January 2005

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Recommended Citation
Available at: https://doi.org/10.7825/2164-6279.1343
Leibniz and Ramanuja on the One and the Many

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THE polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716 CE) and the Visistadvaita theologian Ramanuja (c. 1017-1137 CE) both face a similar conceptual problem: each holds that the universe is composed of a single substance yet is experienced by us in the phenomenal realm as plural. The problem, simply put, is that they must both show how it is that our experience of diversity arises from ontological unity - how the many comes from the one. In what follows I suggest that reading Leibniz through Ramanuja in the way suggested by the structure of metaphorical dialectic as elucidated by Ricoeur and exploited by Clooney1 (among others) casts Leibniz's problem in a more helpful light. As I show below, such a reading facilitates for Leibniz Ramanuja’s dialectic or ‘polarity’ theological method in order to nuance Leibniz’s discussion of well-founded phenomena. This provides a better understanding of the relationship between fundamental or primary monadic substances such as God and non-primary monadic created reality. Firstly, however, we must rehearse a little of Leibniz’s Monadology in order to indicate where Ramanuja’s method might usefully be employed.

Leibniz begins his Monadology with a very simple and brief argument:

1. The Monad, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites – simple, that is, without parts.
2. And there must be simple substances since there are composites; for the composite is nothing more than a collection, or aggregate, of simples.
3. But where there are no parts, neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible. These monads are the true atoms of nature and, in brief, the elements of things.
4. There is no dissolution to fear, and there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can perish naturally.
5. For the same reason there is no conceivable way a simple substance can begin naturally, since it cannot be formed by composition.
6. Thus one can say that monads can only begin by creation and end by annihilation, whereas composites begin or end through their parts.
7. There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed internally by some other creature, since one cannot transpose anything in it, nor can one conceive of any internal motion that can be
excited, directed, augmented or diminished within it, as can be done in composites, where there can be change among the parts. The monads have no windows through which something can enter or leave. Accidents cannot be detached, nor can they go about outside of substances, as the sensible species of the Scholastics once did. Thus, neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from without.

8. However monads have some qualities otherwise they would not even be beings. And if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no way of perceiving any change from its simple ingredients; and if the monads had no qualities, they would be indiscernible from one another, since they also do not differ in quantity. As a result, assuming a plenum, in motion, each place would always receive only the equivalent of what it already had, and one state of things would be indistinguishable from another.

9. It is also necessary that each monad be different from each other. For there are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not possible to discover an internal difference, that is one founded on intrinsic denomination.

10. I also take it for granted that every created being, and consequently every created monad as well, is subject to change, and even that this change is continual in each being.²

We can see that his argument follows deductively. Premises 1 and 2 are merely definitions, 2 being a corollary of 1. Simple substances, which Leibniz calls monads, are defined as entities without parts, and composite entities are those made up of parts. As two sides of a coin the two are both mutually exclusive and dependent. So far so good; I expect that most people would agree with Leibniz’s fairly innocuous premises. Premise 3 is the most important for our purposes. If a thing has no parts, then it follows that it has no front side, or part, nor a backside, left or right. If it has no sides or parts then it cannot be extended in space, and if it is not extended in space, then it is not material in the ordinary (Cartesian) way.³ Monads are also, Leibniz goes on, indivisible, since if they were divisible they could in principle be divided into left and right, or greater and lesser parts. But being defined as simple substances they cannot have parts and thus they cannot be divisible.

These three premises are actually quite radical and certainly ahead of Leibniz’s time for they foreshadow both modern atomic theory as well as aspects of quantum theory. They are also in many ways the foundations of Leibniz’s mature thought. Indeed the importance of the idea of the monad can hardly be underplayed in the full flowering of Leibniz’s metaphysics; however the full implications of this notion were hardly felt in his time. The monad is a perplexing creature and we shall see just how queer it is below. Three further premises need comment at this stage.

