N.A. Sokolov. As students at an art institute, these three began to work together forty years ago. They were almost immediately successful and attracted the attention of Maxim Gorky, who--according to Soviet sources--advised them to "go out and have a look beyond the boundaries of our Motherland, unmask the enemies of the Soviet government." Equally talented were Boris Yefimov and Yuri Ganf, both of whom produced some pointed caricatures at the
Almost every issue of *Krokodil* carried anti-American political cartoons. A study of themes used in only the back-cover cartoons (a very desirable spot for attention-getting) indicated that in the year 1956, for example, of thirty-two issues of *Krokodil* viewed, eighteen were devoted to anti-Americanism in one form or another.

Newspapers frequently use such cartoons, and even the annual calendar printed by the State Political Publishing House in 1957 had an anti-American cartoon to illustrate the date February 28. "On the Street in the USA" a newsboy approaches a fat, cigar-smoking capitalist. "Sir! Buy a newspaper." "What for? I already bought its editor." 

**Maps and Charts**

A glance at the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* will serve to show the reader to what extent maps and charts may be used for purposes of propaganda. Choice of subject: "The Rise of the Workers' Movement in the United States and Demonstrations Championing the Soviet Union," "Extermination Wars Against the Indians in the Territory of the United States, 18-19th Century," and the methods of using these maps and charts support well the thesis that the field of graphic propaganda is almost unlimited. The first of the above maps, for example, illustrated the Soviet theme that the Americans are a divided people; in this case, the industrialists against the workers.

"American Bases for Aggression" in the Arctic, North Atlantic and in Africa were subjects for maps in *Sovetskiy Flot* and *Krasnaya Zvezda*.
where bombers and warships are depicted as poised to attack the Soviet
Union. A reprinted map from Newsweek showed "where racist terror rages
strongest in the Southern states." 17

Charts taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States,
Newsweek, Time and other American publications were used to provide
"facts" about lynchings, murders committed, sex offenses; in short, any-
thing which served to show the United States in a bad light. An example
is the chart, "America's Biggest Crimewave," taken from U.S. News and
World Report in 1956. 18 That these statistics were taken from official
American sources lent further credence to the Soviet government's claim
to present the "unvarnished truth" to its people.

The book, Statistics of the Foreign Trade of Capitalist Nations19
is literally full of charts which purport to give a "true picture" of
commercial conditions in the West, with the United States being invariably
the basis for comparison. Polovitskaya's Economic Regions of the United
States: The South 20 has a field day with graphs and charts of comparative
statistics; here she gives much evidence of what an author can do to show
only that side of an issue which he intends to show.

Newspapers have printed graphs showing the amazing progress of the
USSR in production, as contrasted with the United States, which was said
to be lagging behind. 21 Often the growth of American industry was depict-
ed on charts in novel ways: in a full-page article, "Monopolists of the
USA--Inspirers of War Adventures," Komsomol'skaya Pravda 22 showed "profit"
with piled money bags; "growth of U.S. military expenditures" is traced
with a long-barreled artillery piece. A strong Socialist worker is shown
striding confidently up the line on the graph tracing Communist industrial
growth, while a bent old man with a cane wearily climbs the lower line of capitalist growth. "The countries of the socialist camp" are shown smoothly climbing a graph in a modern streamlined locomotive, while capitalist countries are represented as jerking along in an ailing jeep, held back by a heavy cannon and bags of "profits."

Photographs

In the pages of Soviet newspapers, magazines and books a reader will encounter reportazhniy photographs—current photo-chronicles; individual photographs related or unrelated to the text; "photo-essays" created from a collection of several photographs; photo-montages, which are an artful grouping of photographs or parts of photographs; and reproductions, i.e., taken from documents and the like. The wide field for falsification in photo-montages is exemplified by the frequent elimination or substitution of figures in photographs of meetings of Soviet and other leaders.

Nothing in this categorization differs markedly from the methods used in the West; however, in the technology there is a remarkable difference. The quality of photo-reproduction in the USSR has been very poor, especially in books and magazines printed before 1950. Not much improvement can be noted in Soviet newspapers since the decade of the 1930's. "Screening" of photographs, i.e., rendering the black and gray coloring in photographs into microscopic groupings of dots through acid etching on zinc plates, which when coated with printer's ink and pressed
against a white surface gives the desired outlines and shades, is extremely crude by our standards.

As many Soviet photographs are "lifted" from foreign publications where the original photograph or print is not available to the Russian printers, a negative is made of the already screened, printed reproduction. The results which are obtained when this photograph is, in turn, screened for the second time may be imagined. The "double screening" destroys detail and renders the photographic reproduction colorless and flat.

The chronic shortage of newsprint and hard-finished paper in the Soviet Union is often reflected in the sub-standard quality of the books and newspapers for sale; however, the use of pulp-paper for books means that one of the prime requisites of mass propaganda--easy accessibility--can be fulfilled, as the books then can be sold for ridiculously low prices. Even such an important work as The Large Soviet Encyclopedia in its prewar edition was poorly printed on low grade paper, with extensive use of line cuts instead of photographs; however, the 1953-1956 edition was printed on good quality stock. In 1957, a brochure commemorating the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Southeast Asia was illustrated with color photographs of better-than-average quality, and other improvements have been noted since then.

Documentary photographs are published frequently in the Soviet press, where "by the strength of their agitational and propaganda influence on the reader" they are considered to be superior to other forms of printed propaganda. The reader-interest created by such photographic reporting is a fact that has been widely recognized by public
opinion analysts.\textsuperscript{25} Some of the timeliness and effect on the reader is lost, however, when photographs of current events are not printed in Soviet newspapers until after a considerable lapse of time. For example, photographs of the May 1, 1957, parade and demonstration in Red Square were not published in the Soviet press until May \textsuperscript{14}. Again, photographs taken on November 7, 1957, were not printed until November 9 and 10. This is unquestionably due to the detailed censorship and over-caution practiced by Party organs.

The purpose of the "illustrateds" is clearly defined by Volchek as "to propagandize the policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet government by all means . . ."\textsuperscript{26} Pravda in February, 1958, chided leading Soviet newspapers for wasting time and space on photographs which were pointless or merely for entertainment. While acknowledging that photographs play an important part in propaganda, the newspaper claimed, nevertheless, that "only those which reflect the most stirring, striking and noteworthy events in the life of the Soviet people deserve space in the press."
In the Soviet Union in 1957 more than 7,500 newspapers and about 1,760 magazines were printed in seventy different languages. Not all of these gave scope to graphic propaganda; however, the very considerable number of so-called "illustrated," and the large printing devoted to them has made propaganda accessible to every Soviet citizen. If the Soviet claim of 53,500,000 newspaper subscribers can be accepted as fact, some idea of the all-pervasiveness of the press of the period may be obtained. In addition to this, the unique tradition of the "wall newspaper" at factories and the public posting of newspapers for passers-by to read made coverage by the press almost universal within the USSR.

One of the Bolsheviks' first acts in 1917 was seizure of the press facilities of Russia. Vyshinsky declared that under the guidance of the Party, "the press in the USSR became a mighty instrument for the true education of the masses . . . for fostering new discipline among them . . . for the building of socialism." Lenin hailed the value of newspapers to the Party as "not only a collective propaganda organ and a collective agitator, but a collective organizer." "The press," he said, "is one of the most powerful weapons [and is] . . . not less dangerous than bombs and machine guns."
As such, the newspaper still represents the basic method used by the Party to spread the information that it desires the Russian people to heed. A former Soviet writer, Michael Koriakov, stated pointedly that "Soviet newspapers don't report news just for information. They wage propaganda." And further, "newspapers are a continuation of the Party machinery and print only what suits the Party. It is from the Party that all initiative derives." Khrushchev wrote in Kommunist:

The press is the long range weapon of the Party. We can, if we select our own newspaper articles well enough, hit the mark thousands of kilometers away...

An editor or journalist is very well paid by Soviet standards. For example, a staff writer on New Times in 1955 earned 2,000 rubles ($500) base pay. With additional payments for published pieces, his monthly earnings frequently totalled 3,000-4,000 rubles ($750-1,000). A writer for Pravda received a base pay of 3,000 rubles, and payment for every sketch and article, with a total of about 5,000-6,000 rubles each month.

Photograph "art" is used by the Soviet press in two ways: in conjunction with an article, or separately, with a caption. The former is usually supplied by Fotokhronika TASS, together with a topical article; the latter may originate in Fotoklishe TASS or may be a topical photograph of a recent event, also from Fotokhronika TASS. A photograph has an element of prestige because many individuals assume that it is an accurate reflection of reality; in addition, it has a much higher interest value to the reader, and thus will be noticed even by casual readers. An investigator once estimated that "a pictured page in a newspaper will
be read by a third more adults than anything on the front page." The additional effect created by a photograph printed in the small four-page Soviet newspaper is not difficult to imagine.

Psychological techniques known the world over to "ad" men are fully understood and utilized by the Soviets. Although the first page of newspapers represents to us the most important position for news, Europeans traditionally look to the middle or back page for last-minute news. In Pravda or Izvestiya anti-American news and cartoons or photographs are usually on the back page, and sometimes on page three. The top half of the page possesses a perceptual advantage over the bottom half, as people begin to read from the top. In Vechernaya Moskva from 1949 to 1953 anti-American photographs were invariably at the top of page three. However, factors in the layout of a page can be even more decisive: an illustration can be boxed in by wavy or heavy lines, unusual space arrangements, or in conjunction with a caption whose type differs from the standard body type in the paper. In this way, cartoons and sketches are often located at the bottom of the page and are no less noticeable.

Literaturnaya Gazeta is a thrice-weekly publication of the Union of Soviet Writers, and because of its "non-official" status, is used for much of the Soviet propagandists' rougher hatchet-work. It also serves as an outlet for material whose dubious authenticity and libelous character might embarrass the government and Party organs. A military attaché once declared: "... in spite of its cultured name, it has little to do with literature or culture of any kind. It is merely an
extremely scurrilous rag, mainly devoted to publication of virulent attacks on prominent foreigners." When John Foster Dulles was still Undersecretary of State, a photo-montage of a monkey with a hat, glasses and pipe was used to illustrate an article concerning the "Biography of a Scoundrel," which concerned the diplomat.

Cartoons are frequent in Literaturnaya Gazeta. These have included "Truman and Wall Street," 1948 (Truman as a waiter serves the world to a greedy, monstrous Wall Street); "Attenshun! Eyes on command!", 1949 (General Bradley stands on a jeep hood, his hands in his pockets, reviewing the "Western Alliance," which is bound together with a U.S. money-belt); "Close ties of civilization bind Wall Street to Europe," 1949 (a huge spider web covers Europe with the center in the United States, where an ugly black spider--Marshall--clings to it).

An issue on the 12th anniversary of the atom bomb attack on Hiroshima printed a photograph of a brochure, No More Hiroshimas: For the Banning of the Atom and Hydrogen Bombs. The text of the brochure (Japanese) is explained to readers, with a plea to end the horrors of atomic warfare and the death of Japanese fishermen. The publication was brought to the Moscow Youth Festival to encourage youth of the world "to protest against nuclear weapons and atomic war."

Magazine publishing the USSR has taken a great upswing in the years since World War II, both in quantity of units published and in the quality of the product. Magazines have an advantage over newspapers in their additional prestige. Their dignified appearance, the more elaborate layout, the increased use of color and their substantially higher cost can produce greater submissiveness among readers than the more
ephemeral newspaper. Infrequency of publication usually prevents magazines from exploiting primacy and recency, but this factor also enables them to achieve greater perspective and obtain more facts.

The relatively larger size and space lends itself to diversity in layout which sets the Soviet magazine distinctly apart from the newspaper. Only here is initiative displayed and originality shown in the publishing world of the USSR. Krokodil uses color throughout, not only in cartoons, but often in captions and headings. Full-page caricatures are common, and often a double-page center cartoon is printed, such as that which depicted "The Bosses" from the series, "Enemies of Peace." This showed Krupp, Rockefeller, Ford and DuPont gathered around a huge pile of gold coins and bloody soldiers' skulls, fondling the money greedily. A typical cartoon showed "Europe's New Christ" (Uncle Sam) before a microphone, an olive branch on one hand, a bloody toga over one shoulder, with the dollar representing a halo around his head. Behind the folds of the toga can be seen guns, aircraft and tanks. In another cartoon, Franco harangues his Fascist guard "At the beginning of the school year" at the "Washington Diversion Faculty of Espionage, Border Incidents and Executions": "You kids completed your middle school under Hitler and Mussolini, and here you'll get your higher education!". In the "school" are seen an executioner's axe, grenades and KKK klansmen.20

Ogonyok frequently illustrated articles with wash or ink drawings, such as hanging Negro corpses in "The Kingdom of Lynch," or the Statue of Liberty burdened with a militarist demanding "world domination," and gangsters with a sign: "We are a Higher Race!". Capitalists carry
placards: "Quickly Drop the Atomic Bomb!", "Loyalty Oath," and "Search for the Reds!". Around the base of the statue are Ku Klux Klansmen complete with gallows and signs: "Business . . . A New War!". 22

Both Ogonyok 23 and Krokodil 24 reproduced watercolors which were on the theme, "Mayakovsky on America." Drawn to supplement anti-American verses of the famous Soviet writer, these had been displayed at the 1951 All-Union Art Exhibition. A terrified Negro tied to a tree and being burned to death is representative of the series.

