1-1-1942

The Person and the Work of the Holy Spirit

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THE PERSON AND WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

by

STEWART WILLIAM HARTFELTER

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts College of Religion.

Division of Graduate Instruction
Butler University
Indianapolis
1942
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**BIBLIOGRAPHY** 77800
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to show that the Holy Spirit, as He is revealed in Sacred Literature and in the lives and experiences of men, is a Person possessing all the attributes of a person and doing work which can be accomplished only by a person.

The question of the personality and function of the Holy Spirit is one of fundamental importance to psychology and philosophy as well as theology. This subject, which is a specific field of the greater subject - the person and work of God, "God" being a term used here to designate the triune God of the Holy Trinity,-is not one of mere abstraction and speculation divorced from everyday human life and activity. The answer to this question will do much to shape our conception of the universe, determine the reality and value of our own personality, decide character and destiny, and underlie all our psychology, ethics, economics, sociology, politics, science, philosophy, and religion.

It is, therefore, clearly observed that the subject of the person and work of the Holy Spirit is not a simple and limited study, but rather is one that is complex and comprehensive. It might seem that the subject is so vast and runs beyond our faculties of understanding that it is impossible
for us to get any probable or possible light upon it, and that all our thinking about it is purely futile speculation. The agnostic takes the quick and easy way out and declares that our very faculties are incapable of reaching or catching any glimpse of the nature of the Holy Spirit, and that we are hopelessly shut up within our own finite limitations of impotence. But the agnostic view is fatal to all knowledge and precludes us from knowing the least as well as the largest things.

Our minds are made to think about big things and the very heavens themselves cannot set bounds to our faculties. The means and methods of studying this subject are the same as those by which we try to answer any question no matter how great or small. Perception, observation, comparison, combination of objects into larger units, tracing of causal links and connections, the use of analogy, the deduction of principles and their wider application, constructive thought and imagination, all the means and methods of experience apply to this subject and lead us to our conclusions. Thus, it must be acknowledged that the study of this subject places great faith in the trustworthiness of the human mind. This trustworthiness is an assumption which must underlie this undertaking as it does all our reasoning in any field. We must

1. See John Locke, Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, published in 1690. Locke wrote this Essay to show how we can attack our moral and religious problems.
trust something before we can know anything, and the mind must trust itself or it cannot prove or disprove anything. If it cannot know that it is trustworthy, then it cannot know that it is untrustworthy, and all knowledge is at an end.

Before any further discussion is made, it is imperative that certain terms be defined to make for a clear understanding of the pages to follow.

A person is an individual organism being endowed with self-consciousness consisting of perceptive and reflective thought, sensibility and responsible will.² He knows his own thinking, feeling and willing immediately and his self-consciousness unites these operations in one organic whole. In his consciousness he is always thinking, feeling and willing simultaneously. Any one of these modes may at any one moment be predominant and seem to submerge the others, but the three are always acting together, though in varying degrees and combinations.

To say that a person is capable of thinking implies that he has a mind. The intellect is the knowing power of the mind, by which the person is aware of his mental faculties and processes by immediate intuition. Reason and self-consciousness are functions of the mind and are the effect of thinking.

It is the feelings that create a person's interest

---

in objects and give him his sense of their value. Without feeling, objects of knowledge would present the aspect of colorless reality, and one thing would not mean more to the person than another. Feelings invest objects of knowledge with various degrees of value so that they appeal to the person with varying degrees of interest. Feelings are also the motives that pour as a stream upon the will and move it to action. A person never acts until he feels, and the volume and intensity of the feeling determine the degree of decision and energy with which he acts.

The will is the soul or spirit in action or the soul controlling itself. The stream of ideas and feelings that pour into consciousness is not an ungovernable flood on which the self drifts helplessly, like a log or a boat without rudder or engine on a swift current, but the soul has a rudder and an engine by which it can steer and drive its boat to its own destination. It chooses and acts, not arbitrarily or under the compulsion of necessary forces, but by its own free choice under the play of motives. These motives, however, are not dead and fixed weights dropped upon the soul from without, which necessarily determine it, but are subject to the soul's own judgment and evaluation. A person makes and chooses the motives that move him, and this fact is the very center and pivot of his free agency and responsibility. The will is thus the spinal column and unifying power of personality, the crown and captain of the self. The spirit or soul, with all his faculties and activities, is a unitary organism in which the
whole enters into each operation, and it is characterized in its totality by liberty, purpose, and responsibility. It is this unitary self that constitutes personality.

Personality is that which constitutes an individual a distinct person, or that which constitutes individuality. In law, it is that which concerns the capacity, condition and state of persons.

The word "Holy" is found in both the Hebrew and Greek languages. The root meaning of the Hebrew word גַּלֶּד (gâlêd) is "to be selected," "to be pure," "holy," "sacred," "consecrated," "devoted," "hallowed." The Greek word ἁγιός (agios) corresponding to גַּלֶּד means "holy," "pure." W. J. Hickie says that ἁγιός ὅφρα, the root being the same as ἁγιός, and meaning "holiness," "purity," "is a purely biblical word." 3

A. "Spirit" is a word which is likewise found in both the Hebrew Old Testament and the Greek New Testament. The word נָר (nâr) in the original Hebrew language, generally translated "spirit" in English, comes from a Semitic root נָר (nâr), which, in cognate languages, signifies "to breathe," "to blow." Kindred words in Hebrew are נָר (nâr) meaning "scent," "odour," and the verb (only in Hiphil) נָר (nâr), "to smell," "to scent," "to perceive odour." With the verb the organs of breathing, the mouth and nostrils, are frequently mentioned. The primary signification of נָר appears to be "air in motion," as wind, or breath, and the

general idea which is common to nearly all its usages is "power in manifestation," or "energy." The various usages of נְפָעָה (which occurs 378 times) may be roughly classified under four heads: (1) physically, (2) physiologically, (3) psychically, and (4) "supernaturally."

(1) **Physically** (131 times). -- In this aspect נְפָעָה is used of the air in motion, the wind in all its moods and phases, whether gentle or stormy, hot or cold. Then it serves to denote direction, the quarter from which the wind may blow: for example, "God made a wind to pass over the earth" (Genesis 8:1); "Thou didst blow with thy wind" (Exodus 15:10); and "Upon Elam will I bring the four winds from the four quarters of heaven" (Jeremiah 49:36). In later writings it acquires the figurative sense of "vanity," "emptiness": for example, "they are all vanity" (Isaiah 41:29); "O remember that my life is wind" (Job 7:7); and "all is vanity (וְנָפָעָה) and vexation of spirit (נְפָעָה)" (Ecclesiastes 1:14). In this latter verse נָפָעָה is a word which can be translated "breath," "breeze," "vanity," or "show," or "nothingness" and נְפָעָה is, of course, translated "spirit."

(2) **Physiologically** (39 times). -- This usage, which may be derived from the former by observation, denotes the breath in the bodies of men and animals. From the close connection between the breath and the phenomena of life and energy, the נְפָעָה came to be considered as the vehicle of life and even as the life itself. In sickness, exhaustion, or fainting the breath and corresponding vitality were reduced, and it was said
that the נַשׁ had gone away. Similarly, after food or under the stimulus of joy the נַשׁ returned and man revived: for example, "and Jacob's heart fainted,......and when he saw the wagons which Joseph had sent to carry him, the spirit (נַשׁ) of Jacob their father revived" (Genesis 45:26,27);
"they found an Egyptian in the field......and gave him bread, and he did eat; and they made him drink water; and they gave him a piece of a cake of figs, and two clusters of raisins: and when he had eaten, his spirit (נַשׁ) came again to him: for he had eaten no bread, nor drunk water, three days and three nights" (I Samuel 30:11,12).

When the נַשׁ left the body entirely, death took place. Psalm 104:29 indicates this when it says, "thou takest away their breath (נַשׁ), they die, and return to their dust."

The further induction that the נַשׁ was the immaterial life principle does not seem to have been common before the Exile. In Ezekiel 37:5, "I will cause breath to enter into you, and ye shall live"; and 37:6, "I will.....put breath in you, and ye shall live," נַשׁ is the word used for "breath" in both cases. In verse 9, "Prophesy unto the wind (נַשׁ נֵ'י), prophesy, son of man, and say to the wind (נַשׁ נֵ'י), Thus saith the Lord God; Come from the four winds (נִי נֵ'י), O breath (נַשׁ נֵ'י), and breathe (נַשׁ נֵ'י imperfect, future, singular form of נַשׁ נֵ'י) upon these slain, that they may live," it will be noticed that נַשׁ is translated "wind" and "breath."

Since the writing of Ezekiel נַשׁ is used, along with נַשׁ נֵ'י and נַשׁ נֵ'י, to denote the breath-soul in man. In earlier
literature אֲניָ יָ is the usual term for the normal breathing, as exemplified in Genesis 2:7, "the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed (יָ נָ) into his nostrils the breath (יָ נָ בּ) of life; and man became a living soul (יָ נָ ל)"; יָ נָ was reserved for the more violent breathing which marks exertion or emotional excitement. In the passage just referred to we have the first statement of the notion that man's breath-soul is derived immediately from God by inspiration. Not until after the Exile does יָ נָ occur in that connection, as seen in Isaiah 42:5, "he that giveth breath (יָ נָ) unto the people upon it, and spirit (יָ נָ) to them that walk therein"; Job 27:3, "all the while my breath (יָ נָ) is in me"; and Zechariah 12:1, "and formeth the spirit (יָ נָ) of man within him." And then it is applied to animals as well as man: for example, Genesis 6:17, "behold, I, even I, do bring a flood of waters upon the earth, to destroy all flesh, wherein is the breath (יָ נָ) of life, from under heaven; and every thing that is in the earth shall die," and Genesis 7:15, "and they went in unto Noah into the ark, two and two of all flesh, wherein is the breath (יָ נָ) of life." Yet, a distinction is drawn between man and other animate beings. Both are formed out of the dust of the ground (Genesis 2:7, see quoted at the beginning of this paragraph; and Genesis 2:19, "and out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air"), but man becomes a living being by the direct inbreathing of יָ נָ and at death his יָ נָ returns to יָ נָ as seen in Ecclesiastes 12:7, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the
spirit (נֵרִי) shall return unto God (דָּנֶא) who gave it"; and Psalm 31:5, "Into thine hand I commit my spirit (נֵרִי): thou hast redeemed me, O Lord God of truth."

Because man's נֵרִי comes from God, it is the object of God's regard. He protects it and continues it in being, and so can be called "the God of the spirits of all flesh," for example, Job 10:12, "Thou hast granted me life and favour, and thy visitation hath preserved my spirit (נֵרִי)"; Job 12:10, "In whose hand is the soul (לְדוֹת) of every living thing, and the breath (נֵרִי) of all mankind"; and Numbers 16:22, "O God, the God of the spirits (שְׁנֵרִי) of all flesh." "The Hebrew genius was not speculative, and the derivation of man's spirit from God probably expressed the popular opinion of animism, the wonderful power inherent in נֵרִי indicating the presence of deity in man. But the ideas of divine immanence or the divine breath physically extended into man, as Stoicism fancied, cannot be in the Hebrew thought; they belong to later philosophical speculation, the first traces of which become apparent only in the extra-canonical literature" 4 (e.g., see Wisdom and Philo on pages 20f. of this thesis). Man's divine origin, however, lifts the Hebrew view above the Greek: he is no mere product of nature, the dualism of Greek thought about man is avoided, and through the original connection of man's נֵרִי with God the way was left open for those approaches of God to man which are


(3) Psychically (74 times). — As the breath is often the visible index of man's stronger emotions, the term נַשֵּׁא readily served to express his inner life in its emotional and mental aspects, and was used in parallelism along with the terms עֹז and יָרֵע. Anger, grief, and zeal were often exhibited with dilated nostrils and laboured breathing. Hence we find נַשֵּׁא as well as nostril (אֶפֶן) used as a synonym for anger in both God and man, as shown in Judges 9:3, "Then their anger (אֶפֶן) was abated toward him," and Job 4:9, "by the breath of his nostrils (אֶפֶן) are they consumed."

In post-Exilic literature the term נַשֵּׁא is extended to cover such emotions as sadness, trouble, bitterness and longing, which are regarded as located "in the נַשֵּׁא." Examples of these emotions are found in I Kings 21:5, "Why is thy spirit (כְּנַשֵּׁא) so sad, that thou eatest no bread?"; Genesis 26:35, "Which were a grief (ﬠֹז) of mind (נַשֵּׁא) unto Isaac and Rebekah"; Job 7:11, "I will speak in the anguish of my spirit (כְּנַשֵּׁא); I will complain in the bitterness (ﬠֹז) of my soul (ﬠֹז)"; and I Samuel 1:11, "I am a woman of a sorrowful (ﬠֹז-melancholy) spirit (כְּנַשֵּׁא)."

From Ezekiel's time onward the נַשֵּׁא was regarded as the organ of knowledge, parallel to יֵשֶׁר, the usual term. A few verses where this may be found are Ezekiel 11:5, "the
Spirit (נִלְדָּח) of the Lord fell upon me, and said unto me, Speak; Thus saith the Lord; Thus have ye said, O house of Israel: for I know (יִנֶּקֶד) the things that come into your mind (נִמְנָחִית); Ezekiel 20:32, "that which cometh into your mind (נִמְנָחִית) shall not be at all"; and Psalm 77:6, "I call to remembrance (יִנֶּקֶד) my song in the night: I commune with mine own heart: and my spirit (נִלְדָּח) made diligent search."

Occasionally נִלְדָּח is used as the seat of volition, as in Psalm 51:12, "uphold me with thy free spirit (נִלְדָּח)"; and Exodus 35:21, "And they came, every one whose heart stirred him up, and every one whom his spirit (נִלְדָּח) made willing (נִמְנָחִית)."

Lastly, of it are predicated such ethical qualities as "new," "guileless," "broken," "haughty," etc. Examples are found in Ezekiel 11:19, "I will put a new spirit (נִלְדָּח) within you"; Psalm 32:2, "Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity, and in whose spirit (נִלְדָּח) there is no guile"; Psalm 51:17, "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit (נִלְדָּח): a broken and contrite heart (לִשְׁכַּנ), O God, thou wilt not despise"; Isaiah 57:15, "I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit (נִלְדָּח), to revive the spirit (נִלְדָּח) of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones"; and Proverbs 16:18, "Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit (נִלְדָּח) before a fall."

כֹּלֶד and אַֽמְרָה. At this place in our study a few words
should be said on the relation of these two terms. Dr. Hoyle says:

It has been held that they express distinct substances or elements in man, which, along with \( \text{flesh} \), make up a trichotomy in human nature. A comparison of of passages where the terms occur together does not sustain this view (cf. Is. 1:15, Is.26:9, Job 3:20, 7:11). Both express the invisible immaterial element in man as contrasted with the flesh. \( \text{spirit} \) and \( \text{power} \) are related together as animating principle and animated result: the former denotes the vital energy, which lies more basally in human nature than \( \text{power} \). From the point of view of experience, \( \text{power} \) is the subject, the ego, whilst \( \text{spirit} \) is less immediately under self-control, and is more moved from without. Hence it is that aspect of human nature more immediately in touch with the Divine Spirit. But it should be remembered that Hebrew thought does not work scientifically as it describes mental phenomena; it moves instinctively and intuitively, and deals with things, not abstractions. And, because \( \text{power} \) had a physical quality and connoted power and energy, it was used to denote the causative principle in all actions, whether bodily or mental.

The connotation of power with \( \text{spirit} \) explains its usage to denote the energy of the personality in particular manifestations. Some of these may be more settled - what we call character or disposition; to these the ethical predicates are applied as stated above. Less permanent manifestations, as humours, moods, whims, are frequently described in such phrases as "spirit of wisdom," "of grace," "of whoredoms," "of deep sleep," etc. In so far as they are manifested in the human spirit, they may be grouped under the heading psychical, but by reason of the unusual force which they display, and in


accord with primitive views of personality as liable to in-
vasion by spirits from without, they fall rather to be con-
sidered under the next section.