Premises 4-6 are also corollaries of the basic notion of a simple substance. Leibniz argues that a monad cannot perish naturally since natural construction and destruction are in fact simply the breaking down or building up of composites. When we naturally destroy a brick, we get dust – the brick is a composite, and in crushing it we have simply made it a large pile of smaller composites. We could go on crushing this dust ad infinitum, and while eventually it may look like we have destroyed the brick entirely, the law of conservation of matter tells us that the atoms of the brick are not destroyed but rather transformed into invisible atoms or perhaps into different kinds of atoms. The basic units cannot be destroyed and for the same reason cannot be created either: for Leibniz they come into being and are annihilated solely at God’s behest. So we arrive at the notion that a monad is a simple, immaterial substance able to aggregate into composites

https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol18/iss1/10
DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1343
and which can neither be destroyed nor created naturally.

Now most of what Leibniz has just stated should be familiar enough to modern scientific realists. Leibniz's premises make sense in our experience of the world. We now accept that we do not destroy matter nor create it so much as simply push it about or pull it apart. Secondly the definition of a simple substance seems non-controversial: simples cannot have parts and complexes are made of simples. But the consequences of these few premises are staggering. That the world is made of complexes seems patently true; however Leibniz has argued that the simples making up these complexes must be immaterial. To put it another way: if the primary substance of creation is immaterial then the world of complexes, the world we experience in normal sensory life, must be very different than it appears.

The counter-intuitiveness of this position is difficult to exaggerate. Indeed the claim that the world is at its foundations immaterial was one of the reasons why Leibniz's mature metaphysics have not only been disputed but also derided. How is it that the patently hard substance making up all material things in the universe could be composed ultimately of incorporeal substance? How do conglomerations of Leibniz's immaterial entities add up to the very real impenetrability experienced when I stub my toe on the leg of the table on which I now write? To dispute the materiality of the cosmos might seem counter-intuitive at best, but Leibniz's premises are difficult to reject out of hand. As mentioned above, they do follow deductively, and the foundational premises - those that count - seem to be analytically true. I find it difficult not to be convinced by Leibniz's basic arguments, but as we shall see later, Leibniz does face some significant problems.

Now before we consider monads further, let us first follow our train of thought through so that we are sure just what is at stake if Leibniz is right. If the basic substance of the universe is immaterial, then our experience of the world of matter is either in significant ways false or deluded and hence we must revise our view of the physical world. Leibniz inherited Descartes' legacy of the problem of interactionism: how it is that res cogitans (thinking stuff, mind) relates and interacts with res extensa (extended stuff, bodies)? This was a serious difficulty for Descartes who never developed a convincing explanation for everyday occurrences such as human locomotion. Spinoza and Leibniz provided two coherent responses to the problem of interaction, Leibniz's being to deny that corporeal matter existed, or rather he asserted that matter was in fact monadic in composition. For Leibniz, all that exists is mind or rather soul-like entities some of which exhibit properties of mind which merely appear to be substantial in the way that we regularly experience the physical world. Clearly for Leibniz, the universe is not in itself the way we normally experience it. It is very different from what our senses tell us it is, though of course at the level of ordinary perception the world does work in regular harmonious ways. That the universe functions harmoniously and predictably was important to affirm in the early modern period as the then nascent science was quickly coming to dominate the intellectual tradition of western Europe. Importantly, the world as describable through science was for Leibniz entirely compatible with monads. We should not therefore think that the world is some kind of illusion. Leibniz emphatically maintains that the world is real, but monadic, that is immaterial.

Now let us very quickly take this train of thought to its ultimate end. If the universe is immaterial and this means that it is composed of what Leibniz terms 'soul-like entities' (some of which have the properties of minds) then how is it that what we see around us has effects on other things? If a train is a composition of monads, or soul-like entities, how is it that so much death and destruction ensues when it goes off the rails or collides with another train, or should we say, another collection of soul-like entities? Leibniz's answer is that
monads as immaterial atomic entities perceive or cognize each other. Furthermore there is a natural tendency within monads for perceptions to change, to be in process and drive forward as a measure and element of time – this Leibniz calls a monad’s appetition or desire. So Leibniz suggests that a monad is related to other monads through thinking them, and being thought by them in a continuing process. And because in principle any one monad, whether singly or in concert, can come into contact with any other monad, each monad is related to all others – each monad perceives and is perceived by all other monads.

