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THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

by

FREDERIC A. CHANDLER

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
College of Religion

Division of Graduate Instruction
Butler University
Indianapolis
1941

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THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

CHAPTER I

Introduction

Today the world is in the midst of a cataclysmic upheaval. There is not a field of human thought or endeavor that is not going through a period of unrest and change. The most prominent phase of this changing world is the struggle to the death between Totalitarian and Democratic ideologies. On the one hand we have the concept that individuals can only be free, and have an opportunity to develop as they should and want to do, by being in abject and total subservience to the state, and that all societies must also become vassals to one supreme dominating state. On the other hand we have the concept that the right to rule is derived from the just consent of the governed, and that each individual must be free to work out his own destiny, and that all societies must be co-operative that all may have a "place in the sun." Time alone will tell which ideology is for a time to be supreme.

Closely allied to this political conflict is the economic upheaval and the principles involved in both are primarily the same. The Machine age, with its mass production and collectible bargaining, has tended to suppress and submerge the individual. In the midst of the struggle to find a new basis of economy, bitterness, misunderstanding, and violent oppositions of viewpoints run riot and add to the chaos of the total picture.

Through the forces of the new economic order brought about by the machine and mass production and its demands for changed domestic conditions, shifts of labor, et cetera, the old picture of home life is radically altered. This fact, grasped but slowly at first, today plays a vital part in the thinking of sociologists, Church leaders, educators and all those who are even remotely affected by this change at the very core of our social life.

In religion the stress, while not so obvious, manifests itself in the Church's loss of prestige and its evident confusion. On the one hand the Roman Church stands steadfast in the position it has held through the ages, and asserts that the Church is totalitarian and through the Pope has absolute and direct control of all human beings through out this life and the life to come. On the other hand, opposed to this view, stand the Protestants, but the opposition is not a unified one and is split and torn inwardly. Today, Protestants are divided, among many other things, over the question of the "Individual" versus the "Social" Gospel.

Educators face the task imposed by a divided world. They must build a curriculum that will meet the demands of the day; and are faced with the problem of arranging it to suit and satisfy two warring factions, divided on the question of whether the student is to be trained for individual or social ends.

All the social, economic, political, educational, moral, and religious difficulties that interrupt the free functioning

of human beings in societies may be traced to a single source - the age-long conflict between the individual and the social organization of which he is a member. Men have not yet learned how to live together. As soon as men collect in groups friction arises; personal interests clash with other personal interests; the concept of what is good for the whole group is sought at the expense of the welfare of the individual member; the majority tries to rule the minority or small but privileged classes seize control and play faction against faction and use established custom and organized privilege for maintaining their own place and power. Against these inequities the less privileged member strives and struggles, and sometimes wins.

It is not so obvious but becomes clear, upon analysis, that the specific cause of such conflicts arises from different conceptions, or definitions, of man and society. For while the former is fixed in his nature, the latter is a construction made by men. If society and its institutions are placed absolutely foremost the individual is sure to be, first neglected, then suppressed, then enslaved. Such is totalitarian society. If, on the other hand, the individual person is conceived as the supreme end for which all societies are formed, then we have democracy, in principle at least. Furthermore, if the welfare of the individual member is defined in spiritual rather than in material terms, then there is a society that is something more than a mere group bent upon creating material wealth. The divergence of viewpoint resolves itself into the question - is man a means to or is he an end in himself?

From this it appears that the problem of this study is one largely of definition, but definition that arises out of the fixed nature of human beings, and indeed out of his fundamental nature as a moral being. The whole point of view in this thesis is thus summed up in - what is a person? And this viewpoint will give the needed insight into all that is to be said. Naturally, then, the examination will be primarily, not a sociological, nor theological, nor metaphysical study, but a psychological one.

For an authoritative expression of this viewpoint the best is that one given by Dr. Lightner Witmer, some time Professor of Psychology in the University of Pennsylvania, who defines and contrasts the field of the physical sciences with that of the mental science by saying:

"Human psychology is an examination of man's spiritual nature. The unit of observation is a performance, but the unit of consideration is personality, defined by perfectibility of behavior, which is measured or estimated in the unit of progress which men make toward the perfection they prefer. The psychology of man is not to be defined by the observed resemblance of human behavior of other animals, but rather by some differentiating character or characteristics." 1.

As every distinctive science must have its distinctive concept or unit, psychology takes for its focus the concept of a "persona"; and in that complex organism it takes, not his body, primarily, but his consciousness, mind, and his self consciousness. In this respect mental science is set off, definitely, from the physical sciences.

In this conflict between society and the individual it is easy to see that not every one of his functions, but only a limited number and kind are involved. Since, obviously, his personal liberties are restricted, and such restrictions become of vital importance when they affect his moral character, which rests upon his freedom and will, attention and study must be given to human morality.

Fortunately, from simplicity of view-point, this does not bring in another science different from psychology. For many ethical teachers have, for a long time, infused into the older metaphysical view of morality, a new and powerful factor, basing it upon psychology.

No one states this approach more clearly than Professor James A. Seth, who writes:

"Ethics, as the philosophy of conduct and character, must be based upon a psychology or science of the moral life. Inadequacies in ethical theory will be found largely traceable to inadequacy in the underlying psychology. Kant, indeed, seeks to separate ethics from psychology, and to establish it as a metaphysic of the pure reason. But even Kant's moral philosophy is based upon a psychology. Abstracting from all other elements of man's nature, Kant conceives him as a purely rational being, a reason energizing; and it is to this abstractness and inadequacy in his psychology that we must trace the inadequacy and abstractness of Kant's ethical theory. It is impossible for ethics to escape psychology; it is necessary for philosophy to take account here as elsewhere of scientific results. As Aristotle maintained in ancient times and Butler in modern, the question, 'What is the characteristic excellence or proper life of man?' raises the previous question, 'What is the nature and constitution of man, whose characteristic life and excellence we seek to describe?' 1.

Having suggested the presence of world conflicts in all forms of human society, and having traced this warfare to a basic difference of interest between the individual person and his group to a moral problem, resting upon man's psychological nature, the background has been prepared for the statement of this thesis. It is this:

The Kingdom of God as depicted by Jesus Christ is the only human society that will effectually eliminate the conflict between the individual and society.

To prove this thesis, the succeeding chapters will proceed as the nature of the subject dictates. First, as the individual human being is the fixed and unchangeable factor in this problem, the first step will be to give an adequate definition of a person. Next, since his conflict with his fellows reaches the very essence of his being when it touches his moral nature, morality will be defined and it will be shown what that freedom is, that a man must enjoy, in order to remain a moral being.

Specifically stated, Chapter II will be a study of "Person" in terms of psychology. Man, person, individual, personality shall be used to express the same idea. Man will be defined by what he does, and by what he is. The unit of consideration will be a normal, rational person. The person will be placed in the class organism. He will be shown to be different ^{from} ~~than~~ any other organism in that he thinks, feels and wills, that his end is that of his own moral perfection.

In Chapter III the unit of discussion will be that of a self-directing organism, the Free Man, and this discussion will

be a consideration of Freewill. The entire man will be viewed in action. The individual will be shown to be a creature of his own choosing, that he has the power to and does make choices in the alternatives presented to him.

Chapter IV will take into consideration the nature of society. It will be viewed as a component part of the individual. The conflict arising from prevailing concepts will be defined and the inconsistencies of these concepts pointed out. Finally, society shall be defined in terms of function and shown to be the same as that of the individual. The basis for the reconciliation of this apparent conflict will be given, and a statement as to why man has failed to make this reconciliation will be made. Next, since societies are formed by collections of persons relating themselves together in various ways, society will be defined, and the conflict of the member, with his society, will be traced to its source in the purpose of his social organization. The thesis will emerge when it is shown that a society must always have a spiritual end or aim; this necessity growing out of the natures of the men who form it. Finally, it will be shown that the Kingdom of God, now an Ideal, is the only society that can ever reconcile the interests of society, as a whole, with that of its members who are striving for moral perfection.

Chapter V will be the climax of this study. For, without altering the method of procedure, it will be shown how God has revealed His Kingdom, both through the nature of man and also through His Word, the one agreeing with and confirming the other; or, perhaps a better statement would be to say, that

revelation completes what imagination, under the control of reason, builds up from observed facts of human nature and its moral demands; builds up to a certain point, yet cannot make perfect, even in thought. For the Kingdom of God is a Perfect Society made up of Perfect Christians, neither one of which can be conceived or comprehended by the limited mind of man. It follows that only the Incarnation of God in the form of man, and that the Perfect Man, could give to man a conception, adequate, both to inspire his imitation and to guide him in the slow process of realizing this Ideal in themselves. This will be at once both the theoretical and practical climax of the thesis, the presentation of a concept of a Perfect Society, arising out of the nature of man and his needs.

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THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

CHAPTER II

Person Defined

In order to understand the conflict between the individual and society it is necessary to establish a clear statement of what is meant by the term "person" ^{for}, out of the conflicting viewpoints, as to what a "person" really is, arises the problem [that is the basis of] ^{ed} consideration in this thesis. In this chapter the individual will be ^{treated} considered apart from society; for, in a peculiar sense, he is isolated from his fellows and the external world in manners and degrees most baffling.

The word "person" is interesting. In Latin it means "mask" and consists of two words--"per", through and "sona", sound. The mask was worn by Greek actors in their out-door theatres to indicate to the audience the character they were portraying. That the voice might be carried clearly and distinctly to the listeners the lips of the mask formed a small megaphone, so that the voice of the actor and hence the character depicted "sounded through" his lips in magnified volume. The Latin Church Fathers, needing a word corresponding to the Greek word "hypostasis", by mistake, borrowed this word, "persona" and used it in their discussions of the doctrines of the Trinity. While the early fathers never defined persons in the sense of an individual being, they did supply the word that came to designate the individual human being to whom Christianity had given such new prominence.¹

¹
C.C.J. Webb, God and Personality (McMillan Co., 1918),
p. 40 ff.

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¹ C.C.J. Webb, God and Personality (McMillan Co., 1918), p. 40 ff.

It is astonishing that the being, symbolized by the idea represented by the word "person", should, by many, be denied to even exist. In spite of the fact that men in all ages have believed that persons do exist, and that every one accepts the testimony of our own introspective analyses that we do think, feel and will, some thinkers and many of them psychologists, deny that persons exist, that souls have any being at all, and assert that consciousness is an illusion. Man is reduced to a mere piece of machinery. He is made an automaton. In Wundt's Psychology man lost his soul, and in Behaviorism he lost his mind. ¹ | 2

The origin of such an approach is of more value than is a complete analysis of it. Such a view is inspired chiefly, if not wholly, by devotion to that scientific method which gathers all its facts by observation of the senses (and these negate or neglect introspection) and which justifies its existence by its "being common knowledge" shared in and used by all like-minded beings. To succeed in that approach science must not contain any knowledge that is strictly private and personal. It must be both communal and social. Obviously, a man's own private feelings, thoughts and decisions are not open and exposed to the view of such a science. Therefore, some scientists blithely deny that men have any such private property. Once the motive for this denial of persons is thus exposed to view, the denials of consciousness and mind need not be taken with any more seriousness than the value of the motive, prompting such denial, determines. There are many works presenting both sides of this view that enlighten the

reader on how and why such a concept arose, but here the discussion is turned again to the universally established belief that persons are, that they are conscious in some sense which places men above the level of mechanical playthings of a jesting deity.¹

¹ See Encyclopedia Brit. (11 ed., 1911, V.30) Conway L1. Morgan who writes three articles bearing on the subject: "Behaviorism" (Vol. 30) "Instinct" (Vol. 14) "Animal Intelligence" (Ibid) also "Emergent Evolution" by C. L. Morgan (William and Norgate, 1925) "Behaviorism" by John B. Watson (W.W. Norton, 1929) "Man a Machine" by Joseph Needham, 1929) Wm. C.C. Dampier Wetham, "History of Science in Relation to Philosophy and Religion" (1929) brings the subject up to date with many references. Sir Arthur Eddington in "Nature of the External World" shows that physics upon which opponents of persons rely for their refutation, is itself nothing more than the readings made by minds from dials.

The historic concepts of persons is interesting. Etienne H. Gilson, in the Gifford Lectures,¹ "The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy", traces the history of the idea person in his lecture on "Christian Personalism". He opens his duscussion by showing that there is a conflict between the individual and collective societies, and in preparing the background for the consideration of this conflict, traces the idea of persons from the time of the Greek philosophers onward. He points out that the Greeks "never denied the reality of the individual" but contrary to the thought of the Middle Ages, neither Plato nor Aristotle ever "had a sufficiently high idea of the individual." To Plato, "the idea, Man, is eternal, immutable, necessary," but a man is but a mere reflection or "shadow on the wall" cast by the idea. To Aristotle, the individual was accidental, the species eternal. Thus, for Aristotle, the individual as such did not count, the thing of great importance was the species, Man.

In the 13th Century, Duns Scotus defined the individual as a person "marked with an individual character that distinguishes him from all others" while Thomas Aquinas held that a person was "a being divided off from all other beings, and not itself divisible into other beings."² This is but a reaffirmation of the definition given by Boethius, the 6th Century theologian, and has been the common concept of theologians since that time.