Literature

The Soviets claimed to have 360,000 libraries of all types in operation in 1952, with forty-four millions circulation. 25 There were more than 100 million books in military libraries alone. 26 Book publishing in the USSR has always been of prime importance to the Party and government, as the fantastic rise in volume of publication indicates. By Soviet data, in 1955 in the Soviet Union 1,004,100,000 books were published—twelve times more than in 1912. The Soviets point out that in the quantity of books published, by title, the USSR by far leads the world, 27 while book publishing in the USA has remained almost unchanged for over forty years. 28 In 1957, nearly one and one-half billion books were published in eighty-four different languages.

As might be expected from such a volume of printing, there is great diversity of products in Soviet book publishing. While most books are poorly printed on low-grade stock, some books in recent years have
been of superior quality, both in paper and typography used. Even photo-
reproduction is improving, and in some books has been excellent. The
quality of this material as literature has been as diverse as its physi-
cal makeup; however, the heavy ideological handicap forced on it must
share the blame for many of its shortcomings. Zhdanov expressed the mis-
sion of Soviet writers in his Cominform address of 1947:

Imperialists and their ideologies, lackeys, their literature
and journalists, their diplomats and politicians, seek by all
means to slander our country, to present it in a false light ... 
Under these conditions, the task of Soviet literature is not
only to reply blow for blow to all this foul slander and attacks
on our Soviet culture ... but boldly to fly out and attack bourgeoise culture.

Literary works which have included anti-American propaganda have
been very numerous and varied in type. Some non-illustrated books have
had lurid cover illustrations which, as in capitalist countries, help
"sell" the contents. American Silhouette, published in 1936, bore on
its cover a picture of a forlorn hobo set against the New York skyline.
The theme of the book was the social decadence of technologically pro-
gressive America; this was explained to the reader in terms of unemploy-
ment, poverty, racism and moral and cultural barbarism.29 The Truth
About the American Legion depicts a fat Legionnaire with a skull and
crossbones on his necktie. He is held on a chain by a hand which is
labeled "§."30

Agency of Wall Street (1951) shows a gloved hand (on the sleeve:
"§, "Wall Street") holding leashed dogs who root in bowls marked "§."
The dogs bear the unmistakable faces of John L. Lewis and William
Green, American labor leaders.31 In 1957, the cover of To Put an End
to Testing of Nuclear Weapons showed the peoples of the world holding
high placards which demanded "No Bomb!".32

In the years 1950-1953 books filled with the utmost in vituperation were published in the USSR. Frequent use was made at that time of cartoons, and in the two years 1950-1951 a veritable rash of unbelievably libelous books of caricatures by top artists made their appearance. For a Lasting Peace: Against the Warmongers professed to see (in redrawn cartoons) the close link between Wall Street and the Nazi menace before 1940.

Uncle Sam is shown watering a seedbed ("Ruhr") with gold dollars. "Blood and Business" shows him calculating with an abacus (beads are human skulls) as "war news" comes over the radio. The postward American den ("Western Zone") is featured as a gathering place for "Fascist filth," including all the hated figures of the Soviet past; a banner proclaiming "Democratization of Japan" is altered to read "MacArthurization of Japan," as the General sits with his feet across the Emperor's throne. Under the "Marshallization of Italy," that country is seen being weighed on the scales in exchange for "horsemeat, chewing gum and cigarettes."33

The Frenzied Anglo-Americanizers depicts a fat capitalist riding on a moribund old nag ("The Marshall Plan") to Western Europe, while behind him in the saddle rides the specter "Crisis." Truman cuts the British lion's mane in a "Wall Street stripping," and uses "devaluation" to soothe the shame. A madman ("Forrestal") tries to jump from a window, shouting, "Help! The Red Army attacked the USA!!", while Harriman holds him back, and in another cartoon Forrestal is shown as a madman in a straitjacket.34
In Fables, a journalist's pen impales a frightened American capitalist who carries an A-bomb, and a Yankee pig with a cigar and flag ("North Atlantic Aggressive Pact") rides a thin English lion to the brink of a cliff. Various editions of The Large Soviet Encyclopedia show dramatically what force propaganda can exert on supposedly cultural pursuits. In a comparison of two editions, the difference found in sections on United States history is enlightening. At the time of the "Coalition War" (1945), this section is toned down and not offensive to America, but in a later edition (1956) graphic coverage of United States history is much distorted. These drawings and photographs in no way fairly represent such history; of nine illustrations, six are devoted to demonstrations and strikes, and two to American-Soviet meetings! A random selection from the 1952 edition (Volume XVI) shows photographs of a strike at the Ford River Rouge Plant in Detroit, and a magazine cover with General Ridgeway ("General Germ") hanging from a lamp post.

Children's Literature

As the system of education is rigidly controlled by the Ministry of Culture, this has resulted in complete uniformity of textbooks used throughout the USSR. Shortcomings and disadvantages have been noted in this superimposed rigidity on Soviet education, but in general the system "is one of the most effective channels through which propaganda is disseminated," and is successful by Party standards.

The Soviet school system did not always enjoy its relatively good
current standing; from 1921 to 1931 it was in chaos, with very lax discipline and poor results. However, in 1931 Anatol Lunacharskiy was replaced as Commissar of Education by Andrei Bubnov, who had organized propaganda and education in the Red Army. Bubnov carried out sweeping reforms and greatly improved the system with a complete reorganization of teaching methods. The Second World War resulted in a temporary setback for education (in the RSFSR alone, the Germans demolished more than 20,000 schools, according to Soviet claims), but the Fourth Five Year Plan called for availability of 193,000 elementary and secondary schools with a total attendance of 31,800,000.41

The vast number of books and other publications which are printed specifically for children and young adults is indicative of the emphasis the Party places on raising the youth of Soviet Russia "properly." The State Publishing House for Children's Literature (Detgizdat) has produced works on almost every conceivable subject which might interest children; however, "the monotony of themes and creative methods" has been criticized.42 Of forty-six young people's books which were the most popular in the USSR in 1957, nine were on military and counter-intelligence adventures, twenty-three on espionage and subversion, and nine on criminal offenses.43

The number of translated foreign books published annually in the Soviet Union is considerable. In children's books alone, Detgizdat between 1947-1954 published 280 books by non-Russian authors which had been translated from twenty-eight different languages.44
The hate campaign against the United States has been particularly prominent in young people's literature. No opportunity has been lost to create the desired impressions and images of America, though many of the cartoons used have been in extremely poor taste under any circumstances, considering the ages of the intended readers. The foreword to They Have No Childhood describes the purpose of the book as

for preparation and introduction to talks at pioneer assemblies. These talks help to cultivate in Soviet children a feeling of pride for their great Soviet motherland and hatred toward capitalist regimes which deprive people of their brightest and happiest part of life—childhood. 45

Sergei Mikhaklov, a favorite children's author, declared to the XI Congress of the Komsomol' in 1949, "We must create for Soviet children works that will wrathfully show the beastly countenance of the Anglo-American imperialists, those warmongers, those slaveholders . . ." 46

Several writers of children's literature have attained prominence in the USSR; the most popular author is Samuel Marshak, whose best known book is Mister Twister, the story of an American millionaire who decides to take a trip around the world. When he arrives in the Soviet Union, he is given a room at a hotel, but when he sees a Negro under the same roof he storms out to demand a room at another hotel. One after the other, the hotels are "tipped off" in advance, and thus refuse him, although he offers large sums of money. Finally, tired and desperate, he is chastised by the Soviet people and is given a room surrounded by a Negro, an Indian, a Chinese, etc. The book is illustrated throughout with amusing and well-executed drawings. 47

Originally published in the USSR as The Story of the Great Plan to publicize the First Five Year Plan in 1928, New Russia's Primer was
reprinted in the United States. A well-illustrated chapter, "Two Countries," emphasizes the waste in America, the "get-rich-quick" psychology of the people, and the terrible results of capitalist competition and a non-planned economy.\(^48\)

**Young Germany** (1951) shows children how the Soviet Union wants them to view the American "occupation" of Western Germany. A photograph shows a crude United States flag painted on a wall with the words, "GO HOME" scrawled boldly across it. "This is the work of German patriots," reads the caption.\(^49\) **The Great Volga**, nominally a story of the Volga region and economic development there, includes photographs which show America in contrast as an eroded land of catastrophes.\(^50\)

In the press, **Pionerskaya Pravda** and other publications for the young described American Boy Scouts as trained spies; American children from the cradle up were portrayed as playing with toys patterned on the A-bomb, and are thus trained as "little warmongers."\(^51\) A book for very young readers published in 1955 shows a positively nightmarish "capitalist" with a green, scaly face and fangs who carries a lighted bomb in his hand. He is the "incendiary bourgeoisie" who inflames fascist troops to advance into battle for capitalism.\(^52\)

Literature for young adults is published mainly by the publishing house **Molodaya Gvardiya**, which is controlled by the Central Committee of the Komsomol. Two books will serve as examples of the countless anti-American products which have originated there.

In **They Have no Childhood**, the chapter, "America: Land of Childhood Sorrow," contains poorly reproduced photographs of Negro slums in
Washington, with the Capitol in the background ("contrasts"); in San Antonio a tin-sheet shack houses eleven of a Mexican-American family ("discrimination"); a family is dispossessed and all their furniture is piled in the street ("insecurity"); a street is littered, filthy, crossed with clothes lines, while children play in the gutter ("poverty"); young Shirley O'Brien, whose parents are migratory cotton pickers, was sold by them to a filling station proprietor for five dollars and three gallons of gasoline ("degeneracy"); Donald Menius, seven, an uneducated St. Louis shoeshine boy, works from dawn to dusk ("child labor"); American children play a game, "Direct Hit," using a toy airplane which drops bombs on play houses ("militarization among youth"); the Ku Klux Klan is represented by a group of five-year-olds who form "part membership"; Navaho Indians are gathered around their hogan, where their poverty is contrasted with American White capitalist wealth. 53

Enslaved Youth: the Situation of Youth in the United States tells about America as it is in actuality, of the difficult position without rights and enslavement of the young generation of workers in the land of the dollar, of the militarization of youth. Also shown is the growing battle of the progressive forces of youth of the USA for peace, democratic freedom and a better future . . . 54

The chapter, "Economic Enslavement of Youth," contains drawings of a hopeless man sitting on a park bench with his head in his hands; children in adults' clothing leaving a factory, "where they work on the night shift"; a man "with a degree from Columbia University" sitting on a wooden crate awaiting shoeshine customers. "American Democracy" depicts policemen hauling a struggling youth off to a police wagon (he was seized "for [listening to] records made by Paul Robeson"); gun- and rope-carrying
men with a dog on a leash and accompanied by a policeman draw near a scene "where a lynching is going on." "The Marasmus of Culture" shows two youths who have just clubbed a man, searching his prostrate form ("comics taught them"). Also shown are a group of cigar-smoking men standing around a baseball player in uniform ("I'll buy this lad!") , and an American soldier standing in the back of a jeep photographing hanging corpses of women ("the fruits of education").

The height of the anti-American campaign in children's literature appears to have been the years 1950-1952, when it could be detected in almost any publication. Its virulence lessened thereafter, but the campaign continued. A hint of a possible renaissance of Soviet adventure literature for children was seen in an article in June, 1957, in Komsomol'skaya Pravda, which condemned the past development of such literature as "artificially retarded for a full decade and a half" and acknowledged it to be "still in the experimental stage."

Foreign Sources

Almost daily in the press and periodicals the work of foreign caricaturists and illustrators is used. In keeping with Soviet methodology, most of these drawings are simple, single-subject drawings with a one-line caption. In Soviet newspapers, cartoons depicted "the Dove of Peace and the Cold War," (Danish); vicious animals "In the Atlantic Den" (Bulgarian); "Newton" sitting under a tree, the fruits of which are "U.S. bombs" (Chinese); the United States militarists being knocked
off his perch "from a position . . . of strength" by the Soviet sputnik (Rumanian); and the "USA Embargo" sinking as Western Europe's movement for closer ties with the countries of the socialist camp gathers strength . . ."61 (English).

