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National Identities Confronting European Integration

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INTRODUCTION

The modern antecedents of European integration can be traced back to the beginning of the 18th century with the publication in 1713 of the large "Projet de Traite pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe" by the abbey Saint-Pierre (1761), the European commonwealth of Blöntschli in 1871, and the project of European confederation proposed by the lawyer Gaston Isambert. In the 20th century, ideas promoting European integration go back to the proposals of the Comte Coudenhove-Kalergi (1922), who dreamed of a society of nations (pan-Europe) and of Aristides Briand (1929) for a European Union.[1] They took a more concrete form with the signing of a treaty in Paris in 1951 to establish a European Community of Coal and Steel, also called the Schuman plan, and with the signing of a treaty in Rome by the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and France in 1957 to create the European Economic Community (EEC). In the 1970s and 1980s, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined the EEC to bring the number of member countries to 12.

The EEC was initiated principally to ensure peace and security and to facilitate an economic flow among its member countries by creating an internal market for goods, services, and capital.[2] However, in the 1980s its aims became broader, to encompass the political and social, as well as economic sphere. The EEC came to be called the European Community (EC) to reflect that change.

Since its creation, the institutions of the EC have been issuing agreements to strengthen its unity. The latest agreement, and probably the most important since the EC's creation, is the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1991 ratified by all member states in 1992 and 1993)[3]-a comprehensive and ambitious treaty that seeks to convert the EC to a new power, with single currency, and with the explicit aim of political unity. Following this treaty, the EC began the process of creating the largest internal market in the world, with no borders among its 12 members for people, capital, goods, and services. In 1993 the EC was renamed again and is now officially called the European Union (EU).

This move toward further European integration has produced mixed feelings among the populations of the EU's member countries. To many[4] citizens, the EU is no longer exclusively concerned with global economics; they view European integration as a sociocultural process that will affect their everyday lives and will obliterate their national and local traditions and cultural expressions. Indeed, the Danish and French referenda, as well as recent surveys *(Eurobarometre* 1992, 1993) and my own research, revealed that many Europeans-including some who support further European integration-fear that increased international interchange may reduce the core of their national cultural identities and autonomy. This loss of identity and autonomy is considered a crucial issue by several observers and politicians, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (Daniel, 1992). In the past decade, the institutions of the EU have recognized that the cultural space of Europe is an essential issue in the pursuit of further integration.[5]

This article examines the relationships between cultural identification and the process of European integration. Specifically, it describes and analyzes 1) people's cultural attachments to Europe as a common social organization and 2) the connection between people's perception of European integration and the defense of a national cultural identity.[6]

Cultural integration is different and broader than the principles of economic integration laid down by the original Rome treaty. It develops beyond mechanistic market integration. Therefore, it requires an approach that is free of deterministic views, such as neofunctionalism, which assumes that a European cultural union will follow the economic union. I view the different elements of human life (such as economy, politics, and culture) as interconnected and without a leading factor. The methodology I used in my study is based on the subjectivist perspective, found in the works of ethnomethodologists such as Garfinkel (1967) and phenomenologists, such as Schutz (1962), but allows for the recognition of the articulation of individual interactions with the social structure.[7]

I compiled evidence from different sources and relied upon two techniques of data collection: individual in-depth interviews and document analysis. The interviews were conducted in France and Spain between December 1992 and July 1993. In-depth interviews followed the procedure developed by Sullivan (1992) and Seidman (1991), one that is open but focused. With the in-depth interviews I tried to gather people's feelings and how they explained their positions on the European Union. Each respondent has been interviewed for about one hour, with mostly open-ended questions. To select interviewees I used a combination of key informants and stratified quota sampling (c.f. Wimmer and Dominick, 1987). In order to have a representation of different opinion relays of the population at national and regional level, people from the following categories were interviewed: Mayors, municipalities' upper-level staff, leading figures of political parties, unions, professional and business associations, as well as blue collar workers, journalists, and university professors. A total of 52 persons were interviewed (25 in France and 27 in Spain). The interviews were directed to assess people's perceptions regarding European integration as a whole, and the importance the mentioned segments of the population attached to this process. Interviews have been oriented to gather information on cultural identification, the meaning of European integration, how they saw their country's role within the European Union, and its relationships with the European institutions.

Document analysis, defined broadly here, was useful for obtaining data from a large set of recent surveys and for analyzing institutional records; for analyzing articles and different publications related to the problem studied; and for studying historical trends of European cultural policy. The documentary sources for this research project were the documentation centers of the European Commission in Brussels, Madrid, and Paris, the libraries of Notre Dame and the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, in Indiana, and the library of the West European Studies Center at Indiana University, Bloomington.

The article is divided into two main parts. In the first part I discuss the views of the EU in France and Spain.[8] In the second part, I examine the implications of the most widespread concepts of cultural identity and nationalism that nurture people's perspectives on European integration.

PERCEPTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY

From 1986 to 1992 the move toward a single market infused the economies of the 12 member countries with energy and capital, and the projects of political and economic union fostered the illusion of a promising future for a united Europe. However, since then, Europe has been confronted with an economic recession, the discontent of agriculturists, refugees in large numbers, clandestine immigrants, a high level of unemployment, and the growing influence of fascist and Nazi ideologies, racism, and national egoism. As further integration is planned (as represented by the Maastricht Treaty), the debate over its impact on their lives intensifies among the people of the 12 member countries.

In France, people are divided in almost two equal parts concerning the value of further European integration. The referendum of 1992 showed that a large part of the French population (49%) is opposed to surrendering French sovereignty to Brussels. Besides, as a result of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in the fall of 1992, particularly between the EU and the United States, some of the old French nationalism has reappeared. The hostility of the French agriculturists to the word *Europe* or *European* is a tradition and is acknowledged by everyone. What is more revealing, however, is the fact, that according to an IP-SOS-Le Point survey in September 1992, 82 percent of the French supported the agriculturists in their rejection of the agreement with Washington, and 69 percent wanted the French government to veto the agreement even if that measure would have provoked a crisis within the EU. The negotiations on GATT were completed in December 1993, with no substantial changes in favor of the French agriculturists.

The economic and cultural French elites, for the most part, favor European union. However, among the political elite, only a slight majority in favor of the present process of European integration, and the population at large is more or less divided into two equal camps. According SOFRES poll *(Le Nouvel Observateur,* 1992), the French public's vote Maastricht Treaty in the French referendum was divided along educational and class lines. The majority of those who voted in favor of the Maastricht Treaty were highly educated and occupied generally high socioeconomic positions (SOFRES-TF1-RTL, 1992) (see Table 1).

Some of the elite easily accept the idea of European unity because they often travel abroad and have frequent contact with foreigners in their work (not to mention that some businesses depend entirely on the international market that the European Union has created). In other words, upper-level employees, managers, industrialists, and intellectuals tend to be cosmopolitans in the sense defined by Hannerz (1990), and thus are better able to see the similarities among some of the nationalities that belong to the European community. However, they too, are concerned with keeping alive what they perceive as their distinctive national culture. People with different political ideologies exhalt the national values that they perceive as endangered by a supranational organization such as the European Union. The defense of French identity was emphasized originally by the right wing political parties, particularly the Front National, but today this theme has permeated all the political parties (From the Rassemblement for the Republic-RPR to the Communist Party).

The idea of national identity does not have a precise and consensually established content. It is more often invoked than described. The following are some of the typical answers I received from French people of different socioeconomic statuses.

"Nineteen ninety-three will be the beginning of a silent invasion. The foreigners will invade this country," said the owner of a small business; "besides the Arabs and the Africans, we will have to receive more Portuguese, Spaniards, Italians, and other people. I have nothing against foreigners, you see, but you know here, there are no jobs even for the French people. Besides, foreigners influence our culture." I said, "But Sir, the French could also go to other countries. He answered: "I do not think so; very few French will go to other countries because I do not believe that they will be better off. Maybe to Germany, but they [the Germans] also are trying to get rid of foreigners. I think many foreigners will come to France, and very few French will go to other countries."

Another interviewee stated: "Because of the European Community, taxes are higher, and they are destroying French agriculture. France has been agricultural for a long time. If you destroy the agriculture, you destroy France. The European Community is the end of French culture and of France as an independent country."

Antagonism toward the institutions of the EU was common among the people I interviewed. As the owner of a medium-size farm said: "The bureaucrats of Brussels not only are affecting the French economy with the international agreements, they are also trying to destroy our way of living. They are even attempting to regulate what we eat and how we eat it. They want to forbid our Reblochon cheese. You see, that is a clear attack on the French way of living. We have been eating Reblochon for centuries; that is part of our traditions."[9] Indeed, 54 percent of people interviewed perceived that the institutions of the European Union were intruding in their everyday lives. They feared that because of the standardization of products and other goods as a result of the integration process, their particular way of doing things will be totally changed to some unspecified external culture. One person said: "I am not against the other Europeans or against the Germans in particular. We have to live in peace, and I think we must have agreements with the Germans and others, but I want to live in an independent country." This opinion was also expressed by the leaders of the opposition to the Maastricht Treaty, Philippe Seguin and Charles Pasqua, who stated, in an advertisement in the conservative German newspaper, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine,* that their opposition to the Maastricht Treaty was a vote not against Germans or other Europeans, but against the bureaucratization of Europe.

Even those who accepted the idea of European union, with few exceptions, mentioned the national interest and national culture as a concern: "I think that the European Community is important for peace and good for the economy, but I believe that we have to find the way to keep alive our own cultural particularity."