¹ Etienne H. Gilson, Gifford Lectures, "The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy" (C. Scribners, 1936) pp 189 ff., R.A.H.C. Downes.
² Ibid. ppl 92 - 198. ³ Ibid. p. 204

Boethius, (486-524) the Sixth Century philosopher, gave us the classic definition in his well-known formula: "A person is an individual substance of rational nature." This definition is essentially the favored one of Christian theologians and is still held by them.¹ It is framed with man's moral responsibility, here and hereafter in view; for the soul, or this individual substance, is simple and cannot disintegrate. Hence, it is immortal, as it is rational; it is moral, and being both moral and eternal, a man's moral responsibility never ceases, here or in the hereafter. Today, defining is no longer done in terms of substance or "substantia" -- an unknown and an unknowable substance. Man, like all other things, is "what he does" and so must be defined functionally.

The idea of "person", while for a long time static, due to the inhibition upon discussion, effected when Thomas Aquinas became the official standard of authority for the Roman Catholic Church, is today a most important and prominent concept; so much so that a whole philosophy of "Personalism" has been built upon it. The idea is treated in "The Philosophy of Personalism", by Dr. Albert Knudson, who gives a brief historical review of the doctrine and quotes a number of definitions. He raises the question - "What is a Person?" - and asks, "Does personality imply self-consciousness? Does it imply freedom?" and continues with a number of like queries.²

¹ Dr. Albert C. Knudson, "The Philosophy of Personalism" (Abingdon Press, 1927) p. 83. ² Ibid, p. 20

Then he quotes J. M. E. McTaggart's assertion, "Nothing exists but persons connected in a unity."¹ But he rejects McTaggart's notion that "ultimate reality consist of a society of persons," on the ground that such a congeries has no unity ⁱⁿ ~~it~~ itself but must rely upon some fundamental unifier, and that it has no real freedom, of which he says, "Freedom is usually singled out as one of the most important characteristics of personality."² He continues the discussion by consideration of the views of William Stern, Leibnitz and others, until he arrives at his own conception in his section headed, "The Concept of Personality."³

Starting with the definition given by Boethius, previously stated, he discusses the various shades of opinion of this definition as held by others, and sums up the composition of a person as consisting of four "fundamental" elements: the first, individuality, which includes unity and identity; secondly, self-consciousness, in the sense of the power to know as well as to feel (or be conscious of); the third, will or free activity; and the fourth, dignity or worth.⁴

¹ Dr. Albert C. Knudson, "The Philosophy of Personalism," (Abingdon Press, 1927) p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, pp 78-87.

⁴ Dr. Knudson gives numerous additional sources for further reading from which he quotes directly.

Out of these definitions we offer the following inclusive statement -- A person is a self-conscious, self-directing organism, consisting of a soul, (spirit), a mind (consciousness) and a body, originated by organic creation and functioning for the moral perfection or integration and development of the ¹ man.

This definition satisfies the scientific procedure of first placing the "thing" discussed, in a class, giving its species. The origin and development, in a genetic sense, is of no material interest in this study, ^{now do} and ^{to} we need ^{any} give no special consideration to the body. Our defining will be done, as stated before, in terms of function, except for minor considerations that will be pertinent to the understanding of the whole person in action.

Having placed man in the class "organism" we must next form a concept of his composition. Man is an organic whole, "an organization of component elements, that make up a living body, capable of separate descriptions, but mutually dependent upon each other," ² which agrees with James' statement that ³ "personality" is a composite organization of several selves."

¹ Arthur Holmes, "Psychology of Preaching," (Mimeographed 1940) p. 4.

² Websters International Dictionary - Definition of organism.

³ William James, "Principles of Psychology", Chapter XVI P. 292 ff

As ~~is to be~~ ^{now thought} expected, psychologists have taken persons more seriously than any of the mechanistic scientists. Some, however, (amongst them the behaviorists who carry the mechanical mode of defining to the limit) describe man as merely composed of inherited and acquired reflexes constituting the behavior of the body as a whole. This method does define functionally, or by what the body does, and not merely structurally, by that of which it is made up, but (and some of the behaviorists have gone to the ^{last} extreme) such a psychology, describing men as machines, finds no need of consciousness, and calmly, deliberately, boldly proceeds to divest the human being of such an apparently useless ¹ appendage, -- an act that seems almost unbelievable but true.

Among the psychologists who have seriously attacked the problem of man's composition, the late William James was, as usual, both picturesque and lively in his talk about persons. His treatment presented a tremendous advance in thinking over that of the early Boethius and his followers, who made personality a hard and fast simple substance, unshatterable and eternal. James, making his beginning with a broad and sweeping statement of his conception of a person, or self, said:

1 "Behaviorism," (John B. Watson, (W.W. Norton Co. 1929)
 For man as a machine, Charles B. Upton, "Atheism," Hast. Enc.
Religion and Ethics, Vol. II, pp 175 ff.
 William James, "Principles of Psychology," (1890) Part 1,
 Chap. v. ^{Best essay}
 La Mettrie, "The Automaton Theory," pp 128-144
 Joseph Needham, "Man, a Machine," (1748) "Man, a Machine,"
 1927.

"In its widest possible sense a man's self is the sum-total of all that he can call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his land and horses, his yacht and bank account, his reputation and his works, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends."¹

This definition is different from both the popular notion of a person limited essentially to a "personality" and Boethius' indivisible "substance". According to James, a person is a complex compound, made up, not only of many visible constituents but of many invisible elements, and a mind that reaches far out into the world about him. From material so gained he builds himself "nobler mansions" or a larger world and identifies himself with it; so that where the one leaves off and the other begins, no one can discern -- any more than they discern and distinguish a man's heart, brain and perhaps even his clothes ^{from} and the man himself. This idea is expansive and suggestive; it renews and transforms the old problem of morality and free-will and man's place in society -- the basic consideration of this thesis.

Dr. Charles H. Judd has a similar concept of personality. To him, man is not only "the center of the world", he is also a conscious center, so that "the full concept of self must include every possible relation."² As a consequence, all men taken together,

¹ William James, "Principles of Psychology," Vol. I p. 291.

² Charles H. Judd, "Psychology," (C. Scribners, 1907) p. 310.

have in their minds the universe of perceived things and the relations between them. Each man, being like other men, thus builds his own world, which is himself, with God, who unites all these worlds together in a universe. The world thus be-
 comes a world of selves or persons, human and divine.¹

"Properly speaking," James has said, "a man has as many selves as there are individuals who recognize and carry an image of him in their mind."² From this it is obvious that man extends and expands himself enormously.

Persons are both born and made. The "stuff" out of which the rational, moral man is to be made, comes at birth. How much the finished product is due to heredity and how much to environment and how much to education involving ideals and their choice, is a mooted question. Moreover, it is not of primary consideration at this ^{point} time. At first, the conscious processes of the infant's thinking, feeling and willing are guided by his animal-like appetites and inborn instincts. But these conflict amongst themselves. As the child grows he tries to introduce into them some order and harmony, so that he does not at one moment seek a certain end, and the next moment act so as to destroy that end. One who does that is irrational, insane, maniacal, or merely non-rational. The growing person, quite naturally, strives for rational conduct. The intelligent person, therefore, is one who forms an idea of what he wants to accomplish and proceeds to attain that objective by means and methods which he judges will use the least energy in its attainment.

¹ For several concepts of man similar to this - see Knudson's "The Philosophy of Personalism," (1927) pp 30 ff and especially pp 75, on "Personalism and the World."

The extent to which man can develop is unlimited. It is evident that man cannot be limited to the contours of his body. He continually reaches out and beyond them. By his inventions he steps out and roams far and wide in the extension of his influence. Is not the voice of the singer, located at the loud speaker, the same as it is located at his lips for those who are in his bodily presence? ~~Where~~ ^{Is} the voice of one speaking over the long distance telephone? Any one feels a table top at his fingers' ends if he places it there. If, however, he touches it with a pencil it is at the pencil's tip. Thus has man extended himself, ^{by his} as with a cane, ^{feeling} at the end of a cane, and so on indefinitely. All of man's inventions have extended his sphere of influence immeasurably and there is no end in sight of this enlargement. In a literal sense, as truly as a man is present in every part of his body, he is where he is actively conscious and reaches as far as do his perceptions.

Not only does man do this but he brings forward the past and welds it into the present and with the future makes one indivisible whole. Today, men are making decisions, consciously and distinctly, because of promises ~~men~~ made years ago. Thus, they acknowledge that the person, ~~who~~ made the promise then, still lives and must fulfill it. Equally, men are planning the future and are busy with matters that, did they believe time would cease ere their possible fruition, they would end the planning and doing immediately. Our intentions which are now foresights, or insights into the future, bind that future into

the present which is already bound into the past, and thus make man, not a mechanical, but a spiritual product of a distant past, and equally, to a degree at least, a fore-ordainer of the future man.¹

This view gives prominence to the unlimited extension of every person who is the center of his conscious world, now practically unlimited, and of the real world in which, as Einstein has pointed out, each man, since he is the observer, is the center.²

The origin of man is not of essential interest to a study that deals with man's moral nature; for the validity of an activity, or of a thing, does not depend upon its origin. This being so, there is no value in describing or considering all the earlier and now discarded doctrines of man's "evolution" which described his "descent" as an "ascent" from lower stages. The present-day doctrines of man's origin -- Creation versus Evolution -- have combined in organic-creation. Here God's work appears in the formation of every individual, making him something other than any one of his antecedents, or the sum total of them all, something unique,

¹ For further study and elaboration of this phase of a person, see Borden P. Bowne, "Personalism," (Houghton Mifflin, 1908) also Sir Henry Jones, "A Faith that Enquires," (Gifford Lectures, MacMillan Co. 1922) Lecture IX, X, especially pp 114 ff.

² Sir James Jeans, "Relativity," (Encly. Brit. 11th ed. New Volume 5) p. 32

different¹ from any other person on earth. Man stands not at the end of a long series of chain-linked events, but rather, in its glory and uniqueness, as the crowning act of creation.

Sir Henry Jones insists that a "man is what he does", and this truth holds most emphatically in the realm of morals. A man is moral or immoral only and wholly -- not in the "stuff" he is made of, nor in the structure of his mind or body, but in the way he wills and acts. This fact is of importance in studying the individual's place in society and his freedom to choose and act morally. "In fact," Jones says, "morality is a process." He points out that in order to be at all, will must be in operation. If men cease to will what is right the moral world would cease to exist. All spiritual facts imply a similar condition, the spiritual world being a constant creation. The world of ideas is one in which rational persons carry on the processes of intelligence. The moral world is the world made by the process of active volitions of rational beings, seeking to convert what is, into what should be, or to realise their ideals. Man truly is what he does. He is characterized by his thinking, feeling and his willing. He actually exists in these operations and extends as far as they extend -- without known limits, in an infinite sphere of being.²

¹ James Sully, "Evolution" (Encl. Brit. 11th ed.) gives history of this doctrine down to time of Conway L. Morgan, "Emergent Evolution", (Gifford Lectures, 1922)

² Sir Henry Jones, "A Faith that Enquires," pp 124 ff.¹⁹²²

Man is never satisfied with what he is, or with his present mode of conduct. Always he aspires to be what he is not, as Longfellow laments -

"O, that a man would arise in me
That the man I am might cease to be."

More hopefully Lowell asserts -

"The thing we long for,
That we are for one transcendent moment."

And Browning, in a braver spirit and more robust faith, declares -

"What I aspired to be and was not, comforts me,"

and assures us,

"All that is, at all,
Lasts ever past recall
Earth ~~changes~~, but thy soul and God stand sure,
What entered into thee
What was and is and ^{shall} be.
Time's wheel runs back and stops; Potter and clay
endure."

From this review of the meanings given to that familiar word "person" it is evident that the human individual is a factor of almost unlimited significance to modern philosophy. Thinkers have just begun, seriously to study man as a person. For the impetus first given by Christianity to the concentration of attention upon this center and circumference of the universe was, unfortunately, later diverted to other things by historic influences.

Christian theologians from 100 to 450 were occupied, chiefly, if not wholly, with purely philosophical concepts of the nature of God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit, ending in Nicean Trinitarianism. A ^{primary} second factor is this diversion of attention away from the

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The verse quotations in this essay, where not otherwise indicated, are taken from John Bartlett, (Little, Brown & Co. 1909)

person to other matters that were of no significance in the teachings of Jesus; In fact, a step that he taught against most clearly when he said, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's," came about as a result of the Church's absorption into the Roman Empire. In that absolute, totalitarian and militaristic system of Rome, a person was reduced to a virtual zero. Just as soon as the state was supreme in every thing, the Church, as a bureau of that State, was imbued with like concepts. Augustine, because of his notion of his own conversion and his leaning toward the Platonic philosophy (that paid some attention to the nature and destiny of man) divided his genius between the Church and the individual. He magnified, however, the sovereignty of God by predestination, until, in the sight of religion, man sank again into comparative insignificance. Later, during the period of the Reformation, Calvin completed man's degradation by the elaboration of the theory of foreordination.

At about this time, ^{a second factor} mechanistic science, beginning with the "I think, therefore I am" of Des Cartes, was beginning to take form, but was speedily depersonalised and eventually went so far as freely to deny man any reality whatever -- a view heartily endorsed by some Neo-Hegelians like F. A. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet.¹

¹ See A. C. Knudson, "Philosophy of Personalism," (1927) p. 31 ff, who lists Absolutists who accept and deny the Personality of the Absolute.