(4) Supernaturally (134 times). -- Perhaps a more
accurate word for a heading would be "extra-human," since
Hebrew thought made no distinction between natural and super-
natural, God being regarded as the ultimate cause of all that
happens, whether good or evil. But for convenience' sake,
and because the action of the Spirit of God falls under this
head, though its detailed consideration is deferred to Chapter
III, Section A, the term may be allowed to stand. Under the
heading "supernatural" נֶל are included agencies operating
upon man - only rarely upon inanimate nature - whose source
is outside or above him. In the literature, as we now have
it, they are all under God's control, but the literary phrase-
ology suggests that in the pre-literary period they were not
so viewed. These agencies appear to be "survivals from the
animistic past of Israel,"8 in which sickness, insanity, ab-
normal powers of body or of mind, were accounted for as due
to a subject becoming possessed by an extraneous spirit. Such
was the evil spirit which rushed upon Saul and terrified him
(I Samuel 16:15, 16, "And Saul's servants said unto him, Behold
now, an evil spirit, נֶל נֶל, from God troubleth thee......
and it shall come to pass, when the evil spirit, נֶל נֶל, from

8. E. Stade, Biblische Theologie des alten Testaments,
(Tubingen: n.p., 1905) p. 99. Quoted by R. Birch Hoyle,
"Spirit (Holy), Spirit of God,"Encyclopaedia of Religion and
God is upon thee....... thou shalt be well"; and 18:10, "And it came to pass....that the evil spirit, פֶּרֶשׁ פֶּרֶשׁ, from God came upon Saul"), the ill-will caused by an "evil spirit" (Judges 9:23, "Then God sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem; and the men of Shechem dealt treacherously with Abimelech"), the spirit of jealousy between man and wife (Numbers 5:14, "And the spirit of jealousy, פֵּרֶשׁ פֵּרֶשׁ, come upon him, and he be jealous of his wife"), and the spirit of whoredom which makes Israel err and wander into idolatry (Hosea 4:12, "the spirit of whoredom, אֶרֶס אֶרֶס, hath caused them to err, and they have gone a whoring from under their God"; and 5:4, "the spirit of whoredoms is in the midst of them, and they have not known the Lord").

The over-mastering might of such beings is expressed by the vigorous verbs which describe their action. They "rush upon," "fall upon," "come upon," "pass over upon" men. The action of the Spirit of Jahweh upon Elijah suggests storm-demons (I Kings 18:12, "the Spirit of the Lord shall carry thee whither I know not"; and II Kings 2:16, "the Spirit of the Lord hath taken him up, and cast him upon some mountain, or into some valley").

In one case a "lying spirit" is distinctly hypostatized. It stands, speaks, receives commands and departs (I Kings 22:19-26, "Hear thou therefore the word of the Lord: I saw the L ORD sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left. And the L ORD said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall
at Ramoth-gilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner. And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the LORD, and said, I will persuade him. And the LORD said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also: go forth, and do so. Now therefore, behold, the LORD hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets, and the LORD hath spoken evil concerning thee. But Zedekiah the son of Chenaanah went near, and smote Micaiah on the cheek, and said, Which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak unto thee? And Micaiah said, Behold, thou shalt see in that day, when thou shalt go into an inner chamber to hide thyself. And the king of Israel said, Take Micaiah, and carry him back unto Amon the governor of the city, and to Joash the king's son).

This language had a marked influence upon the descriptions of the activity of the Spirit of God in both the Old Testament and the New Testament. That Spirit is said to clothe (Judges 6:34, "the Spirit of the LORD came upon Gideon, and he blew a trumpet"; and Luke 24:49, "tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high"), come mightily upon, fall upon (Ezekiel 11:5, quoted on page 10, and Acts 11:15, "as I began to speak, the Holy Spirit fell on them, as on us at the beginning"), carry away (I Kings 18:12, quoted on page 14, and Acts 8:39, "the Spirit of the Lord caught away Philip, that the eunuch saw him no more"), push or remove
(Judges 13:25, "the Spirit of the LORD began to move him at times in the camp of Dan between Zorah and Eshtaol"; and Mark 1:12, "and immediately the spirit driveth, ἐκβάλλει, him into the wilderness") men.

Another group of phrases, which first appears in the time of Isaiah, ascribes to πνεῦμα material properties, as a kind of fluid element. Thus a "spirit of perverseness" is "mingled" by Jahweh in the midst of Egypt (Isaiah 19:14, "The LORD hath mingled a perverse spirit in the midst thereof: and they have caused Egypt to err in every work thereof"), a "spirit of deep sleep" is "poured out" like a stupefying drug, producing effects like drunkenness (Isaiah 29:10, "the LORD hath poured out upon you the spirit of deep sleep, and hath closed your eyes"; cf. Acts 2:13, "others mocking said, These men are full of new wine"). Such language is repeatedly used of the Spirit of God in the writing prophets as seen in Isaiah 32:15, "Until the spirit be poured upon us from on high"; Isaiah 44:3, "I will pour my spirit upon thy seed"; Joel 2:28, "I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh"; Ezekiel 39:29, "I have poured out my spirit upon the house of Israel"; and Zechariah 12:10, "I will pour upon the house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the spirit of grace and of supplications." In all these verses the Hebrew word translated "pour out" is נָפַל which means literally "to pour," "to pour out," "to shed," "to spill," "to throw or cast out or up."

נָפַל relates itself with the idea of "anointing" whereby is imparted the divinity that "doth hedge a king," or prophet.
A few examples of this are found in I Samuel 10:1, "Then Samuel took a vial of oil, and poured it upon his head..... and said, Is it not because the LORD hath anointed thee to be captain over his inheritance?"; and Isaiah 61:1, "The Spirit of the Lord GOD is upon me; because the LORD hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek."

The Spirit can be put into a person (Isaiah 63:11, "where is he that put his holy Spirit within him?"; Ezekiel 37:14, "and shall put my spirit in you, and ye shall live"), so that he is "filled" with it as expressed in Exodus 31:3, "I have filled him with the Spirit of God," and Luke 1:41, "Elisabeth was filled with the Holy Spirit." The Spirit can be taken away as in Psalm 51:11 it says, "take not thy holy spirit from me," and distributed upon others as is spoken of in Numbers 11:17, "I will take of the spirit which is upon thee, and will put it upon them," and 11:25, "the LORD....took of the spirit that was upon him, and gave (it) unto the seventy elders."

The Spirit can be poured out with fertilizing effect upon inanimate nature as well as man. Examples of this are found in Isaiah 32:15, "Until the spirit be poured upon us from on high, and the wilderness be a fruitful field, and the fruitful field be counted for a forest," and 44:3, "I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground: I will pour my spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring."

As the "demonic" Spirit suggested personal actions and so influenced New Testament terminology, so the fluid-like Spirit had a far-reaching influence, appearing in the New Testament conception of the Holy Spirit as a gift, and
in the later theological speculations of the Greek Fathers as a kind of substance, which was imparted to believers in the sacraments. From this analysis it is clear that the term Πνεῦμα is a general one embracing, by syncretism, elements collected from various sources, and not derivable from one general principle. Herein lies the difficulty for the modern mind as it approaches the Hebrew idea of "spirit." For now spirit denotes, metaphysically, the immaterial as contrasted with the material; and the modern mind finds it difficult to understand the materialistic view of spirit as an ethereal fluid substance, except in poetic metaphor. Again, the philosophical use of the term to denote a self-conscious subject possessing "perdurability" has little in common with the animistic meaning of Πνεῦμα, or the primitive psychology of the Semitic mind, which could identify mind with physical organs or physical breath. And yet there was an unconscious logic at work when popular fancies grouped such disparate elements under the term Πνεῦμα. The wind of heaven in its mighty, mysterious, quasi-personal activity is very similar to the action of "spirits," and both suggest the miraculous, supersensible power which streams through nature and into human life with such startling effects. Thus, unconsciously, Πνεῦμα expressed the metaphysical notion of causality, the principle of movement, energy, and life in the universe. But, in accord with the Hebrew genius, this principle was expressed, not in abstract static terms as in Greek—the Hebrew language was little fitted for that—but concretely, dynamically, picturesquely, realistically. And so Πνεῦμα was taken into the service of religion as the term whereby could be expressed the nature of the wind, the life of beasts and men, the deepest impulses in the breasts of saints and sages, and the modes of the manifold activities of God Himself. 9

B. The New Testament is preeminently the book of the Holy Spirit. Only Second and Third John fail to refer to Him. Each of the four accounts of the Gospel opens with the promise of His effusion. The Acts of the Apostles is devoted to His operation in the creation, guidance and expression of the Christian Church. The Epistles constantly refer to His working in the individual and collective life of believers. He is spoken of as "the Spirit" and "Spirit" two hundred and twenty

times, and as "The Holy Spirit" and "Holy Spirit" (τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, Πνεῦμα ἅγιον) ninety one times. "The Spirit of God," "the Spirit of the Lord," "the Spirit of God the Father" and "the Spirit of the Father" are found nineteen times and five times He is referred to as "the Spirit of His Son," "the Spirit of Jesus," "the Spirit of Jesus Christ" and "the Spirit of Christ."

Each of these phrases is full of significance. "The Spirit," par excellence, indicates how conspicuous is His place in Christian experience. The "Holy Spirit," found only three times in the Old Testament canon, while differentiating it from the host of spirits, often evil, with which popular fears and fancies, Jewish and Gentile, peopled the regions of air, frequently expresses the ethical working of the Spirit upon Christians, as well as denoting, generally, the divine. And, as "the Spirit of Christ," there is set forth the cardinal feature of New Testament pneumatology, as compared with the Old Testament and Judaism, viz. that the "Spirit of God the Father," which Christians have received, has been procured for them by Jesus, in whom the Spirit dwelt when He (Jesus) was incarnate, from and through whom the Spirit comes, now that He (Jesus) is exalted.

It is not necessary here to review in classified analysis the various passages in the New Testament which refer to "the Holy Spirit." It is sufficient for the present to say that in the New Testament personal actions are attributed to the Spirit: He "speaks," "bears witness," "separates"
for service, "approves" a conciliar decision, "forbids," "appoints overseers," and can be "resisted," "tempted" and "lied against." A complete discussion of these and other activities of "the Holy Spirit" will be given in Chapter III.

C. On page 9 reference was made to the Extra-Canonical literature regarding the ideas of divine immanence or the divine breath being extended physically into man. This theory is found in the Jewish-Alexandrian writings - Wisdom of Solomon, 150-50 B.C. and Philo, 20 B.C.-A.D. 50. The outstanding feature in these authors is the attempt to combine Hebrew conceptions of spirit with those of Stoicism.

In Wisdom the term "spirit" is bound up with wisdom, with which it is practically identified and in which it is inherent. This Spirit, whether of Wisdom or of the Lord, is presented as a material ductile essence, perming and pervading the universe, of which it is the cohesive bond. Streaming into man by the divine inbreathing, it constitutes him an active soul and originates his spiritual nature (πνεύμα ζωής), and, in accord with the Κοινα ένώσει of the Stoics, is the cause of his understanding of the phenomenal universe and the hidden counsel of God. It is an ethical principle, training men to virtue, fleeing from the wicked, and, since it is an extension of the divine Spirit into men, it is the medium whereby God is cognizant of their thoughts and deeds. The materialistic implications of "spirit" check the tendency to hypostatize and personify it, and wisdom, which had been quasi-personalized in earlier literature
(cf. Job 38, Proverbs 8:22-31), takes its place, and is more personally regarded, without, however, becoming fully a person or ceasing to be an attribute of God.

In Philo both wisdom and Spirit are over-shadowed by his doctrine of the Logos. The Spirit of God (σῶμα Πνεῦμα, Πνεῦμα ὁ Θεὸς) is mentioned only when making citations from the Old Testament, and these are limited to man's creation and inspiration.

The conception of Πνεῦμα (in Philo) may be regarded as being closely analogous to the modern conception of "force," and especially to that form of the conception which makes no distinction of essence between "mind-force" and other kinds of force, such as light or electricity. It is analogous but not identical; for force is conceived to be immaterial, whereas Πνεῦμα, however subtle, is still material.10

The spirit which was imparted to man at his creation is the divine Spirit, which is "a stamp and impress of the Divine power," a "colony from that blessed nature," "the image of the Divine and invisible," "the basis (οὐσία) of our thinking reasonable nature." But it is not severed from its source, of which it is an extension, as a ray from the sun, and this connection explains how man is able to grasp God's thought, for the Πνεῦμα is "the pure science of which every wise man is a partaker."11 All men have visitations of the divine Spirit, but in men of pleasure, owing to the


flesh, it makes no lasting stay, while its continuance with
the prophet and philosopher requires that their normal fac-
culties lie in abeyance, and, in ecstasy, they are played upon
by the Spirit as the harpist strikes his harp. Personal lan-
guage is used to describe the mode of approach and the oper-
ations of the Spirit. It "seeks men," "guides their feet to
truth," "strengthens all and conquers all that is beneath";
it has distinctive properties as "invisible," "all-wise,"
"divine," "indivisible," etc. But such language, in view of
the entire system of Philonic thought, does not denote per-
sonality. Whatever personalization and hypostatization of
divine qualities take place must be looked for in connection
with the Logos.

With this brief resume of the use of the word spirit
(πνεῦμα) in the Old and New Testament as a back-
ground, we may now proceed to frame a definition of "Spirit"
which will be acceptable to psychologists, philosophers and
theologians alike. I state my definition realizing that any
definition, no matter how comprehensive, is liable to errors
of omission of certain minor attributes. But let it be ac-
cepted that Spirit is that essence of the supernatural both
found in God's own innate being and derived by man from God
in which intelligence, sensitivity, volition, function, self-
consciousness and eternal life are basic attributes.

Having defined our terms, the purpose of this thesis
begins to take shape. In the pages to follow I shall en-
deavour to develop the proposition that the Holy Spirit, as
He is revealed in Sacred Scriptures and in the lives of man, is such a person - person as understood by psychology, philosophy and theology.

In the conclusion of this paper I hope to bring to light that this subject is not one of pure speculation, but that it is practical and useful in the everyday affairs of man, both individually and collectively.
Chapter II

Study of the Meaning of "Person"

A. The Origin and Currency of the Word "Person"

There is one theory that the word "person" is an inheritance from the ancient Roman law.

In Roman law, from which some have derived its use, it means a holder of legal rights. In this sense it would not be quite coextensive with our word "person." For we should call a slave a person, though he was incapable of sustaining legal rights, and we should not call a Corporation or College a "person," though legal rights may be vested in one. These differences of usage serve to bring out the central meaning of the Latin word: we may paraphrase it "one who performs, or is capable of, certain functions." The term is applied in view of these alone; nothing is said of any other characters he may sustain.1

If this legal phrase is the origin of the use of the word, there is no word in the Greek which will correspond with it precisely as a theological phrase.

But there is another theory which is generally accepted by etymologists as the true origin of the meaning of the word. In its original use the word "persona" was the designation of the mask worn by the actor on the ancient Roman stage. Later it came to be used to mean "a character," "a face," or "a countenance" in a play; it also came to be used of the actor himself and his part in the play. From

this latter usage it became common to use the word "persona" to express the "part" a man plays in social intercourse, especially those forms of social intercourse in which, as in legal transactions or in the official relations of public magistrates, a definite task is assigned, as in a play. In general "persona" did not acquire in classical Latin that vague use as equivalent to "human being" in which "person" among ourselves is so often employed. It would be more correct to translate "persona" as "party" rather than by "person."

Neither did "persona" in classical Latin express what may be supposed to distinguish the inner life of a human being from that of an animal - self-consciousness, moral purpose, aesthetic emotion, intelligence. The possibility of such a use of it - the philosophical use of it - lay no doubt in this, that "persona" always implied that the being so designated had a part to play in some kind of social intercourse, such as is represented in a drama. Of such social intercourse no mere animal but only a human being is capable. But the appropriation of the word to express the dignity of the rational human being in his consciousness of a special function and worth in relation to his fellowmen would, though assisted by the juristic associations of the term, probably not have taken root in the modern languages of Europe had "persona" not come to be used by the Latin-speaking theologians of the Christian Church as the equivalent of the Greek word ὑπόστασις.

The word ὑπόστασις, which literally means "a standing under, or below," was in classical Greek used only of that
which has settled down at the bottom - dregs, sediment; or else of the position of one who lies in ambush, standing concealed under some kind of cover. At a later period it came to signify what we may call real concrete existence as opposed to a mere appearance with nothing solid or permanent underlying it.