Krokodil and Ogonyok print similar foreign cartoons, sometimes devoting an entire page or more inside either cover to "Foreign Humor" or "Satire Abroad." One such page was composed entirely of cartoons from Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary on the theme of American germ warfare in Korea.62 Others showed "the evolution of German imperialism" with the "1951 Model" shouting, "Wall Street over all!"63 and Adenauer playing a broken harp ("US Dollar") on instructions from Washington.64

Illustrated foreign articles and short stories in Ogonyok have included "Rickshaw" by Howard Fast, which professed to show unfriendly relations of American military men with natives in India,65 and a French author's condemnation of racism in the United States, "Corpses—the By-Products of Business." Illustrations showed frightened Negroes being persecuted by evil Whites, soldiers and police.66

In the Shade of Fort Knox, translated from the German, used almost exclusively United States sources for its illustrations. "The Land of Contrast" shows the huge trailer house which Ginger Rogers "uses from time to time for a few hours" while an entire family is shown below sleeping in an auto; in "The Land of Waste," a Broadway star "with more dollars than taste" wears a dress costing $20,000; Roy Rogers holds a party for his horse and "friends" (other horses) on a New York hotel rooftop: "$10,000 thrown into the air"; an electric sign fifty feet high
over Times Square advertising candy "is using nightly enough electricity to light a small city"; a veteran with wife and baby sits on a park bench under the open sky: "Yesterday a soldier--today, homeless!". Congress is in session with but a handful of people present: "the real work is carried on in lobbies"; Henry Ford is met at Tempelhof airdrome in Berlin by American military authorities: "the Inspector comes"; "Fascism in the United States" is indicated by paraphernalia taken from Raymond Nelson, self-styled "Fuehrer" of an underground nationalist organization in Minneapolis; "the Middle Ages on Stone Mountain" shows the Ku Klux Klan burning a cross. The last photograph in the book, appropriately with no comment, shows the Statue of Liberty from the back, a huge litter of trash strewn about the scene.67
As is true in all spheres of activity in the Soviet Union, the film industry is called upon to satisfy the ideological demands of the Party. "Of all the arts, the cinema is the most important to us," declared Lenin, who foresaw in its future growth the most significant propaganda factor in the spread of Bolshevism. Indeed, the Soviet Union claimed in 1955 to have in operation 15,700 cinemas and 24,100 mobile motion picture units. This was in sharp contrast with the early days of the Revolution when "of the original 143 cinemas in Moscow, only ten were functioning regularly; and because of lack of equipment, current and films there were many weeks when not a single theatre in the city was able to put a picture on the screen." 

It is interesting to note that Babitsky regards American film directors Griffiths and DeMille as the fathers of the Soviet film industry. For months after they seized the picture-taking establishments, the Soviets produced nothing more ambitious than short propaganda reels which were destined mainly for the front. It was not until the advent of such directors as Eisenstein, Pudovkin, Dovchenko and others whose artistry was based on American technology that the Soviets began to produce effective feature films. The period 1925-1929 saw the real establishment
of the Soviet film industry.

Soviet audiences in the 1920's responded enthusiastically to American and foreign films. In 1926, for example, eighty percent of all the films shown were of foreign origin. However, in order to neutralize their ideological "danger," Soviet authorities edited and cut them, often beyond all recognition. In general, they accepted for import only those films which provided escapist entertainment or illustrated some deficiency in the capitalist world. In 1929, with the onset of the Five Year Plans, all foreign films vanished from the Soviet screen at the direction of the government. Since that time, Hollywood has been caricatured as surviving on the sensationalism of Ku Klux Klan lynchings, gangsterism and tasteless sex. An illustrated article in Ogonyok in 1949 strongly condemned the American film industry as devoid of art.

As was the case with all Soviet propaganda in the period of militant communism, the main figure of hatred was the White Guardist, especially the officer. A standard type was created; he was cowardly, cruel, stupid and eternally drunk. Only after the onset of NEP, when it was asserted that combat with such a disreputable type discredited the fighting abilities of the Red Army, did the White Guardist assume more human qualities. During this period, the "Imperialist Trio" (France, Britain and the United States) suffered considerably at the hands of the film propagandists, mainly in scenes depicting assistance rendered by the capitalists to the White armies. Even in films which featured spies and diversionists whose activity was not necessarily ascribed to the United States, but simply to "the West," or "the bourgeoisie," America shared
in part of the audience's hatred and contempt by propaganda symbol association.

In 1921, the Sovnarkom by special decree ordered the film industry to speed up production on needed films and coincidentally ordered that a propaganda film be included in every program in domestic theatres. In that same year, some of the outstanding pre-revolutionary film directors returned to their profession; however, only in 1923, with the formation of Goskino in Moscow and Sevzapkino in Leningrad did the Soviet film industry, as an art, have its beginning.

American films, beginning with Griffith's Impatience in 1922, made frequent appearances on the Soviet screen. Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks, Rudolph Valentino, Pola Negri, Emil Jannings and others attained quick popularity among Russians. By 1924, however, anti-American propaganda was already evident in Soviet feature films, The Heart and Dollars and The Unusual Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks. The latter film was hailed by Moscow critics as a great film which gave

American impressions of Soviet Russia and of Russians who admire America. Mr. West, an American senator, decided despite all terrors (which, in the words of American newspapers are extant in Russia) to visit the land of the Bolsheviks. In Moscow he falls into the hands of the adventurer Zhban and his gang, who depict the life of Russia as the half-baked senator expected to see it.

In reality, this film contained all the stereotypes (including a cowboy) which unrealistically represent an American to a foreigner. On the other hand, supposed wild ideas of Americans about Russia were loudly ridiculed. A 1927 production, The Voyage of Mr. Lloyd is described as
"exposing the capitalist class and at the same time revealing the tasteless worship of comfort, which the bourgeoisie utilize."\(^\text{12}\)

During the period of NEP a number of studios sprung up all over European Russia and in the Caucasus. Concurrently, Soviet film technology improved through modernization and adaptation of foreign methods of filming and projection. The complexity and length of feature films increased together with the experience of master directors. It was in this period that the first great work of Sergei Eisenstein was produced.

October, also called Ten Days that Shook the World,\(^\text{13}\) was a great undertaking for that time in the Soviet Union, and was premiered in the Bol'shoi Theatre in November, 1927. Perhaps because NEP was drawing to a close, anti-Americanism was present in two respects in the film: in Scene VI, opposition leader Kerensky is shown riding in an automobile bearing the United States flag on its hood,\(^\text{14}\) and America is associated as linked with the activities of the hated cabinet ministers of the Provisional Government.

In the Party press of this period more and more frequently there appeared attacks on "bourgeois influence" of the motion pictures imported from abroad; finally, in 1929, foreign films were prohibited altogether. They were not to reappear on the Soviet scene until ten years later, on the eve of the Second World War.\(^\text{15}\)

Stalin recognized the value of motion pictures in propaganda work; following the example set by Lenin, he tightened Party control over film activities to include detailed censorship of thematic planning and thus
complicated the already difficult process of preparing scripts. Stalin described Soviet cinema as "a great and inestimable force . . . which has exceptional possibilities for spiritually influencing the masses . . ." It is interesting to note that he saw the cinema only as a method of agitation, and not as an art.

A purge campaign against "formalists" resulted in the stifling of creative effort and the absence of new forms and styles. This also rooted out many talented personnel and interfered with natural growth of the industry. Themes of films produced during the period of reconstruction and early collectivization included "the fight with foreign spies; the economic crisis in the West, and anti-Fascist propaganda."\(^{16}\) It was also at this time that the model of the "new Soviet man" began to emerge in films. Though the first sound picture was produced in the USSR in 1931, the quality of the films continued to be mediocre. As late as 1936--ten years after the introduction of sound films--only twenty-one percent of the projectors were equipped for sound.\(^{17}\) The suppressed potential of Soviet artists caused one British visitor to note in 1932 that Bolshevik cinema was

the scene of a struggle between art for its own sake and art constrained to serve the purposes of propaganda. It has to crawl along under a heavy burden of Bolshevik propaganda, and for this reason the visitor to Russia does not see many beautiful films--he only feels how fine the Russian cinema might be.\(^{18}\)

In 1932 a number of American Negroes of radical views were invited to the Soviet Union to act in a film production which was to expose the oppression and exploitation of the black race in America; however, influential American businessmen strongly remonstrated with the Soviet
government and pointed out that such a film would have disastrous effects on the prospects of recognition of the USSR by the United States. Accordingly, production on the film was stopped, and the Negroes were sent home. This did not prevent the release in April, 1933, of the anti-American film, The Negro from Sheridan (later reissued as Love and Hatred).

The first Soviet color film was produced in 1934 by Eck, and in the following year the industry celebrated its 15th anniversary with great fanfare, including the awarding of titles and medals. After a visit to Hollywood, the director Alexandrov produced a "comedy" in the late 1930's which played on the popular theme of racial discrimination in America. The Circus told the story of an American white girl who found happiness in the Soviet Union, where she had fled after being ridden out of town because her baby had been fathered by a Negro.

When war came to Russia in 1941, many film studios were lost to the Germans; however, this did not prevent the Soviets from producing a number of war-agitational films in other studios. Primarily documentary in nature, these differed from those of the Civil War period in their relatively high art quality.

Parallel with the substitution of patriotic for "Party" themes came a relaxation of the ban on Western films. Certainly the most significant field of communication during the war, films from the United States were imported in sizeable numbers. North Star, Mission to Moscow, Song of Russia, Edison were some of the most outstanding. Also popular were Deanna Durbin and Walt Disney films. The latter, along with films starring Charlie Chaplin, had been permitted after the Nazi-Soviet pact
of 1939, as they had themes ("the Big Bad Wolf," the underdog) which could be easily translated into anti-capitalist terms. From 1943 to 1945, Soviet newsreels occasionally used fragments of U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) commentaries in their makeup.

At the end of the war, the Soviets set to the task of rehabilitating their war-torn film industry with vigor. The Fourth Five Year Plan for motion picture production, approved on May 21, 1946, by the Party, was ambitious. Its program included among other propaganda points: the advantages of the Soviet system over the capitalist; the people's vigilance, patriotism and duties to the state; problems facing the USSR; and popularization of achievements in science and technics. It was hoped that by 1951 there would be no fewer than two sound-film showings per month in each rural village.

For all its potential, the Soviet film industry was not able to meet its requirements under the Plan, and for nearly a decade after 1946 it continued to run in low gear. The Party offensive which had its origin in the postwar period was strongly reflected in political interference in the movie industry. Pravda in 1946 stated:

Soviet cinema has not and cannot have any interest or task other than the interest of the state and the task of educating the people and the youth, particularly, in the spirit of the great ideas of Lenin and Stalin.

The resurrected anti-American campaign in the early part of this period (1945-1947) was waged with old prewar films, including some captured Nazi propaganda films which happened to fit the Party line. Old American films which portrayed the United States in a bad light were also shown. These included The Grapes of Wrath (the plight of the "Okies" in
the Depression years), and Black Legion (activities of the Ku Klux Klan).

Iksusstvo Kino declared: "Soviet art moved into a decisive battle with the self-satisfied film art of contemporary imperialist reaction." 29

After the huge success of Simonov's The Russian Question as a play in 1947, it was filmed and thus presented to a far wider audience. With the intensification of the Cold War after 1949, the Soviets portrayed "the growing disillusionment of the Russian people with their former allies" in the vividly anti-American Meeting on the Elbe. 30 Beginning with the glorious juncture of American and Soviet troops on the Elbe in 1945, the film ends with a sordid revelation of the United States "espionage, fascism and treachery." A veritable parade of stock characters is introduced; these range from the heartless blonde spy and effete officers to the reactionary senator. Only one American officer fights to promote democracy in the American Zone, but is sent home in disgrace. Various scenes show a "pin-up"-covered jeep, drunken and undisciplined soldiers and officers, militarists drinking "to Wall Street," and an American at the head of goosestepping German marchers. The final scene shows a farewell on a bridge which crosses the Elbe—symbolic of the "gulf" between two worlds which Soviet propagandists were hard at work creating. The film's popularity was attested to by advertisements in Vechernaya Moskva within ten days of its opening which claimed "more than 1,500,000 people have seen Meeting on the Elbe."