Medieval serfdom, also ecclesiasticism, theology, philosophy and modern science have all conspired to deny the worth of man as revealed in the Bible and especially in the teachings of Jesus who placed him above any society, any state and depicted him as the very flower of God's creation, and the thing of supreme value in the universe.

Man, being a moral being, his value depends directly upon his goodness or badness, and it is by these standards that he is judged throughout the Bible, which places him on two distinct levels. On the lower level the inspired writers paint him, hopeless, corrupt, utterly unable to lift himself to the plane he confesses and desires. Because, "that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was evil continually," he is suitable only for destruction.¹ But on the higher level God sees men with their potentialities realized, as but little lower than "elohim" (angel) being formed after God's own image when He was Creator, at the climax of his work, and he is pleased with him.² Men are indeed corrupted but, "in every form of the human, some hint of the Highest dwells," and this latent power, "built into him by God,"³ this ideal that a man longs to become, this spark of divinity never extinguished, can be realized.

For these reasons the Bible weighs man and names him, according to his worth in the sight of God. He is called a "living soul," (Genesis 2:7) made in the "image of God," (Genesis 1:27)

¹ Gen. 6:5; 8:21; Job 15:16.

² Ps. 8:4; 144:3; Heb. 2:6. Luke 2:14.

³ Phil. 2:13.

the monarch of all the earth (Genesis 1:26) endowed with the power to choose evil or good (Genesis 3:5) and to obey or disobey. (Genesis 3:12)

When Jesus trod the shores of Galilee he proclaimed that he came to seek that which was lost. But the briefest of glances at the social conditions of that day reveals, cogently, that the concept of man, as a Divine image, precious in the sight of God, a free moral agent, had indeed been lost. Totalitarian Rome ruled the world with an iron fist. At best, men were but "cives" or citizens, "milites" or soldiers; human life was cheap, of little if any value, except as it served the purpose of state.

The priesthood of Aaron was ^{then very} utterly corrupted. From servants of God and leaders of men they had made the Temple a "den of robbers and thieves," class distinctions were rampant, man had become mere hopeless "tools" and pawns of the rulers. When Jesus placed the individual above the Sabbath, when He decisively refused to join the cliques (that were longing to revolt and become the political rulers of the world) when He chose rather to serve, to inspire and renew the latent hopes and aspirations of the leper, the blind, the lame and the poor, the "whited sepulchers" were so enraged they gnashed their teeth in hatred. Then they sought, to annihilate, by Crucifixion, the Son of Man, who had come to proclaim the Kingdom of God and the glad tidings that "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son that who so ever believeth on Him should not perish but have life eternal."

For a time, an unfortunately long time, the pagan concept of Aristotle, who later was regarded by the Church as an almost infallible thinker, prevailed. Aristotle's judgment was that of the upper classes of his day, and was the prevalent concept accepted by all classes. He saw man, not as having any eternal value - an equality between man and man - but surrounded by slaves and sycophants of the Court of King Philip, where he was engaged as Tutor for Alexander the Great. He saw "the human average as nearer the beast than god." "From the hour of their birth some are marked for subjection, others for command." "He who can foresee," sagely remarks Aristotle, "is intended by nature to be lord and master." Some men, for him, have no absolute value, but are means to other men's ends, to be used or spent as their masters see fit. "The slave is a tool, with life," (a horribly cruel concept) "the tool is a lifeless slave." "He who can work only with his hands is by nature a slave."

His crowning cynicism relates to women -- "She is unfinished man, she will be the last thing ever civilized by man... her will is weak and she should remain silent in the presence of 'finished males' ".¹ These judgments would be humorous, if we did not at times, at certain periods of history, have men reverting to type, who, like Napoleon, made use of men as tools for his own ambition, or like the cynical Bismarck, view the common people as mere "cannon fodder."

¹ Aristotle's Politics, quoted by Will Durant, "Story of Philosophy" (Garden City Pub. N.Y. 1927)

The prediction of Christ, however, that "And I, if I be lifted up shall draw all men unto me," ¹ Has slowly, and relentlessly, changed the world's estimate of a person, and the meaning and worth of the individual; ² until today, in the best thought of the times, though he may not build it, he does occupy the known world, from its center to its circumference.

From this study of personality there has come a conception widely different than that held by certain scientists, and even theologians. The conclusions reached are based upon both authorities and upon the common observation, which any man, any where, anytime, can make, both upon himself and upon those about him. A full definition of a person must include, first, his assignment to a class, organism, secondly, in which he is distinguished from others in the class, organism, -- by his self-consciousness; and thirdly, by his peculiar and unique striving for self-betterment, which separates him, with an impassable gulf, from the lower animals which struggle for mere existence and the reproduction of their kind.

It is man's universal striving for self-betterment that makes him a moral being. For he finds that all that he labors for as ends, are eventually used for improving his spiritual nature.

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Johm 12:32

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See Hastings Dictionary of the Bible, (1906) Man, VIII, p. 225. J. Hastings; W.F. Adeney. The word person does not occur in the English Bible. Cf Philosophy, ib. p 848, T.B. Kilpatrick; and Psychology, Ib. IV. pp 1633 ff, J. Laidlaw, which bears on this subject.

To set before any man the ambition to secure a million dollars, just to spend upon his animal appetites and instincts, would be appalling, even to him, and those who do scramble for money and use it largely upon their bodies, eventually discover to their despair, Omar's assurance -

"A jug of Wine, Loaf of Bread and Thou
Beside me singing in the Wilderness,
O, Wilderness were a Paradise enow,"

is a result of that deceitfulness of sin that always reaps such despair. It is certain, that a person, to be a person at all, must be moral, must be rational, or able to form an ideal of the man he wants to be, must be free to strive for constant progression toward the realization of the chosen ideal within himself.

With the image of what he longs to be ever before him, he realizes it step by step, and with each step of progress, he finds a better and more appealing, a more desirable image appearing before him. His progress on earth is never finished. These processes of moral progress, edification, sanctification, education, et cetera, constantly continue and lead him on toward the ideal of perfection.

To summarize: Man is a peculiar animal, a unique being, a most complex organism, different from any other earthly thing, in that he thinks, feels and wills, and more, he knows that he does it and also directs it. By that thinking he forms ideas of things that are not in existence and fills the world with his inventions and social organizations. Moreover, he possess an ideal of the person he wishes himself to be. That ideal is the image of

a morally perfect man. Not only has he ideas but also emotions made up of appetites, instinctive feelings, developed sentiments, and from these arise a Divine discontent, that urges him always away from his "lower" self to a "higher" self, not yet here, but which he wills to bring into existence. To choose that ideal, to use myriads of possible means to that end, man must be free, freer than plants and animals, free as a moral being. This free man will be the subject of our next succeeding chapter.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

CHAPTER III

The Morally Free Man

To show that the Kingdom of God is the only society that a person may enter and remain a person, with no conflict between himself and the society, a full study of person must be made. In Chapter II, man's nature was studied. He is a large and complex, self-conscious, self-directing organism. His self-consciousness and his self-direction enable him to form an ideal of the kind of a man he would like to be. That is the basis of his morality. A person must be a moral man. But, to be moral, he must be free to strive for the attainment of a chosen ideal or end; it is the consideration of that freedom to which attention is directed in this chapter.

To be moral, man must be free, to some extent, from efficient, physical causes. Hence, while person, morality and freedom cannot be actually separated, for purposes of description this chapter naturally falls into two parts -- the moral man and the free man, both united in a person. This union is not always made clear. Such terms as man, self, individual, ego, are sometimes used in the same sense as person, and again in general senses. "Man", for example, when it is used to include infants and abnormal people, is a broader term than person, and does not designate a moral being. Dr. Albert C. Knudson makes clear this distinction:

"The words self and person are sometimes used synonymously, and properly so. But strictly, person is a narrower term. It applies only to selves that have attained to a certain degree of intellectual and moral development; a slave is not a person, neither is a child. Personality implies moral responsibility and freedom."¹

Personality implies morality and morality implies freedom. Are men free? If so, can they remain morally free and still be members of a society? The solution of this problem is the ultimate goal of this thesis, and with it in mind, we will first consider a man's morality, to see its nature, composition, derivation and value.

In Chapter II, man was defined as a self-conscious organism and it was shown that he is composed of spirit (soul) mind or consciousness, and a body. A consideration of the body will be omitted, for it is an instrument, devoid of moral freedom. It is, to a large extent, a piece of machinery, bringing in news of the external world, through the senses to the spirit, and carrying out the spirit's commands to that same world of things. As the spirit thinks, feels and wills, and this activity itself constitutes the mind or consciousness, the spirit is not immediately dealt with. Instead, a study is made of the processes of thinking, feeling and willing, to see if they exhibit that freedom from necessity, and have liberty of choosing, which is necessary to moral man.

The common consent of mankind has held that insensate things are not moral. Neither are the lower animals which act

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A. C. Knudson, "Philosophy of Personalism," (1927) p. 63.

instinctively, without having in mind any idea of the ends to be accomplished.¹ Nor are infants, idiots or people afflicted with certain physical defects and diseases, held morally responsible. Only man, of all creatures on this earth, displays the capability to be a moral being, and then in only certain of his actions. In short, only persons in the true sense of that word, are moral beings. They perform many actions, some of which are moral.

Reflexes, automatic acts, instinctive acts, performed for the first time, and instinctive, mechanical habits, however acquired, done without consciousness, are all forms of human behavior which are excused from moral accountability. Only those actions that are voluntary, ideational, rational, intentional and deliberate are held to be moral acts. Each of these actions is complex, composed of some desire or felt want. (The latter embody an idea of what is desired and of the means by which it may be secured, also the power to secure the end or to satisfy the desire.) They are ideational because the agent has an idea of the end he seeks; rational, because he does realize the end sought. To strive for the end man must be free from obstacles in the way, and at liberty to pursue the end he has in mind. This is the freedom required for moral action.

It is admitted that all persons do strive for ends and thus are counted as moral beings. But for what do men strive? What is the ultimate end of their labor? Obviously, they seek myriads of quickly obtained ends, but these are immediately turned

¹ William McDougall, "Outlines of Social Psychology", (1908) discusses instincts.

into means to secure another end and so the process goes on until it arrives at some ultimate end which is never a means to more ends. Such ends are called "moral ends". What are they?

The centuries of study, since Socrates, has confirmed the statement of Plato, in "Phaedrus" and "Protagoras", that no man ever deliberately strives to injure himself. If, in a fit of insanity, rage, or intoxication from liquor, or from religious fanaticism, he does injure his body or his character, he does it either because of uncontrollable forces, in which case he is not morally responsible, or to gain some future benefit. Socrates taught that no man voluntarily pursues evil or that which he thinks is evil. To prefer evil to the good is not human nature. Man must always seek what he feels is for his own apparent good in his earthly life.¹ With this, F. H. Bradley agrees, saying, "A purely evil self is a sheer impossibility."² Man always chooses deliberately what he believes will best satisfy the desires he feels.

But many of the ends that men strive for and call good are merely means to other ends. They labor to change their physical environment, to invent machines for bodily comfort, to provide the necessities of life, to obtain education, to form societies for their own protection and enjoyment. But these are

¹ See Enc. Brit. (9th Ed. 1892) Ethics, H. Sidgwick, Vol. 8, p. 576, ff

² Joseph A. Leighton, "Individual and Society", (D. Appleton, 1926) quotes F. H. Bradley, "Ethical Studies" 1878

always means to some other end. Men, possessing them, still crave and strive for something else. No matter how luxurious their physical surroundings, no matter how enormous their wealth, no matter how elevated their moral character in their own and other peoples' eyes, as long as they live men are unsatisfied and continue to strive for ideals approachable but never reachable.

The ultimate ideal that men strive to attain is that of the morally perfect man. No person is a means to an end; a man is an end to himself.¹ He is an integrated man, -- one in whom emotions, intellect and will all work harmoniously together, so that no discord due to internal friction, mars the man's inner serenity. He finds himself working smoothly and efficiently to obtain what his heart desires, because it is so in accord with his own conscience. If his ends and means are in accord with his fellows in society, then he enjoys external peace also.

Beyond all other ends lies the Absolute End, his own moral perfection -- the completed man -- who retains his inner integration like an evergreen tree, that keeps its shape through all the years of its growth, in height, circumference and content.

Just so the integrated man, with his Ideal before him, grows toward completeness and does it without conflict within, nor

¹ See Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason," tr. Thomas K. Abbott (Longmans Green & Co. 1909)

insuperable obstacles without. This is the moral man, not yet perfect, but successfully striving for perfection.¹

If a moral being is one who can be guided by ideas of the consequences of his acts before they take place, if he can foresee what will come to pass, he, of all men, would be the most miserable, if he could do nothing to avert impending calamities to himself and his loved ones, and could not as much as lift a finger to attain the good that he conceives. To be moral he must not only have this power to foresee consequences, thereby rightly judging his course, but he must actually be free and able to perform any necessary operations to fulfill the needs of his judgments.

Many arguments have been used to deny just this kind of freedom, to use means to ends desired, and even to prove that men are not free at all. The most determined opponent of this concept is that of scientific determinism. Before proceeding to further define moral freedom we must determine that it is both possible and a reality.