How is it that monads are able to do this? Leibniz holds that they were created to do so by God who organises all of these relations in the most harmonious way. Each monad is related in a particular way to all other monads in a system of pre-established harmony. The principle of pre-established harmony, for which Leibniz was equally celebrated and ridiculed, follows from Leibniz’s view of God’s omnipotence, omniscience and absolute goodness. Being omniscient, God knows the ideal state of the universe, being omnipotent God can create this state and being absolutely good, God is duty bound to actually create it. The world as we have it is, for Leibniz, the best of all possible worlds since it actualises the most harmony between all of its related monads. We should note here also that God is seen by Leibniz to be a monad as well, though a monad distinguished from all others by having all perfections and being, uniquely, a necessary monad.

Now that we have a clearer view of just the kind of world Leibniz is letting us into, we can return to the notion of monads and their nature. In §7-8 of the Monadology, Leibniz states that for things to have different qualities, yet all be composed of immaterial monads, monads must each have the possibility of multitudinous simultaneous modifications. Monads must bear some qualities, for if they were not distinguishable in this way, it would be possible for two different monads to be identical – clearly logically impossible. Leibniz draws an even stronger conclusion however in that not only are all monads in principle distinguishable, they must all be individually unique – each monad must be different from every other monad.

In § 10 Leibniz further states as an axiom that ‘every created being, and consequently the created monad as well, is subject to change and even that this change is continual in each thing.’ We are now getting closer to a complete picture of monads. Monads are fundamental principles of action whose state at any time is defined by a multitude of cognitions, that is relations to other monads, and subject to constant change reflecting their continuing alteration with respect to other monads. The relation of monads forms a dynamic network where each node (each monad) continually alters and is altered by the other continuously changing nodes in real time.

At this point let me summarize what we know about monads: firstly they are simple, eternal and immaterial. Secondly they form together in composites to make up what we experience as the world around us. However as immaterial entities, they cannot be related in a Newtonian sense, but rather are interrelated through perception and appetition: they think and are thought by other monads. Thirdly they are individual and particular – each monad being unique by virtue of its particular intrinsic relations to all others. Now the main problem that arises for Leibniz is how to explain the ‘hardness’ of the experienced world. How is it that we seem to experience objective material reality when in fact all that there actually is in the universe are immaterial entities and the subjective relations between them? Leibniz seems to have two stories to tell at this stage. The first makes bodies the appearances of collections of monads. This is the phenomenalist interpretation where bodies do not themselves have independent realities but are the appearances of collected monads. Just as a flock of sheep is only a flock in the mind of the perceiver, bodies do not have independent realities apart from their
appearances. Bodies are what collections of monads look like to other collections of monads. This interpretation makes Leibniz rather close to Berkeley’s *esse est percipi* where bodies rely for their existence on their being perceived.

The other, and some argue incompatible, interpretation is the aggregationist view. Here bodies are well founded (*bene fundatum*) phenomena, to use Leibniz’s phrase. Bodies are real (though dependent) aggregates of real substantial unities. On this view what you get when you analyse bodies ‘all the way down’ as it were, are nothing but simple, immaterial unities, which are, of course, monads. If this is the case, moving back to the level of our normal experience must yield bodies which are merely the aggregates of monads. These monadic aggregates perceive themselves as an, “embodied creature that stands in spatio-temporal and causal relations to every other body in the universe, and hence to every other body that is represented by another monad as its body.”

While sometimes complicated to distinguish, these two interpretations are, I suggest, pulling in opposite directions. The phenomenalist sees the material bodies which make up our normal experience as unreal but understandable appearances of immaterial monads. The aggregationist demurs maintaining that material bodies are well founded phenomena — the real aggregates of real substantial unities.

Now there is a great deal of debate in Leibniz studies on this problem but I cannot here run through the various arguments on both sides. Suffice it to say that the situation seems to be at a stalemate, the various responses dependent on what one sees to be at stake in the question: the sensibility of Leibniz’s metaphysical system or the corporeal reality of the physical world. It is here where I think we can profit by bringing Ramanuja into the fray.

Of the large corpus of Ramanuja’s thought I will focus only on those aspects which I will put to use for Leibniz. We should note, however, that *prima facie* Visistadvaita shares some significant concepts with Leibnizian idealism: indeed reading the first part of the *Monadology* through Visistadvaita’s eyes is revealing. In the first sections of the *Monadology* one could read atman (or jivatman as the particularised form of atman associated with prakriti bodies) for monad. In this sense the jivatman is simple, immaterial, and eternal. It is also, as related to Brahman (as maha atman), the fundamental element of the universe — with the prakriti or material elements with which it is associated being merely the primeval evolutes of original purusha (Brahman). Each jivatman is also unique, differing from each other in precisely the same way that monads differ: they have varying degrees of perfection partially due to their specific co-relation to all other jivatmans and to Brahman. Where the monad and jivatman differ is in the fact that the jivatman does not aggregate into composites to form phenomenal bodies. The relationship of individual souls (jivatmans) to each other and to their creator (Brahman) is the subject of Ramanuja’s principle doctrine of the world as God’s body, and it is to this that we now turn.