There can be little doubt that it was among the Stoics that this usage arose; but actual examples of its use by writers of this School are lacking. The corresponding verb, however, occurs in the great Stoic moralist Chrysippus in a related sense (Plutarch, "Moralia," 1081 F: τομέν, παρωχημέναν τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐχ ὑπάρχειν ἀλλ' ὑφεστηκέναι θεσία. It is noticeable, in view of the later history of the word ὑπόστασις, that it is not the actual present for which ὑφεστηκέναι is here reserved.; and the word itself is employed in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise "de Mundo," which was most likely written in the first century of our era, and in a passage of it which probably repeats the views of the Stoic Posidonius, the master of Cicero, to express the corporeal reality which comets, for example, have, and mere effects of light, such as rainbows, have not.2

The appearance, about the same time, in the letters of Seneca of the Latin "substantia," which must have originated as a translation of ὑπόστασις, to express real concrete existence, testifies to the acquisition by the Greek word of this signification in the preceding generation at the latest.

Neither Seneca nor Quintilian, who in the next generation often uses "substantia" in the way to which I have referred, regards it as corresponding to the Greek word ὀψια, which signifies "being" in the broadest sense. However, it later became the usual rendering of ὀψια, for which Seneca

and Quintilian lamented the absence of a proper Latin equivalent in common use.

The word "essentia," which might have seemed to be the natural representative for οὐσία in Latin, failed to establish itself until several centuries later and left the place in philosophical terminology which its patrons intended for it, to be filled by "substantia." This was the case despite the fact that "essentia" could claim the authority of such great writers as Cicero and Seneca. That "substantia" could fill this place implies a close approximation in meaning between ὑπόστασις and οὐσία, making any discrimination between them a difficult task.

The first conspicuous example of the use of ὑπόστασις itself in a sense hardly distinguishable from that of οὐσία is in the anonymous work "The Epistle to the Hebrews." In chapter 1, verse 3, of this Epistle God's Son is described as the Χαράκτηρ τῆς ὑπόστασέως the "express image of the substance" of His Father. It will be noticed that the King James Authorized Version of the Bible, influenced by the technicalities of the later theology, translates ὑπόστασεως as "person" in this passage; but the Revised Version has translated it "substance." According to the Revisers of 1894, the Jewish writer of "Wisdom of Solomon" also used ὑπόστασις in referring to the "nature" of "being" of God, and Philo, the Alexandrian philosopher, employs the cognate verb with this reference. It is also to be noted that the word ὑπόστασις in the sense of "subsistence" or "continuance" -
a sense which would easily pass into the sense of "nature" or "essence" - is already found in the Septuagint Version of the Psalms, for examples Psalms 39:6 and 89:49 where the Hebrew word for man וַיְהִי is translated in the Greek as ὑπόστασις. It was due to the employment of ὑπόστασις in Christian theology that it came to be rendered by, and so to affect the usage of, the Latin "persona."

For clarity in the history of the word ὑπόστασις it is necessary to go back to an earlier period of Greek philosophical terminology and consider the difficulties in determining the proper use of the word ὄντι ὁ, "being" or reality." We are made acquainted with these difficulties through Aristotle's discussion of the ambiguities of ὄντι. This word might very naturally be applied to the characteristic nature of a thing and be used as a description in answer to the question "What is it?" But if this question were raised about several things of the same kind, exactly the same answer might be given in the case of each. The "being" or "essence" of a thing might seem to be something common to it with others, or, in the language of the logicians, a "universal."

But Aristotle argued that nothing could be properly considered as an ὄντι, or real being, which was not something existing upon its own account, something to which attributes might belong, but which could not belong in this

particular way to anything else; which was, in the phrase which had come to be appropriate to such a thing, a ὑποκείμενον, a "subject" or "substratum." Thus, a mere "universal" such as "man," which is no more what I am than it is what you are or what you are than what I am, could not be rightly called ὕσια, but only an individual being, this or that individual man, for example Lincoln or Washington, in whom are met together the two mutually complementary conditions of full reality, namely: a "distinguishable nature" of its own and that "concrete independence" which cannot be ascribed to what is only an accident or attribute of something else. But the term ὑποκείμενον, which is used to indicate this latter aspect of a real being, could be and was employed also as a designation of that abstraction of indeterminate, unqualified potentiality which Aristotle called ὑλή or "Matter." Greek philosophy was haunted by the thought of this "Matter," lying at the root of whatever is capable of any kind of development. In itself, "Matter" is without form or character of any kind, but is capable of receiving any and so becoming some particular thing, qualified in some definite way. "Matter," so understood, might be called the ultimate ὑποκείμενον of "substratum" of everything in this lower world. As I understand it, it was because this word ὑποκείμενον might be so used, and thus could not be restricted to the concrete individual thing, in which some form or nature, describable in general terms which are applicable to more things than one, is realized in this or that instance, this or that man, this or that dog, that there was felt in the
post-Aristotelian period of Greek philosophy to be room for a word appropriate to this last signification only. This word was found in ὑπόστασις, a word involving practically the same metaphor as ὑποκείμενον, but without the associations of ὑποκείμενον with mere indeterminate "Matter." So it is that ὑπόστασις comes into use as a philosophical term, quite often equivalent to οὐσία, which for Aristotle is most properly used of the concrete individual of a certain kind; but of Aristotle's two aspects of real being, its "intelligible character" and its "concrete independence," emphasizing the latter, as οὐσία emphasized the former.

This difference of emphasis between the two words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις sufficiently accounts for the use made of them respectfully by the Christian Church in the eventual formulation of her theology. When it became necessary to give systematic expression to the implications of the divine Name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the use of which had been characteristic of Christianity at least from the time of its first appearance on the stage of the Greco-Roman world as a claimant to universal allegiance, the Church fathers worked out a terminology in which οὐσία was appropriated to the one Divine Nature, ὑπόστασις to the distinctions within it designated by the three titles - Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

The settlement of this terminology was a long and controversial affair. The discrimination of οὐσία from ὑπόστασις was not readily accepted because, whatever may have been the difference of emphasis between the two, they
were at first considered on the whole as synonymous by scholars in the Church as well as outside of the Church. They were considered synonymous by Origen, in whose writings the description of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as three ὑποστάσεις first occurs, and also by Plotinus, Origen's fellow-student at Alexandria. For Plotinus ὑπόστασις and the corresponding verb seem to signify the "concrete actuality" of that to which they are applied. Origin attributes such a "concrete actuality" to each member of the Christian Trinity where he speaks of them as three ὑποστάσεις. Plotinus attributes "concrete actuality" to each member of his corresponding triad - the "Supreme Good," "Intelligence" and the "World Soul," which, in the title of one of the essays by him which his disciple Porphyry collected into the fifth Ennead,⁴ are described as the three ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις, primary or original realities.

The word ὄνοσία, though generally regarded as synonymous with ὑπόστασις, was clearly more readily applicable to something which was shared by several "concrete actualities," but was itself not actual apart from or outside of them. Therefore, in the final settlement of the terminology of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity the divine ὄνοσία was said to be one, the divine ὑποστάσεις three. This terminology was so far, however, not distinguishable from that which might be used to discriminate the one identical human nature of Peter, James and John from the individuality in which the three men differ each from the other. But, since the Christian Church intended in no way

⁴ Plotinus, Ennead, V., 1.
to forsake the confession that "the Lord our God is one Lord" (Deuteronomy 6:4; Mark 12:29), which had been the heart of the faith of the parent religion of Judaism, out of which she had arisen and whose Scriptures she retained as her own, it was in itself a defect in this part of her theological phraseology that it did not, as it stood, more decisively exclude the interpretation which would assimilate the unity of the Godhead to the merely specific unity in which three separate, individual men partake. But a deficiency in the philosophical vocabulary of the Latin-speaking Churches as compared with that of the Greek-speaking Churches proved of valuable service in helping to remedy this defect.

As we have said on page 27 above, "substantia" was regarded in philosophical Latin as the translation of the Greek word ὄσια and "essentia" which was afterwards found to be useful for this translation, failed for a long time to obtain recognition in this capacity. Therefore, there arose the difficulty in rendering into Latin the discrimination between ὄσια and ὑπόστασις necessary to the orthodox expression of the doctrine of the Trinity. "Substantia," which naturally would have been used for ὑπόστασις, of which it was the direct translation, was needed to represent ὄσια. Thus, another word had to be found to represent ὑπόστασις.

It seems to have been Tertullian who discovered the word to serve this purpose which was ultimately to take the place of ὑπόστασις in the theological phraseology of the Western Church and to suggest a useful variant for it in the
theological phraseology of the Eastern Church. This word was
"persona." Though used in the relation of which we are now
speaking to stand for ὑπόστασις, it had already a more nearly
literal representative in the Greek word ἰησοῦς· To Greek
theology this is not unknown as a synonym of ὑπόστασις when
employed in formulating the doctrine of the Trinity. But there
seems reason to guess that the introduction of this word ἰησοῦς
into Greek theological terminology was due to the reaction of
the Western usage upon the language of the East. Its first
appearance in theological reference is in the works of Hippolytus,
a presbyter of the Roman Church who nevertheless wrote in the
Greek language. Also, Hippolytus was to a considerable extent
in theological and ecclesiastical sympathy with his African
contemporary Tertullian. But whether Hippolytus was influ-
enced by Tertullian's use of "persona" or not, "the evidence
would still point to the Eastern Church having borrowed the use
of ἰησοῦς from the Western, in which Latin (already, no
doubt, though Hippolytus still wrote in Greek, by his time the
medium of ordinary intercourse), became with Tertullian the
language of theological literature as well." 5

Whatever the case might be, "persona" became the prin-
ciple Latin word to translate the Greek word ὑπόστασις in
its theological sense, and the use of its more literal render-
ing ἵησοῦς as an alternative expression for ὑπόστασις in
Greek balanced the suggestion contained in the use of ὑπόστασις
of a too complete distinction of Father, Son and Holy Spirit

5. C. C. J. Webb, God and Personality, p. 45.
within the Godhead, as that of three men within the human species, by a suggestion of an exactly opposite kind. For had, principally because it had not acquired the legal associations of "persona," made still less progress than "persona" towards the modern philosophical use of "person."

Primarily, meant the "face," not, like "persona," the "actor's mask," which was properly in Greek . So far as it had come to be used at all for an individual human being, it was probably rather through taking the "face" to stand for the man, much after the fashion as we speak of "counting noses," than through being used for a "dramatis persona," although it has been found to have been used occasionally in this sense. This being the history of the term , it is not surprising to find that it suggested a mere "aspect" or "role" even more than did "persona." Several such aspects might be presented, several such roles discharged by the same individual at different times. Therefore, , used of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, might suggest, did one but forget that one might also say that the distinction between them was one of as superficial, perhaps of as temporary a character as that between the different aspects the same man may wear on different occasions, or the different parts he may take in different conversations.

Thus, what we may call the philosophical use of "person" in the modern European languages has been determined by the use in the framing of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity of and "persona" as equivalent expressions.
B. The Early Idea Signified by the Word "Person"

It is to Anicius Boethius (480-524), the Roman statesman and philosopher and the last Roman writer of any mark who understood the Greek language and literature, that we owe the definition of "persons" which became the standard definition for the writers of the Middle Ages. It occurs in his "Contra Eutychen et Nestorium," written about 512. Nestorius and Eutyches held two opposite views of Christ's personality, both being regarded by the main body of the Christian Church as heretical.

His well known definition of "persons" is - "naturae rationabilis individua substantia."⁶ Here is brought out what Webb calls "the double-facedness of the term."⁷ For when we use the word "person" we describe that which we so designate as an individual, not as a universal which may attach to many individuals. "Naturae rationabilis," taken by itself as a universal, is not a person. But neither is any individual a person whose nature is not rational, i.e. an individual which is not aware of itself as an instance of a universal. Therefore, an individual piece of coal is not a person, because, though we recognize that there is a common nature which it shares

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with other pieces of coal, the piece of coal itself is not aware of this. Nor is an animal, such as a dog or a cat, a person, because, although it may possess for example in the form of sex attraction an instinctive awareness of the presence in others of a nature common to them with itself, yet we do not suppose that it reflects upon this so as to form a general notion of this common nature. Nor do we generally apply the term "person" even to a human infant which has not yet arrived at the stage of such reflection. When some religious psychologists such as John E. Kuizenga of Princeton say that a human baby is a person, but only a candidate for personality, they are using the word "person" to express his inherent rational nature, and the word "personality" to express his rational nature in a developed state. These men are not in conflict with what I am saying, but are simply using terms loosely. It is only to mature human beings that within the sphere of our everyday experience we commonly apply it, because only in them do we find a full recognition of his or her self as at once distinct from other selves and sharing along with other selves in a common nature.

It is true that a corporation may be a person in law, as suggested on page 24, and may be treated like an individual man or woman as a subject of rights and duties. But to call a corporation or College a person without qualifications would be unnatural and pedantic. It is true that in the early stages of civilization the community and not the individual was regarded

8. From class lectures in Christian Ethics, 1937.
as the primary subject of rights and duties, but with the birth of democracy the individual person's rights and duties have come to be recognized.

It is also to be noted that the two notes in the conception of "personality" which are expressed in Boethius' definition of "persona" may be said to be emphasized the one rather by that word itself, the other by what is its Greek equivalent in this sense, i.e. the rational nature rather by "persona," the individual subsistence by ὑπόστασις. The word ὑπόστασις does not by itself convey any suggestion of a "naturae rationabilis." There is nothing in its etymology to forbid its application even to a merely material thing. We have already seen (page 26) that in one of the earliest instances of its scientific use, in the passage from the pseudo-Aristotelian "de Mundo," it is even used to distinguish the solid corporeity of a comet from a mere effect of reflected light like a rainbow. But the later usage of the word tended to give to it dignified associations which made it suggest a higher kind of reality than could be ascribed to a mere inanimate thing. Boethius asserts in his definition of "persona" that the Greeks do not use ὑπόστασις even of irrational animals, but only of rational beings. This is probably not true in the unqualified form in which it is here asserted. But it must have some ground in fact. If we accept it as having come from Boethius, it must be allowed considerable weight. As has been stated on page 35, Boethius was well read in Greek literature, philosophical, scientific and theological. He had translated
into Latin Plato, Aristotle (including the entire six books of
the "Organon"), Archimedes, Euclid and the "Isagoge" of Porphyry.
Thus, such a man as Boethius hardly would have made such a state-
ment had it not held good in a great majority of instances. We
have already seen (pages 30,31) that not only was οὐσίας the
word used by the Christian theologians of the Father, Son and
Holy Spirit whom they worshipped as one God, but it was also
used by Plotinus to indicate the three members of his Trinity -
"the Supreme Good," "the Intelligence" and the "World-Soul" -
a Trinity suggested by Plato's "Timaeus," and despite very im-
portant differences, presenting a certain correspondence with
the Trinity of the Christian faith. The use, therefore, of
οὐσίας to indicate the members alike of the Neo-Platonic
and of the Christian Trinity suggests that Boethius was justi-
fied in calling attention to this association of special dig-
nity with the word as characteristic of Greek thought as a
whole during the period in which it had been used as a techni-
cal term of philosophy.

Now if οὐσίας, in spite of the absence of any
suggestion of the kind in the etymology of the word, had come
to imply the individual subsistence not of any nature, but
only of a "naturae rationabilis," "persona" was from the first
obviously inappropriate to any but a "naturae rationabilis."
Only a "rational" being could be an actor in a play or a party
to a suit or contract. On the other hand, there was lacking
in "persona," and perhaps still more in its Greek represent-
ative πρώσωπον, any decided suggestion of a permanent, in-
alienable, fundamental individuality. Rather, it carried with
it the associations of an occasional, temporary, voluntary activity, although no doubt also of one which distinguished him who exercised it from the mass of his fellows and made him in some particular respect an outstanding figure. An individual man is not born a player or official. When he ceases to act in any of these capacities, he does not thereupon cease to be, nor while he is acting in them do they absorb the whole of his existence.

In general the history of the word "person," with its derivatives in philosophical terminology, may be said to have moved on lines determined for it by the process whose result is summed up in Boethius' definition of "persona." Within these lines there has been a continual oscillation, according as the thought, emphasized by the Greek word ὑπόστασις, of independent and fundamentally unchangeable individuality, or the thought of social relationship and voluntary activity, suggested by the Latin word "persona," has been uppermost.