Science demands, not only an absolute necessity, but physical necessity, and not only physical necessity, but that kind of uniformity that comes from a chain of efficient causes, that, as James remarked, reaches from primeval chaos to the crack of doom; events geared together like cog-wheels; interwoven like chain mail; lock-stepped like "caterpillars" on tractors.

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Sir Henry Jones, "A Faith that Enquires," (1922) Ch.X Moralality - A Process that Always Attains, pp 118-135, Also see H. Sidgwick, "Methods of Ethics," on "PERFECTION".

The meaning of this determinism has been stated by many writers; among the more recent ones is Sir Henry Jones, who gives a very clear and emphatic statement of the issue. He says -

"The problem of freedom is held to be the problem of natural cause and causality means the transmutation of energy from one form to another, according to fixed quantitative laws, which physical science defines. No other kind of connection is conceived in this controversy."¹

In the imagination of the modern scientist the world is a vast machine. Its parts are so geared together that when one moves, all of them move. The first moving part is the cause; the part it moves is its effect. In terms of motions of matter in space, the mechanist seeks to describe each and every event in all the unlimited universe. This aim, astonishing as it may seem to anyone who takes his science chiefly from glowing accounts of its applications to human health and comfort, and to inventions that save human labor and give men new command over nature, is, nevertheless, the purpose that guides researchers in their quests, and determines so many of the bewildering beliefs held by men whose world is nothing but "atoms and the void". That it has been abandoned, by many thinkers, as an inadequate and distorted picture of the actual world, does not preclude its use as a mechanical Ideal which many earnest souls seek to realize. It is this view of the world that rigorously exorcises all human freedom from human action and makes man a mere bundle of inherited or conditioned re-

¹ Henry Jones, "A Faith That Enquires," p. 105

flexes, set going by physical stimuli.¹

The scope of determinism is, by several writers, seen to include, not only every particle of matter in the universe which has its path forever determined for it, but more by the use of LaPlace's "Perfect Calculator" it can be located at any future moment. Such an ideal is indeed fascinating, but a specious one. Nobody has ever exactly calculated even the solar eclipses with perfect exactness. But the craving for the power to prophesy and the necessity of the postulate of determinism are so strong that scientists erect a Mechanical Ideal World, wherein, theoretically, but never actually, things happen as determined by the hypothesis-
es, but then use that imaginary hypothetical concept to crush out
all freedom of will and thus all human morality.²

Modern Inductive science was impelled by two needs to reject final causes or purposes, in its descriptions, and to restrict its own explanations to efficient physical causes alone. The first reason arose out of the Lockian theory, that all facts observed must come through the senses, That single process restricted science

¹
For this view well treated see ENC. BRIT. 11th Ed. Mechanics, For opposing views see James Ward, "Naturalism & Agnosticism." (1899) I, II, and the works of the pragmatists, humanists, and personalists, together with such physicists as Sir Arthur Eddington, Sir James Jeans and others who have adopted the new views of the world.

²
See James Ward, "Naturalism and Agnosticism," (Cambridge Press) 1899, Vol. I, p. 41; also see "Atheism," Charles B. Upton, H.E.R.E., II pp 174 ff for mechanism and refutation. A.B. Bruce, "Apologetics," (1896) is largely devoted to the refutation of materialistic mechanism.

to material things and their causes to physical antecedents. The second reason for scientists' accepting and postulating determinism was the necessity of making science justify itself, not by the truth it attained - for it cannot attain truth or certainty, but by its utility in predicting coming events, so that man might know "What is in the wind for them" as James expressed it. To fulfill such promises of utility in predicting coming events, in theory at least, all the events of the universe must follow the law of cause and effect, each cause always producing with fatal uniformity the same effect.

The fact is, however, that science never does predict anything with certainty. The variation sign is attached to every formula, and at best, an approximation is the best it can do, for no stone ever falls quite as the "law" says it will and would if events were constant and invariable. The variation from Newton's Law of gravitation started Einstein on the study that resulted in the discarding of gravitation and the substitution of curved space for it.¹

The ends that necessitated the postulates of determinism have been given up, and hence the postulate, itself, is of no use. Scientists have asserted that they used only efficient causes and effects, but never recognised final ends, or purposes. Today, biologists, especially, fully recognise that organisms exist everywhere, and each and every one of them manifest intelligent parts

¹ ENC. BRIT. 11th Ed. New Vol. 32, "Relativity" by Sir James Jeans

working together for their own good and the good of the whole. Purposiveness appears visibly on every hand, and purpose always exhibits a certain freedom from efficient causes of mechanism, and always exhibits the power to use mechanisms for purposes. While mechanisms exist everywhere, mechanisms do not control purposive organisms, but purposive organisms do use mechanisms - as the driver of the automobile guides it where he pleases. Moreover, human beings who can observe the behavior of intelligent persons, and at the same time also observe their own internal actions, declare that in any deliberate choice, they could have made the opposite choice. This personal testimony of conscious free-will, or conscious freedom, comes from a source from which we secure incontestable judgments. Personal certitude transcends any theoretical postulate assumed to meet the needs of a hypothesis. Both subjective and objective arguments lead to the final rejection of scientific determinism which asserts that all events are due to physical necessity, to causes that are antecedent to the law of uniformity, which nowhere admits of any exception.

Purposiveness is free from efficient causation. Teleology has come into its own and scientists are compelled to recognize it everywhere riding upon mechanisms. This new objective view, supported by the old assurance that every man has, that at the moment of making a deliberate decision, he could have made a dif-

¹
See H.E.R.E. Ethics, II, p. 175, "Atheism?" Charles B. Upton, quoting Poynting from Hibbert Journal, (July, 1903) p.939 and p. 743

ferent one, is stated by J. H. Poynting, who says, "I hold that we are more certain of our power of choice and of responsibility than any other fact, physical or psychical," and "I repudiate the physical account of nature when it claims to be a full account,"¹ as LaPlace and other mechanists claimed it to be.

Before the self-conscious agent are forks in the road. In many cases he can move either to the right or to the left. At times the situation resembles that of a billiard ball balanced on the edge of a razor. It can be moved either way by a force so slight as to be immeasurable.² Myriads of such situations occur in this world. A boat, moored on a level smooth lake, pointing mid-way between two distant towns, (each equidistant, so that town A, town B and the point of the boat form an equilateral triangle) can go to either town with exactly the same theoretical expenditure of energy. The boatman can turn the rudder either way with the same bodily energy. The decision to go to A takes no more physical energy than the decision to go to B - a total amount consumed that no scientific instrument pretends to detect. For a mere thought cannot directly move any scientific instrument. A man's spirit weighs nothing. Thinking, feeling and willing employ

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See H.E.R.E. Ethics, II, p. 175, "Atheism," Charles B. Upton, quoting Poynting from Hibbert Journal, (July 1903) P. 939 & 743

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See Wm. McDougall, "Social Psychology," (J.W. Luce, 4th Ed. 1911) for illustrations of billiard ball. H. Sidgwick, "Methods of Ethics"; Freewill; F.S.C. Schiller, "Humanism" (1907) Essay, "Freedom" Wm. James, "Will to Believe," (1921 Ed.) Jas. Ward, "Naturalism and Agnosticism," (1899) all treat freedom of will and show the necessity and reality of it.

no physical energy that can be measured. Here is freedom from the physical. Here is liberty to use an energy - if it is an energy - which transcends all the ability of instruments and all sense to detect. Sir Oliver Lodge denies that mechanism only exists, by declaring, "Life is not a form of energy, but guides energy," so that from this view, human will may be like the electrical energy that opens a water gate to start a turbine wheel - one kind of energy releasing, directing or controlling another kind. So our spirit, may release the stored energy in brain-cells¹ which results in bodily behavior.

Another opponent of freedom is predestination.² But, strange as it may seem, predestinarians never have released man from moral obligations. They may declare in one breath that God predetermines every thought, feeling and act that a man may perform, and yet they declare that some of man's acts are sinful, and for such deeds God justly metes out punishment. Into the devious ways of supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism this study need not delve. Moreover, we may retain class-predestination according to that which God has already revealed, the end of men who join certain classes of people. However, this does not reject, but rather confirms freedom of choice, just as a conductor, proclaiming the destination of his train, does not compel the boarding of it, but merely points out the results of

¹ See H.E.R.E. Vol. ii, p. 175, "Atheism", Chas. B. Upton.

² Wm. Kelly Wright, "A Student's Philosophy," (MacMillan, 1929) Chap. 21, pp 391 ff gives an interesting and illuminating discussion of predestination, showing clearly the dilemmas facing proponents of that theory.

doing so.

Predestination, seems, in theory at least, to affect the non-moral as well as the moral. In either case, the theory of God's foreknowledge, irresistible grace, foreordination, and assignment to bliss does not touch the problem of that freedom which the moral man exercises. For as long as predestinarians admit that a man is moral, their predestination does not deny the moral freedom that is being studied here. It is in this realm of freedom from physical necessity, and in spiritual liberty that man's moral freedom must be found. He testifies, with all the might and assurance of a conviction never yet molested by any evidence, that he CAN choose, and does choose. He knows, also, when in some instances he has no choice, and says so. By this proclamation he takes responsibility upon himself for his deeds. He judges himself to be moral.

From this incursion into the problem of free-will it is evident that a man is free from physical compulsions, in certain of his deliberative, voluntary acts. The outside, material world, with its mythical physical forces does not invade his soul where his moral decisions are made. His own body does not prevent him from making similar decisions and he can impart those decisions to his body as a whole, and to its members, so that they act in obedience to his edicts. Nor does predestination, which at best, either completely contradicts itself, and demeans the God whose sovereignty it seeks

to magnify, by declaring, in the same breath, that man must do what he does by the will of God, and so destroys this freedom. If God toys with men like automatoms, and condemns them for what He, Himself, does, He is made so abhorrent to all justice, that no morality exists at all. Finally, a conception of God's sovereignty, which views Him as the Creator of the World, in which He reveals the consequences to any man, who joins himself to certain classes of people may be readily admitted and accepted, for here there is no individual determinism. A man is a free moral agent. The forks of the road are clearly marked; he freely chooses the way he will take and knows the destiny that awaits him. God, who foresees all, foresees what will happen to men who choose either the right or the wrong road, but He does not compel any individual to take either in place of the other.

Closely allied to the problem of man's ability to be a free moral agent is that of the mental processes, intellect, emotion and will. All of these are engaged in any moral act. If all of them, or indeed any one of them, operates by necessity, under some uniform law, defying any change, then there is a determinism that prevents man from seeking and striving for a moral ideal.

When we make a study of these mental processes we also ask, incidentally, which one is the essential one in the moral act. Thus a two-fold query arises. Is the will free to make decisions - and does the ultimate issue of morality reside in the

will and the will alone?

The old faculty psychology viewed the soul as made up of three distinct factors of intellect, emotion and will. This tripartite division made famous by Kant (1755) lasted until the days of Wundt, (1879). It has a value for descriptive purposes. But many complications arise when the three faculties are treated as separate and distinct things. Only by such arbitrary methods, can it be said where the intellect leaves off and the emotions come in, and then, where the will functions.

James views it that the soul must be considered as an organic whole.¹ The will is the whole man in action, the sum total of what he thinks, feels and wills. Thus the old doctrine has given away to the understanding that intellectual, emotional and volitional processes are so many phases of the organic whole, in action, phases which the person, himself knows and distinguishes.

This view of the three separate functionings of the spirit has had far-reaching consequences. It has always been clear to moralists, when they considered the matter fully, that the intellect operating as reason, must of necessity come into play in any moral act worthy of the name. In a large sense, they saw that all moral action, in general, is striving for an end. Such action is rational. In it the intellect, as conception, or imagination, must frame and conceive the end, and hold it in mind as an ideal.

¹ Wm. James, "The Will to Believe", (Green & co. 1896) also Henry Jones, "A Faith that Enquires" (1922) p. 50

² See Knudson, "Philosophy of Personalism", (1927) Chap. 1.

All rationalistic methods of ethics, variously called goods or hedonistic ethics, have freely emphasized man's rationality; and have insisted that blind obedience without question of the end or the purpose of the act, could not be moral. The common soldiers, under orders of the general, have not been held responsible for their military acts. Likewise, members of certain religious orders, who have taken oaths of obedience, are not held accountable, as though their acts were their own. The function of the intellect in a moral act extends as far as the person is able to foresee the consequences of his act. Without being able to foresee the immediate consequences, acts are no more than blind obedience. The extent of this foresight, variously estimated, and its moral significance, have raised many nice questions.

How far must a man, to be morally responsible, be able to fore-see? Should the rebel, who, to kill the dictator, blows up the train on which he is riding, be held morally responsible also for the deaths of others on the train? Is the bomb thrower guilty of the murder and morally responsible for the death of the innocent by-standers who are killed, but at the same time unintended victims. These are real questions, possibly more often academic than practical, but they serve to show where viewing the intellect alone (as the essential process in a moral act) leads. The final decision must be left to courts and executioners who are interested solely in anti-social and social conduct, rather than by the personal, ethical teachings.

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See Henry Sidgwick, "Methods of Ethics" (1st Ed. 1874) also "Ethics," John Dewey and James Tufts, (G. Bell and Sons, 1st. 1914) Chap. XVI, "The Place of Reason in the Moral Life" "Moral Knowledge".