Ramanuja construes the God-world relationship along the general analogy that God is to the universe as our souls are to our bodies. To develop this Ramanuja uses the primary relationship of mode (prakara) and mode-possessor (prakarin) to describe how it is that a body is related to the self or atman. This relation is further subdivided into three sub or correlative relationships: (1) the support (adhara) / thing-supported (adhyeya) relationship; (2) the controller (niyantr) / thing-controlled (niyama) relationship; and (3) the principal (sesa) / accessory (sesa) relationship. I do not have space to consider each of these relations separately, but a consideration of the prakara / prakarin paradigm will do for our purposes.

Put very simply, the *mode* (prakara) is that which is made manifest and the *mode-possessor* (prakarin) is that which manifests the mode. In Leibnizian terms, the mode-possessor is the monad and the mode its perceptions. Ramanuja explains it thus:
This is the relation between the self (atman) and its body (in the sense we are considering): the relation between support and thing-supported such that the latter is incapable of being realised apart from the former, that between controller and thing-controlled, and that between principal and accessory. The atman [. . .] is that which in every respect is the support, controller and principal of what is the thing-supported, controlled and the accessory, viz. the 'body' or form which exists as a mode (of the mode-possessor, i.e. atman), incapable of being realised apart (from the latter). Now this is the relationship between the (finite) individual self and its own (material) body.15

Lipner points out that there are both ontological and epistemological implications of the mode/mode-possessor relationship.16 The ontological aspect is brought out in the quotation above by the phrase 'incapable of being realised apart from the [mode possessor].' This is a dependence of being such that the mode cannot exist without the absolute support of the mode-possessor. Moreover, this is true regardless of whether the mode is material or not. Carman notes, in this regard, that Ramanuja privileges the body-self relationship as more fundamental than the mode-mode possessor relationship.17 The latter is a general relationship, and it is clear, for Ramanuja that general characteristics depend for their existence on their being possessed by some substance. So, for example, 'heaviness' (a mode) is a general characteristic which requires for its existence the existence of something else (its mode-possessor). 'Heaviness' cannot exist on its own — unpossessed by some substance. But this general characteristic is secondary to the particular 'body-self' relationship. The body is, for Ramanuja, paradigmatically the mode of the self or atman (the mode-possessor). Carman explains this view thus: "to say that something is a mode is just a brief way of stating its relationship of utter dependence, but to state that something is a body is to state an irreducible and fundamental fact. Therefore it is this category which is fundamental. If a material thing is the body of some intelligent self, then it is a mode."18 This is an important point since it allows that bodies, that is, a kind of material substance (dravya), can be modes of selves (atman) — which are also substances, and that, by analogy, creatures such as humans can thus be modes of the supreme self, Brahman.19 If we accept Ramanuja's argument here, we can immediately lay to rest the question of how atmans, which are substances, can be modes of another substance, Brahman.

This is also rather important for our comparative exercise since if we appropriate Ramanuja’s notion of the world as God’s body for Leibniz, then the mode/mode possessor relationship entails that not only are physical/phenomenal bodies modes or forms of their monadic selves, but each created monad (which are substantial unities) can be seen as bodies of the ultimate monad which is God. This is a significant re-narration of Leibniz who assumes the Christian ultimate separation of God and creation even though by his own lights both creation and God are monadic in nature. Leibniz’s view of God, which I only touched on earlier, is that God is the perfect, uniquely self-created monad. As such God differs from all other monads not in kind but in degree only. Ramanuja’s view of the world as God’s body is ironically more consistent with God as a monad than Leibniz’s capitulation to the conventional Christian standpoint, since on Ramanuja’s view there is no substantial distinction between creation and the divine.