C. Modern Approaches to the Study of the Meaning of "Person"

(1) The first aspect of personality in what I have called "modern" approaches to this study, although its foundation was laid in a passage of the twelfth-century mystic Richard of St. Victor,⁹ is what is termed "incommunicability." To dwell upon this feature of personality was congenial to the tendency which from the middle of the thirteenth century

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manifested itself in medieval philosophy towards preoccupation with the problem of individuality. It is plain that, in emphasizing the incommunicable nature of personality, these writers of medieval philosophy were attending to that part of the conception of personality, as defined by Boethius, which is expressed by the words "individus substantia" and suggested by the Greek word ὑπόστασις, rather than to that expressed by the words "naturae rationabilis" which remind one more of the original associations of the Latin "persona." It became the custom to use in defining "persona" phrases which, like "suppositum," or "ens completum," called attention mainly to its concrete individuality, though, of course, with some epithet such as "intellectuale" to distinguish persons from "supposita," concrete individuals, of a lower order. This practice still persisted among the philosophical theologians of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

Certainly Calvin was greatly influenced by this line of thinking when he, in speaking of the Persons in the Godhead, wrote:

What I denominate a Person, is a subsistence in the Divine essence, which is related to the others, and yet distinguished from them by an incommunicable property. By the word "subsistence" we mean something different from the word "essence." For, if the "Word" were simply God, and had no peculiar property, John had been guilty of impropriety in saying that he was always "with God," without subsisting in the Father, hence arises that subsistence, which, although inseparably connected with the essence, has a peculiar mark, by which it is distinguished from it. Now, I say that each of the three subsistences has a relation to the others, but is distinguished from them by a peculiar property. We particularly use the word "relation" (or comparison), here, because, when mention is made simply and indefinitely of God, this name pertains
no less to the Son and Spirit, than to the Father. But whenever the Father is compared with the Son, the property peculiar to each distinguishes him from the other. Thirdly, whatever is proper to each of them, I assert to be incommunicable, because whenever is ascribed to the Father as a character of distinction, cannot be applied or transferred to the Son. Nor indeed, do I disapprove of the definition of Tertullian, if rightly understood: "That there is in God a certain distribution or economy, which makes no change in the unity of the essence." 10

It may be said, however, in defense of Calvin and the other philosophical theologians of his period that their works were written before Hegel's logic of opposites and dynamic becoming had reached them. It is not that I deny the existence of substance in the universe or in the Godhead; but I do deny that an adequate definition can be framed with substance as the only basis for such a task. Substance, by itself, is an unknowable.

(2) With the advent of Descartes a new light in philosophical thought was thrown upon the study of personality. Descartes, after attempting to carry doubt as far as it would go, had found one thing which he could not doubt, namely the existence of his own thinking self. Even to doubt he must think, and to think he must exist. This led him to state his famous dictum, "Cogito ergo sum." Starting from this certainty, he reasoned back to the assurance of the existence, first of God and then of the universe of objects. Thus by following this line of reasoning and treating the mind of man as the one unquestionable reality, he tore loose from the conviction, which the medieval philosophy held, that the

existence of something real other than the mind of man was beyond question, and introduced into modern thought that "psychological bias," the presence of which in so much of the speculation of the past three centuries perhaps more than anything else differentiates it from other periods of thought. The change of point of view due to the introduction of this "bias" is characterized by the changes in philosophical terminology to which it has led. Formerly, "subjective" meant what belonged to the existence of things as they were in themselves, independent of our perception or knowledge of them, "objective" what belonged to them as presented to or apprehended by consciousness. But now, since for Descartes the only thing whose existence was directly and unquestionably certain was the conscious mind, this conscious mind has arrogated to itself the designation of subject "par excellence" and "subjective" has come to mean what belongs to it, "objective" what is in any particular connection contrasted with it.

"Subject" has a similar origin and history to "substance." "Subject" originated as a rendering of ὑποκείμενο and "substantias" became the translation of ὑπόστασις.

The term "substance" became a source of embarrassment for the philosophers of the age of Descartes, because the thought which was provoked of an unperceived foundation, concealed underneath those immediate objects of our consciousness of which we are actually aware, was not easy to harmonize with a philosophy which found in awareness or consciousness itself what is surest, deepest and most abiding. The notion of personality was profoundly affected by this new set of the currents
of thought and "self-consciousness," i.e. "consciousness of self," came to be considered the essence of personality.

No doubt "self-consciousness" had always been implied in the definitions which spoke of a "naturae rationabilis individua substantia" or of a "suppositum intellectuale." Yet the changed attitude toward the old problems led to emphasis on what in those definitions was adjectival, almost or quite to the exclusion of what in them was substantive. When Christian Wolff, the Schoolman of the Enlightenment, defines "person" as "Ein Ding das Sich bewusst ist" (a thing that is conscious of itself), the words might stand as a translation of Ockham's "suppositum intellectuale." Yet the rest of the phrases are quite different. In Wolff's definition as compared with Ockham's the substantive is the vaguest, most colorless word which could be found, instead of one implying a whole metaphysical theory, while the adjectival clause describes in terms which at any rate seem unambiguous the activity which in the older formula is merely designated by a conventional epithet that might well be thought to stand itself in need of explanation.

In the development of the study of consciousness two words have come into prominent use, namely: "perception" and "awareness." Perception is used to denote that species of

11. The expression "self-consciousness" probably originated in England, where we find it used by John Locke in his Essay Concerning Humane Understanding published in 1690. Locke's contemporaries also used the word.

awareness which we have of the existent; awareness is a mental state which is not a belief, though it is knowledge. These two terms are well defined in their use by Bertrand Russell when he says:

I am aware of an object, or am acquainted with an object - the phrases are used as synonymous - when "I have a direct cognitive relation to that object.... In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S.... When we ask what are the kinds of objects with which we are acquainted, the first and most obvious example is 'sense-data'." When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have direct acquaintance with the colour or the noise. We are acquainted, in introspection, with "objects in various cognitive and conative relations to ourselves. When I see the sun, it often happens that I am aware of my seeing the sun, in addition to being aware of the sun, and when I desire food, it often happens that I am aware of my desire for food... The awareneses we have considered so far have all been awarenesses of particular existents, and might all in a larger sense be called sense-data. For, from the point of view of theory of knowledge, introspective knowledge is exactly on a level with knowledge derived from sight or hearing. But, in addition to awareness of the above kind of objects, which may be called awareness of 'particulars,' we have also what may be called awareness of 'universals'.... Not only are we aware of particular yellows, but if we have seen a sufficient number of yellows and have sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal 'yellow'; this universal is the subject in such judgments as 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does.' And the universal yellow is the predicate in such judgments as 'this is yellow,' when 'this' is a particular sense-datum. And universal relations, too, are objects of awarenesses; up and down, before and after, resemblance, desire, awareness itself, and so on, would seem to be all of them objects of which we can be aware."13

Reservations must be made in accepting what Russell says are objects that we are aware of by introspection, but this does

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not affect the meaning of "awareness." This, then, is what "awareness" means. By "perception" is meant the awareness of what Russell calls "particulars," or sense-data in a large sense. All of these are substances. We can be aware of them only when they exist. Perception, therefore, is always awareness of the existent. But awareness which is not perception need not be of the existent. If I know what any simple characteristic means, I am aware of it. But my awareness, of yellow for example, does not prove that there is any existent thing which has the characteristic of yellow.

Perception, however, is not limited to the perception of substances. There is no perception except when a substance is perceived, but, along with the substance, we are able to perceive some particular characteristic of the substance. This is proved by the fact that we make judgments, which no one would assert were in all cases incorrect, that a substance has certain characteristics, for which our only evidence is our awareness. And, since the judgment is that a particular existent substance has characteristic, the awareness on which it is based must be perception. Since the characteristics of the existent themselves exist, the best definition of perception will be that it is awareness of the existent.

Now what are the existent things we perceive? It is clear that we do not perceive physical objects, as opposed to sense-data, or other people's minds. Our only ground for believing in them is by an inference from the sense-data which we do perceive. This does not mean that every belief in them
is a deliberate and conscious inference from a premise about sense-data. On the contrary, we often judge that there is a table in the room, or that we have met a friend, without making any judgment whatever that we have perceived sense-data. But, although our judgment that there is a table in the room is not an inference from sense-data, it will not be a judgment which we have any right to make unless we have experienced sense-data such that the existence of the table in the room could be legitimately inferred from them. And, if any doubt is thrown, by ourselves or others, upon the correctness of our judgment as to the table, the only way in which it can be justified is by an inference from sense-data.

In the same way the only way of justifying our belief that another person exists will be by an inference from sense-data which, except for a Berkleian, will lead first to a belief in his body, or a reality appearing as his body, and then to himself. Of course the sense-data which are the basis of such an inference need not be as closely connected with the object inferred as to be a case of what is commonly called seeing, touching, etc., the object itself. For example, I did not see the death of Jesus, but my belief in it is an inference from visual sense-data in reading the accounts of it in the Bible and other books.

We do perceive, then, sense-data, using this word in the larger sense, to include our perception of mental events by introspection. We do not perceive physical objects or other people's minds. But a vital question still remains. Does each
of us perceive himself?

McTaggart believes that this is the case and his reasons are based on the passage in Russell's paper already quoted on page 44.

We are certainly aware of certain characteristics, for example - the characteristic of equality. We know, therefore, the proposition, "I am aware of equality." If we know this proposition, we must know each constituent of it. Each of us therefore know "I." Whatever we know must be known by acquaintance or description. If, therefore, "I" cannot be known by description, it must be known by acquaintance, and each of us must be aware of it.

"I" must be known by awareness if it is to be known at all. The alternative remains that it is not known at all, and that no statements which contain "I" as a constituent are justifiable.

Of those philosophies which, without falling into complete scepticism, deny the reality of the self the two most important are Hume's and Bradley's. Hume seems to take the view that we must be aware of the self if we know it at all, since he contents himself with proving to his own satisfaction that we can have no "impression" of it, and does not discuss the possibility that I might have a "compound idea" of it, as I have of the death of Jesus which I did not see.

He offers two arguments against the possibility of an impression of the self. The first is that the impression, if there were one, must be the same throughout life.

There is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea.\(^{15}\)

But in answer to this we may say that it is not necessary that the impression should be the same throughout life. If the impression were had for but a minute, it would be enough ground to believe in the self then. There would, of course, be room for argument as to whether the same self existed before and afterwards, but, whether it did or did not, a self that lasted for a minute would still be a self. As for the passage quoted above, no one would deny that no impression of "pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations" could be an impression of the self. But Hume is wrong when he concludes at once that no other impression can be an impression of self. His grounds for making this illegitimate assumption are probably the fact that, if there is a self, it has parts, all of which are pains, pleasures, griefs, joys, passions, sensations, or something else which is not a self, and his supposition that, in that case, there can be no impression of the self which is not an aggregate of these. This becomes clear in his second argument:

Mankind are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an

\(^{15}\) Ibid.
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.\textsuperscript{16}

Without accepting the detail of this, we may agree that all the content of a self falls within various mental states, not selves, and that — at any rate, within certain limits — these change while the self remains the same self. But it does not follow from this that the self is not an existent reality, any more than it follows that a college is not an existent reality, because it is made up of men who are not colleges, and who join and leave the college while it remains the same college.

Furthermore, Hume's attempt to account for the arrangement of the mental states without accepting the reality of the self, when looked at more closely, seems to involve the very reality that it was meant to exclude. For what is meant by saying that the perceptions which exist from different "bundles or collections"? It does not mean that those which form the same bundle are connected in space with one another more closely than they are with those in other bundles, for Hume does not regard the perceptions as being in space. Nor can it be that they are connected more closely in time, or by resemblance. For, if there is really a bundle wherever there is, on the ordinary theory, a self, then similar and simultaneous perceptions are found in different bundles, and dissimilar and nonsimultaneous sensations in the same bundle.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the contents of each bundle must be determined to be parts of that bundle by their relation to, or inclusion in, some reality which is not any one of the contents, nor the aggregate of these taken as a plurality, but is something as ultimate as, say, one of the contents. If we reach this, we have reached the self.

It is not possible here in limited space, nor is it necessary to this thesis to consider in detail all the stages in Francis Herbert Bradley's analysis of the various possible meanings of the self, on which he draws his conclusion that the self is not absolutely real. If the view which we have taken is to be refuted in consequence of any of his criticisms, it will be by those which he offers in respect of the sixth sense of the word which he discusses, - that in which the self is a subject which becomes an object. 17 For the self which each of us knows by awareness as his "I" is that which is the subject which perceives and judges. The self is the subject in all knowledge.

"The self," Bradley says, "is a concrete group." He points out that most, if not all, of the content of the self can become an object and from this he concludes that very little, if any, of the content of the self can belong to it essentially. He holds that whatever becomes an object must be removed from the self and that therefore no self can know its own existence.

But there is absolutely no reason for holding that a self cannot be its own object, remaining all the time the self which has the object. If Bradley is correct, I could never know my self whether by awareness or by description, and consequently could never know any proposition in which "I" occurs. But the more we contemplate our experience, the more reason we find for holding that it is impossible to reject knowledge of self. Thus the absolute realism of Bradley and his disciple Bernard Bosanquet, founded upon Hegelianism, in which they reason ultimately that God is the only and the all-inclusive self, falls to the ground.

Thus it is that self-consciousness becomes one of the characteristic functions of a person, because self-consciousness implies the activity of reason. It is persons only that reason, and reasoning beings only that are persons.

(3) Since the philosophical revolution which we associate with the name of Descartes, one other remains to be mentioned as having affected in an important degree our way of regarding personality. The name which we associate with this revolution is that of Immanuel Kant. It was Kant whose proclamation of the primacy of the practical over the theoretical reason gave the chief impulse to the tendency, apparent in much recent speculation, to find in "will" rather than in "cognition"

18. In a footnote on p. 59 in God and Personality, Webb says that Leibnitz already defines "persona" thus: "Persona est cuius aliquae voluntas est, seu cuius datur cogitatio, affectus, voluptas, dolor." This definition is quoted by Wallace, Essays on Moral Philosophy VI (Lectures and Essays, p. 273), without a reference to the work from which it is taken.
the most fundamental characteristic of the experienced mental activity, wherein rather than in anything underlying experience, called "substantial soul" or the like, the modern world had come to seek the essence of personality. An emphasis on "will" rather than on "cognition" may easily lead to the search for the true sources of mental activity below "the threshold of consciousness," and thereby to a reinstatement of something strangely like the mysterious underlying substance or "suppositum" of the older schools, which the philosophy of experience believed itself to have exorcised.

Kant's theory of the "will" is embodied in his system of Morality. His doctrine is that nothing can be morally right but what can be regarded as law universal, i.e. obligatory upon all rational beings. This simply implies that every one's duty is always what would be any one else's under those same circumstances. Every "personal" interest and "personal" preference must be discounted in ascertaining what is "right." The presence of a personal inclination to what is right makes it possible that what seems to be a morally right action is after all due merely to this inclination and not to the consciousness that it is our "duty." Therefore the absence of inclination or the presence of positive repugnance to a certain course which is notwithstanding adopted becomes the one certain test of genuine morality: for the consciousness of duty alone could have moved us to act thus absolutely contrary to our liking.

But Kant's use of the words "personal" and "personality" is certainly ambiguous. At least it must be said that he does
not clear up an ambiguity involved in our ordinary use of the words, now for what is private and peculiar to this or that individual, now for knowledge and morality, which distinguish human beings not only from inanimate things, but from the lower animals. For these, although they possess life and consciousness, we do not call "persons" because they lack that capacity. As a result, he sometimes calls by the name of "personality" that very rational nature in virtue of which we can will to do what we see to be right for all who share that nature, whether we as individuals, with private feelings and interests unshared by our fellows, chance to like it or not. Sometimes, on the other hand, that from which in ascertaining the universal laws of morality we have to abstract is called by him "the personal distinction between rational beings." It is the use of the word "personal" in this second connection which corresponds with that employment of it of which contrasts the "personal" with the "rational;" although every one would allow that rational beings within our experience are personal, nor should we call any beings personal which we did not take to be rational.

But, however mistaken Kant may have been in some of his conclusions regarding "personality," he must be given credit for opening up a new channel of thinking on the subject of "personality," the development of which has meant much to the theological realm of thinking as well as that of the psychological and philosophical.