From a positive viewpoint, however, it is evident that man possesses and uses some intellectual powers. He must enjoy the perceptions of normal senses. He must have imagination -- be able to form ideas of his perceptions. He must imagine or fore-see the consequences of his act to a normal degree. For a person is one who is normal and rational, free to make choices, and his moral responsibility is the ability to determine choices by the idea of the consequences of the issue -- the fore-sight to see, to a normal degree, what those consequences will be. Beyond this, no one is held morally responsible. This is to say that man must have reason, judgment and understanding. For as he judges, reasons and understands the issues presented to him and acts upon them, so is he judged moral or immoral.

This view is the every day accepted practise and common consensus of opinion. Blind and deaf men are not held responsible for those acts attributable to their misfortune, Errors in judgment, illusions and delusions, often remove, or at least mitigate moral responsibility. Forgetfulness, a defect of memory, is common, and from it flow many acts which are excused, but it is not a settled question to what degree this is done in any instance. Many a child and weak person are immorally punished for forgetting, failures which the punisher freely excuses in himself. The general opinion is clear and respected: man must be rational -- that is, have "normal" intellectual powers.

From Plato onward, thinkers, analyzing human conduct, have agreed that men seek their own apparent good. That good has

usually been defined in terms of some emotion, simple pleasure or complex happiness. These have played a two-fold office in moral acts. First, men, like animals, do what gives them pleasure easily and seek to continue the action as long as the pleasure lasts, as in eating good meals. Such actions are short-lived, for sensual pleasures soon lose their attraction, and if continued, result in pain. Secondly, men act morally with the aim to secure happiness, which is an idea in their minds, a purpose, an end - one upon which hedonists have always built their systems.¹

Many difficulties arise from this viewpoint, which does not, however, deny the fact that men have made emotions the central essential of their systems. The first difficulty arises from the inability to define what happiness really is, how to gain it, or how to keep it. It is as indeterminable as the silly patter of the comedians who first find that some thing is "good" and in the next breath, "bad".

The inability to show us how to secure happiness has led some to vest morality in the emotional urges or motives of an act. This leads at once to moral situations contradictory to common-sense.² A bad act may have a good motive or vice versa. As Dr. Sam Johnson observed, a man, exasperated at a beggar's importunity, might throw a coin at the man's head with the intent of breaking

¹ See ENC. BRIT.(11th Ed.Vol. VIII)H. Sidgwick,"Ethics"p. 573 ff.

² Wm. G. DeBurgh, "From Morality to Religion", (London, Mc-Millan and Evans, 1938) Gifford Lectures.

it. But if his aim was bad the beggar might thankfully pick up the coin and buy himself a meal, and, not knowing the motive of the act, would judge it to be a fine thing. But if the intention were known, a far different conclusion might be reached. These faults, however, have not kept men from judging an act, done without feeling, as empty and mechanical, devoid of worth.

Most ethical thinkers choose the will to be the single and only essential of a moral act. Probably Kant was the ablest defender of this notion,¹ although Archbishop Temple points out that St. Augustine was the first to insist upon it, but with a comprehensive view of the will.²

The very question assumes the ancient fallacy that "will" is a faculty able to act alone,³ a usage gaining some slight justification from long custom, as Sir Henry Jones points out:

"In every case of knowing, all the powers of mind are employed. So far as I know there are now no surviving examples of psychologists who avow belief in the existence and activity of separate faculties; but, on the other hand, neither are there many psychologists that do not make use of the concept of separate faculties. Occasionally, the attempt is made to give priority to feeling, or to the intellect, or to the will -- the will is probably the favorite of the moment. But, we may assume that the self is one and whole in what it does. After all, it is the personality A, B, or C who feels, knows, or wills; and personality is not an entity hiding behind the faculties and looking on as they work."³

¹ Kant, "Metaphysics of Morals ", Sec. 1, p. 9.

² Wm. Temple, "God, Nature & Man," (1934) Gifford Lect.

³ Henry Jones, "A Faith that Enquires," p. 50 off for full discussion.

The will seems to stand in a somewhat different relation to human action than do ideas or feelings. Ideas seem to be the most remote from conduct; feelings nearer; and the will seems to make the final and complete gesture. Yet no one can say where the one leaves off and the other begins. They are, in the final analysis, the whole man in action. The essential of any moral act does not reside in any single faculty of itself. In any moral act the whole man is engaged.

Nor is there any evidence that, in any of these mental processes, physical causes determine their functions. Even the stoutest proponents of materialism have been forced to admit that while physical events may follow the law of efficient causation, or uniformity under the same circumstances, our ideas, emotions and volitions follow another entirely different mental law of association. One idea does not flow out of another as an effect¹ out of a cause. There is no absolute necessity of succession.

Each person can testify that often the reaction to any situation varies, and nowhere do we find men all reacting in any set pattern. Situations present themselves and men do arouse different ideas in them. It is this liberty to form ideas that gives the freedom that morality requires. Within that realm of liberty man forms ideas which for him, by choice, becomes ideals, and he strives to realize them. When his supreme ideal is Moral Perfection

¹ David Hume, "Treatise on Human Nature," (1739) On association against causation. Wm. James, "Principles of Psychology," (1889) Chap. XIV. Association, a full discussion.

he is a morally good man.

Man, to be free, must of necessity be free from the laws of physical necessity, of the predestination of Divine Will, and have freedom of mental processes. The person, an organic whole, must be free to act as a whole in a certain way. There has been no attempt made to free him from his past, nor to isolate him from the present. The freedom sought here has been merely the absence of restraints that prevent a man's making conscious, deliberate choices, after weighing the consequences, and using those means that lead to the end of moral perfection. Man is free from physical necessity, he is not dominated by any single faculty of mind; he is an organic whole, acting as a unit; he pre-determines his own end by the choices that he makes.

A moral man must be free, also, from non-rational instincts of fear, anger, greed, etc., from appetites and from sentiments of love and hate, so often viewed as obstacles to morality. They are not, of necessity, hindrances, but, as many can testify, means to moral freedom, becoming useful to moral development, as they were¹ to the Apostle Paul. The urges of hunger and other bodily appetites need not enslave, but may become instruments for gaining larger freedom, and are transformed into "stepping stones of our dead selves to higher things."

¹
Arthur H. Holmes, "The Mind of St. Paul," (McMillan, 1929)
Chap. Phil. 4: 11,12. II Cor. 12: 7 - 10, Phil. 1: 15 - 24

Not that he is free from every restraint, nor does he wish it, for absolute freedom from every earthly influence would mean that he would become a dead man. He wishes to be free from non-rational powers, so as to be at liberty to realize his chosen ideal.¹ For that, it is necessary to go beyond any abstraction to the complete, organic whole, the full man.

The freedom we are seeking to define is the liberty of the whole person, a self-conscious, self-determining organism, composed of body, mind and soul, whose end is his own moral perfection. That this self-determining organism is freer than all other organisms is at once apparent. Plants do indeed perform certain selective operations, by which from the soil and the air, they select certain elements and reject others. But they are bound to do this, or die, for they have not the power to choose other means for existence. Man, not only uses what nature offers him, but constantly invents and discovers new means and new ways to sustain life and prolong it.

In the same respect animals have a far greater freedom of selection than plants. They choose their means of sustenance and by their powers of locomotion, also vary their modes of struggling for existence. Many of them migrate annually, especially the birds, and this is a manifestation on a gigantic scale of the locomotive liberty granted them. But here we find that they respond to weather and climate, stimuli that are physical, and no

¹
Gal. 5; 1,13; Phil. 3; 12 - 16

doubt to others too obscure for observation. These acts reveal not a shred of purposive action. All of it is instinctive and environmental. Both plants and animals, while they can choose some of the means of their existence, cannot choose the end. They must, within fairly fixed limits, devote themselves to the reproduction of their kind. That "like begets like" is¹ indeed a far-reaching, if not absolutely fixed, law. There are no observed reasons, or purposes, as ideas, residing within them.

Man, the monarch of the world, alone, can and does choose for himself his ends and his means. The immediate ends chosen are myriad, but ultimately, in every normal "person" moral perfection rises above all others and all secondary ends become means to its attainment. Man's ability, thus to hold before himself, the image of this supreme end, this morally complete man, is evident in all thoughtful people. A series of questions about the utility of material things always brings a final conclusion that in themselves, no matter how diligently they are sought for, they give no satisfaction. They are always means to ends. The ends, when found, turn out to be spiritual. Of these, not the intellectual riches, nor the emotional treasures such as happiness, are themselves satisfactory. Unless a man knows himself to be earnestly seeking to be a better man morally, his wealth and

¹ William McDougall, "Outlines of Social Psychology," (6th Ed. 1912) Chapter I, p. 29 ff. The volume treats fully animal and human, instinctive and purposeful behavior.

his erudition both appear to him to be empty and worthless. Man's natural ideal is moral. To seek it, to realize it more and more, he must be free from many things. But from the ideal itself, as a beacon and an inspirer, he does not wish to be free, but only to be at liberty to realize it more and more within himself. This liberty is the moral freedom that we have sought, and we have found it in those men who are rational, who seek ends, and above all, in those who seek moral ends.

In reviewing the study of morality and freedom it is evident that all conduct is not moral or immoral. It may be social or anti-social, and as such, falls in the field of jurisprudence,¹ and is of no moment in this study of personal morality.

The freedom of man has been lodged in the whole man, that is, in his spirit's thinking, feeling and willing, and in judging man's acts from the moral viewpoint, the act must be traced to its source in the agent's emotions, his purposes and his decisions of will. These hidden springs of external action, in order to be moral, must be free from external compulsion. Moral freedom resides, therefore, in the spirit of the man. To be a person he must be a moral agent, and to be a moral agent he must be free to direct his thinking, feeling and willing to the extent of controlling them to a certain necessary degree.

Man does have this freedom and is a free moral being. As such, he strives constantly to achieve his purpose -- the moral

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A. Holmes, "Principles of Character Making," (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1913) Chap. XI, On social conduct vs. morality.

perfection of his being.

Unfortunately, man finds that that which he finds himself to be striving to become, and to realize the end established, that of moral perfection, meets with violent opposition from the concepts held by the society in which he must live. He is faced with a conflict to which he must be reconciled, before he can realize that which is at the very core of his being. The basis of that conflict -- when man is placed in society -- and its issues, are the next matter of consideration to be treated in the succeeding chapter.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

CHAPTER IV

Man In Society

In the preceding chapters the individual person has been studied. It has been shown that, as a person, he is a normal, rational, moral being, able to imagine that ideal of himself that he wishes or longs to be, with an urge to realize that ideal, and with power, free from physical control, to strive at least for its progressive realization in himself.

In following this procedure the individual was abstracted from the world in which he lives. Such abstraction is of value for purposes of description, but as this chapter develops it will be apparent that such procedure can be and is highly dangerous, because the abstraction may eventually be viewed as the organic whole, and with devastating and fallacious results. It is now necessary to study the individual as a constituent "whole", a member of society, a position that every man enjoys from his birth to his death.

But here a conflict arises. The smallest child is irked by the restraints of the home, feels this growing conflict and grows sharply conscious of it when he starts to school, meets "that tyrant," the teacher, who hampers restrains and suppresses his natural inclinations. With each successive period of growth the conflict expands in its manifestations, and demands new adjustments. This warfare with society is the universal experience of all men. True, it may be felt more keenly by

some than others, depending, as it does, upon temperment; but the conflict is always there, not to be ignored, but to be met and dealt with.

Man looks within himself and finds that there, he is indeed, "monarch of all he surveys." He finds that he thinks, feels and wills; that he does establish ideals and can work toward them. He finds himself, at once created and creator. Man also looks upon the external actions of men and sees an entirely different picture. Man becomes nothing but a creature of the society or world in which he lives. To observing men it is from these divergent viewpoints that the conflict appears between the individual and society. An understanding of what man is, as viewed from that external viewpoint, is necessary before any attempt can be made to reconcile that conflict, to delineate the society in which it would not exist at all.

Generally, the first question arising is: What is a society? Some thinkers conceive it in terms that carry the conflict, between the individual person and society, so far as to deny the reality of the person entirely.

About this theory of society Dr. Daniel S. Robinson has this to say:

"In the social philosophy of the social theologians society is an over-individual, super-intelligence. They refer to it as the social consciousness, which, in the very essence of nature, has culminated in a social order, conscious of its substantial unity and inherent solidarity. The individual mind has always been a mere abstraction. The real mind is that of the social whole, and it is in the making....The

mind of the society transcends the minds of its members. The monster engulfing mind is that real master mind.....Subtract from the universe the human social consciousness, and the life blood of the individual minds is drawn. Society lives. Yes, but it also thinks and feels and wills. It is an organism. Yes, but it is more than that - it is a super-intelligent mind.

§----They hold that it is philosophically sound to look upon a nation, an educational institution, a business corporation or any other social institution, as having a peculiar mind of its own, not only over and above the minds of its several members, but constituted by their interpenetrations."