Academician Pavlov and Life in Bloom 31 underscored the supremacy of Russian science and the venality of American scientists who falsely claimed credit for Soviet discoveries, or encouraged by Fascist bosses,
resist the evident truth of Micherin's, Pavlov's or Lysenko's theories.

Conspiracy of the Doomed\footnote{32} was directed against the Marshall Plan. During the Korean War (1950-1953) the Soviets produced numerous anti-American films. Both the following were shown to Soviet Army trainees during this period: There Were Five of Them told the story of five demobilized "G.I.'s" who engaged in illicit trade with badly-needed penicillin; A Soldier's Fate in America concerned a veteran who became a gangster because of abominable living conditions and was ruthlessly shot down by the police.

The most infamous of all was produced in 1952 when as support of the Chinese claim that the United States was waging germ warfare in China and North Korea, a documentary film was made of the trials of captured American airmen. Displays of "evidence" and the haggard faces of fliers who confessed their "guilt" made an impressive picture story. This was widely shown throughout the world and reached all parts of the Soviet Union. Follow-up newsreels showed Chinese peasants with masked faces determinedly and dextrously using chopsticks in fields to pick up insects which they declared were dropped in "germ-bomb" canisters to spread disease among the Chinese people. These were often shown in conjunction with exhibits of allegedly captured equipment.

In 1955, Footsteps in the Snow and \textit{In Square 45}, both of which depicted "the heroic and determined struggle of the Soviet people against spies,"\footnote{33} signified the intensification of the then-current "fight against United States spies and saboteurs." Another film of the time, Silver Dust, will be described here at length. A vicious movie which had a very wide screening in the USSR, it depicts Americans as guilty of
everything form superstition and corruption to rape.

As the film begins, an American scientist, Steel, acquires riches and the formula for "Silver Dust," a deadly germ preparation, by marrying the widow of the inventor. He is subsidized by Southern Trust, in which he owns stock. At the Pentagon, General Mac Kennedy and his cronies decide to purchase the formula from the United States Army, but first intend to divert the formula to Eastern Trust, which is owned by their relatives. To assist him in this venture, they enlist the services of a former Nazi colonel, an itinerant preacher (to prey on the religious credulity of Mrs. Steel), and a gangster.

The minister tells the widow that when in a seance Christ appeared, he had asked him, "When will the war of justice begin?" Christ replied, "You had better hurry." When asked about the danger of Russian troops, Christ said, "But I have blessed my troops!" The preacher then claimed that the deceased scientist had joined the seance and had advised that the formula be given to Eastern Trust.

Progressives in town hold a demonstration for peace, but the preacher drowns out their speeches by leading in a blaring Salvation Army band. When he later pinches a prostitute in a bar, he is thrown out; however, he starts a fracas which ends with the girl and six Negroes being taken to jail.

Steel needs live humans for laboratory experiments, so he telephones the governor for help. He explains to the governor that prisoners of war from Korea are too far away, and besides, use of them might entangle the United States embarrassingly with the United Nations. The governor gets
a sheriff to frame the six Negroes in prison; this is done by having the prostitute accuse them of rape. They are convicted, but as the country is stirred by the "Case of the Six," they are kidnapped by the Ku Klux Klan and are to be burned at the stake. The chief of police "rescues" them from the mob and transports them to Steel's laboratory.

At this moment, Steel's young son sneaks into the laboratory and touches the "Silver Dust," then dies a horrible death while the Nazi colonel watches and coldly notes the details of the death process. All this he reports accurately to the imperturbable father. The Progressives learn of Steel's intentions and break in on General Kennedy and gangsters as they torture Steel for the formula. The mob carries the Negroes to safety, just before the police arrive to stop them. When the general tells the Progressive leader, "The electric chair awaits you!" he flees into the night, saying, "Come on, let's get out of here. We don't want to be under the wheels of American justice!"

In an article in Izvestiya in 1953, the director of the Moscow Shock Worker Theatre pointed out the poor quality of films:

Because of the printing defects in laboratories and poor sound tracks, audiences sometimes see on the screen a darkened, grey picture, accompanied by poor sound. The color is often distorted in color films and barely comprehensible sounds come from the screen.

The low quality of motion picture scripts submitted for production was also the subject of an article in Sovetskaya Kul'tura. Directors of the Mosfilm Party Committee complained to the Ministry of Culture: "... arc lighting is not even yesterday's film technology, but that of the day before yesterday."
By 1957, however, studios were well-equipped and competently staffed, with apparently unlimited financial resources. Film stars and extras were well paid; for example, extras received as much as 400 rubles a day,37 as compared with the 600 ruble monthly wage of the average Soviet worker.38 The Ministry of Culture opened a free six-year school of cinematography for the training of motion picture technicians and the grooming of "people's artists." Soviet writers were also well-rewarded for their work. The author of a scenario received not only a fee ranging from the equivalent of $1,000-$30,000, but was paid a like amount for each hundred prints of the film released. Unusually successful films might win additional money prizes.39

The industry in 1955 produced sixty-five feature films, an increase of twenty-seven over the previous year, and forty-seven over 1952. By contrast, in 1955 the United States produced 254 and Mexico ninety-six. Plans calling for ninety full-length films in 1957 were overfulfilled.40 Though film production was not impressive by Western standards, the Soviets seemed to be in the process of learning that the best propaganda is that which is so subtle as to defy detection; in short, that an artistic film of high quality is, per se, effective propaganda. Some films, particularly those intended primarily for domestic showing, remained heavy with propaganda, but subtlety was unquestionably a new keynote.

Although American "Cinerama" was characterized as "closer to a tourist novelty than an art film" in Sovetskaya Kul'tura in 1956,41 an illustrated article in Sovetskiy Flot at the end of 1957 hailed the premiere of the "first Soviet panoramic stereophonic film" as the "successful
beginning of a new form of native cinematography, having great perspective for development." 42

The continuing expansion of the use of films for propaganda was evidenced during 1957 at the Moscow Youth Festival, when "tens of thousands of Muscovites and their guests viewed films in open squares and parks." 43 On January 29, 1958, after the United States-Soviet agreement on cultural exchange was signed in Washington, preliminary talks were opened on exchanging films for screening in both countries.44

Foreign Films

As has been pointed out in other chapters, Soviet propagandists frequently use the work of foreign artists and press to their own advantage. In addition, selected foreign films from the satellite countries, and those from the non-Communist world which are ideologically suitable are shown. Vechernaya Moskva frequently ran advertisements on its back page from non-Russian films which were produced by fellow-traveler studios, and together with Sovetskaya Kul'tura, reviewed those films with appropriate commentary and illustrations. Other films which coincidentally carried an ideologically useful theme—American cowardice, waste, racism, etc.—were also shown.

Kariera (Poland) had an anti-American spy story as its plot; Hiroshima (Japan), made by the Communist-front Teachers' Union gave a lurid picture of the horrors of nuclear warfare which suggests that only an inhuman force could have been criminal enough to drop the first atomic
bomb. Mexican Girl (Mexico) and Under Sicilian Skies (Italy) are typical of the anti-capitalist genre which was always "admissable" to the domestic screen. The Western Zone gave a Hungarian view of the "American bloc" as aggressive warmongers.

A film which falls into the category of innocently providing the Soviets with suitable propaganda material is Bread, Love and Dreams, shown in the USSR in 1956. It was reviewed in Ogonyok as filmed "in a locale so poor that the inhabitants are forced to eat only bread..."

On Moscow screens one week after its London premiere in 1957 was A King in New York, produced and directed by Charlie Chaplin. Ridicule of rock 'n roll, Hollywood movies ("The Killer with a soul... You'll love him... Bring the family..."), blaring jazz and television commercials is interspersed with hysteria concerning witchhunts, the atom bomb and freedom in America ("There's no freedom here... They don't give you a passport.") Soviet newspapers hailed the film as "a hydrogen bomb dropped on New York's skyscrapers," and "a destructive satire on living conditions in the USA."

Animated Cartoons

As has been stated, Walt Disney's art has long been popular in the Soviet Union, but only in recent years have the Russians produced comparable animated cartoons. In 1957, they claimed that their twenty-year-old "Soyuzmult" Studio was the largest of its type in Europe. Much use has been made of cartoons during the past three decades in the armed forces.
and "voluntary societies," primarily in the technical training of young men and women. It may be assumed that in the future increased use will be made of animation in films by the Soviets, as the effectiveness of this form of amusement-instruction is unsurpassed. Though the cartoon lacks the realism of a motion picture, it is able to stimulate audience responses more arbitrarily and thus can evoke strong emotions, even among adults.

In 1955, an animated short film, The Painted Fox, cleverly ridiculed the United States. The film concerns a fox which accidentally fell into red, white and blue paint. Masquerading as a super-beast, he is then able to rule the forest until it is discovered that under the paint he is really just an ordinary fox.56

Television

The Soviet Union is devoting considerable effort to the development of television. This is not surprising, in view of the huge propaganda potential represented by this medium of mass communication. The newspaper Sovetskaya Kul'tura has described television as "a powerful medium for Communist propaganda and the cultural education of the working people."57 However, any comments on television as used in propaganda work must still be largely guesswork, since the greatest development of this visual broadcasting in the USSR is still in the future. As it has the potential of nearly universal coverage, it could become the most important of all mass communication media.
The Soviet system of television was available in 1957 to a far smaller percentage of Soviet citizens than in the comparable system in the United States. Data published in April, 1956, put the number of sets in operation in the USSR at 1,500,000; however, in June, 1957, the number had grown to almost four million, according to Soviet sources, of which over 700,000 were said to be in Moscow. The goal of the Sixth Five Year Plan was "seven million sets with twenty-five million viewers." The Plan further envisioned television in all republic capitals, as well as the country's principal industrial centers.

Moscow and other large cities boasted television reception, but still on a limited basis; i.e., the programming was not scheduled for the entire day and evening. For example, a television schedule published in December, 1957, indicated that Moscow's two channels did not operate simultaneously, but commenced at 2 p.m. or 7 p.m. (depending on the day of the week) and signed off at 10 p.m. daily, with periods of non-transmission in between. A Soviet newspaper complained of "lengthy pauses taking up to ten percent of the time."

The quality of Soviet television came under fire in Sovietskaya Kul'tura in 1953, with the admission that "many complaints are received that programs are monotonous, dull and hastily prepared and that they are frequently repeated." An old complaint is reiterated in the words, "... creative initiative is vital to feature broadcasts. Yet it is precisely that quality that some studio workers lack." The same source asked in 1954, "Why are [so many] television sets out of operation?" It was claimed that in Leningrad, "of 1,260 sets sold in four months in 1953, ... 487 have had to be repaired." Though a trivial part "costs but
That Soviet propagandists quickly adapted their methods to television's unique advantages is evident from a description of a program which originated in Tallin, Estonia, in 1955. Included in the day's programming was a sketch and song performed by "a meritorious Soviet artist," showing jobless American workers who held out their caps, begging, "Give us bread or anything else, dear people!"

In February, 1957, 200 foreign and Soviet correspondents were summoned to Moscow's House of Journalists, where they found the stage set for a very dramatic presentation. Batteries of kleig lights and television cameras were focused on four pale men, who were surrounded by a curious display of pistols, explosives, maps, Soviet currency, miniature radios and poison pills. Foreign Ministry Press Chief Leonid Il'yichev identified the men as Russian refugees, recruited as spies by the United States and parachuted into the Soviet Union in 1954 and 1955.67

As television cameras recorded the scene, each man solemnly told his fantastic tale:

In order to turn us into obedient servants and make us forget our love for our mother country, the Americans encouraged drinking, gambling and bad language among us and even took us to Munich to visit immoral houses to enjoy ourselves.68

Il'yichev punctuated this confession with a charge that the United States was waging a "secret war" of subversion and espionage against the peace-loving Soviet Union. The alleged spies were "told to obtain genuine Soviet documents through bribery or with the aid of thieves, and even by murdering Soviet citizens."69
It may be assumed that, as the Hungarian uprising during the previous October had shaken the Russian people, the television show and films made from the presentation would strongly support the regime's contention that American provocateurs were behind the whole thing. The arrest of Jack and Myra Soble in the United States as Soviet espionage agents also undoubtedly spurred the Soviet propagandists to a retaliatory move at this time.