(4) The last of the modern approaches to the study of the meaning of "person" is what is called "feeling" or "sensitivity."

It has long been customary to regard the distinction of intellect and will — the contemplative and the active powers — as exhaustive, feeling being regarded as merged in impulse, desire, and volition, and the emotions as complex products in which cognition and appetency blend. To this view some psychologists still adhere. But, whether we consider the dual or the triple aspect of unitary consciousness as psychologically the more exact, it must be admitted that feeling is so unique a fact, and that the feelings are so impressive, bulk so large in consciousness, and are so important for human life, that it has become imperative to give the exposition of feeling a place either primary to or of co-ordinate rank with that of knowing and of willing.

The importance of feeling may be realized by a moment's consideration of the consequences of its withdrawal from consciousness. Were we incapable of pleasure and pain, of joy and sorrow, were nothing good in our eyes and nothing evil, we would be as stones, nothing could have any value for us, no event would have any interest for us and life would be shorn of all significance. It is because we are capable of feeling that we are interested in ourselves, or interested in each other, or have any questions to put about life and the universe, or have any reason for desiring any one event to come to pass rather than another. "It is feeling that stirs
to action the whole animated world." To say this is not laying a basis for hedonistic ethics, because behind this fact of pleasure and pain lies the impulse of self-preservation and self-development, which, setting us to action, conducts us to the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil." In the case of the lower animals, pleasures and pains receive purely a quantitative valuation, and, as such, absolutely rule their doings. In the case of a self-conscious being, who can make objective all the contents of his reason, and look before and after, pleasures and pains are valued relatively to his whole complex nature both individual and social, and to that ideal end which gives law to all conduct. "Self-conscious desire" and "appetite" are not synonymous terms. Pleasure and pain remain powerful factors in our life, although not sovereign masters prescribing even the moral law of conduct. They are the conditions of life having value, but are not themselves the standard of value.

Feelings can be classified into two classes according to the nature of that to which they attach, and from which they rise. (1) There are feelings that have "sensations" for their base. These may be called sensuous, or sensation-feelings. Examples of these are the pleasureable feeling arising from the taste of food, from the odour of flowers, from the light of day or the blue sky; or the painful feelings arising from melancholia, or weariness. (2) There are feelings aroused by "ideas"

that have these ideas for their base such as may arise from presentation of an object to sense, such as the sea or rising sun, when it also conveys a rush of ideas. Such feeling may also arise in the activity of memory and the constructive imagination. Examples of these are jealousy, fear, moral approbation, hope and the sublime. This class is usually distinguished as the emotions.

The first, the "sensation-feelings," are habitual and are common to all men. They mainly determine the mood or temperament, and thus tell upon the formation of character. These, however, are unique to human beings and have no bearing upon the establishment of the personality of the Holy Spirit in as much as they are derived from the senses of a physical body which the Holy Spirit does not have.

In discussing the second, the "emotions," it will be best to give an outline of the more prominent characteristics.

(a) The first point to notice is the "number" of the emotions. These are difficult to list in as much as languages vary in their ability to express these emotions. For example, we have no word in English to translate adequately the German "Gemuthlichkeit," and it is said no other language has an equivalent for the Scotch word "seriness." Furthermore, each one of the more familiar emotions subdivides into several species. Therefore, in the aesthetic emotions we have the pretty, the graceful, the elegant, the lovely, the picturesque; anger becomes indignation, rage, fury, resentment; joy becomes gladness, cheerfulness, delight, rapture, ecstasy. Probably every
modification of consciousness has its own modification of feeling. Thus, it is practically impossible to list an absolute number which will designate the emotions, but at least we are capable of thinking of them in numbers.

(b) Next we observe the manner in which the emotions "subdivide" in the mental life. Let us take fear for an example. We can trace its presence in the religious feelings of reverence, awe and adoration. It enters into the composition of the emotion of the sublime. Kant says it belongs to the sense of duty. In timidity, anxiety, suspiciousness, caution, bashfulness it requires but very little insight to detect its colouring. It acts as a check on conceit and arrogance. Superstition and intolerance would more readily slacken their hold if it were not for fear. The emotion of fear is, like all other simple feelings, in itself neither good nor bad. But it may enter as an element into the very worst and very best qualifications and activities.

The subdivisions of hope, pride, anger, etc. may be traced in a similar fashion.

(c) Our next step is to observe that the emotions "compound" themselves. Melancholy is a good example. In this pain of regret for loss so fuses with the pleasure of memory of possession, or the pain of self-commiseration so fuses with the pleasure of self-congratulation, that there emerges a new type of feeling - unpleasant, and yet too pleasant that men will even coddle it with tenderness.

Jealousy is a more complex example. Here joy and
pride of possession, the fear of loss, anger, indignation, rivalry, all blend to create a remarkable new form of emotion of tragic potency.

(d) Sometimes, instead of fusing, the emotions "conflict." Like emotions such as pride, success, generosity, kindness and courage combine easily and strengthen each other. But some emotions are contradictory and, like oil and water, never blend. Love and hate, arrogance and humility, ludicrous contempt and reverence exclude each other, and do so in proportion to their intensity. Yet sometimes they press simultaneously on consciousness. A friend will sometimes provoke at once our admiration and our contempt.

Then, too, there is a third case in which emotions may be simply different, although not contradictory, such as humility and hope. In this case the result depends entirely upon the ration of the predominance of one over the other. If the one feeling is much weaker than the other, the predominant emotion absorbs the other and converts it into itself, while yet receiving from it some modifications. As a result, the self-confident courage with which a speaker advances to an audience is sometimes met by the different feeling of alarm when facing it.

(e) The next point to command our attention is the "spread" of the emotions. If a man loves a woman, he is apt also to love everything connected with her. It is a common phrase to say "he worships the very ground she walks on." Palestine became the "Holy" Land by virtue of our reverence
for Jesus Christ who lived and died there. By such an emotion patriotism is created.

(f) In human experience, the "emotions of the soul are always correlated with commotions of the body," although in smaller degrees in the case of the higher or more intellectual emotions. Medical science and psychiatry tell us there is no doubt a correlation between every form of mental life and the physical organism. It is generally accepted that an excessive amount of bile in the liver will help cause a man to become depressed and melancholy. General physical health conditions play a strong part in the emotional life of a man.

(g) Also various emotions are correlated with "definite" bodily movements and each has its definite and characteristic expression. From the expression of the face we can tell that a man is deep in thought or is fixed in purpose. But we cannot tell what is the thought or resolution. In the case of the emotions, however, we can tell at once the fact of feeling and the definite nature of the feeling. Shame will cause a blush; fear will cause pallor; dilated nostrils will express rage; drooped eyes will express sadness. Actors master the various activities of the face in order to express the feelings of the character they are portraying.

(h) The "function" of the emotions is to serve as the connecting link between the intellect and the will, and to furnish us with springs of action. Aristotle was absolutely correct when he said, "Intelect moves nothing."

emotion that mediates, and translates thoughts into deeds. Nothing great was ever accomplished by a man incapable of intense feeling. We do violence to our nature, and demoralize ourselves, if we do not use emotions as the impetus to conduct, or if we permit ourselves to cultivate them simply for the luxury of having them.

(i) Next, notice the "inertia" of feeling. Hume says, "The imagination is extremely quick and agile, but the passions (emotions) in comparison, slow and restive."22 We can pass easily and rapidly from one object of thought to another and from one kind of mental activity to another. When we cannot, some harassing feeling is the cause. But we cannot pass as easily and rapidly from melancholy to gladness, from despondency to hopeful courage. Thus, emotions are in some respects a hindrance and in other respects advantageous to the movement of thought. The emotion that holds fast to a thought will not move and yield so readily as the thought, and may, therefore, cause a memory to haunt us, from which we desire to be free, and drag a belief back on our mind long after its logical hold has been loosened or destroyed. Such cases need the Christian application of psychiatry. On the other hand, we have the compensation that, once a new conviction has been well lodged in us, and has been well saturated with emotion, it becomes thereby a possession of which we cannot be easily deprived. In human

affairs emotion alone wields strongly and perpetuates securely. The intensity of emotional attachment makes ours a better world.

(j) We can see the ethical importance of the emotions when we consider their "relation to character." The springs of conduct lie among the emotions, in emotional dispositions, and in complex emotional formations. Men act from hope and fear; love and hate; from love of money, power, knowledge and distinction; from kindness, sympathy, or sometimes from malignity and misanthropy. Thus, when we describe the character of men, we, for the most part, do so in terms taken from the emotions. We speak of them as gentle, affectionate, cold-hearted, sentimental, etc. Even when we speak of a man's moral character in terms of intelligence, as when we praise him for prudence and discretion, we have in view types of intelligence created by a habitual preference for certain forms of emotion. Thus, the prudent and discrete man has had his habit of judgment formed by the emotions that have reference to evil and pain.

Also, when we speak of moral character in terms of will, such as praising a man for being patient and resolute, we are speaking of a will greatly influenced by certain emotions. Thus, the morally resolute man is possessed by a feeling of self-respect, honour, sense of duty, and hatred of meanness and craveness.

A man's moral character is the resultant of his controlling emotional habits and proclivities, and of the ways
in which they combine and co-operate. It is through the emotions relation to character that misers, philanthropists, etc. are made.

(k) Very definitely emotions stand in a relation to "religion." The Psalmist says, "As the hart (male of the red deer) panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God,"23 i.e. as the presence of water means life to the deer, so does the presence of God mean life to the human soul. The search for religious life comes from a desire to comprehend the use and meaning of our existence. This desire is awakened from a longing to be rid of the feeling of dreariness and worthlessness, and to be able to rejoice in the conviction that life has value. The possession of religion comes to a man as a new emotional experience; as a deepening and purification of his feelings; as a consciousness of inward nobility raising him above the world's vanity; as a new self-consciousness springing from a heart purged from the foulness of a bad conscience; as a revelation of a new capacity for praise and adoration. In the eighty eighth and one hundred and third Psalms we can see how this emotional life has an incomparable depth, and passes from deepest sadness to highest rapture. This is the sort of religion Christianity is meant to be.

But emotion cannot feed itself, nor can it support itself. The "sumnum bonum" revealed in immediate feeling demands reconciliation with the "sumnum verum"; and here all our difficulties in dealing with religion begin.

23. Psalm 42:1
experience of the heart enwraps ideas that we have great
difficulty in making clear and stable, and in bringing into
harmony with the facts of life and the world. The cor-
related creed has never yet been able to make itself more
than just a "reasonable faith," and in its details has
never risen above the fogs of controversy. Nevertheless,
no one who has truly experienced the religion of emotion
can doubt that it is the greatest and best that can ever
enter into the life of man, and that its necessary impli-
cations must needs be true.24

Of course, there is to be found a fervent emotional
religion without moral purity and without stable religious
character. This is often found in the case of revivals. It
was in this connection that Jonathan Edwards wrote his memo-
able book on "The Religious Affections" in order to set forth
the marks by which to discriminate between genuine and spurious
religious emotions. No empirical tests are available, and the
outcome of his effort is simply to show that religion must en-
wrap intelligence and volition as well as emotion - must root
itself in enlightened conceptions, and take form in a holy
walk and conversation - must grasp consciousness in the unity
of reason. But we must not lose sight of the fact that re-
ligion is centrally an emotional experience. Otherwise it is
purely formalism.

(1) Now the question arises as to whether emotion can
ever be accepted as "a ground of judgment, a basis of belief,
and a test of truth." There is no doubt that emotion is a
cause of belief, but a cause of belief is not necessarily a
ground or reason. Of course, in judicial trial and generally

24. Salmond, "Feeling," *Encyclopaedia of Religion and
in all purely scientific work emotion must be peremptorily excluded. However, in moral and religious questions emotion may sit in judgment on truth and error. When emotion seems to judge in moral and religious matters, it is found that the process is one of deductive reasoning assuming as true some such major premise as "No doctrine can be true which robs existence of worth and meaning," or "The Universe is at bottom wise and good and rational," and every proposition is straight-way rejected that is or involves the contradictory. But only the man who has had a complete religious experience has the right to sit in judgment on religious subjects, for the man without this experience lacks the materials for judging and the capacity for appreciation of the factors.

(m) The "proper wealth of reason" consists in its emotional experiences. We do not speak in a slighting manner of thought and volition when we say that we have lived only as we have felt. We have lived only as we have glowed with emotion. It is the hours of intense feeling that stand forth in memory. The more simple emotions, such as love and hate, hope and fear, are known by all men. But the higher emotions which come into activity in religious experience are known by only some men.

(n) The "intellectual" or "logical" emotions, such as arise in connection with cognitive activity and gather round the ideas of "truth," seem to be unknown to most men, for only a few lead an intellectual life. All men laugh and desire to be made to laugh; yet it does not appear that the higher reaches
of the emotion of the ludicrous are very common. The sense of
humour, with its subtle combination of quick perceptiveness and
genial kindness, is not a universal possession. The lack amounts
to a fearful impoverishment of reason. Those who lack it neither
see nor feel. Their souls become like leather.

All men have some "aesthetic sense" in a rudimentary
form. The decorations on their bodies and weapons on the part
of the most primitive races shows us from how deep a root in
reason the aesthetic emotion springs. It is as deep as the de-
mand for truth and goodness. Yet a true artistic sense is not
common to all men.

The same can be said for the "ethical sentiment" and
"religious emotion." No normal human being is lacking in the
emotion or moral approbation and disapprobation attendant on
the judgment of conscience, or perhaps an integral part of it.
Yet, man as a whole has not reached the highest moral order.
In like manner, all men are religious; yet they are also irre-
ligious. There comes moments in every man's life when the re-
ligious emotion burns higher than it does at other moments.
Mankind, individually and generically, has not attained to the
highest in the possibilities of religious emotion.

I have made no attempt to enter on the analysis of the
emotions in detail. It will suffice to indicate the most im-
portant principles of explanation. (1) The fundamental impulse
of self-preservation and self-realization, moving us to make
real the ideal possibilities of our nature. (2) Pleasure and
pain, joy and sorrow, attaching to the successful or thwarted
efforts, with desire for the aversion to all objects according as they aid or hinder us - our conception of good and evil being purely anthropocentric. (3) The Laws of Association. (4) The activity of the constructive imagination. (5) The Law of Relativity, i.e. every fresh experience has its nature and effect in consciousness determined by the antecedent and contemporaneous circumstances into the midst of which it enters. These doctrines seem to furnish an adequate explanation of the development of the emotional life throughout, and up to its highest reaches.

D. Conclusions Drawn from This Study.

In conclusion, let me state my convictions regarding the study of "persons." On page 41 I said, "It is not that I deny the existence of substance in the universe or in the Godhead; but I do deny that an adequate definition can be framed with substance as the only basis for such a task. Substance, by itself, is an unknowable." This statement is in strict accord with the best science of today. For example, no one doubts that electricity is an actual substance; but science cannot tell us what electricity is by defining it from its substance. We do not know what electricity from its substance, but we do know what it is from what it does, i.e. we define it functionally.

In like manner are we able to discover what a "person" is. When Boethius says that a "persona" is an "individus substantia" he is correct. Take a concrete case for example. The general term "man" is not the name of an individual, because
there are many "men," each of whom is "a" man. But "Socrates" is the name of an individual because there are not and cannot be in this way several Socrateses, each of whom is "a" Socrates. Of course, there may be several men called "Socrates," but they do not constitute a class characterized by participation in a common "Socrateitas," as the Latin Schoolmen said, of which each would afford an instance. In the technical language of elementary logic it is only "equivocally" that the name is applied at once to the philosopher and to the ecclesiastical historian.