"For them the human social-consciousness is the only ultimate and absolute reality. It is the human social consciousness which has made us and not we ourselves. Indeed, not only did it make us but it made nature. For how else is the following statement of Professor Edward Scribner Ames - one of the ablest of the social theologians, - to be interpreted? 'Another misapprehension and reference to the social appears in the conception of its relation to the cosmos or nature. Durkheim and Cornford have shown that the cosmos is socially determined.....The picture of a Deity fashioning the world and all that in them is, is so vivid that few realize that it has little, if any, place in a genuinely scientific view of the world.'¹The human social consciousness, child of the cosmic evolution as it admittedly is, nevertheless determines the earth and the starry firmament on high, the whole cosmos.... The social consciousness is not only a living organism and a super-intelligent mind, it is God, and the only God, a very God of God."²

This picture gives us no such thing as a real person. The social consciousness is at once the earth, the heavens, an organism, a super-intelligence, an all in all,"God, a very God of God." Man exists because society exists and makes

¹From Journal of Religion, Vol.I, p. 268

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Dr. Daniel Robinson, "The God of the Liberal Christian" (D. Appleton Co. 1926) pp 69-71, also see Knudson, "The Philosophy of Personalism," p. 100 ff for a treatment of this theory.

¹
him. He is transient, unreal, passes away as do the heavens and the earth, and only society, the Eternal remains.

Man is made merely to serve the ends of society. In himself he has no value, and is reduced to a mere instrument, to be cast off, when of no further use, just as an old pair of shoes are thrown away and a new pair takes their place. This concept has grown and developed along with that of some political economists who hold the state to be the supreme and absolute over-lord of its citizens' activities.

"The individual is subordinated to the state, through which he alone can be developed in his nature and completed, and to which all of his efforts must be directed. The state, therefore, exercises a controlling and regulating authority over every sphere of life, in order to bring the individual into harmony of the good of the whole." ²

That this doctrine has been the basis of long and oft time bitter struggle is a matter of common historical knowledge. Its modern development, giving rise to the concept of social consciousness and the limitation of the concept of society to the state alone, has given us modern totalitarianism. The two ideas, one asserting that the individual being is supreme, and the other declaring that society is supreme, are locked in a death struggle, the outcome of which cannot be predicted, nor does the result make a basic difference in the conclusions of this thesis.

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Enc. Brit. 11th ed. "Sociology", by Benjamin Kidd, Vol. XXV, for a similar view of the individual.

²

Enc. Brit. 9th ed. "Political Economy", J.I. Ingram, p. 349

The sociologist, Professor Benjamin Kidd, justifies this struggle, and sees in it the culmination of the inevitable victory of that "most advanced science of all," sociology. This directing force is derived from the teachings of Hume and Huxley, through Kant and Hegel, also Grotius and Savigny and others, down through the English Utilitarianism of Herbert Spencer, influenced on the one hand by the English concept, of the rights and liberties of the individual, and on the other by the Marxian theory and its Latin concept of the supremacy of the state. Professor Kidd can see but one development and that is the "theory of organic evolution by natural selection and the historical method as an ever expanding influence in the science of society."¹

Not only is the society making the individual; it is doing so in keeping with "the highest spiritual ideal of man, and the only conception of the Truth or the Absolute which the human mind can hold at the present time, is that which is being evolved in it in relation to its own environment, which is the social process."²

From the above discussion it is evident that some sociologists view man, as James says, as a box-within-a-box-within-a-box ad infinitum. One by one remove the larger ones and at last a vacuum is reached and the individual is gone. Man is just layer after layer of social increments. Are these conclusions valid?

¹
Enc.Brit. 11th Ed. New Vol. 25, "Sociology", Benjamin Kidd, pp 330, 331

They contradict, not only the inner reality of each person's own thinking, feeling and willing, but it is obvious that society does treat individuals. It makes and imposes upon them these social increments. By the same figure used to destroy the individual may the society be destroyed. Remove persons, one by one, until the last is gone, and society vanishes also into a vacuum. It must be recognized that to abstract the individual from the society is fatal, just as it is an absurdity to abstract society and elevate it to a "God of Gods." The two are not separate but components of the whole. Man is at once an individual and a part of society. Society is at once an entity and a part of man. Divorce the two and both vanish into thin air. They can be separated only for purposes of description. Who can say where the man leaves off and the society begins, or vice versa?

The theory of social consciousness being supreme arises from the old one of evolution, which was purely mechanical. After it was derived, lo and behold, it makes men. These men evidently treat evolution loosely. Does the Social Consciousness, who is God of Gods and creates the world, make it and societies out of Nothing? Does he create at all? If so, then this is not evolution in its ordinary sense where there is no creation, but just mere "accidental growth."

The theory has no value either of a practical or theoretical nature. Professor Ames makes it into a religion, and

¹J. S. Robinson, "The God of the Liberal Christian," p.79

it is evident that it is designed to eliminate both what was called "supernatural", and "creation" too; likewise the God of orthodox people. How utterly impossible it is for men to even think, in terms apart from God, is evident when, after all is said, the proponents of the Social Consciousness come back to the "God" they have made. This "God" has creative powers. Hence he is a person. So in the final analysis man comes back to persons. In reality, the only change made is that a new label has been placed over the old and a jubilant declaration made that the old content has been swept away forever and that there is something new in the world.

What has been done is the abstraction of the idea from the thing, society; then this idea has been hypostatized, given a being of its own, even to the erection of it into a Deity.

That moral relationships are to be erected and guided brings persons back again into the picture. Morality is personal and "we may be sure that no scheme of measurement will ever be devised which will strike a balance of quantum of satisfaction and number of desires for an entire social order."¹

The final consideration of the fallacy of this viewpoint is that it is predicated upon a scientific theory that has fallen flat. Mechanical Evolution is impossible and it destroyed

¹
D. S. Robinson, "The God of the Liberal Christian," p. 94, see also pp 80 ff for a full discussion of this concept.

¹
Mechanism. The transformation of evolution from performance-ism and from mechanistic descriptions of development, over to creative evolution, by Henri Bergson, in 1911, and by Conway Lloyd Morgan, in 1922, render much of the ancient and modern speculations in sociology, inapplicable. The problem, however, remains acute as ever.

In his book, "The Philosophy of Personalism," Dr. Knudson points out that "the fallacy of abstraction is one of the commonest of errors. The essence of this fallacy consists in overlooking the truth of metaphysical individualism, and in mistaking class terms for things, or the classifying processes of our thought for the process of reality."²

When we see a group of chairs, every one of them different, yet recognizable as such, and we clap the name "chair" upon each, we have done nothing to the chairs themselves. "They," as Dr. Knudson points out, "remain as separate and individual as ever."³ The abstraction chair has no existence by itself; it is only when the abstraction, or idea takes form, that we have a chair, and then each is individual, never any two being just exactly alike.

¹
See ENC. BRIT. 11th Ed. New Vol. 32, "Relativity" by Sir James Jeans.

²
Knudson, "The Philosophy of Personalism," p. 187 ff

³
Ibid.

Such attempts at abstraction always result in structural definitions, and never deal with actual existing things. This is one of the great factors of the conflict between the individual and society. For analysis reveals that in such, a definition combines two very distinct and different components, each of which has its own being. The members of a human society are persons. Their relations are spiritual, invisible bonds that unite them. It is possible, therefore, to make assertions about the member that cannot be made about the whole society. Turning from abstraction, to an analysis of persons, associated together, for a definition of society, a start may be made with the usual and common statement, "a collective body of persons comprising a community," or "the aggregation of such communities,"¹ neither of which gives much insight into the nature of a society.

In a loose sense this terminology might be applied to a chance group of persons gathered together in a city park on a hot summer day, brought there by a desire to escape the summer heat. No one, however, would claim such a "group" to be a society. The group might grow into "a mass" or an "assembly", a "congregation", a "multitude," and yet be nothing more than loosely knit groups with no common end or purpose of a spiritual nature. The reason of the gathering is absent. But on the other hand there might be an invisible bond that brings them together - an unseen

¹
Webster's International Dictionary.

force, not apparent to the eye, one of which the onlooker would have to be appraised to know that it existed. Persons are the steady, unchanging factor in the group, crowd or assembly. The ties may change from the natural, gregarious instincts - as, for instance, the innate desire that brings people to the scene of a construction project, their running to see a dog fight, or a fire, gathered together waiting for a street car, or viewing the base-ball score board. Thus it is that both persons and their "ends" have a vital part to play. To finish the dictionary definition - "bound together by some ties" - is specious, and gives but little more than the obvious information, yet out of it has grown the concept that underlies the basic conflict of the individual and "society."

From the days of hand-work to that of mass production there have been many and far reaching changes that have taken place. The old guilds of England were societies, it is true - men were bound together by ends that were spiritual - but the replacing of them by the vast organizations of mass production changed the entire picture. The old ideals of artisanship gave way to quantity production, and the making of profits for the stock holders. Contrary to all ordinary assumptions, such aggregates of workers did not, in their work, form societies in the true sense of the word. There were groups, crowds - but not societies held together by their ambition to contribute a part in the production of spiritual values.

Functionally, society may be defined as a group composed

of two or more persons, made up in any way, who, by their joint efforts, create a product that they cannot produce separately and then add together. This necessitates that the end of society be spiritual and not material, for obviously, material things may be made separately and then be brought together. Factories often make parts in one place and ship them to another for assembly. This is not true of choirs, orchestras, schools, the home and many other types of activities. The end demands unified action and is mutual. The person wishes to sing and joins the choir, a society, whose end it is to furnish him with an opportunity to sing. This is the essential characteristic of any society in the true sense of that word.

This brings another conclusion to the fore-ground, namely, that a society is made up of persons who have freely chosen to enter it. Entrance is made to achieve the fulfillment of a desired end. Just as choirs are made by persons wishing to sing so are all other societies made. Compulsion or chance does not produce a society.

It is evident, however, that individuals, without their consent, are born into a home, a state; are compelled, by law, to attend school, enter the army, etc. Here, the real cause of conflict appears, that of hybrid-societies. The home, the state, public schools with forced attendance, the army, factories - none of these, in every instance, are true societies.

The home without children is a society composed of husband and wife banded together in a common purpose, freely, and

with a spiritual end. A child is born, and a hybrid-society is born with it. A third member, without its own consent, has taken its place. This is but a means to an end. It must be remembered, however, that the child is not a person. When it has reached the age of moral responsibility, has grown into a person, this conflict may or may not disappear. The child may become an integral part of the home, or it may rebel and leave it. If it remains and assumes its place as a member of the home, the end of the child has been fulfilled and the home is no longer a hybrid but a true society.

The school is always partly hybrid; there are always those who rebel at attending; some accept the opportunity and for that portion it is a means to an end. Likewise, the army and the state are partly hybrid and partly true societies. Where they leave off being mere organizations and become societies is indefinable and thus a constant source of conflict.

Factories, with their mass production, their assembly lines, their forced labor as automatons, can be either organizations or societies. The end defined determines their classification. As mere organizations, interested only in getting the most labor for the least pay, they become focal points for violent conflict. When the workers band together this sometimes makes societies. At best, however, they have, with few exceptions, remained hybrid, and conducive to continual disturbance.

Another consideration presents itself. That is, that the end of the society and the persons making it up must be

identical. The singer wishes to join a choir that he might sing in it; the choir's end is to provide a means to fulfill that end; and the final and most far reaching conclusion presents itself, namely - that the persons making the society are at once ends and means, and the society is likewise an end and a means. Ask that father about the home and he will declare that it is a means to his end. Ask the wife - and the father is a means. Ask the child who is a means to both father and mother and, immediately, they both are means to it.

Drawing together the elements discussed it is clear that a society is composed of two or more persons, drawn together in any way, working to produce something that they cannot produce separately and then add together. The end of the society is always spiritual and identical to the end of the persons comprising it; thus both persons and society are means and ends at one and the same time.

Several conclusions force themselves forward for consideration. Man and society are not two separate entities, but are rather component parts, inseparable except for the purposes of description. Man makes the society but it immediately becomes an integral part of his being. Society wields a vast influence over the individual but is a part of the person, and falls, without him, into nothingness,

In reality, the State and like organizations of mixed purposes, have been called, erroneously, societies, for in the strict sense they are not societies, but hybrids, and it is here that the conflict arises with the individual. The conflict is

not between the society and the individual, but with the hybrid organizations he has built. That this is so is of no consequence to this thesis, for the problem lies between Persons, whose end of moral perfection gives them a unique and special consideration, and true societies. The moral man does have a society whereby he reconciles this conflict, in which there is no conflict between himself and the society and which eliminates also the conflict between the person and the hybrid societies in which he finds himself surrounded. This society is the Kingdom of God, and it is in it that we find the reconciliation of the conflict that has been in evidence throughout this essay.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

CHAPTER V

The Kingdom of God

As a self-conscious, self-directing organism, by the processes of his thinking, feeling and willing, man has come, in the final analysis, to choose the end of moral perfection as his goal in life. To do this he is free from physical necessity. In spite of the obstacles presented by the world in which he lives, and contrary to arguments that declare him unable to do so, man evidently does so choose, and has made progress toward the realization of the moral ends. He has been able to personally exercise liberty, and more, he has also formed societies that serve to that end.

He has established homes, entered into fraternal orders, choirs, orchestras, welfare societies, and a whole host of other societies wherein there is no necessary and inherent conflict between the individual and the society of which he is a part. In some cases the society and the person are at once both ends and means, coterminus and mutually dependent one upon the other. On the other hand, however, it is evident on all sides that men also form hybrid-societies, with mixed functions. In these he has not been able to resolve the inner conflicts.