American television has been widely and frequently attacked as a cultural menace. Sovetskaya Kul'tura on January 28, 1956, emphasized the horror of television for American children in a cartoon which showed children cowering in fright from a mass of bloody gangsters, ghosts, headless corpses, axes and A-bombs which poured from a television set. The connection between the terror of television and comics in the United States was discussed in the article. Many readers of this paper might have been inclined to agree with the Soviet correspondent who commented on the superfluity of American television commercials: "Only a stone sphinx could stick to one of these performances to the very end."\textsuperscript{70}

Proposals for an uncensored exchange of television broadcasts of the "canned" variety resulted in inclusion of this matter in the United States-Soviet agreement on cultural exchange signed in early 1958.\textsuperscript{71} After the filmed interview of Party leader Khrushchev, which was televised in the United States on June 2, 1957, Mikoyan and Molotov had both expressed their approval of such an idea. First Deputy Premier Mikoyan had commented at that time that television could be especially suitable for the competition of ideas because it would be more difficult "to
falsify" before the cameras than on radio, "as you cannot only hear, but also see." A surprising feature which was not widely publicized at the time was thirty minutes of American newsreels shown on Moscow television once weekly in 1955. These films, supplied to the Soviets by Hearst's Telenews Newsreel Agency, emphasized baby parades and sports contents, and were thus ideologically neutral.
Plays

The stage is less important as a propaganda vehicle than the motion picture. The number of theatre-goers is necessarily restricted by the fewer theatres; yet, in spite of the relatively small number of its patrons, the play exerts a wider influence than would be expected in the Soviet Union. In that country, the theatre is more important as a means of entertainment than in the United States, although there, too, it is largely confined to the bigger population centers. Izvestiya complained that "rural audiences are poorly served by the theatres. Special performances for collective and state farms . . . are given only rarely. It is not often that a theatre troupe appears in the countryside with a traveling show."¹

The shortcomings of the play as a propaganda medium are headed by the spectator's consciousness of the fact that he is watching actions which are not reality. He, himself—and not the camera—selects stimuli on the stage to which he responds, and few theatres can compete with the motion picture's efficient use of sound and light. The lesser cost of plays is to be noted; however, as the Soviet government has never given any indication that it lacks funds for propaganda purposes, it may be
assumed that the cost of propaganda is not a primary consideration in the
USSR. A play can be adapted to a smaller audience easily, and the propa-
ganda can be more blatant than in a film. In areas of the Soviet Union
which are isolated the government has employed small dramatic companies
for years.

The mission assigned to the theatres was similar to that of the
press and film industries. As *Culture and Life* (the organ of the Central
Propaganda Department of the Party) stated with frankness in late 1950:

> In the world peace campaign our stage productions unmask the
> beastly features of American imperialism. Our theatres exhibit
> a whole gallery of stage types of enemies of peace—American
> politicians and gangsters of the pen, industrial tycoons and
> bandits . . . and lackeys of Wall Street.²

To put such a program into operation, eighteen anti-American plays were
produced in the Soviet Union in 1949; the following year this number was
increased to twenty-six.³

Such crude anti-American plots as were common after 1946 in Soviet
plays were not always the case, however. A visitor to the Soviet Union
in 1927 reported seeing in plays "no attacks on capital or capitalism as
such, but always upon the extravagant profligacy and brutality of the
Tsarist regime."⁴

It would be a mistake to assume that the United States escaped
unscathed, because the unmistakable figure of the capitalist was present
in many plays from the time of War Communism and after. In general, how-
ever, not until the late 1920's and more particularly, just before the
Second World War, did the United States figure importantly on the Russian
stage. Especially popular was *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, adapted from the Ameri-
can play with many changes in the script and setting.
During the Second World War, the tone was quite friendly to the United States, with several stage adaptations of American plays and films running from 1942 to 1945. *It Happened One Night* was adapted as *The Road to New York*, being performed successfully by the Leningrad Comedy Theatre all through the war. *Immortal* in 1943 portrayed an American newspaper correspondent who joined the Red guerrillas and fought the Nazis in a straight, positive role.

Perhaps the best known of all was *The Mission of Mr. Perkins to the Land of the Bolsheviks*. In this play, produced in the autumn of 1944, Perkins, a millionaire from Chicago, went to the USSR to find out whether it was possible to do business with Stalin. A journalist companion, Hemp, represented "the American Yellow Press." Hemp found confirmation of all his prejudices and retained his original opinion, while Perkins, an unsentimental but open-minded businessman, was convinced that it was possible to get along with the Soviets. The play was quite friendly, with many amusing scenes; Perkins was portrayed as friendly to the Russian people.

After the war, a rash of plays with anti-American themes appeared in the theatres. At the height of the Cold War, no comedy revue was complete without several anti-American numbers in it. President Truman was caricatured malevolently in two spectacles which spurred a storm of protest from our embassy in Moscow. In *The Mad Haberdasher*, by Anatoliy Surov, a haberdashery salesman from Kansas City who bore a striking resemblance to Hitler was selected by the "Pendergast Machine" as its candidate for president on the Nazi ticket. The politicians hit upon the idea of proclaiming that he is indeed "Der Fuehrer," who had been secretly
saved from the Chancellory bunker in 1945.10 The Missouri Waltz purported to expose the corruption of Kansas City politics; however, Soviet critics insisted that the corrupt politicians were more human than the play's "positive types," portraying American Communists!

Annabelle Bucar's book, Behind Embassy Windows was produced as a play which showed the United States Embassy in Moscow as a nest of warmongers hatching plots aimed at undermining the Soviet state. Although direct references were made only to "a capitalist power," the audience could hardly mistake the intention of the playwright. Actors engaged in trickery, deceit and blackmail, and the counsellor of the embassy is revealed as having sold aluminum to Nazi aircraft factories during the war "for use on the Eastern front." He states, "If only Hitler were on the Oder, everyone could sleep quietly in his bed." The plot was based on alleged American efforts to revive the Nazi Party and reorganize the Wehrmacht to fight with the Soviet Union.11

The Roman Catholic Church was shown in league with the Americans in Conspiracy of the Doomed.12 A capitalist states, "God has placed the atom bomb in our hands to establish peace, as I understand it." Cardinal Birnch answers, "Drop the bomb quickly, sir, while the Soviets still have not got it."13 This play appeared at the time of the Czechoslovakian coup. Within six months of the start of the Marshall Plan, Ilya Ehrenburg authored Lion in the Square, a clever production in which an American adventurer arrived in a French provincial town with a scheme. He persuades the mayor to let him take the town's lion monument in return for promises of dollars and canned meat. When the hoax is discovered, the townspeople
rise in wrath and thwart his plans. This play was also published in an illustrated series in Ogonyok.

Perhaps the greatest number of performances for any play in history can be claimed by Constantin Simonov's The Russian Question, which first appeared in Zvezda in serial form in December, 1946, and on the stage the following March. It is known that the production was later adapted for the screen, after having run continuously in at least 500 theatres in the Soviet Union.

The plot concerns Harry Smith, a correspondent who had written favorable articles about the USSR during the war, and Charles MacPherson, co-owner of a chain of newspapers, who asks Smith to write a series of articles on "why the Russians want war." Smith says he believes that the Russians want peace, but MacPherson offers $30,000 if he will make a trip to the Soviet Union and write the series. Smith is broke and in love with Jessie, MacPherson's secretary. In a bar, he meets a foreign editor on a MacPherson newspaper; this man apologizes for what he must do with news about the USSR: if it is bad, it goes on page one; if it is good, it is "buried" on page sixteen. Jessie convinces Smith to accept the job.

Back from his trip and married to Jessie, Smith is busy working on his manuscript; meanwhile, MacPherson is widely advertising the forthcoming work, and is very curious. When Smith finally gives him the completed series, he is infuriated because the articles declare Russia does not want war! Smith is fired, and is blackballed as a "Red" in the journalistic world.

In the final act, Smith's home is being dismantled by movers; Jessie says she loves him but cannot face poverty, and leaves, too.
Alone in the empty house, Smith vows to make a new start and find a place for himself in the "other America" which he knows exists.

This play won Simonov the Stalin Prize. Its basic theme was that there are two Americas in conflict with one another— one, that of Lincoln and Roosevelt which is sympathetic with Soviet ideals and aims; the other, that of Wall Street and reaction, where the theory is that the dollar will buy anything, even a man's soul.  

The Voice of America and For a Second Front, both appeared in the winter of 1950 and "exposed" United States militarists. The former showed them in league with the capitalists to slander the USSR, while the latter condemned their unwillingness to open a second front in the world war. American aggression in the Intervention proved a popular theme in the early 1950's. In 1950, Aurora Borealis was eulogized by Pravda as an accurate and penetrating portrayal of the "imperialist" policies characterizing Anglo-American intervention in Northern Russia. In the play, a mother demands "that Colonel Larry severely punish the murderers of her daughter, who had been a victim of American officers."  

By 1953, Intervention plays (mainly inspired by the Korean War) were less lurid or hysterical than previously. Hostile Winds in that year gave equal billing to the British as "spies" and "imperialists." Three Years After, a sequel to Conspiracy of the Doomed, warned that "British and American intelligence agents ... operate through blackmail and bribery; they kill honest people; they penetrate the Communist Party ranks and recruit spies and traitors."  

After the death of Stalin, anti-Americanism in plays changed rapidly.
in keeping with the "new look" in Soviet propaganda. Much of the previous raw hatred was watered down with subtlety now. In 1957, Sovetskaya Kultura complained that too many American plays were being staged: Telephone Call (Dial M for Murder), The Sixth Floor, etc. The newspaper lamented that not enough good Soviet plays were being produced to take their place.26

Foreign plays are frequently seen on the Soviet stage. The Jackals (Estonian), a dramatic satire in four acts, later became the venomous movie Silver Dust. A Routine Case27 (Polish) "tells how, under the cover of 'justice,' a charge is concocted against a current police victim, a Communist worker in America . . . with the aid of false witnesses [he] is accused of murder. Acquittal is impossible; the FBI has seen to this beforehand."28

Colonel Foster Will Plead Guilty (French) "describes the war in Korea by depicting the camp of the interventionists," who look like malicious criminals on stage.30 A Polish play, Julius and Ethel, eulogized the Rosenbergs, who had been executed for espionage against the United States in 1953, "in a work portraying with perfect truth and honesty the figures of these good and inflexible people who, by their deaths hurled a heavy and ineradicable accusation at the American way of life."31

Children's Plays and Puppet Shows

As in the realm of books and magazines, the Soviet government provides considerable children's theatre entertainment. Basic anti-American
themes used are those which easily stimulate young imaginations, such as racial persecution, the plight of children in America, etc.

_Snowball_, written especially for the Children's Theatre in Moscow by V. Lyubimova, scored a big success with its story about the color bar in an American school. There, racial prejudice is complicated by hatred between the rich and the poor students.33

_Uncle Tom's Cabin_ was resurrected in the postwar period in an unrecognizable form. Its basically religious theme had been turned into a political one, and by means of a prologue and epilogue the plot was brought up to date. The curtain rises on a New York street scene at night. The glow of neon signs illuminates a Negro mother clutching at her wounded daughter. The audience learns that the men had shot at the mother because she dared to vote, and had hit the girl by mistake. Cars speed by, unheeding. The mother comforts the daughter and begins to tell her the story of Uncle Tom. In the final moments of the play, the two are in the same position, with the evil face of Simon Legree leering in the background. The mother looks at the face and tells the child,

Yes, people like him are alive today. His planter's clothes have been changed for the dinner jacket of the businessman, and now he manages banks, theatres, hotels and restaurants. It is a person like him who has forbidden the Negroes to use the schools, parks, theatres, hotels and restaurants. He does everything to deprive them of a human existence.34

Puppet shows are still common in the Soviet Union, particularly in areas where the language barrier remains a problem to entertainers. The figures of the "warmongers," Truman, Acheson, etc., were easily adapted to this ancient art, and visiting Oriental puppet shows have been particularly successful in using contemporary themes.
Lectures and Speeches

One of the first agitational methods used by the Soviets was speeches at factories, public gatherings and before assembled troops. The advantage of personal contact with large groups of people thus gained has never given way entirely to other propaganda media. Great numbers of public lectures and agitation speeches are organized by the government each year.

Journalists and other official travelers who have visited the United States are often asked, on their return to the Soviet Union, to give lectures on their observations. That their subject matter has often been colored or simply false is evident from the reports of several newsmen who have attended these lectures. The Soviets have been guilty also of presenting supposedly discerning lectures on America by people who have never been there.

Even at the time of the "Coalition War" in 1944, Doctor of Juridical Science Levin presented lectures on the State Organization of the United States which, although generally factual and friendly, contained the usual attacks on isolationists in America. Soviet geographer N. N. Baranski in Moscow the following year lectured on the thesis that the capitalist machine civilization had molded the psychology of the American people.