A "person" is not only an individual, but an individual "substance." That is, we cannot call anything which exists only as an "attribute" of something "else" a "person," in the sense we are now trying to fix. No doubt there are senses of the word "person," and those earlier senses than the one we are studying, in which it signifies something which is not a substance but an accident - for example, an assumed character or a legal qualification. But in the sense in which "person" is equated with ὑπόστασις a person must be a substance, not an attribute, and moreover an "individual" substance. For a personal name, such as Socrates, is not the name of a "kind" of substance, whereof there may be many instances, but of an "individual" substance of which there can be no instances. Here a certain temptation to sophistry offers itself, which we shall do well to note as we pass and so to avoid yielding to it. "Person" itself (it may be objected) is after all a common term; it is therefore the name of a kind of substance and applies to many
such substances. I am "a" person as I am "a" man, or "a" lecturer, or "a" scholar, or "a" student, an instance of the universal "person" of which every one of my readers is an instance too. And on the other hand "a" man or "a" student no less than "a" person must be an individual substance. Is there anything to distinguish "person" in this respect from such other appellations as I have mentioned? I am, of course, assuming that by "person" we mean a rational "individual" or an "individual" mind. If "person" were a mere synonym for "human being," of course it would be a common or general term like any other, but I think that it is not usually employed as a mere synonym for "human being," and that we could not substitute it for this latter term on all occasions, but only in certain special contexts.

That leads me to my point. We know Socrates not by his "individuae substantiae," which we are in no way doubting that he had, but by his "naturae rationabilis," i.e. the way in which he expressed himself functionally. We cannot know anything, including a person, except by the way it acts and reacts when acted upon.

Therefore, when I defined a "person" on page 3 I said, "A person is an individual organism (substance) being endowed with self-consciousness consisting of perceptive and reflective thought, sensibility and responsible will." This definition is based upon the definition given by Boethius, but is phrased in the light of recent discoveries made in the fields of psychology, philosophy and theology.
In the next chapter I shall endeavour to show that the Holy Spirit is a "Person" in accordance with the meaning of "person" as I have traced it in these preceding pages.
THE PERSON AND WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

Chapter III

THE EVIDENCES THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS A PERSON

A. Statement of the Problem.

The personality of the Holy Spirit has been the faith of the Church from the beginning. This doctrine has had but very few opponents, even in the chaotic period of theology during the early centuries after Christ. In more recent times it has been denied by none but Socinians, Arians and Sabellians.

(1) In like manner, the doctrine of the Trinity has been held by the Church from its earliest history. The term "Trinity" appears to have been first used by Tertullian, while the corresponding Greek term ὙΦΙΑΣ appears to have been first used by Theophilus the Christian apologist, and older contemporary of Tertullian. In Tertullian, as in the subsequent usage, the term designates the Christian doctrine of God as Father, Son and Spirit.

Although the notion of a divine Trinity is characteristic of the Christian religion, it is by no means peculiar to it. In Indian religion we meet with the trinitarian group of Brahma, Siva and Visnu; and in Egyptian religion with the trinitarian group of Osiris, Isis and Horus. Nor is it only in historical religions that we find God viewed as a Trinity. Mention has already been made on page 31 of this thesis of the Neo-Platonic view of the Supreme or Ultimate Reality which was suggested by Plato in the "Timaeus"; e.g., in the philosophy
of Plotinus the primary Realities are triadically represented as the Good, the Intelligence and the World-Soul. Comte's philosophy might also be cited: the cultus of humanity as the Great Being, space as the Great Medium and the earth as the Great Fetish.

That which gives a special character to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is its close association with the distinctive Christian view of divine incarnation. In other religions and religious philosophies we find the idea of divine incarnation, but it may be claimed that nowhere is the union of God and man so concrete and definite, and so universal in its import, as in the Christian religion. As Augustine said, "If in the books of the Platonists it was to be found that 'in the beginning was the Word,' it was not found there that 'the Word became flesh and dwelt among us'." It is the very central truth of Christianity that God was historically manifest in Christ, and that He is still revealed in the world as the indwelling Spirit of the Church or community of Christ's founding. This Christian faith in the incarnation of the divine Word (λόγος, sermo, ratio) in the man Christ Jesus, with whom the believer is united through the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, constitutes the distinctive basis of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

(2) In ecclesiastical history there are five distinct

stages in the dogmatic development of the Trinity.² (1) The
formal identification of the pre-existent Christ of the Pauline
and Johannine theology with the Logos of Greek philosophy. In
the New Testament the identification is in the practical rather
than speculative interest, but in Justin Martyr and the apolo-
gists it may be regarded as the first step in the logical pro-
cess whereby the historical figure of Jesus Christ was caught
up into the purely speculative sphere. (2) The doctrine of
the eternal generation of the Logos or Son, hitherto regarded
primarily as the cosmological principle of revelation and not
therefore co-eternal with God. This doctrine, due to Origen,
which may be expressed in other words as the eternal Fatherhood
of God, entered into the Athanasian theology. Formulated in
the interests of the divinity of Christ, it conserved also, as
against Sabellian views, the distinction between the Father
and the Son. On the other hand, the subordinationism it im-
plied and acknowledged, while countering dyotheistic and tri-
theistic tendencies, lent support to the Arian conception of
the Son as a creature, especially after the Origenist theory
of eternal creation, which enabled Origen himself to regard
the Son as still primarily a cosmological principle, had been
abandoned. (3) The doctrine of the consubstantiality of Son
with the Father. This was affirmed against Arianism at Nicaea
in 325 A.D., where the concept, if not as yet the actual term,
Ωμοούσιος as applied to the eternal Son was amply vindicated.
As Athanasius taught, in jealous regard for the divineness of

² W. Adams Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, (Edinburgh,
the Christian incarnation and redemption, there was an absolute likeness between the Father and the Son, and also a co-inherence or mutual immanence (\textit{Περικωπησις}) of their Persons. This doctrine was based primarily on John 17:21 where Christ says, "thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee."

(4) The doctrine of eternal distinctions within the divine Nature, according to the formula of "three Hypostases in one Ousia or Substance" (\textit{τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, μία οὐσία}). To the Cappadocian theologians Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa we owe the final settlement, for which this formula stands, of the dogmatic terminology. In distinguishing between \textit{ὑποστάσις} and \textit{οὐσία}, the former denoting a real principle of distinction within the divine Nature and the latter the divine Substance, they sought to lift the orthodox doctrine out of the Sabellian modalism which recognized no distinction in reality between the Father and the Son, so impairing the significance of the historical Christ, and at the same time to vindicate it against the opposite error of heathen polytheism, of which it was so often accused.

Moreover, the Cappadocians gave to the third member of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, the definite place and character which He now possesses in the Eastern orthodoxy, as being also a \textit{ὑποστάσις} in the Godhead, consubstantial with the Father and proceeding from the Father through the Son. (5) The doctrine of the double procession from the Father and the Son, the "filioque" clause, was added to the Nicaeno-
Constantinopolitan Creed on canonically indefensible grounds.\(^3\)

This is a doctrine which represents the difference between Western orthodoxy and Eastern, with its view of procession as from the Father alone, \(\textit{μία πηγὴ Θεότητος}\), the unitary source of deity. Thus, according to the Eastern doctrine the procession of the Holy Spirit is "from the Father through the Son."\(^4\)

The Western doctrine of the double procession was conceived, in the interests of the divine unity, as counteractive of the subordinationism contained in the Eastern formulas; and found, under Augustine's influence, its way into the Athanasian Creed.

Curiously enough, the Athanasian Creed thus differs theologically from the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Creed in its original Eastern form on a point on which Athanasius' own sympathies would have lain with the Eastern symbol. The Greek (Athenasian) theology found the divine unity in the Father, the one fountain-head of deity, so leaving room for the conception of the Son and the Spirit as subordinate to the Father. The Roman (Augustinian) theology found the divine unity in the divine Substance, with the result that, as the distinctions between the three \(\textit{οὐσιωδεῖς}\) or Persons became weakened under the doctrine of the co-inherence, so attractive to the non-metaphysical Westerns,\(^5\) there remained no proper foothold for the doctrine of subordination.

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4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 177.
Let us now state the doctrine of the Western Church as held, as a whole, by the Roman Catholics and Protestants alike. "Although the doctrine of the Trinity was the subject of much discussion, dogmatic and speculative, in the Middle Ages and at the Protestant Reformation, and has been since, it has been formulated all along on the lines of the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds. Both Roman Catholics and Protestants, generally speaking, yield formal adherence to these symbols, and the old orthodoxy remains still the new." 6

The statement then is this: There are three Persons (ὑποστάσεις) or real distinctions, in the unity of the divine Substance, which is Love. The Persons are co-equal, inasmuch as in each of them the divine Substance is one and undivided, and by each the collective divine attributes are shared. As a "person" in Trinitarian usage is more than a mere aspect of being, being a real ground of experience and function, each divine Person, while less than a separate individuality, possesses His own hypostatic character or characteristic property (ἰδιώτης). The hypostatic characters of the Persons may be viewed from an internal and an external standpoint, i.e. with reference to the inner constitution of the Godhead as related to the cosmos or world of manifestation. Viewed "ab intris," the hypostatic character of the Father is ingeneration (ἀγεννησία), of the Son filiation, of the Spirit procession: wherefore, "The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is

eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son. 7 Viewed "ab extra," for Love functions externally as well as internally, is centrifugal as well as centripetal, 8 the hypostatic character of the Father is made manifest in creation, whereby a world is provided for beings who should be capable of experiencing fellowship with the divine Love; the hypostatic character of the Son in redemption, whereby the alienating power of sin is overcome; and the hypostatic character of the Holy Spirit in sanctification, whereby human nature is quickened and renewed and shaped to the divine likeness. Yet, while this is said, as there is no separation in the unity of the Godhead, so the one God is manifested in the threefold work of creation, redemption, and sanctification. Moreover, each of the Persons as sharing the divine attributes is active in the threefold work, if with varying stress of function.

It should be emphasized that the Trinitarian statement is never tritheistic in the sense of affirming three separate self-conscious and self-determining individualities in the Godhead. When it is affirmed that there are three Persons in one God, the word "person" is used archaically, and not in the modern sense of a center or core of personality. As has been said, it was a word used by Tertullian 9 as on the whole the best word by which to convey the idea of an inner principle

of distinction or individuation (ὑπόστασις). "It was a good enough word when it bore a vaguer and more flexible meaning than it bears nowadays in Western Europe." To say that there are three separate personalities in the Godhead would be polytheism. To say that there are three eternal principles of distinction or modes of subsistence in the Godhead is not polytheism, although in the speculative construction of the Trinity it might lead, and has sometimes led, to a theoretical pluralism or polytheism.

(4) It is here necessary to notice the speculative construction of the doctrine of the Trinity and its important bearing upon the problem before us. Even though the Christian Church in its early history came to consider the Trinity as an incomprehensible mystery of revelation, which reason might not probe, her theologians have not refrained, either in ancient or modern times, from speculation upon the doctrine. Harnack says that the doctrine of the Trinity in medieval days was "the high school of logic and dialectic." Then, as before and since, resort was quite often made to the principle of analogy, in order to throw light upon the mysterious notion of tri-personality in the Godhead. This is a principle which has received classical treatment by Augustine, who used in particular the analogies of the human self-consciousness and the relationship of love. It is not pretended, however, that by


such analogies the doctrine of the Trinity can be rationalized. Clearly, such analogies fail on one side or the other to satisfy the conception of "three Persons in one Nature (Substance)." On the one hand, the psychological analogy of the self-consciousness does justice to the unity of the Nature, but not to the distinction of the Persons. Haering\textsuperscript{12} points out that this is as true of the modern expositor Dorner's construction founded upon Hegel's "being in itself, being for itself, being in and for itself," as of Augustine's "memoria, intelligentia, voluntas,"\textsuperscript{13} in each of which he found the whole rational nature expressed; or of his "mens, notitia, amor."\textsuperscript{14}

On the other hand, the social analogy of love does justice, more or less, to the distinction of the Persons, but not to the unity of the Nature. In this case the three elements of the analogy are the loving subject, the loved object and the mutual love which unites them. The subject and the object possess, it is true, more than sufficient independence for the purpose in view, but it is difficult to see how the love which unites may be accepted as a distinct person, even in the vaguest sense of that term. The application of the psychological analogy may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy the theoretical interest attaching to the traditional dogma


\textsuperscript{13} Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate}, ch. ix-xv.

\textsuperscript{14} Augustine, \textit{De Civitas Dei}, xi. 26.
for which the Logos-conception stands, namely, the explanation of the relations between God and the world. On the assumption that the human individual is a microcosm, bearing traces of the divine personality upon him, it would seek to make more intelligible the unity in diversity, or more precisely the unity in triplicity, affirmed in the orthodox view of the Godhead.

Again, the construction of the Trinity which is founded upon the social analogy may be regarded as an attempt to satisfy the practical interest attaching to the traditional dogma, namely, the vindication of the truly divine character of the Person and Work of Jesus Christ. On the assumption that the love-created social unit is the real microcosm, it would make more intelligible the triplicity in unity which is also affirmed in the orthodox view of the Godhead. The social analogy certainly offers a picture of the inner constitution of the Godhead that corresponds to the Christian Gospel: "The Love of the Eternal Father is for ever satisfied in the Eternal Son; the Father and the Son are for ever bound together in the Holy Spirit, who is the bond of the Divine Love."15

In modern constructions of the doctrine of the Trinity there is a tendency to make much of the microcosm of human personality as carrying traces of macrocosmic reality. God is to be interpreted according to the teleological principle of the Highest, and human personality is the highest thing we know. The result is that we hear quite a great deal now, even in

non-Unitarian Christianity, of "the Personality of God," whereas the historical doctrine is that of "Personality in God." In regard to the first occurrence of the expression "Personality of God," Webb says,

There can....be little doubt that it should be among the writers of the eighteenth century, and in the period which historians of philosophy sometimes describe as that of the enlightenment. I do not actually know of any instance of the use of "the Personality of God" in our sense before Schleiermacher's Reden uber die Religion (Uber das Wesen der Religion), but he speaks as though the expression were already known and by some insisted upon. Its currency in England is, however, most probably to be attributed to its appearance in Paley's Natural Theology, the 23rd chapter of which is devoted to "The Personality of the Deity." This work appeared in 1802.16

It might be well to note certain characteristics of the thought of this period which would have assisted an expression with Unitarian associations, though not used by Unitarian writers, to escape the suspicion which would have attached to it on that account in the preceding age.

One of these characteristics was the several influences then most potent in the world of thought which tended to draw away attention from Trinitarian speculation and to fasten it upon the unity of the Divine Nature. Such was the great progress made by mathematical and mechanical science in the period illustrated by the names of Galileo and Newton, revealing clearly the unity of the material system and thereby impressing upon the mind the unity of its Cause. But this tends to encourage an abstract and unhistorical mode of thinking.

to which a doctrine like that of the Trinity, which seeks to construe the Highest in terms of a life of love, could make but little appeal. Such was the movement in philosophy inaugurated by Descartes with its preference for "clear and distinct ideas." But it seems that the philosophers and scientists of this period had not learned from Plato that the conception of unity is also not without grave difficulties of its own.

This was also the pattern of Locke's philosophy, with its cautious resolve to plant its feet upon the firm ground of experience and to abjure excursions into regions with the knowledge of which our happiness or misery has nothing to do; and to the temperament characteristic of that age the regions of speculative theology which had exercised the subtle wits of Platonists and Schoolmen in earlier times were apt to appear regions deserving so to be described.

Another characteristic of this period is the revival of the view of Saint Thomas Aquinas, which is now authoritative in the Roman Catholic Church, that, while Reason could demonstrate the unity of God, Revelation alone could make known to us the Trinity of Persons therein. This view prevailed among the adherents of tradition. It was also a view which relieves a theology claiming to be Natural or Rational from any obligation to trouble itself with a doctrine which is declared by its defenders to be of necessity altogether beyond its sphere.

Now, when we consider the direction taken by these two currents of thought, we can see that the use of a phrase like
"the Personality of God" would have been considered heretical in the early days of Trinitarian controversy. But I cannot see that these two schools of thought are incompatible. The ancient and medieval theology used the best science of its day, Neo-Platonism, to shape its doctrines. However, modern science, philosophy and psychology have done much to unlock the mysteries surrounding personality, although there are still many problems in this field which have not yet been solved. Each school of thought has much to add to our study and neither must exclude the rights and discoveries of the other. They differ only in their points of emphasis.

There are a few points in these two currents of thought on which we must guard our thinking carefully to avoid falling into pits of error. Personalism, which makes human personality the key to the mystery of the Godhead, will crumble into humanism if it does not allow for the knowledge of God gained through the Revelation of Scriptures. McDowall17 goes entirely too far when he contends that there is more than analogy between human and divine personality; there is also identity in their nature.