That man has felt this conflict and recognized what, of necessity, the society must be, to remove that conflict, is clearly written upon the pages of history of all ages. In pro-

test, men have formed monasteries, orders of monks and nuns, and have founded other settlements, as Robert Owen did in his New Harmony, or witness many of the Quaker, Mennonite, Amish and other similar ventures, which have always been defeated in their purpose, by the bringing in of elements that make of them other hybrid-societies within hybrid society, so that the conflict has not been reconciled or removed, but intensified. Besides these attempts thinkers have imagined ideal states, like Plato's "Republic". In such ideal states the conflict between the individual and the society is reconciled, so that the hybrid is made into a real society. The most famous and well worked out of these plans for such an ideal society is that of Immanuel Kant in his "Kingdom of Ends."

Kant saw and pointed out the danger and fallacy of abstraction. He insisted upon there being a consideration of both subjective and objective data. Man is free from physical necessity and therefore has freedom of will, which makes of him a moral being. He conceived the person as being a rational being and only such were persons. Man was, therefore, "an end in himself, not merely means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions-----must at the same time be always regarded at the same time as an end."¹ He continues:

¹ Kant's "Theory of Ethics," tr. W.K. Abbott(Longmans, Green & Co.1909) p. 46. See pp 23 ff for full development of grounds from which these conclusions are drawn. ENC. BRIT. 11th Ed. New Vol. 15, Kant, R. Adamson gives full treatment of Kant's philosophy and complete bibliography. See also pp 65 of above tr.(W.K. Abbott's - Kant's "Theory of Ethics")for Concept of Freedom.

"Beings, whose existence depends, not on our will but nature's, have nevertheless, if they are rational beings, only a relative value as means, and therefore are called things, rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is something that must not be used as means and so far, therefore, restricts freedom of action and is an object of respect." ¹

Man is an organism made up of component parts that are all different but yet are all working for the good of each other and the good of the whole, so that each and every constituent is at once a means and an end.

"Rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so: so far this is a subjective principle of human action. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just as the same rational principle holds for me; so that it is at the same time an objective principle from which a supreme practical law, all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced." ²

This principle will be the guiding law of all conduct and resolves itself into the Categorical Imperative; "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person, or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." ³

Man, as is evident from this principle and as Kant taught, is at once a lawgiver, an objective act, but at the same time he is a keeper of that law and, therefore, it is at once a subjective act. As he will give laws only after considering the other ra-

¹ Kant's "Theory of Ethics," tr. W.K. Abbott (Longmans, Green & Co. 1909) p. 46, pp 23-ff

² Ibid, p. 46, 47

³ Ibid

tional beings around him, there will be only universal laws, built not upon caprice or chance, but upon rationality. Neither will he change those laws without cause, and thus he becomes in harmony with the universal laws of nature and there emerges the universal law. This implies a state of relationships that constitute a society. This society Kant called the "Kingdom of Ends".

This "Kingdom of Ends" was that society where each man regarded himself as a means and an end. All other members who have freely chosen this relationship, constitute a society that is at once both means and an end. They are coterminus and there is no conflict. The individual, as a lawgiver, is sovereign, as a member of the society, a subject. All being rational men, with the same objective, they all give and make the same laws and become co-sovereigns and co-subjects. The operation of this Kingdom rests upon "Dignity" or self-respect:

"The practical necessity of acting upon this principle does not rest at all on feelings, impulses or inclinations, but solely on the relation of rational beings, to one another, a relation in which the will of the rational being must always be regarded as legislative, since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in itself. Reason then refers every maxim of the will, regarding it as legislating universally, to every other will and also to every other action towards oneself, and this not on account of any other practical motive, or any future advantage, but from the idea of the dignity of a rational being, obeying no law but that which he himself also gives."¹

1

Kant's "Theory of Ethics," tr. W.K. Abbott, p.52-53. See also pp 51 ff for elaboration of the concept of the "Kingdom of Ends."

Everything in the "Kingdom of Ends" has either value or Dignity. Those means that help to the achievement of the end have value, but they can be replaced by equivalents; some will be one thing to one and another to another. Mens' tastes and temperments vary. The final end has no equivalent, cannot be replaced by another, so has dignity. Thus moral perfection is an ultimate, belongs to all, and thus gives and has Dignity. Everything has either value or Dignity. "Whatever has value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; what - ever ---- is above all value and therefore admits of no equivalent, has Dignity."¹

The connection is clear. If a man must always treat another as himself - as the Golden Rule more clearly states - then since he treats himself as an end, and never sacrifices himself to any thing as a means, justice in society compels each member of that society to treat every other member just like himself. To this end in himself society functions. In this society no member or group of members, no matter how rich or powerful, would ever treat another member as a means to some end, in which the member would be injured or even ignored. In such a society there would be no slaves, no people like those described by Aristotle, mentioned above, but all would be fellows, equal brothers. Stripped of all accidental attributes, each man would

¹Kants "Theory of Ethics," tr. W.K. Abbott, p. 52-53. See also pp 51 55 for elaboration of the concept of the "Kingdom of Ends."

be exactly alike, equal to one another, having the same rights and duties. Morally, in such a society, there would be the same unity we find in one person. He would be seeking his own moral perfection according to the categorical imperative or the Golden Rule, and never injure himself. The fact that such units are multiplied would in no wise change the ideal to be sought.

The next trait of the principle is its universality. A man who performs an act under certain conditions should never change his conduct without a change in circumstances; for a reasonable man is not capricious - he does not change without a sufficient reason for changing. In this respect the principle resembles a natural law which asserts that there is a uniformity in nature, that the same cause always produces the same effect, and that changes never come in the world without a cause for them. Thus does the rational man act with reason, and thus does he follow the very nature of the world in which he lives.

Such a "Kingdom of Ends" is supposedly composed of perfectly rational or moral men. They are always just. They never act capriciously, never change without reason and never relinquish their supreme purpose of retaining their own moral perfection. In such a kingdom there is no external force, for none is necessary. Each man obeys the law because he makes it, because he himself acknowledges that it is good for him, is what he wants above everything else. No man leaves that society, for he retains that supreme desire to remain perfect in all his dealings, and he finds in that society, of his fellows, congenial company. Out

of self-respect and out of respect for the other members, who are the same as himself, he gladly obeys the moral law and all the subsidiary laws, or rules of conduct that flow logically out of it.

This "Kingdom of Ends" would, naturally and necessarily arise from men who have already adopted, as the supreme purpose of their lives, their own moral perfection, and who behold in this Kingdom of Fellowship, like-minded souls. Their gregarious instinct, unimpaired by their moral perfection, still functions, and they gladly enter into a fellowship where they are recognized and in which they are received as members, where the activities are always influenced by a single desire and into which they can freely enter without fear of conflict.

The criticisms that are brought against this "Kingdom", on the grounds that it is impractical, miss the mark, and do not lessen the value of this conception. For the "Kingdom" is an Ideal. It is a conception, but one derived logically and necessarily from the nature of persons who must seek to be rational, who behave the same under the same circumstances, without changing, unless for a sufficient reason. Such people are perfect beings and of course such perfection does not exist. But this Ideal of Perfection is, nevertheless, a most valuable and practical one.

First, it is derived rightly, namely, it is but the carrying out, in the imagination, under the strict control of reason, what men imperfectly behold, in their strivings for a

perfect society. Next, coming thus out of human experience, but transcending it, the Ideal furnishes a beacon or guide to moral men who try to reform societies, or to form them. It is indeed the final ultimate standard by which every earthly human organization must be judged by rational, moral beings. Finally, it is practical, because men are always changing their societies and this Ideal shows them how they may take the next step forward.

No one can at once, and completely, set up this "Kingdom." It takes time even to inform people about it, and more time to develop them into characters that make it remotely possible. It is evident how far away it is when a search is made for even one state government that is founded on the single supreme purpose of making its citizens morally perfect, and with all its laws derived from and in harmony with this supreme end.

Even in Democracies where the closest approach is made, there is a yawning chasm between this ideal society and the actual hybrid-societies that they represent. But in Democracy it is possible to see that the ideal has been working in mens' minds, and, even if but dimly felt, they are groping their way in the darkness toward it, led by their own reason and their desire for a society with a moral or spiritual end.

Turning from Kant's "Kingdom of Ends" to the Kingdom of God, as depicted by Jesus, there are, obviously, many points of similarity, which is not surprising, as Kant came from a devout

l.c. Pietistic family. The first point of similarity is that both were Ideals. It is well to observe, at this point, the different concepts of ideals; the one, that which regards an ideal as visionary and wishful thinking, and that in which an ideal is thought of as a perfect standard of conduct, the only real thing¹ upon the earth. An ideal as the Perfect cannot be defined for no one knows what the Perfect is and therefor cannot define it, yet at the same time it is the only and the most real thing on earth. The manufacturer of an automobile produces a new model and immediately sets out to make a more nearly perfect one. What the perfect is he can never say; he goes a step at a time, always making progress, always improving, but the the ideal, the perfect car has never arrived. Just what it would be cannot be conceived. Men write books, build beautiful buildings, and when they are finished, regardless of how fine they may be, flaws are apparent, the changes that would have improved them are evident. New ones are made and immediately and again the ideal is a step away. Just like "Jacob's Ladder" the ideal reveals itself step by step, but the end is infinity. Yet it is this burning desire, for the perfect, the resolve to attain the perfection imagined, that has furnished all advance that has come into the world.

Kant was showing man that he was not a creature of physical necessity, that he was not the mere automaton, created by a God who had foreordained and predestined every act, every desire, every thought. Rather, to combat to combat such speculative

¹

Websters International Dictionary

theologies, he pointed out to man that within himself he found freedom of will, that he was not a creature of chance, but a person, rational, with the intelligence to view choices presented to him, and to act upon them as he chose in the light of his own concept of moral perfection. Further, he showed, of necessity, what kind of a society that would be in which all these conflicts would be reconciled and wiped away.

It was upon the very same basis that man found, within himself, by those concepts that well up within the human heart, and persist and operate, despite all contradiction of abstract speculations, that Jesus Christ gave to Man the Kingdom of God.

Jesus regarded man as the supreme end of the universe. He arose above every society or man, every state, for indeed was not the Sabbath made for man and not man for the Sabbath? Moreover, he recognised that man was a moral being whose end was his own moral perfection, and he defined that perfection for him as "be ye perfect even as the Father in Heaven is perfect." This "norm of perfection"¹ is the norm of the Kingdom of Heaven; it "develops" from within outwards, as a good tree brings forth fruit. (Matthew 7: 17)

The Kingdom of God is an ideal society composed of men who have freely chosen the ideal of perfection as their goal of life:

¹ Hastings Dictionary of the Bible (Charles Scribners, 1906) Article - Kingdom of God - J. Orr, p. 852. For full discussion of the Kingdom of God and bibliography see pp 844 - 856.

"It is in its principle something inward, vital, invisible. (Luke 17: 20, 21) It is not the idea of Jesus, however, that this Kingdom should be confined solely to this inward life. It is rather a principle working from within outwards for the renewal and transformation of every department of our earthly existence, marriage, the family, the state, social life,¹ etc. (Matthew 19: 3 - 9; John 2: 1 - 11; Matthew 22: 21)¹

"-----it is a moral task set before the members for their achievement."²

The ideal of the Kingdom is at work and is both an actuality and a future thing; actual, in that men have entered it, and are on the way to achievement of its goal; in the future, in that it has yet to be realized in its entirety. That it is of supreme worth to man is shown by the parable of The Pearl of Great Price (Luke 4: 18), this worth residing in the fact that it gives to man a concept that removes all conflict. Man and his society are at peace. They are at once both means and ends. His end is the moral perfection which is also to be the end of all in society.

Jesus defined man and estimated his value by his end. Free man is not a creature of chance or caprice. He "knows the truth" and Jesus said "I am the truth,"³ and "the truth shall make you free,"⁴ and "he that comes is in no way to be cast out!"⁵

¹ Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible (Charles Scribners, 1906) Article, Kingdom of God, J. Orr, p.852. For full discussion of the Kingdom of God and bibliography see pp 844-856.

²

Ibid

³

John 14: 6

⁴

Ibid 8: 32

⁵

Ibid 6: 37

This normal rational Christian, whose thinking, feeling and willing is to be that of Christ - has the "mind of Christ"¹ - and whose end is his own moral perfection, is not an abstraction from the world in which he finds himself, but "unable to abide alone,"² he is to seek "first the Kingdom of God,"³ that Ideal society where all men are at once both means and ends, and at the same time the society is also means and ends, Here the conflict between man and society vanishes.

In Christ's view His Kingdom will be composed of perfect Christians. They will love themselves. This self-love and self-respect was the standard of the Old Dispensation. The Ideal standard, for Christ's own Kingdom is given in "A new Commandment I give unto you that ye love one another even as I have loved you,"⁴ a counsel of perfection that can never be surpassed.⁵ Jesus loved his disciples as much as himself. His love was that perfect love (Agape), a perfectly, intelligent goodwill. He treated men, not as automatons, but as rational free-men, each endowed with powers for working with God. Each person

¹
I Corinthians 2: 16

²
John 12: 24

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Matthew 6: 33

⁴
John 13: 34, 35

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John 3: 16

could imagine what he wanted to be and long for it, and approach the fruition of that idea.