Under Zhdanov's prodding in 1947, Soviet lecturers took American intellectuals to task for their loss of motivation and spirit. Mendeson asked, "What 'dry terror' has paralyzed the pens?" The speeches of
Party leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev have received wide publication in the press and over the community loudspeakers. The increasing use of television makes it clear that the graphic element in such speeches may be emphasized in the future.

**Demonstrations and Meetings**

Closely allied with public speeches are the mass demonstrations and parades which have always been a tool of dictatorships. The memories of Hitler at Nürnberg and Mussolini at Rome linger vividly, but it has been under the championship of the Communists that the mass demonstration has gained its full maturity. From the very beginnings of Soviet power — indeed, to bring the Soviets to power — the emotional effect created on participants of mass meetings has been utilized to advantage. This propaganda medium has an advantage over certain other propaganda vehicles, such as radio, because under certain conditions it can lead directly to action, whereas the radio only produces pre-action responses. Too, the agitator at a meeting can continually respond to his audience as it responds to him; at this point communication leaves the field of propaganda and becomes more properly persuasion.\(^{38}\) A mob spirit can be deliberately manipulated by the agitator or by his claque which pretends to be a bona fide part of the audience. The peculiar advantage of parades as an ideal propaganda medium is that the parader, himself, actively participates in the enterprise and thereby commits himself to its purpose.\(^{39}\)

In the USSR today the demonstration may arise from a current issue (the "spontaneous event"), or it may be publicly planned for weeks ahead,
such as the annual May Day and November 7th parades, or to celebrate a festival or conference. The propaganda use to which such an event may be put is described by a military attaché of the late 1940's:

"It is customary after a great ceremonial parade on the Red Square for thousands of civilian "volunteers" . . . to file past the Politburo on top of Lenin's tomb, accompanied by decorated lorries representing topical events or pillorying notorious foreigners."

Attendance at such a parade will number in the hundreds of thousands, particularly in view of the methods the Soviets use to ensure a sizeable audience. Invariably the demonstrators carry huge banners and placards, often massive photographs or paintings. Photographs taken at parades showing slogans, "Ban the Bomb!" and "We are for Peace!" are familiar sights in the Russian press. In this way, a parade can serve a double purpose in graphic propaganda: the benefit of "visual participation" can be extended to the newspapers' readers, and thus increase the effectiveness of the original propaganda.

A common feature of the Soviet press is publication of photographs taken at mass demonstrations all over the world, purporting to show sympathy with Communist ideology. Photographs taken in England showed Londoners parading with miniature "H-bomb" masks, and women bearing a banner, "Stop H-bomb Tests!". Another from Japan showed a huge slogan painted on the street: "Down with the Hydrogen Bomb!". Koreans in Pyongyang demonstrated against "provocative maneuvers of the United States, trying to disrupt the armistice."

In recent years the effect of demonstrations has been enhanced by the use of television. On May 1, 1956, the first television broadcast
was made from Red Square, and parts of the May Day parade were televised that date.  

Meetings are often conducted by political advisors and their assistants in the Soviet armed forces. An intrinsic part of every soldier's training, political indoctrination is given higher priority by the Party in the overall preparation of an individual for the defense of his country. The zampolit, unit officers or NCO's frequently meet and discuss "current events" with the troops. For example, in 1953 a Soviet publication reported: "The library of the officers' club of the Lvov Military District recently held a conference on the theme, 'The American Army is an army of pillage, murder and enslavement.'"
CHAPTER XII

OTHER FORMS OF PROPAGANDA

Art

Art has gained mass appreciation, if not quality in the Soviet Union since the Revolution. In 1927, the Soviets claimed to have 476 museums, and in 1940 they gave 922 as the number. "Art is for the masses," declared Felix Kon, head of the Fine Arts Department of the Commissariat for Education in 1930. "Art organizes thought, and as it formerly served the priesthood, the feudal classes and the bourgeoisie, it must serve the proletariat of the Soviet Union." The very considerable talent of the Russians as artists must be taken into consideration as great potential. Such famous cartoonists as "Kukryniksy" are also noted as artists in their own right.

In several of the greatest art galleries—e.g., Tretyakovskaya—and museums in the past, exhibits have been held of anti-American graphic propaganda; these have included paintings, drawings, cartoons and posters. It was not uncommon for a room to be devoted specifically to the theme. Generally speaking, oil painting seems not to have been used frequently for such purposes; however, the Museum of the Revolution in Moscow does have a number of paintings rejoicing in the triumph of Soviet armies over capitalist interventionists and White Guardists backed
by the "imperialists." An oil painting, Ku Klux Klan, was shown at the International Exhibition of Pictorial and Applied Arts in Moscow in August, 1957. This depicted a seething mass of white-cloaked figures preparing to lynch a Negro.

Postwar orthodoxy in art was signalized by a drive begun by the Party in August, 1946, to impose new and sharper discipline over the entire field of the arts. Zhdanov attacked the view that for artistic expression to be ideologically neutral was permissible. He claimed that to exist, art must serve a positive creative purpose in the scheme of state development; it must advance Communist doctrine and attack all bourgeois "slanders." On the other hand, art must not give expression to the weariness or discontent of the people with their leaders or their lot.

Art in the United States has been attacked frequently as part of the campaign to ridicule American culture, or the alleged lack of it. Sovetskaya Kul'tura has devoted columns, cartoon and photographs to this end on occasion. The tastelessness of American abstract sculpture is taken to task in photographs under the captions, "And this is called art!," and "Look until you don't see it." Krokodil published a picture series, "Uncle Sam Draws Himself," which was illustrated solely with fantastic abstract drawings gleaned from the American press. The purposefulness and solidity of Communist art is contrasted with the absurdity of American abstractions in an article in Komsomol'skaya Pravda.
Posters and Banners

A means of propaganda which was among the first to be used by the Bolsheviks and which today is still liberally utilized, is poster art. Large and small, black and white or color, single or group themes on every conceivable subject, these have been particularly adaptable to anti-American propaganda. Early posters were poorly composed and printed, often stenciled, but in recent years Soviet poster art has surpassed art reproduction in books and other publications, both in eye-appeal and in general composition. Particularly impressive is the excellent color processing used. Soviet methods of propaganda and agitation render the poster useful and effective, and its inexpensive production in quantity printing has made its use almost universal within the USSR. Few photographs of Soviet life in cities, villages or kolkhozes fail to capture a poster in the background.

During the Intervention, a poster, "Capital and Co." showed Wilson and others as the "inspirers of bloody intervention."¹⁰ One phase of later Russian history under Stalin was a violent campaign to blacken the United States with the biggest share of guilt in the Intervention of 1918-1920. Entire series of posters showed Uncle Sam as the ringleader in anti-Bolshevik activities. One such, "The Second Attack of the Entente," showed leashed curs with Tsarist caps ("Denikin," "Yudenich," "Kolchak") held by Uncle Sam. John Bull and La Belle Francaise are there, too, but in the shadow of prominent Uncle Sam.¹¹ This same poster was used in an exhibit in the Museum of the Red Army, a photograph of which was published in Ogonyók in February, 1952.¹²
In the 1940's, the play Uncle Tom's Cabin (see Plays) was advertised with garish posters depicting a Negro tied to a tree, being flogged by brutal Whites. Similarly, Silver Dust (see Motion Pictures) in 1953 hinted of the horrors of germ warfare with a poster depicting an evil-looking man carrying a test-tube; behind him a painted backdrop represented skyscrapers at night and a tell-tale sign beaming, "Coca-Cola." 

During the period 1949-1953, great numbers of virulently anti-American posters were disseminated. In 1950, one depicted a group of figures (Truman, Acheson, Churchill) on a clifftop; a Soviet man writes in his diary, "We do not want war, but if they move..." Another portrays "Freedom--in the American Way" (reminiscent of the Five Freedoms of the Second World War), which included "freedom of person" in which the Ku Klux Klan lYNches a Negro, "freedom of speech" showing men jailed for having spoken their minds, and so forth. A third poster shows workers: "Under Socialism there is no place for unemployment," but under Capitalism "there is much unemployment." A thin, worried man pleads, "I will accept any kind of work." 

A poster reprinted in Fedin's On Guard for Peace shows a Soviet woman who declares, "All the mothers of the world fight for peace." The text adds: "...against warmongers!" The same incentive is posed in a placard inciting workers to overfulfill the plan: "Every percent over the plan is a blow to the warmongers." A 1952 poster, "In Answer," shows an American militarist holding a germ bomb ("Cholera") in one hand, while he attempts to cover up his germ bombing ("Typhus, "Germs") with the United Nations flag (stamped with the seal "Wall Street"). Behind him a
chemist wearing an American uniform and Nazi swastika creates these bombs, which are packed in crates labeled "To Korea," "To China." "Villains cannot hide from the wrath of the people," declares the caption.20

The State Department protested against Soviet Air Force Day posters, "Glory to the Stalinist Eagles standing guard over Peace and Security of their Homeland,"21 which depicted United States aircraft being shot down by Soviet fighters. This called to mind the repeated Soviet announcements previously made of border violations allegedly made by American aircraft.

Huge banners are very commonly used throughout the USSR, often with portraits of leaders or crude caricatures of enemies who are shown as being vanquished. Slogans are brief and simple ("Peace!", "Death to the Warmongers!"), and no holiday is complete without countless banners for marchers to carry and to line the streets and public buildings. The Moscow State Circus was long decorated with banners bearing the word, "Peace" in ten languages.22

**Exhibits and the Circus**

Exhibits have been of several types: photographs and drawings, cartoons, graphs and charts, objects and combinations of these. Sometimes they have been accompanied by lectures or demonstrations. Huge All-Union art exhibitions, as well as local and Republic exhibitions are held each year in the USSR. These include all categories of art, the varieties of anti-American propaganda which have been shown in the past ranging from
photographs to wood-block prints (frequently used by Oriental artists).

Pravda reprinted material from a Peking exhibit in 1951 which showed executed Nazi war criminals. An immense banner over all proclaimed, "Such is the fate of all warmongers!" In the same year, the Leningrad Naval Museum held a graphic exhibit dealing with United States intervention in 1918. Comparisons were made with the alleged American "invasion" of Korea. At Houses of Culture photo-exhibits have been held which have contrasted life in the United States and the Soviet Union, with the inevitable unfavorable contrast made. Common during the years 1949-1951 were "Intervention Museums," set up temporarily throughout the USSR. Izvestiya reported the opening in 1949 on Mudyung Island in the White Sea of an alleged site of a frightful concentration camp run by the Interventionists. Public inspection of this "historical preserve" was encouraged.

At the 1950 Moscow Art Exhibition a series of watercolors, "Soldiers of Truman," purported to show the terrors of American occupation. "Not to be Restrained!" showed military policemen grappling with German youth, who yearned for peace. "Morning Before the Elections in the American Zone" showed a military policeman standing guard over a machine gun in a quiet German city.

In 1951, a documentary and photo-exhibit on crimes allegedly perpetrated by United States interventionists in the Russian Far East was opened in Khabarovsk. Exhibits with anti-American themes were common in the "Lenin's Corner" reading rooms on military posts. A series of drawings ("Capitalist Europe") depicted Americans in the Western Zone; an
example, "The Yankee in Vienna," portrayed carousing drunken soldiers and
girls in a jeep, with a wall in the background covered with cheap "girlie-
bar" advertisements.30

When the Soviets accused the United States of waging germ warfare
in Korea in 1952, exhibits were held in many of the populated centers of
the USSR. These included photo-exhibits and some in which were displayed
"germ war canister bombs." The main themes in the Soviet Cartoon Exhibit
in 1952 were the struggle for peace and exposure of the imperialist-
marauders.31 In 1956, Leonid Il'yichev, Foreign Press Chief, took over
the huge Spiridonovka Palace, where state receptions are usually held,
to display more than fifty balloon and instrument containers that he
charged the United States had sent over the Soviet Union. The equipment
was spaced out over the courtyard and illuminated by Army floodlights.32
Il'yichev also staged an exhibit of alleged American spies and their gear
on television in February, 1957.33

An Estonian artist displayed a political cartoon series at the
republic art exhibition in September, 1957, and designated it for similar
showing at the All-Union Jubilee Exhibition in Moscow. These caricatures
purport to show the fall of Estonia under bourgeois domination, with the
United States sharing the guilt of "imperialism." The dollar signs on
figures stand out clearly. Ten of the drawings were reproduced in
Sovetskaya Estoniya, dedicated "to the 40th anniversary of the Great
October."34

At intervals until the end of the year, examples of exhibited
cartoons were reproduced in Soviet newspapers. One cartoon shows a Negro
track star running with a jeep bearing two Whites behind him, clocking his speed. "Faster, Blake, faster! Imagine that they are after you to lynch you!."35

At the All-Union exhibition, watercolor drawings for a book, Tanya, were also displayed. The wife of a Soviet diplomat who is sent to Washington to work, Tonya returns to the Soviet Union completely disillusioned about America. The drawings reflect her life in both lands.36

Even the circus, the perennial chaser of worldly worries, has been taken over by the propagandists as a vehicle for their goods. Zaslavsky declared, "The Soviet circus, developing as part of our people's culture, has created its own style..."37 which he claimed was fundamentally opposed to that of the West. In Moscow, for example, all performers are graduates of the State Circus School and thus receive a standard education along Party humor lines. The circus is subsidized by the Soviet government, and is not required to make a profit. It also does not have the competition which the circus has in the United States from television and other forms of entertainment, and so enjoys relatively greater popularity.