On the other hand, the "orthodox" school based on Platonism must not exclude "general" revelation and the truths we learn regarding "personality" as gained from the study of human personality. The Godhead is revealed to us in Scriptures through their functions and activities. But it must be added that concerning "the Personality in God" and "the Personality of God" we

have no right to speculate beyond that which Holy Writ tells us. However, the Bible tells us enough about the Holy Spirit, that particular One in the Godhead with which this thesis is concerned primarily, to give evidence of His Person through His work and function. Certainly A. A. Hodge was correct in saying,

As to their (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) mutual relations, of course we can know only the surface. There must be infinite depths in the conscious being of God to which no created thought can penetrate. It is plain, in the revelation God has made of himself in the history of redemption and in the record of it, that he exists eternally and constitutionally as three self-conscious Persons. But for aught we can know, in the depths of this infinite Being there may be a common consciousness which includes the whole Godhead, and a common personality. This may all be true; but what belongs to us to deal with is the sure and obvious fact of revelation, that God exists from eternity as three self-conscious Persons, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and that these sustain the following relations:

1. They all are modes of existence of one indivisible spiritual substance. "They are the same in substance."

2. Hence they must be essentially equal in power and dignity and glory. There can be no temporal pre-existence, no dependence of one upon the will of the other, no superior authority to which the others are subject. Therefore they are to be regarded and treated by all their creatures with equal love, gratitude, reverence, confidence and obedience. 18

The problem before us, therefore, is to give evidence of the personality of the Holy Spirit through His functions of intelligence, sensibility, volition, purposiveness, self-consciousness and His relationship to the Father and to the Son without doing violence to the Scriptural teaching of unity

in diversity, i.e. the Godhead of one substance expressed in three distinct Persons. Indeed, the Scriptures must be the source of our evidences, for pure speculative thinking can never give the answer to our problem.

It is also to be noted that every place in the Bible where the word "spirit" is used does not necessarily mean that it has reference to the Holy Spirit. We shall be able to identify those passages referring to the Holy Spirit by the functions ascribed to Him in the context of the passages and by the article used in the Greek New Testament.

B. Intelligence is an Evidence of the Personality of the Holy Spirit.

Acts of intelligence, the types of which are found only in persons, are ascribed to the Holy Spirit in both the Old and the New Testaments.

In Exodus 31:3 he is accredited as being the agent of wisdom, knowledge, understanding and workmanship when the Lord says, "I have filled him (Bezaleel) with the Spirit of God, in wisdom, and in understanding, and in knowledge, and in all manner of workmanship."

Joseph is said to have received his wisdom from the Spirit of God when it is written in Genesis 41:38,39 that Pharaoh called Joseph "a man in whom the Spirit of God is, forasmuch as God hath shewed thee all this, there is none so discreet and wise as thou art."

It is also inferred that Moses' wisdom was derived through the work of the Spirit when, in recording that the
work of Moses in governing the people was to be shared with seventy of the elders, it is said in Numbers 11:17, "and I will take of the Spirit which is upon thee, and will put it upon them."

When in Job 26:13 it is said in reference to creation, "By his spirit the heavens are furnished," the whole system of teleology must include the wisdom of the Spirit. The preposition "by" would indicate that the Spirit, in the work of creation, was more than just a means or a power, but rather a personal agent doing the work Himself. Certainly the design of the universe is, therefore, strong evidence of intelligence in the Holy Spirit.

The Holy Spirit is further said to be the agent of understanding and knowledge in Job 32:8, "there is a spirit in man: and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding," I Corinthians 12:8,10: "to one is given by the Spirit...the word of knowledge......and to another the interpretation of tongues," and I Corinthians 2:11, "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God."

Intelligence of the highest order is ascribed to the Holy Spirit in His work in the "gift of tongues." Practically all schools of psychology agree that language is a characteristic peculiar to persons. The development of language is one of the most glorious chapters in human history. Language requires an intelligence far above that of the beasts and the
fowls. Thus, when the Holy Spirit is spoken of as giving understanding of language to people, he is accredited with intelligence belonging to a person. In Acts 2:4 such credit is given the Spirit when it says, "they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance," and this was not a gift bestowed upon the apostles only, for in Acts 10:45, 46 we read that "on the Gentiles also was poured out the gift of the Holy Spirit, for they heard them speak with tongues, and magnify God." Paul also ascribes the "gift of tongues" to the Holy Spirit in I Corinthians 12:10 when he says that another, i.e. one human being distinguished from another, received "divers kinds of tongues."

Likewise, when it says that the Spirit speaks, the intelligence expressed through language is credited to the Holy Spirit. However, this is a function which perhaps more properly should be classified under volition, or will.

Also, when the Holy Spirit is called the "Spirit of truth" in John 15:26 and 16:13, there is no question but what the evangelist means this to imply intelligence for the word "truth" denotes wisdom.

Memory is another characteristic of intelligence which is possessed by the Holy Spirit. John 14:26 says, "the Holy Spirit....shall bring all things to your remembrance," and unless the Spirit has the capacity for memory he cannot bring "remembrance" to us.

Although the Holy Spirit is not spoken of precisely
in Isaiah 43:25 and Jeremiah 31:34 where God says, "I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more," nevertheless, it is inferred that memory is a function of intelligence shared by all three Persons of the Godhead. In like manner "reason" is ascribed to God in Isaiah 1:18, "let us reason together, saith the LORD." Reason is a sound philosophical basis for argument of the possession of personality. Reason is a function of the highest intellectual order.

The accrediting of all prophecy in the Old and the New Testaments to the work of the Holy Spirit is another sound piece of evidence of His intelligence. Prophecy indicates not only knowledge of the past and the present, but also of the future. Throughout the Old Testament, when a prophet spoke his wisdom was said to have come directly from the Spirit. A characteristic example is found in II Samuel 23:2, "the Spirit of the Lord spake by me, and his word was in my tongue." And in Joel 2:28,29 when the Lord says, "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions: and also upon the servants and upon the handmaidens in those days will I pour out my Spirit," the fact that prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit is clearly conveyed.

In the Gospels the Old Testament prophecies are quoted extensively to show that Jesus was the Messiah, fulfilling that which was foretold in the Old Testament. In the Epistle to the Hebrews the relation of the Spirit to Scripture and prophecy...
shows a notable advance. As in Talmudic teaching, the Holy Spirit speaks directly through Scripture, and not, as hitherto in the New Testament, medially through the Old Testament writers as found in Acts 1:16, "this scripture must needs have been fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit by the mouth of David spake before concerning Judas," and 28:25, "well spake the Holy Spirit by Esaias the prophet unto our fathers...."

The Spirit which spoke in and through Old Testament prophets is described as the Spirit of Christ in I Peter 1:11, "the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ." Weiss holds that "this Spirit is none other than the eternal Spirit of God, in which the decoc relating to the Messianic salvation was formed from eternity." Others who hold this view with Weiss are Schmid, Beyschlag and Briggs. There are some Bible scholars, however, such as Lechler, Gloag, Pfleiderer, Bovon and Holtzmann who contend that this means the Spirit of the pre-existent Christ." Either way, the revelation in both Old and New Testaments by prophets or evangelists is regarded as continuous, the same Spirit operating in both, and later "the Spirit of prophecy" and the "witness about Jesus" are interchangeable terms, as found in Revelation 19:10, "for the testimony about Jesus is the spirit of prophecy."

Righteousness and judgment are also qualities of intelligence possessed by the Holy Spirit. In the prophecy of

Isaiah 32:15-17 it is said that the land shall be desolate "until the spirit be poured upon us from on high, and the wilderness be a fruitful field, and the fruitful field be counted for a forest. Then judgment shall dwell in the wilderness, and righteousness remain in the fruitful field.

And the work of righteousness shall be peace; and the effect of righteousness quietness and assurance for ever." In Psalm 143:10 we find this prayer: "Teach me to do thy will; for thou art my God: thy spirit is good; lead me into the land of uprightness," and again in Isaiah (11:2-5) we read "the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord, and shall make him of quick understanding in the fear of the Lord; and he shall not judge after the sight of his eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his ears: but with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and reprove with equity for the meek of the earth: and he shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked. And righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins." This last quotation pertains to the Messiah's rule in His Kingdom and tells us that Christ has the counsel of the wisdom and righteousness of the Holy Spirit upon which He can depend.

Righteous judgment is ascribed to the Spirit in the New Testament in Acts 15:28 when Peter spoke to the people at Jerusalem and said, "it seemed good to the Holy Spirit... to
lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things."

Scriptures, therefore, tell us that not only is the Holy Spirit righteous and just in that His wisdom gives Him knowledge to discern between all that is right and all that is wrong, but also that in His instructions to us He conveys to us wisdom to judge righteously. He is thus the agent of righteousness.

Being righteous, the Holy Spirit is therefore a "moral" person. His goodness is acclaimed in both the Old and the New Testament. In Nehemiah 9:20, when that noble prophet was praying for the Levites and was recalling God's care of the Israelites during their sojourn in the wilderness, he said, "Thou gavest also thy good spirit to instruct them." In the New Testament the word "Holy" is used more often with "Spirit" than in the Old Testament. As was seen in chapter I of this thesis, "holy" implies the quality of perfect moral goodness.

From the evidence before us, we draw the conclusions that the Holy Spirit is the possessor of intelligence and is the giver of wisdom, knowledge, understanding, discretion and workmanship to human persons. Being credited with powers of memory and anticipation of the future, reason and the agency of design in the universe, intelligence which is peculiar to personality, personality is ascribed to the Holy Spirit. And by the function of His thinking and His actions resulting from his thinking (to be discussed under the topic of the will of the Holy Spirit) He is also a moral person.
C. Sensibility is an Evidence of the Personality of the Holy Spirit.

Certain acts of feeling are ascribed directly to the Holy Spirit. For example, Paul says in Ephesians 4:30, "grieve not the Holy Spirit of God," thus indicating that the Holy Spirit can suffer sorrow and grief. Vexation, or anger, is also a feeling of which the Spirit is capable as is evidenced in Isaiah 63:10, "they rebelled, and vexed his holy Spirit." The Holy Spirit can experience "joy" for Paul speaks of "joy in the Holy Spirit" in Romans 14:17. Although this verse refers to the "righteousness" and "peace" and "joy" which believers possess "in the Holy Spirit" when they do good works and obey God, it nevertheless implies that the Spirit also has the capacity for these qualities. This verse also serves as a testimony of how the intelligence and sensitivity of the Holy Spirit work together. The Holy Spirit is the inspirer of good works in human beings, and righteousness, peace and joy are the reward for these works.

Now from Hegel's logic of opposites we know that each feeling must also have an opposite feeling. We cannot recognize grief unless we know what joy is, nor can we recognize anger without knowing the feeling of being pleased. Love is also one of the opposites of anger and wrath, and is, therefore, one of the feelings possessed by the Holy Spirit.

Anger and grief are not negations of love and joy; they are positive feelings. If they were negations, a person could be capable of experiencing love and joy without having
the capacity for anger and grief. It is upon the truth of this proposition that those who deny that God can be a wrathful God and also be a loving God, fall into grave error. If God be denied the capacity for anger and wrath, He must on the same basis of argument be denied the capacity for love. It is thus that many people, in trying to arrive at the idea of a perfect God, unwittingly deny Him as a Person, which, to do, is fatal to the conclusion for which they strive.

Hate is also a feeling which is an opposite of love, and is, therefore, a feeling experienced by the Holy Spirit. He would not be a perfect moral person if He could not hate, for it is necessary to His perfection that He hate sin.

The Holy Spirit can be tempted. Peter said to Sapphira, the wife of Ananias, when he learned that this man and his wife had been deceitful with money which belonged to the Church, "How is it that ye have agreed together to tempt the Spirit of the Lord?" Peter previously had claimed that the Holy Spirit could be lied to when he said to Ananias, "Why hath Satan filled thine heart to lie to the Holy Spirit, and to keep back part of the price of the land?" For a person to be tempted and lied to, he must have feeling. Otherwise temptation and deceitfulness would have little meaning. Of course, these two violations against the Holy Spirit also involved the functioning of His intelligence and His will, but there are many activities of a person, and the effects on a person when acted upon, which bring into play the thinking, feeling and willing simultaneously.
Likewise, it is said that the Holy Spirit can be insulted, as for example in Hebrews 10:29 it reads, "Of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath treated with contempt (ἐνυβρίσας) the Spirit of grace." The Holy Spirit being called the "Spirit of grace" also implies that He has feeling, for "grace" expresses the feeling of love.

It is to be admitted that there are feelings which human persons experience, such as sensation-feelings of taste of food, the smell of flowers, etc., which are unknown to the Holy Spirit. The feelings which arise from the basis of a physical body are, of course, not to be found in the Holy Spirit. But this is no grounds for doubt that the Holy Spirit has a sense of feeling, nor even the right to doubt that his personality is complete. He does possess the basic senses of feeling such as love, pleasure, anger, etc. and sensation-feelings and their counter-parts are simply subdivisions of these basic feelings.

From this brief resume of the evidences of feeling in the Holy Spirit we can, in the light of the discussion of "feeling" in chapter II, draw the conclusion that the Holy Spirit is truly a person being capable of experiencing all the basic feelings necessary to personality.

D. Volition is an Evidence of the Personality of the Holy Spirit.
Even though the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son and accomplishes the work which they send Him to do, as for example His work as the Paraclete, He nevertheless exercises a will of His own. He does not have to rely on the wills of the Father and of the Son in the making of His decisions and the carrying out of His functions.

For the first example of evidence of the exercise of His own will let us consider His function as παράκλητος. In John 14:16-18 it is said, "He (God the Father) shall give you another Comforter (παράκλητος), that he may abide with you forever; even the Spirit of truth; whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him: but ye know him; for he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you. I will not leave you comfortless: I will come to you." When Jesus calls the Holy Spirit another Comforter, He is clearly distinguishing the Spirit as a person other than Christ Himself. And yet Christ is to be with the disciples through the presence and work of the Spirit. This is one of the mysteries of the Godhead. In answer to it I believe the doctrine formulated by the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan and Athanasian Creeds stating that there are "three Persons in the unity of the divine Substance" is the best explanation that can be given. This doctrine is supported by functions of the three Persons of the Trinity.

παράκλητος is only used elsewhere as applied to Christ by John in his First Epistle 2:1, "we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous," where it is rendered
"advocate" in the King James Version. This is the literal meaning of the word, - one who is called in to give instruction, encouragement, or help, or to appear and plead on our behalf before an adversary or a judge.20 By this meaning of Παράκλητος it is obvious that only a person can fulfill such an office. "Christ speaks, not of comfort, but of the Comforter. Not a thing, an event, or a fact,......but of a Person, who by His personal appearance actually comes to comfort us."21

It is in the capacity of an Advocate that the Holy Spirit speaks and teaches and it was in anticipation of this function that He was promised as an aid to the disciples when they would be on trial before Jewish and Gentile tribunals. This account was penned by Matthew in 10:30, "for it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you," by Luke in 12:12, "for the Holy Spirit shall teach you in the same hour what ye ought to say," 21:15, "I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay nor resist," and by Mark in 13:11, "whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye: for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Spirit." Thus in John 14:26 it is said, "He (meaning the Holy Spirit as the Advocate) shall teach you all things." And Paul says in I Corinthians 2:12,13, "Now we have received, not the spirit


of the world, but the Spirit which is of God; that we might
know the things that are freely given to us of God, which
things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom
teacheth, but which the Holy Spirit teacheth," thus showing
that Christ's promise of another Advocate was fulfilled. It
was in this same capacity that He was promised in the Old
Testament in Exodus 4:12, "I will be with thy mouth, and teach
thee what thou shalt say," although in this passage it is only
implied that it is to be the Holy Spirit who will do the teach-
ing. But in Nehemiah 9:20, "Thou gavest also thy good spirit
to instruct them," the Holy Spirit is obviously designated as
the one who taught the Israelites.

There are many passages in both the Old and the New
Testaments which give record of the Holy Spirit speaking.
Several of these were cited in the discussion on the "intelli-
gence" of the Holy Spirit and therefore need not be repeated
here. However, it should be said that in this function His
intellect and will are brought into activity simultaneously
and each supports the other in the function, though remaining
distinct aspects of His unitary consciousness.

It should be clearly understood that while teaching and
speaking are functions of the Spirit in His work as the Para-
clete, nevertheless every reference of His speaking and teach-
ing does not necessarily pertain to His work in this particular
office.