Such are to be the citizens of His Kingdom, an Ideal, a Perfect Kingdom, a Society, nowhere actually realized fully upon the earth, then or since. But in all its Ideal glory it has worked persuasively in the hearts of men through the centuries. Today, in spite of war and terror, in spite of all attempts to discredit and reject it, still it stands, mighty in its power, as it works in each self-respecting, rational man, whose individual might is as the weight of the single rain drop, falling on the earth, whose cumulative force will eventually prove irresistible.

The origins of Kant's "Kingdom of Ends" and the "Kingdom of God" are apparently different. Jesus taught his idea to the common people in parables. The common people heard Christ gladly, "for he spoke as one having authority, and not as the scribes." He spoke from his rational mind to theirs. Here was a message that met the needs of the human heart, based upon the deepest needs of their being, not lost in the limbo of the speculations of later theologians. Christ's teachings, stripped of these speculations, are the teachings of a Rational mind, speaking to that rationality implanted in the human heart.

Kant, by means of reason and rationality, derived his kingdom from man's moral nature. This he did by analysing their own minds for them. He showed them that the rational, normal

¹
Matthew 7:29

person accepts the Golden Rule because he sees and understands that its observance will give him and others like him what they all want - moral perfection. That way of looking at it removes the blind obedience of "Authority" with a new and better understanding of authority, an appreciate, joyous acceptance of the Ideal, to be realized amongst them as far as they were able to realize it.

The "Kingdom of Ends," - the Kingdom of God - was not thought of by Kant, in any respect, as being his own. He merely removed it from the realm of the blind dogmatism of his day and placed it in the field of "sweet reasonableness." By the sheer force of reason he showed that the Kingdom of God is the only Kingdom where the conflict between the individual and the society can be reconciled.

In the "Kingdom of Ends" Kant pictured the Ideal Kingdom of God and likewise the Perfect Society where perfect moral persons will find no conflict amongst themselves. For all of them aim at the same end. In so doing they at once become means, also and thus there is a harmony of effort; conflict simply does not exist in coterminus bodies. United organisms act as units and in harmony. Not that there is a necessity for, or that it would be desirable for every one to do the same operation in that Kingdom; rather they are like St. Paul's Conception of the Church of Christ, a Body with a Head, or Aim, or Ideal - embodied in Jesus Christ - made up of organs that are different, and which

perform different functions, which together benefit each and every member, and at the same time preserves the inter-relations between the members. In that Kingdom no conflict enters or remains. From that Kingdom no one ever departs, for it is made up of rational citizens, persons who know what they want and know that herein is where they find what they want. Leaving it would be defiance of a man's own sanity. Rational, normal beings, holy men, would never leave it.

True it is but an ideal, but, in saying that, let it be remembered that ideals are not mere "visionary" things; while they are in the minds of people yet they are far more than mere imagination. It is a conception of reason. Kant connected his law with the law of uniformity of nature. The whole universe stands behind it and guarantees its validity. No where in nature will man find any contradictions to the enunciation of the principles of the Kingdom, nor to any subsidiary rule, derived logically from that principle. The Ideal here is Plato's Ideal, the only Realities in the universe - that concept of pure reason drawn from experience in this world, and toward which all changing human societies must tend. In all ages, in all men, universally and eternally, that Ideal Society is working to bring men to form societies more nearly like it. Mundane wars come and peace may come, but this Ideal goes on forever. To eradicate it man must perish.

Evidence that these eternal principles are real, vital and all powerful are abounding on every hand. The history of

man is the living panorama of the struggle of men to achieve higher and ever higher ideals. That civilization after civilization has passed away has passed away only confirms the impossibility of man and society veing in conflict. Babylon, Egypt, Rome flourished and decayed because they were built on shifting sands. Man was nothing, the society every thing. But the eternal urge to grow brought on successive civilizations, each falling because they were not rooted in eternal principles. Western civilization, which was stagnant and decaying, took form and made the most rapid development in the annals of history, when man became recognized as a focal point. Today, because the "rugged individualist" and the "adamant socialist" are each blinded to the component part of its nature, that civilization is torn and bleeding, fighting for its very existence.

In nature the story is the same; the rugged individualist, the dinosaurs and all the rest of those who looked out only for themselves have long since perished. Only those species which have, in nature, followed the basic principles of the Kingdom, to live and help live, survive. Only because the robin will and does give its life for its young do we enjoy, today, the beauty of its song.

That men have been guided by and have followed, in part. the principles of the Kingdom, gives ample proof of the power of those principles to carry men on toward their goal of perfection. From the Reformation on, began the greatest period of development the world has ever known. Politically, socialally, and eco-

nomically, with the renewed emphasis upon the individual and his worth, in the eyes of God, came opportunities for man to achieve, in part, the long pent up, imprisoned desires that had been thwarted and had thus made life miserable for him for so long a time.

Governments changed; ever more attention was given to the rights and worth of the individual. This resulted, at last, in the forming of Republics, based upon the basic concept that government, the Society of State, was derived and made by the people. In the words of the immortal Lincoln they "were of the people, by the people and for the people." Thus modern "Democracies" grew out of the concepts of the Kingdom of God. Not as is so often claimed does Democracy make the Kingdom or Church possible, but rather the Kingdom and its recognition make Democracy possible.

Socially, the gains were just as great and as far reaching. The individual began to have a "place in the sun"; his health, his education, his environmental conditions became more and more a matter of concern. Hospitals, schools, health centers, libraries, research for the extension of the span of life by removal of disease, Social Welfare agencies, all came into being, but only in those lands where men were trying to approximate the Ideal of the Kingdom.

Economically, the advance was just as great; the individual began to share as never before in the products of his toil. New methods of production, distribution, labor saving devices

for factory and home poured in, in an astounding avalanche of new forms and uses. Here again it must be noted that these advances were greatest where the Principles of the Kingdom were espoused most freely and not at all where they were unknown.

That there were those who were blinded as to how and why these advances were made possible is of no moment. Neither does it matter that many became greedy, grasping, "rugged individualists" with no concern for the whole - interested only in their own selfish aims. That mechanistic science destroyed, for those who accepted it, the God of those who had spread the principles of the Kingdom (out of which all these advances had come) and placed in its stead the "Social Consciousness" - making a god out of it - is of no lasting consequence. The rugged individualist has dug his own grave and is reaping the whirlwind of his sowing. Mechanistic science is gone; the god of the social consciousness has been seen to be a mere idol of clay. The remnants linger on, it is true, but out of the turmoil the Truth and the eternal verity of the principles of the Kingdom will rise again, for they are alive today in the hearts of untold numbers. Implanted in man, they cannot, they will not die. In what form the new day will arise is unknown and unimportant. What is important, what will be of worth is that men have found, for themselves, an Ideal that lifts them, as individuals, into a society that rises above the societies, the hybrid-societies in which he finds himself, into that Society, the Kingdom of God, that shall some day encircle the earth.

Thus it is seen that a society must be one that is composed of moral men - men, who in the making of it, by the unity of their purpose, produce, at once, a society that is coterminus with themselves, an end and a means; thus every member at once is also means and ends. The basis of the society is such that there can be no possible conflict, for it rests upon the "Dignity" of each individual, his love, his self-respect, that perfectly intelligent good will. Hence he is free of all compulsion, for he will never act contrary to his best interests, and realizing that his own best interests are those of his fellows, he never conflicts with them.

Kant's "Kingdom of Ends" illustrates that such a society is the only necessary, absolute, final society that moral men can live in. This society is like the Kingdom of God, and it becomes apparent that the Kingdom of God is the absolutely necessary, only conceivable society for men.

It is apparent that man has, by following the inherent needs found within him, ^{met} founded, in a small way, many societies, based upon the basic concept that the individual and the society are coterminus and component parts of an organic whole. The home, choirs, and kindred societies are an expression of that concept. Moreover, man has, when only dimly and partially conscious of those principles of the Kingdom, proceeded to make the greatest advances recorded in the annals of history.

Slowly, sometimes painfully, man responds to the inherent principles of the Kingdom implanted within him and as they change the concepts of the individual they irresistably emerge and effect

the entire strata of his world. The home, marriage, schools, all social agencies, even to the State, are being changed to conform to the principles of the Kingdom of God. The price of mistakes man makes by taking only one sided, abstract views is one of heart ache, and oft times may border on despair, but, though the cost is high, man does learn, in fact is learning that the Kingdom works within him. Looking beyond and above the elements that seem to deny the ultimate victory, there looms a horizon of hope and conviction that men, seeking the best, responding to the best, will more truly understand and enter into that Society, the Kingdom of God, that absolutely necessary, that only conceivable society for men, the seeking of which truly adds all other necessary things to life.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

CHAPTER VI

Conclusion

Chapter One stated this thesis, the reconciliation of the conflict between the individual and society.

Chapter Two defined a person. There the individual person emerged a self conscious, self-directing organism, composed of body, spirit (soul) and mind (consciousness) whose end is his own moral perfection.

In Chapter Three the free man was the unit of consideration. It was shown that persons, in the true sense of that word, are only those who are rational, normal and moral. That morality predicates freedom just as freedom does morality. The moral person was shown to be that normal, rational being who freely chooses his own moral perfection as his end in life. The denial of freedom, and thus of morality, by the law of physical necessity and by theological predestination was shown to be invalid. That there is a class predestination, that final destinations are predicated for those who choose certain ends, was freely admitted, but this was shown to be a confirmation of the freedom of choice, rather than denial. The Person emerged from this chapter as a free moral agent, with the ability to make choices, that marks him as a person in the true sense of that word.

In Chapter Four such persons form societies. The theory which denies existence of the individual was shown to be built upon foundations now discredited. Man, as an isolated being, is

an abstraction. Only then, placed in society and considered as part of a whole, does he become a full man, for society and man cannot be separated, except for the purposes of description. Man and society are coterminus and component parts of the whole.

It was shown that societies are made by man to fulfill their needs and are a part of him. A true society is a group of two or more persons, gathered together in any way, for the achieving of any result that they cannot produce alone and then add together. The end of the society must be spiritual and, therefore, the same as man's goal - his own moral perfection. In society, a man is at once means and an end, just as society is a means and end. There is no conflict in society, and it was shown that only in hybrid-societies are there any conflicts to be found, between moral members and others. The need of a universal society, to accomplish what the small, more or less local, societies have done, remained apparent and the ideal society - where each member entered freely, was rational, a moral being whose end was the end of each member (his own moral perfection) - was postulated.

In Chapter Five, Kant's "Kingdom of Ends, and the Kingdom of God, depicted by Jesus Christ, were studied to show how they were one and the same, and how they do reconcile the conflict - that in the Kingdom of God the members are free moral agents, that they strive, each for their own and at the same time for the moral perfection of their fellows, that having the same end they are morally one and that, therefore no conflict

is possible. Here the reconciliation was made. Man was placed in a society where there is no conflict. Finally, it was shown how the ideal of this Kingdom had effected man, made hybrid-societies and elevated them to levels above any others ever known, and that, in spite of turmoil all about, men still belong to that Kingdom and are guided by it.

The contention of the thesis has been sustained. The conflict has been reconciled and from this study there are several conclusions that become of apparent value in viewing the world of today.

The first of these is the conclusion that in the world situation we see, not a clash of economic forces, but a clash of spiritual forces. It is a conflict that goes far beyond the question of the "haves" and "have nots" regardless of how important that phase may be. The Totalitarian ideology is derived from the Hegelian concept of the "Whole. Hegel took a universal view and then proceeded to the particulars, but the Universal was not conceived as independent of the parts; all were knit together in a Unity. The taking of the partial view of his concept has given rise to the view that the state is all in all, a veritable God, and the concept of the Kingdom of God is that the favored nation is to reduce, crush and make a world of subservient slaves, who, having no real existence at all, and having contributed their bit, perish.

Opposing this concept is that of Democracy which is, today, a strange hybrid. On the one hand Democracy claims the

rights of the individual to be supreme. But the dominant philosophy of Democracy is that built upon the theory of the "Social Consciousness" - society makes the man; he exists only because of the state and when the state ceases he ceases to exist. Therefore, in the world, a mighty conflict rages, to see which philosophy shall predominate. In actuality both sides are striving at the same ends; the conflict arises over means.

The second conclusion is closely allied to that of the first - namely, the controversy over the Individual and the Social Gospel. The proponents of the Individual Gospel are blinded to the fact that man does not live alone, that he must be a part of the world in which he lives. The adherents of the Social Gospel make an equally fatal abstraction and deify the society. They are interested only in making a political society that will fit that peculiar abstraction. The evident and obvious conclusion is that there is no Individual or Social Gospel and that there is just the plain, simple, unadorned Gospel of Jesus Christ. While "Rome burns" each group "fiddles away" and the very thing they both claim to desire is being bitterly and harmfully attacked. Only a consideration of both views and the reconciling of them into the original Unity will be of any avail.

The third and by far the most vital conclusion is that man has with him the power to choose to strive toward his goal of perfection. The God who implanted that desire, gave rise to those needs of the human heart, made man "in his own image," has given man a way of life, has defined the Society he longs for, and today men are working in that society. They are trans

cending the chaos about them, reaching forth to a new day that can and will, inevitably be built a little more like the Eternal verities than ever before. Man is not dependent upon his hybrid-societies. He can build above them and as he does so will blaze the path, enlightening the way for the ushering in of a brighter tomorrow.

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