Russian circuses play not in a tent, but indoors, in an auditorium-type building. There is no three-ring circus performance to keep the audience entertained every moment; rather, the circus is a one-ring affair and there are often pauses in the activity while equipment is rigged for the next act. There are fewer clowns and animals than in an American circus, more acrobats and gymnasts, and no sideshow.

With a few notable exceptions such as "Karan d'ash" of the Moscow
State Circus, clowns have not been distinguished in the Soviet Union. In 1953, a group of circus artists in Kalinin wrote to the editor of Izvestiya: "The problem of the clown acts is a sore point with us. The circus administration is afraid of laughter and afraid of clowning... Satirists lack a good repertoire." Zaslavsky also complained that satire was neglected in the circus and regretted that clowns were not being trained.

Such circus skits as described below were typical of the late 1940's, when the "Hate America" campaign was gathering speed; at one performance a clown dressed as Uncle Sam holds high a boomerang labeled "$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$. "This is American aid to Europe," he shouts, and flings it into the air, whereupon it splits into two dollars, which return to his hands. Another clown drags a radio into the ring. "Hooray!," he shouts, "I've invented a radio without an aerial." He then turns it on. The loud barking of dogs vibrates throughout the circus building. "That's the Voice of America," the inventor explains, then turns to the channel for BBC. This time the grunting of swine is clearly audible.

Next, a huge papier-mâché head with a red nose and watery eyes is pulled into the ring. A clown opens the head and guides out for inspection some samples of "American culture." These include: for literature—a masked bandit in evening clothes; the cinema—a western badman; the theatre—three fat chorines; science—three dwarfs labeled "anti-Soviet gossip," "Truman," and "the Marshall Plan." Then all characters re-enter the skull, which is closed and the band strikes up American jazz. When the clown again opens the head, all characters have vanished, and in the empty skull is left "The Atlantic Pact."
Other circuses have also furnished anti-American propaganda material. At a Kharkov performance, two clowns entered the ring with a long rubber cow labeled, "U.S.A." They explained, "This is the longest cow in the world. It feeds in Western Europe and gives milk in the United States." In October, 1957, after the successful launching of the first Russian earth satellite, the witty comedian Karan d'ash convulsed Muscovite audiences by exploding a small balloon, then explaining, "that was the American sputnik!"
CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSIONS

The year 1957 serves as a logical end to this study, even were space factors not a consideration. By then it was acknowledged that Stalin was—in truth—dead, and "Stalinism" moribund. Khrushchev had assumed full control of the Party and State, and chinks were showing in the hitherto impenetrable wall erected by his predecessors.

As the first forty years of the Soviet state ended, it was evident that propagandists remained as busy as ever influencing by dissemination of ideas and slogans the "consciousness of the masses" in the USSR. Yet, one cannot resist musing on the question: how effectively has this measureless mass of propaganda guided minds? How is it possible to harmonize this forty-year diet of anti-Americanism with the obvious friendliness which most American visitors have encountered among Russians in the Soviet Union?

Anyone who studies Communist propaganda will soon be repelled by its repetition, ad nauseam. This has been regularly interpreted as evidence of the Soviet aim to propagandize to insensibility the masses of people within its borders. Rostow claims that "propaganda carried to surfeit helps to produce ... political apathy which, with this generation of Soviet rulers, may be judged as useful as, or more useful than political enthusiasm."
In sifting through the foregoing material, the conclusion is inescapable to the reader that the Soviet government has calculatedly pursued a sort of "crusade of hatred" against the United States for its own purposes. Since its early beginnings nothing has changed except volume and --temporarily--themes; even the wording remains in many instances the same as thirty years ago. Nevertheless, though a half century of experience has improved the propaganda techniques and sharpened their barbs, it has perhaps dulled the senses of the Soviet citizenry at the same time.

The continuing curiosity and interest in America by the Russian would seem to provide a clue that anti-American propaganda has been at best only a partial success. It is within the realm of possibility that in the forty years under discussion, Soviet propaganda has failed in its mission by trying too hard. If we determine that its desired end has been creation of apathy, perhaps it can be said to have succeeded. On the other hand, if active hatred of America has been the purpose of it all, the continuous crying of "Wolf!" appears to have reinforced the natural skepticism of the Russian.

Perhaps ironic is evidence which would indicate that the Soviet government dares not relax its anti-Americanism more than minimally. Now that an additional decade has passed since 1957, it would be rewarding for other researchers to analyze more recent attitudes expressed by the Soviets toward the United States. This, especially in view of the Cuba missile crisis, accelerated competition in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and generally increased sophistication within the Soviet
government. Tantalizing to note has been the lessened use of once-standard epithets ("bloodsucker," "cannibal") for Americans, and their adaptation almost wholly to Mao's China. The significance of this and similar changes remains to be explored in a systematic fashion.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I


2. The Politburo was called the Presidium during the years 1952-1966, and hence is referred to in this manner in the text where appropriate.

CHAPTER II


7. Lerner, *op. cit.*, 4-5.


9. Leader in *Partinaya Zhizn'* (Party Life: Central Committee, Communist Party Journal), (No. 8; April, 1947).


CHAPTER III

1. Leslie G. Stevens, Russian Assignment (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1953), 47.
2. Sovetskaya Latviya, April 28, 1957.
9. B. Yefimov, Ogonyok (No. 11), March, 1949, 14-16.
10. B. Yefimov, Krokodil (No. 29), October 20, 1952, 8.
11. Krokodil (No. 34), December 10, 1952.
23. L. Soyfertis, Krokodil (No. 29).
25. Stories of this nature appear chiefly in Krasnaya Zvezda and Sovetskiy Flot.
31. N. Goryaev, Krokodil (No. 7), March 10, 1955, 10.
32. Yu. Ganf, Krokodil (No. 11), May 12, 1955.
33. B. Yefimov, Krokodil (No. 8), March 20, 1955.
34. L. Soyfertis, Krokodil (No. 31), November 10, 1954, 11.
35. K. Rotov, Krokodil (No. 12), April 19, 1955.
38. Sovetskaya Kul'tura, October 5, 1957.
41. Krokodil (No. 34), December 10, 1954.
42. B. Leo, Krokodil, November 30, 1954, 13.
43. Ogonyëk (No. 22), May, 1952, 5.
44. Krokodil appears to be the main outlet for caricatures ridiculing and condemning Soviet juvenile delinquents.
45. G. Banatov, Ogonyëk (No. 6), February, 1948, 22.
46. Vyshinsky, op. cit., 613.
CHAPTER IV


4. Ibid. VOKS was dissolved in 1958 and its place taken by the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.


6. Ibid., 41.
8. Pravo RSFSR (Moskva: Gosizdat Yuridicheskoy Literatury, 1932), Text 228, Sec. 3, Subsec. 6.
11. Ibid.
15. TASS was supplemented in 1961 by APN ("Novosti"), a news agency with a specifically international responsibility.
17. Ibid., 23.
18. Ibid., 50.
19. Ibid., 52.
20. Ibid., 53.
21. Ibid., 55.
22. Ibid., 54.

CHAPTER V

3. Ibid., 136.
5. Williams, op. cit., 106.
15. Class Struggle, December, 1918.
17. Inkeles, op. cit., 32. This department was created in 1920.
21. Ibid., 124.
22. Ibid., 176-77.
23. V. Deni and N. Dolgorukov, printed in Sovetskiy Soyuz (No. 11), 1957.
27. Williams, op. cit., 225.
28. Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 1538.
33. Paraphrased in Foreign Relations, 1933.
37. Ibid., 165.
43. Dallin, op. cit., 257.
44. Krokodil, 1940.
47. Ibid., 259.
K. Voroshilov, Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951), 141-42.

CHAPTER VI


7. I. Yermashev, Moscow, December 11, 1946; quoted in Barghoorn, op. cit., 167-68.


10. Ibid., 111.

11. Ibid., 103.


17. Senate Reports, 80th Congress, 2nd Sess., No. 1440.


19. Ibid.


27. Pravda, August 9, 1952.

28. It is interesting to note that exactly a decade later, on June 20, 1962, the Communist journalist, Wilfred Burchett authored a long article in New Times (Moscow) accusing Americans of using chemical warfare in Vietnam. This same Burchett had been intimately involved in the "germ war" allegations during the Korean War.


32. Krokodil (No. 13), May 10, 1952.

33. Krokodil (No. 5), March 12, 1952.

34. Krokodil (No. 6), March 20, 1952.

179
35. L. Tolkunov, Pravda, December 18, 1952.
36. Pravda, October 6, 1953.

CHAPTER VII

1. Pravda, November 5, 1952.
2. Izvestiya, January 14, 1953.
3. Trud, January 17, 1953.
5. Quoted in review, Literaturnaya Gazeta, January 27, 1953.
6. Ibid.
9. Ogonyok (Nos. 5, 6, 12, 13, 14), January-March, 1957.
17. Izvestiya, February 1, 1953.
22. Pravda, February 8, 1953.

23. Ibid.

24. Quoted from Tikhookeanskiy Komsomolets, reprinted in Komsomol'skaya Pravda, January 16, 1953.

25. Pravda, April 12, 1953.


33. Izvestiya, June 17, 1954.

34. B. Vronskiy, Izvestiya, October 16, 1953.

35. Pravda, December 11, 1953.

36. Ibid.


42. Pravda, February 27, 1955.


44. Pravda, March 26, 1954.

45. F. Filippov, Pravda, August 24, 1954.

46. Krokodil (No. 20), July 20, 1953.
47. Article in Boston Herald, April 23, 1953; quoted in Pravda, October 18, 1953.


49. Trud, April 20, 1954.


52. Pravda, April 25, 1955.


57. Pravda, October 8, 1955.


64. Pravda, January 1, 1956.


67. Pravda, March 5, 1956.

68. Gudok, March 18, 1956.


70. Pravda Ukrain, April 26, 1956.

71. Ogonyok (No. 21), May, 1956, 9-10.
72. Pravda and Izvestiya, November 6, 1956.
73. Pravda and Izvestiya, November 10, 1956.
74. Pravda and Izvestiya, December 9, 1956.
75. Pravda, December 14, 1956.
82. Ibid.
83. Khrushchev mass meeting at Tashkent, January 13, 1957; communique from TASS.
84. Literaturnaya Gazeta, November 17, 1957.
86. Sovetskaya Latviya, January 20, 1957.
88. Valerian Zorin, Soviet delegate to London talks on disarmament, June, 1957; broadcast by TASS.
92. N.S. Khrushchev, quoted in ibid.
93. Pravda Ukrain.
105. Sovetskaya Kul'tura, August 6, 1957.
109. Ibid.
110. Pravda, September 6, 1956.
111. Sovetskaya Estoniya, October 27, 1957.
117. Sovetskaya Kul'tura, December 5, 1957.
118. Krokodil (No. 28), October 10, 1957; 12.
120. Literaturnaya Gazeta, November 14, 1957.
121. Krasnaya Zvezda, October 19, 1957.
122. Sovetskiy Flot, November 17, 1957.
123. Sovetskiy Flot, October 24, 1957.
125. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, October 27, 1957.
127. Literaturnaya Gazeta, October 29, 1957.
128. Interview with N.S. Khrushchev by James Reston; Pravda and Izvestiya, October 8, 1957.
131. Sovetskaya Kul'tura, November 12, 1957.
132. Krasnaya Zvezda, October 9, 1957.
133. Krasnaya Zvezda, October 11, 1957.
134. Trud, October 9, 1957.
139. Literaturnaya Gazeta, December 12, 1957.
140. Literaturnaya Gazeta, November 30, 1957.
141. Literaturnaya Gazeta, December 14, 1957.
142. Literaturnaya Gazeta, December 12, 1957.
143. Ibid.
144. Literaturnaya Gazeta, December 10, 1957.
146. Literaturnaya Gazeta, December 21, 1957.
147. Sovetskaya Kul'tura, December 17, 1957.
149. N.S. Khrushchev, interview with James Reston, American correspondent.
150. Izvestiya, December 8, 1957.
151. Trud, December 12, 1957.
155. Literaturnaya Gazeta, December 5, 1957.
156. Komsomol'skaya Pravda, December 1, 1957.
158. Trud, November 29, 1957.