The will, or volition, of the Holy Spirit expressed in
His work as our Advocate is referred to when He is said to plead
in Revelation 14:13 where John says, "I heard a voice from heaven saying unto me, Write, Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord from henceforth: Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours; and their works do follow them."

The Holy Spirit has the will to choose (Acts 13:2, "the Holy Spirit said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them), the will to distribute (I Corinthians 12:11, "all these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will"), the will to forbid (Acts 16:6, "they...were forbidden of the Holy Spirit to preach the word in Asia"), the will to send forth (Acts 13:4, "they, being sent forth by the Holy Spirit, departed unto Seleucia"), the will to make overseers (Acts 20:28, "the Holy Spirit hath made you overseers"), the will to help (Romans 8:26, "the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities"), the will to make intercession (Romans 8:26,27, "the Spirit himself maketh intercession for us.....and maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God"), the will to work (I Corinthians 12:11), the will to search (I Corinthians 2:10, "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God"), the will to lead (Romans 8:14, "as many as are led by the Spirit of God," John 16:13, "the Spirit of truth......will guide you into all truth," Mark 1:12, "the Spirit leadeth him into the wilderness"), the will to strive (Genesis 6:3, "my Spirit shall not always strive with man") and the will to dwell (Romans 8:9, "the Spirit of God dwell in you," I Corinthians 3:16, "the Spirit of God dwelleth in
you," John 14:17, "the Spirit of truth...dwelleth with you"). In all these functions, the activities of the Holy Spirit are those which only a person can do.

By His work of sanctification the will of the Holy Spirit is also brought into activity. Romans 15:16 speaks of "the sacrificing of the Gentiles...being sanctified by the Holy Spirit," and again in I Corinthians 6:11 Paul says, "ye are sanctified...by the Spirit of our Lord." Peter in his First Epistle 1:2 identifies the "elect" as those who have attained this blessed estate "through the sanctification of the Spirit." Again in II Thessalonians 2:13 Paul speaks of "salvation through sanctification of the Spirit," that is, sanctification wrought by the Spirit.

The doctrine of sanctification is an extensive study in itself which the limits of space in this thesis will not permit to be discussed in all its implications and details. However, it will suffice to say that Paul insists that the Holy Spirit sanctifies both the inner life and body of man. His doctrine of the Spirit is at once ideal and practical. It deals with the commonest and homeliest virtues, and regards them as the products of the Spirit's indwelling. Not devout fervors alone, not dreams of far-off ideals alone, but the every-day qualities which one needs most in his commonplace life, are the Spirit's work. In Galatians 5:22 he tells us that "the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness and self-control." "These are the virtues which men need for every day's
common life and experience. They are the very substance of a
good and useful life. They make up the value and dignity of
life." Here again the will and the feelings of the Holy
Spirit function in harmony to accomplish the work which is
His purpose to do.

From the study of these evidences we conclude that the
Holy Spirit exercises a will of His own in the full capacity
of a complete personality. It must be added, however, that
the will of the Holy Spirit is at all times in perfect harmony
with the will of the Father and the will of the Son, whose
wills are also always in perfect harmony. This is a fact which,
like all other facts pertaining to the Persons of the Godhead,
is established on the basis of function. It is in the light of
the perfect harmony of the wills of the Father, the Son and the
Holy Spirit that it is often said that they possess a "common"
will. But to say that the three Persons of the Trinity possess
a "common" will must never be taken to mean that they do not
exercise separate and distinct wills, for to do so would be to
deny the existence of separate and distinct Persons in the God-
head which would be a violation of the teachings of the Scrip-
tures.

This same understanding must be applied also when it is
said that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit possess a "common"
intelligence and a "common" feeling, which results, therefore,
in a so-called "common" consciousness.

E. Self-consciousness is an Evidence of the Personality of the Holy Spirit.

We have seen that a being which thinks, feels and wills, and knows that he thinks, feels and wills, is a self-conscious person. But there are some aspects of self-consciousness not mentioned in Sections B, C and D which are deserving of a special Section.

In chapter II under "Modern Approaches to the Study of the Meaning of Persons" we have seen that "self-consciousness" is a process of thinking dependent upon "awareness" and "perception." We know ourselves through a subject-object relationship, i.e. by contrast of "self" with the "not-self." Hegel used this argument for self-consciousness in God. The error in his argument, however, lies not in its process, but in the object which he used. Hegel declared that God needs the universe forever in order that He may know Himself. God comes to self-consciousness in and through the world-process. Thus, Hegel gives us a finite God because He is everlastingly working to overcome that which is not Himself.

But, as has just been said, the process of Hegel's argument is correct. The subject-object relationship is essential to self-consciousness. However, the existence of the universe is not necessary to the self-consciousness of God; for within the Eternal Godhead there is a complete subject-object relationship between the three Persons - Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

This subject-object relationship between the three
Persons of the Trinity is revealed in both the Old and the New Testaments, but more clearly in the New. Even though the doctrine of the Trinity is quite vague in the Old Testament, probably because of the Hebrew defense of monotheism against the wide-spread polytheism of those early days and thus any statement that might be confused with polytheism is carefully guarded, there is, nevertheless, a most significant use of plural endings to the verbs and nouns in Genesis 1:26, "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." It is to be admitted that שָׂמַח הָאָדָם is in the plural for the purpose of expressing power and glory in God, but no such interpretation can be given to הָאָדָם (let us make), אֱלֹהֵינוֹ (our image) and יְחַיֵּינוּ (our likeness), for שָׂמַח does not require plural endings of words used in a relative connection. Certainly this verse implies conversation between the three Persons of the Godhead, or at least between two of them, and any conversation establishes the subject-object relationship. This verse unquestionably ascribes self-consciousness to God the Creator.

In the New Testament the references to conversation between the Persons of the Trinity are more frequent than in the Old Testament. At the baptism of Jesus, recorded by all four Gospel writers (Matthew 3:13-17, Mark 1:9-11, Luke 3:21-22, John 1:32-34), the Father and the Holy Spirit made their presence known. All four writers tell us that the Holy Spirit "descended like a dove," but they differ somewhat in the phrasing of what the Father said. Matthew records it, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased," implying that the
message is directed to the people who witnessed the baptism. Mark's account says, "Thou art my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased," and Luke records it in a similar manner, "Thou art my beloved Son; in thee I am well pleased." There is no question but that Luke means that God the Father spoke directly to His Son. John does not give record of the direct statement from the Father, but it is implied in the testimony of John the Baptist when he says, "And I saw, and bare record that this is the Son of God."

In none of these accounts, however, is any mention made of the Holy Spirit saying anything, but that is due, no doubt, to the difference in the missions of the Father and the Holy Spirit. The Father was testifying that Jesus Christ is the Divine Second Person of the Godhead; the Spirit was anointing Jesus with power and glory for our Lord's supreme offices of Prophet, Priest and King.

Brief mention should be made here of the significance of "the dove." Indeed Luke seems to materialize the vision of the dove when he says, "the Holy Spirit descended in a bodily shape like a dove." "But the four Gospels agree that the dove was but a symbol of the Holy Spirit, and that it was the Spirit and not the dove which descended and abode on the Christ."23 No evangelist says εἶδον περιστερὰν καταβαίνοντα. The dove was the visible sign which drew attention to the illapse of the invisible Spirit. The Spirit was not in the dove, even as

afterwards at Pentecost He was not in the wind nor the fire.

Further evidence of the personality of the Holy Spirit, which may be classified under the heading of "self-consciousness" expressed by the relationship between the Persons of the Godhead, is derived from the use of the personal pronoun when Christ speaks of Him. Charles Hodge says, "A person is that which, when speaking, says I; when addressed, is called thou; and when spoken of, is called his, or him." If this statement be accepted as a partial definition of "person" based upon the function of "self-consciousness," then the Holy Spirit is unquestionably a "person." Even though it must be conceded that in the Bible, especially in the Old Testament, the heavens and the elements are often personified, this need not cause any difficulty. There is no confusion between the personifications used as figures of speech, and those in which God, or Christ, or the Holy Spirit is introduced as a person. An illustration can be taken from present day literature. Poets and novelists often personify nations, mountains, rivers, stars, etc., but they are always understood as figures of speech and are never confused with real persons. Hodge further states that "the Holy Spirit is introduced as a person so often, not merely in poetic or excited discourse, but in simple narrative, and in didactic instructions; and his personality is sustained by so many collateral proofs, that to explain the use of the personal pronoun in relation to Him on the principle of personification,

is to do violence to all the rules of interpretation." Therefore, our Lord indicates that the Holy Spirit is a person when He says, "When the Comforter (ὁ παράκλητος) is come whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth (τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας) which (ὁ) proceedeth from the Father, He (ἐκεῖνος) shall testify of me (John 15:26). The use of the masculine pronoun "He" instead of "it," shows that the Spirit is a person. It is also to be noted that (παράκλητος) is masculine, the pronoun referring to it must of course be in the same gender. But as the explanatory words τὸ πνεῦμα intervene, to which the neuter ὁ refers, the following pronoun would naturally be in the neuter, if the subject spoken of, the πνεῦμα, were not a person. In the following chapter, John 16:13,14, there is no ground for this objection. There Christ says, "When He (ἐκεῖνος), the Spirit of truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth: for He shall not speak of Himself; but whatsoever He shall hear, that shall He speak, and He will show you things to come. He shall glorify me (ἐκεῖνος ἐμὲ δοξάσει): for He shall receive of mine, and shall show it unto you." In these verses there is no possibility of accounting for the use of the personal pronoun He (ἐκεῖνος) on any other ground than the personality of the Holy Spirit. In discussing these verses Stevens says, "Since the word πνεῦμα is grammatically neuter, all pronouns which have πνεῦμα for their immediate antecedent must, of course, be neuter also. It is obvious that the use
of neuter pronouns in these circumstances can have no bearing on the question of the personality of the Spirit. It is likewise clear that pronouns referring to the Spirit which do not have πνεῦμα for their immediate antecedent are, in all cases, masculine, i.e. the Holy Spirit is described by personal designation except where grammatical necessity compels the use of neuter words.

It may seem that the use of the masculine pronoun αὐτόν in John 16:7, "It is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him unto you," is due to the presence of the masculine noun Παράκλητος. But this certainly cannot be the case in verses 13 and 14, where Παράκλητος is not used.

Further evidence of the Spirit's self-consciousness is found in His use of the personal pronoun when speaking of Himself. In Acts 13:2 we find a noteworthy example where it reads, "The Holy Spirit said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul, for the work whereunto I have called them."

The doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and from the Son might also be classified in this subject-object relationship, but self-consciousness gained through this relationship is credited more to the Father and to the Son than to the Spirit inasmuch as the Father and the Son function as the subject and the Spirit functions in the capacity of the object. This would not indicate, however,

that the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit would be an
argument against the self-consciousness of the Holy Spirit, for
the work which He does as the agent of the Father and the Son
is work which only a person can accomplish. This fact was
brought out in the discussion of the "Volition of the Holy
Spirit."

From the study of the Subject-object relationship be-
tween the three Persons of the Godhead, we arrive at the con-
clusion that self-consciousness is an eternal possession of
each of the three Persons.

F. The Deity of the Holy Spirit is an Evidence of His
Personality.

Function is also the basis of our evidence that the
Holy Spirit is a "Divine" Person and is truly God. It is in
the New Testament that the greatest emphasis is placed on the
deity of the Spirit and in every citation the Scriptures ex-
press it from a functional point of view. Blasphemy against
the Holy Spirit is spoken of in Matthew 12:31,32, "the blas-
phemy against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven unto men,
......whosoever speaketh against the Holy Spirit, it shall not
be forgiven him neither in this world, neither in the world to
come," in Mark 3:29, "he that shall blaspheme against the Holy
Spirit hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal
damnation," and in Luke 12:10, "unto him that blasphemeth
against the Holy Spirit it shall not be forgiven." According
to the New Testament meaning of the word "blasphemy" (βλασ-
phemía) it is an act of railing, or reviling, which is not only a
violation against God, but against a personal God. It is to be remembered that these verses are quoted from the lips of Christ by the evangelists and their admonition is that those who sin against the Holy Spirit are in graver peril than those who sin against either the Father or the Son. Strong says, "It would be difficult to conceive perhaps, what would be the meaning of sin against the Holy Spirit unless He were a person." A law, or a principle can be violated, but only a personal God can be sinned against.

When Ananias lied to the Holy Spirit (Acts 5:3) he committed sin against the Holy Spirit and instant death was the punishment of his sin. And, as was shown in section C, lying can be done only to a person, for feeling, and also will, are involved in the act, not only in the person acting, but also in the person acted upon.

In these passages the Holy Spirit is correlated with God and in the form of baptism given in Matthew 28:19, "Go ye...and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," He is given a specific place in the Godhead and a name all His own. In the Apostolic benediction, II Corinthians 13:14, "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit, be with you all," He is likewise given His place in the Godhead, recognized as an individual Person separate from the Father and from the Son, even as the Father and

27. T. B. Strong, A Manual of Theology, p. 149.
Son are separate Persons from each other, yet all of the same substance.

The substance of the Godhead is therefore defined by the functions of the Persons in the Trinity and can be defined in no other way. We know that each of the three Persons is truly God, because the work which each does, is work which only God can do.

G. Conclusions Drawn from This Study.

When I defined a "person" I said he was an "individual organism," but did not say he had to have a body, i.e. a body of a physical nature. A physical body is not a necessary attribute to personality, although it was seen in chapter II that the conditions of a physical body play a strong part in the feelings of human persons. But, in the light of the evidences presented in this thesis, a "person" can be an "individual organism" in a spiritual sense, i.e. an "individual spiritual organism," or an "individual spiritual substance," and still possess a "rational nature" expressed through the functions of thinking, feeling and willing.

This fact is one of the pegs upon which hangs the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. For if this were not true, God could not be a person and the soul of man could not maintain its personality when at death it is separated from the body.

To say that the Holy Spirit is an "individual spiritual substance" and at the same time is of "one substance with the Father and the Son" may seem to be using contradictory
phrases. But recent psychology has discovered a vast field in "multiple personalities" within one human body. This analogy of human personality applied to the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be used in all the details which it involves. However, it does serve our purpose to show that it is possible to have three Persons existing in one substance in the Godhead.

Truly the Holy Spirit is a person, the divine third Person of the blessed Godhead, exercising all the functions of a complete personality. Through these functions of thinking, feeling and willing, and knowing that He thinks, feels and wills, He is a person of power and glory from whom we human persons can receive wisdom, happiness, joy and the power to bring our lives to the usefulness which we, in our best moments, most want them to be.

This thesis in no way pretends to exhaust the subject of the personality of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, "personality as yet has been only partially explored."28 But from the criticism of self-consciousness and the narratives of mystical experiences certain conclusions may be drawn - as that the Spirit is known only in His working, and not in Himself; that it is difficult to represent His personality to the mind, since He is manifested in the gifts which He confers without the medium of a physical body; that His presence is apprehended in the light that He brings rather than in what He is; that what lends

precision to the idea of the Spirit is to be sought in the character and life of Jesus, God's Son, whose Spirit He is; that His individuality is suppressed in His mission to glorify the Son; and that the organism He indwells, the individual Christian believer and the Christian Church, through which His operations are manifested, owing to the divided state of the Christian Church, is but dimly apprehended as "the Body of Christ," 29 "the Temple, the Habitation of the Holy Spirit." 30

On the whole question of the Holy Spirit's personality and the difficulty of its expression we cannot better the language of Swete:

The idea of the One Undivided Essence, subsisting eternally after a three-fold manner and in a three-fold relation, finds but very partial correspondencies in the nature of man or in any finite nature. When we try to express it in precise language, our terminology is necessarily at fault; the "hypostasis" of the philosophical East, the "persons" of the practical West, are alike inadequate; in the things of God we speak as children, and we shall continue to do so until "that which is perfect is come." Yet our imperfect terms represent eternal verities. The currency may be base, but it serves for the time to circulate amongst men the riches of God's revelation of Himself. 31

29. I Corinthians 12:27.
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Date: May 11, 1942

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Thesis Title:

The Personality and Work of the Holy Spirit

Thesis approved in final form:

Date: May 1, 1942

Major Professor: Dean F. D. Kerkmann

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