Lipner’s epistemological aspect of the mode/mode-possessor relationship shows that the mode does not ‘make sense’ without reference to the mode-possessor, that is, the mode lacks a raison d’être. Lipner alludes to Ramanuja’s example of staffs and earrings to illustrate. A staff or an
earring, though they each have their own individual, substantive existence apart from anything else, cannot have their purpose fulfilled or realised in seclusion. They require a staff-bearer or earring-wearer to fully be what they are. A certain thing can thus only be known as itself within its rightful mode/mode-possessor relationship.

Leibniz’s echo of this is found in the notion of pre-established harmony. Each monad can only be what it is by virtue of its correlation to all other monads — that is in its proper relation. No individual monad can be what it is much less achieve its perfection in isolation. And again, Ramanuja’s body of God doctrine helps to make sense of this since this harmony is justified not by the will of God (as in Leibniz) but in the necessity of God’s own body. The harmony of the universe is transformed from a particular and somewhat implausible proposition about a world apart from God into the perfection found within God itself. It reflects a more perfect necessity.

So on Ramanuja’s view, the world is God’s ‘body’ in that the universe is the manifestation of the effected Brahman, completely dependent for its very being and meaning on the Absolute One, existing (ideally) only in order to serve and glorify its Lord. In this respect Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of the universe — its creator — as well as the resultant effect, the universe itself. Ramanuja explains this as the dual nature of Brahman’s existence: as Brahman in his causal condition (brahma karanavastham) and Brahman in his effected condition (brahma karyavastham). In Leibnizian terms the material universe becomes the body of God — with God being the universe’s perfect and primary monad. As its body, the universe shares its monadic nature with God but just as our own bodies do not exhaust our selves, God as the monadic maha atman is not exhausted by the universe, and certainly not as we experience it. Moreover the doctrine of pre-established harmony is set in a more elegant context when seen not as the fortunate result of a created universe but rather as the inner harmony of a perfect God.

Having heard Ramanuja, we can now return to our Leibnizian problem of giving an account of the ‘hardness’ of the world — that is an understanding of the physical world. Either corporeal bodies are mere appearances, that is the way collected monads look to each other, or they are the dependently real result of an aggregation of monads. Ramanuja faced a similar problem in trying to understand the identity-indifference which obtains between individual jivatmans and the divine Brahman and he solves it through the particular method of his theology. Lipner calls this method ‘polarity theology’ and we can understand it by considering again the term Visistadvaita.

Visistadvaita, as Lipner has it, is reflected in two complementary discourses, corresponding to two mahavakyas (great sayings) of the Upanishads. As Ramanuja needed to remain within the theologically important ‘literal’ interpretation of the scriptures, he needed to affirm both the mayhavakyas of the Taittiriya Upanishad (Brahman is saccidananda reality, knowledge, infinite) and of the Chandogya Upanishad (tat tvam asi - That thou art). In order to do so he spoke of the God-world relationship in two ways: from top down, that is, from the perspective of Brahman, and from the bottom up, that is, from our creaturely vantage point. From top down the world is not distinct from Brahman; everything deriving from, gaining sense with respect to, and maintained by the Absolute One without a second. Here there is no difference between Brahman and the world, the universe being nothing but Brahman in ‘effected’ or manifest state. This collapsing of difference Lipner calls the centripetal tendency of Ramanuja’s theology. From the point of view of creatures, however, there is great distinction since Brahman is perfect in all qualities, infinite and necessary, and thus, of course, very different from creation. Lipner refers to this separating movement as the centrifugal tendency. The picture of Brahman emerging from Ramanuja is that of Brahman encompassing a dialectic tension between the centripetal and centrifugal, between the One and the many. This view
makes creation both quasi-autonomous yet inseparable from its source, sustenance and end. It makes Brahman and creation identical or non-dual but, in the dialectic of centrifugal and centripetal – a dialectic which mirrors that of comparative conversations such as this – also particular. This is what is meant by identity-in-difference or ‘qualified non-dualism.’

Now Ramanuja’s polarity theology, through which the notion of Visistadvaita is communicated, can also be applied to Leibniz. In what might be called a typical Vedantic style Leibniz’s solution is found not in the either/or of phenomenalism or aggregationism, but in the both-and of Visistadvaita. Understood from the bottom up, monads combine to form dependently real aggregates, while from the top down phenomenal material nature is understood to be founded in and derived from monadic reality. We have in this tense dialectic not only squared Leibniz’s circle but in the process given more coherence to his view that God is a monad as well as greater substance to the doctrine of pre-established harmony.