CHAPTER VIII

2. L. Lagin, Ogonyok (No. 6), February, 1948; 14-16.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 17.
13. Ibid., 600.

CHAPTER IX

4. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 616.

7. V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya, V, 4th ed. (Moskva: "Ogiz" Gizdat Politi-
ticheskoy Literatury, 1957), 10.


10. Ibid., 71.

11. N.S. Khrushchev, Kommunist (No. 6), April, 1955; 102.

12. U.S. News and World Report, interview with B. Polevoy and V.
Berezhkov, November 11, 1955. U.S. dollars computed at official
1955 exchange rate.


16. Ibid.

17. Literaturnaya Gazeta, August 6, 1957.


21. Ogonyok (No. 39), September, 1949; 23.

22. B. Yefimov, Ogonyok (No. 11), March, 1948.


24. Krokodil, December 30, 1951; December 20, 1950.

25. Steinberg (ed.), Statesman's Yearbook for the Year 1953 (London:


27. Sovetskaya Kul'tura, September 5, 1957.

28. Ibid.
30. Justin Grey, Pravda ob Amerikanskom Legione (Moskva: Izdat Innostrannoy Literatury, 1949); review in Ogonyok (No. 18), March, 1950, 24.
32. B. Lerin, To Put an End to Testing of Nuclear Weapons (Moscow: State Printers of Political Literature, 1957).
33. B. Yefimov, op. cit.
35. P. Yegorov and A. Malin, Basny (Simferopol': Krymizdat, 1950).
38. Ibid., Vol. XVI, 269.
39. Ibid., Vol. XVI, 249.
41. Uchitel'skaya Gazeta (No. 16), April 3, 1946.
42. B.N. Polevoy, Literaturnaya Gazeta, December 17, 1954.
43. Leonid Sobolev, Komsomol'skaya Pravda, June 6, 1957.
45. Luk'yanov, op. cit., foreword.
46. Edmund Stevens, op. cit., 108.
47. Goodfriend, op. cit., 54-55.
49. P. Pavlenko, Molodaya Germaniya (Moskva: Detgizdat, 1951), 69.

189


53. Luk'yanov, op. cit.


55. Ibid.

56. Leonid Sobolev, Komsomol'skaya Pravda, June 6, 1957.

57. Land og Volk (Copenhagen); reprinted in Sovetskaya Kul'tura, May 12, 1956.

58. Rabotnicheskoe Delo (Bulgaria); reprinted in Sovetskaya Rossiya, May 11, 1957.

59. Ku pu-in (Chinese artist); printed in Komsomol'skaya Pravda, September 29, 1957.

60. Skynteyya Tineretuluy (Rumania); reprinted in Komsomol'skaya Pravda, October 26, 1957.


62. Krokodil (No. 11), April 20, 1952.

63. Krokodil (No. 29), October 20, 1951.

64. Krokodil, 1953.

65. V. Goryaev, Ogonyok (No. 11), March, 1948.

66. V. Posdner, Ogonyok (No. 44), October, 1949.


CHAPTER X


2. Steinberg, op. cit., 1437.


5. Ibid., 3.


9. Goskino, Moskva, April 27, 1924; from scenario, Chem Eto Konchit'sya.


16. Ibid., 7.

17. Inkeles, op. cit., 302.


20. Ukrain Film, Kiev, April 3, 1933; Kalashnikov, op. cit., 487.


22. Ibid., 8.


27. Pravda, September 11, 1946.
28. Ibid., 119.
29. Isskustvo Kino (No. 1), 1948, "Itoga 1947 Goda."
33. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., 95.
35. Sovetskaya Kultura, October 31, 1954.
36. Literaturnaya Gazeta, April 12, 1956.
37. Isskustvo Kino (No. 8), 1955, 49.
42. Sovetskaya Kultura, December 12, 1957.
45. Kirkpatrick, op. cit., 95.
47. Film Studios "Luxfilm," Rome, 1949; advertised in Vechernaya Moskva, September 6, 1951.
48. Hungarian State Film Studios, 1951; Vechernaya Moskva, June 8, 1952.
49. Directed by Luigi Commencini, Italy, 1953; reviewed in Sovetskaya Kultura, October 26, 1956.
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<td>52</td>
<td><em>Time</em>, September 23, 1957</td>
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<td><em>Literaturnaya Gazeta</em>, October 10, 1957</td>
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<td><em>Sovetskaya Kul'tura</em>, September 14, 1957</td>
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<td><em>Sovetskaya Kul'tura</em>, December 8, 1957</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td><em>Kirkpatrick</em>, <em>op. cit.</em>, 95</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td><em>Sovetskaya Kul'tura</em>, July 16, 1953</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td><em>New York Times</em>, June 25, 1957</td>
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<td><em>Max Frankel</em>, <em>New York Times</em>, June 14, 1957</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>Soviet press, August 30, 1956</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td><em>Televidennye (No. 51)</em>, December 21, 1957</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>Soviet press, August 30, 1956</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td><em>Sovetskaya Kul'tura</em>, July 16, 1953</td>
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<td><em>Sovetskaya Kul'tura</em>, September 12, 1954</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<td>67</td>
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<td><em>Newsweek and Time</em>, February 18, 1957</td>
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<td><em>Time</em>, 1956</td>
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193
CHAPTER XI

1. Izvestiya, May 13, 1956.

2. Kul'tura i Zhizni, quoted in Don Dallas, Dateline Moscow (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1952), 256.

3. Ibid., 238.


10. Ibid., 110.

11. Dallas, op. cit., 243-44.


28. A. Tarn.


30. Roger Vaillant.


33. Dallas, op. cit., 239.

34. Ibid., 238-39.

35. Speeches on July 28, 1944, and November 25, 1944; quoted in Barghoorn, op. cit., 91.

36. N.N. Baranski on July 17, 1945; quoted in Barghoorn, op. cit., 214.


38. Doob, op. cit., 259.

39. Ibid., 536.


43. Sovetskaya Rossiya, May 29, 1957.

44. Trud, October 19, 1957.


CHAPTER XII

1. Ivy Lee, op. cit., 50.
2. Steinberg, op. cit.
3. Chamberlain, Russia's Iron Age, op. cit., 298.
12. Ogonyok (No. 8), February, 1953.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Fedin, op. cit., 121.
23. Dallas, op. cit., 258.
25. See Soviet press during this period.
27. P. Karachentsov and V.M. Briskin, Ogonyok (No. 12), March, 1951, 33.
29. Sovfoto photograph printed in Goodfriend, op. cit., 78; V.V. Ossipov personal interview, Munich, Germany, January, 1958.
33. Time, February 18, 1957.
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38. Izvestiya, December 16, 1953.
40. Goodfriend, op. cit., 162.
41. MacDuffie, op. cit., 315.
МИР

ПОД МАСКОЙ МИРА

Fig. 1. Political Poster, 1919.

THE ENTENTE—UNDER THE MASK OF PEACE.

V. Deni
CHAMBERLAIN DISCOVERS AMERICA. Under the cover of the Kellogg Pact, America continues to arm.

Krokodil
Fig. 3. Political Cartoon, 1932.

AMERICAN CAPITALISM'S CAMPAIGN POSITION. (The President): "America will flourish anew!".

M. Cheryommykh, Krokodil
THE DREAM OF AN AMERICAN BANDIT. "I've been dreaming about this child for so long, and now, at last, he is born!" "Congratulations!" "Hold your congratulations; I haven't kidnapped him yet!"

Fig. 4. Sociological Cartoon, 1936.

Krokodil
Fig. 5. Political Cartoon, 1939.

PHILANTHROPIC UNCLE SAM. "I'd be happy to sell you armaments, but I beg you, please don't hurt anybody with them." (Notice on table: "Credit Spoils Friendship")
Fig. 6. Political Cartoon, 1945.

THE SHAVE. The Allied coalition fights the Axis.

B. Yefimov, Krokodil
Fig. 7. Political Cartoon, 1947.

"THE USSR IS PREPARING TO ATTACK AMERICA!" Wall Street extends its greedy arms around the globe.

B. Yef'imov, Krokodil
Fig. 8. Political Cartoon, 1947.

A NEW YEAR’S ACCIDENT. The Marshall Plan fails to get anywhere because of the power of the true democrats in Europe.

B. Yefimov, Krokodil
Советская джазовая музыка заимствовала от первоначального джаз-бэнда только известную сумму технических приемов, но в остальном развивалась совершенно самостоительно.

Читателя может заинтересовать происхождение джаза, так как и этот род музыки и танца имеет свою историю, как всякий другой.

Существует ряд филологических изысканий о происхождении самого слова «джаз», так как ни в одном европейском языке у танцевальной музыки, отличавшейся острой и разнообразной ритмикой и необычайно колоритными мелодиями.

Из причудливой смеси элементов, вынесеных с африканской родины, переработанных миллионами претензий и гифем, привлекавших в негритянские духовные песенопения, так называемые «спиритуэлс» (spirituals), американские негры, народ, блестяще одаренный и выделявший из своей среди массу превосходных мелодий, создали на основе новой высокой формы музыки, а, напротив того, всеми способами старались консервировать эти черты, воскрешая по возможности захваченные речитативы и барабанные ритмы африканских зажигателей и колдунов, шаманские напевы и танцевальную магию древневосточных культов. В современных негритянских государствах, еще сохранивших тень независимости (Либерия, Гаити), пережиточные остатки этих культов, в том числе религиозные

Fig. 9. Sociological Cartoon, 1948.

DECADENCE AND EMPTINESS IN AMERICAN CULTURE.

G. Valk, Ogonyék
Капитализм несет трудящимся безработицу, нищету, голод

В капиталистических странах господствующая идеология кричала о необходимости сокращения безработицы. Однако для миллионов рабочих и служащих это было лишь обманом. Безработица, нищета и голод стали постоянными явлениями, уничтожающими жизнь и здоровье миллионов людей.

Такова западная "диверсия"

В отличие от капиталистических стран, где безработица не является исключением, советская история показывает, как государство борется с этой угрозой через создание новых рабочих мест и поддержку трудящихся.

Под сенью "Статуи Свободы"

Американский капиталистический уклад, с его миллионами безработных, нищих и голодных, является ненавистным для трудящихся всего мира. Через искусство, литературу и искусство, трудящиеся могут бороться против этого уклада.

В Маршалловской Европе

В Советском Союзе, где господствует социалистический уклад, трудящиеся имеют возможность не только зарабатывать на жизнь, но и развивать свои таланты и интересы.

Сегодня и ежедневно смотрите на экранах кинотеатров:

новый цветной художественный фильм

Заложен обреченных


WALL STREET CONFERENCE. "Take this down, gentlemen! The Russians are arming their soldiers with a terribly deadly weapon!" "What is it?" "Bolshevism!"

B. Yefimov, Krokodil
Fig. 12. Political and Sociological Cartoons, 1950's.

Back covers, Krokodil
Fig. 13. Political Cartoon, 1952.

PRE-ELECTION DRESS REHEARSAL. Both American political parties react to the same stimulus.

Kenevskiy, Krokodil
Fig. 14. Political Cartoons, early 1950's.

Krokodil
К ответу

Не скрывайся злодям от гнева народов!

Fig. 15. Political Poster, 1952.
Dolgorukov
Fig. 16. Political Cartoon, 1953.

U.S. CONGRESS VOTES 100 MILLIONS TO SUPPORT ESPIONAGE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS.

M. Abramov, Pravda
Fig. 18. Political and Sociological Illustrations, 1948-1957, from Children's Books and Periodicals.
Fig. 19. Political Cartoons, 1956-1957.

Newspaper cartoons refer to Syrian crisis, atom bombers over England, Little Rock racial incidents, Communist growth (graph-illustration), and U.S. intelligence balloons.
Fig. 20. Political Cartoons, 1957.

Cartoons from various newspapers in the days following the successful launching of the first satellite.
TRANSLITERATION TABLE FOR THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

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Yе initially, after vowels, and after в, б; е elsewhere.
When written as e in Russian, transliterate as ye or e.
Use of diacritical marks is preferred, but such marks may be omitted when expediency dictates.

Я я

yu
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Politicskiy Slovar'. Moskva: Gosizdat Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940.


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---. Personal interview with J. Baritz, August, 1957.

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