Of course this kind of consolation of Leibniz’s metaphysics was not available to Leibniz himself for various historical and, more importantly, theological reasons. One might object that on these grounds such a reading of Leibniz is illegitimate. Clearly I must disagree with such a complaint, though I cannot mount a defence here. Rather I submit the discussion now concluded as an experiment in comparative philosophy of religion and leave my readers the task of its evaluation and, hopefully, continuation.

Notes

1 See Francis Clooney’s *Seeing Through Texts: Doing Theology among the Srivaisnavas of South India*, (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY press, 1996) for an extended example of this dialectical hermeneutic method at work.


3 I will here accept Descartes’ and Aristotle’s view of extension as a necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) characteristic of prime matter, and I also take it that both Descartes and Leibniz meant extension to include the idea of impenetrability. I do not here have space to consider the idea that primary matter is not to be understood as extension. Leibniz himself argued against this view in an earlier stage of his thinking only to accept it later on. [See Daniel Garber and Jean Baptiste Rauzy, “Leibniz on Body, Matter and Extension,” *Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society*, July 2004, (18) vol. 78, no. 1, pp. 23-40]. Garber and Rauzy argue that in the period between 1680-90 Leibniz tried to reduce material bodies to force rather than to extension – the latter of which is found in Leibniz’s mature view as seen in the *Monadology*.

4 We should not suppose that Leibniz himself suggested that dividing up complexes, that is material entities, *ad infinitum* will eventually produce non-material entities. While he maintains that primary substance is immaterial, in correspondence to Samuel Clarke in 1715 he upholds that infinite division cannot be carried out to this end. But this view is now not altogether obvious. While it is significantly beyond the scope of this paper, according to the standard interpretation of quantum wave-particle duality, the analysis of the smallest elements making up the smallest sub-atomic particles leaves the corporeality of such entities indeterminate.

5 For instance, the notion of a primary simple substance may be questioned by suggesting that composites may well be primary. There seems to be no necessary reason that complexes must be able to be broken down into simples. The world may well be composed of unanalysable, complex entities. Just such a particularist position was the dominant view of the Aristotelians.

6 *Monadology* § 63-63.

7 I agree with Rutherford’s interpretation that the world, while being an appearance of aggregated monads, is still a well-founded phenomenon – that is it is founded on real entities. Leibniz goes to some pains to maintain that the universe is indeed real but immaterial,

8 Since monads have no sensory organs their perceptions cannot be sense-based but rather closer to what one does when one holds something before the mind. In this sense it is an 'internal perception.'

9 Monadology §56. This is referred to as the Mirror hypothesis. Each monad is a mirror to all others.

10 The notion of pre-established harmony leading to the best of all possible worlds prompted Voltaire to write in Candide of the views of Professor Pangloss, a character surely to have been modelled on Leibniz, that if this is the best of all possible worlds, what must the rest be like?

11 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider Leibniz’s interesting variations on the Ontological argument. See Graham Oppy’s Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge: CUP, 1996) for a good discussion of these.

12 This problem is in a sense the opposite of the current 'hard problem' in philosophy of mind, that is how does mind arise from matter. Leibniz’s problem is the opposite – how does matter arise from ideas?


16 WGB, pp. 150-1.

17 TR, pp. 126-7.

18 TR, p. 127.

19 Ibid.

20 WGB, p. 38. Carman notes that Ramanuja accepts as axiomatic the Samkhya view that the effect is a transformation of the cause (satkaryavada) and the doctrine of Brahman changing from causal to effected conditions should be seen in this context. TR, p. 134. See also GU, p. 150

21 Leibniz himself uses the analogy of the harmony of the internal workings of the body in order to explain the harmonious subservience of monadic creation to the divine.

22 Chandogya Upanishad: 8.7; Taittiriya Upanishad II: 1.1. The texts are from Radhakrishnan’s translation of the Principal Upanishads (Indus: New Delhi, 1994) [first published (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953]. Pp. 458 and 541 respectively.


24 The Visistadvaitins attributed to Brahman itself the qualities of being (satya), knowledge (jnanaabliviṣ, ananda [infinity (anantatva) and purity (amalatva). [WGB, p. 146].