By mid-1993, the views of Spaniards toward the EU were similar in many respects to those of the French. Most highly educated Spaniards, as well as most of the political elite from the moderate Left, the center, and the moderate Right are for the EU. The extreme right is against it, and the traditional left (represented by Izquierda Unida-IU) is opposed to those aspects of the process that, in their opinion, will negatively affect the welfare of the working class.

The Spanish economy is suffering from greater external and public debt, and a decrease in the growth of the GDP from 5.2 percent in 1988 to 0.7 percent in 1993. This economic situation has contributed to the erosion of support among Spaniards for the EU. Although, the majority of people that I interviewed are still optimistic about the constitution of a European Union, it appears that by mid 1993, fewer people than ever are supporting the European community. According to Eurobarometer 39, in 1993 only 37% of the Spanish population approved further integration (as contemplated in the Maastricht Treaty), and according to a survey published by *The European* (1994) 21% of Spaniards would even like to leave the EU.[10] Two major groups who generally are opposed to the process of European union are the agriculturists and the blue-collar workers because they believe that they are suffering as a result of the Spanish economy's adaptations to the requirements of the EU. Since 1988 thousands of blue-collar workers have lost their jobs as a consequence of the restructuring of the Spanish heavy industries (coal and steel), particularly in traditional areas with heavy-metal industries such as the Basque country and Asturias.

The following statement of a miner from Asturias in northern Spain, is typical of the views of the blue-collar workers: "They promised that with the entry to the European Community, we will all be better off, and nothing is more false. This region has never been in such a bad shape, and we had to accept a situation of zero increase in our salaries because, they said, we must be competitive." The views of the owner of a small farm were in the same vein: "For me to be part of the European Community, it has meant nothing, except that now it is worse than before. They are even asking us to reduce our production of milk because the Community requires us to do so. For now I continue to sell my milk, but it seems that we will have to stop in the near future. I do not know what I will be doing, but I wish we were not part of the European Community."[11]

Also typical is this statement from an insurance company employee: "Politicians say that the European Community is our chance of surviving in a difficult world, but what I see is that the European Community is not doing anything special for us. We continue to sell our products as we were doing before, and I believe we are losing part of our culture. With this idea of being European everybody values more French and German things than Spanish. I think that we had to establish agreements, but not in the sense of becoming totally part of a single society. In this union the weakest countries will lose their culture, and the stronger ones will impose their culture and their views." Similar ideas were expressed by the mayor of a medium city: "The basic problem I see with the European integration is that we will lose our original culture. Young people are copying foreign things all the time. Even our language could be lost. The English language will, little by little, become the language of the European Community."[12]

In sum, France and Spain have different histories and have attained different socioeconomic conditions; therefore, peoples' perceptions of the European union are not identical. Although in both countries, the worsening of the economic situation and the perceived bureaucratization of the EU's institutions have contributed to increased nationalism, the economic crisis that has been affecting Spain in the past three years influenced more than in France people's evaluation of the European Union. Economic concerns were more prominent among the Spanish interviewees. However, underlying both French and Spanish views is some kind of defense of their local and national identities. National culture plays central role in people's evaluation of European integration. This is a major preoccupation among both, those who oppose and those who support

further European integration. And this seems to be the tendency also among the other countries of the union.[13] In the following section, I examine the origins and contemporary implications of this kind of nationalism.

NATIONALISM AS AN EXPRESSION OF CULTURAL IDENTITY

Most historians agree that the beginning of modern nationalism in Europe can be traced to the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth century (e.g., Anderson, 1983, Kedourie, 1960; Kohn, 1961; Nolte, 1965; Smith, 1986; Snyder, 1964; Toynbee, 1948). The term *nation* originally was used synonymously with race, tribe, or people. In the 17th century, "nation was coming to stand for the political people of a society" (Minogue, 1967: 10), particularly, the elite of the society, such as the nobility. However, by the mid-18th century it was identified with the public interests-the interest of every citizen. Probably the most influential proponent of this latter conception was Jean Jacques Rousseau. For Rousseau, the nation was similar to one's natural community, whereas the state was the executive committee of the elite and was based upon the consent of the people.

In the 19th century, the term was changed to the nation-state, which was considered to represent a particular geographical and cultural division. Nineteenth century nationalists, such as Fichte (1965), thought that the world had been geographically constructed to accommodate nation-states.

At the beginning of the 20th century, there was a widespread belief in Europe that various nations were fragmented into different states. Consequently, after World War I, in an attempt to make the boundaries of the state and the nation coincide, the political divisions of Europe were modified. However, Europe was-and still is-such an interwoven demographic, cultural, and geographic fabric that this attempt to create culturally homogeneous states failed. The new nations still contained large minorities.[14]

The concept of nation, as it is understood by most people in France and Spain today (93 percent of those I interviewed), is based on the idea of national self-determination. It also implies some kind of prepolitical unity of blood, a common language, religious belief, or agreement on values and customs. In other words, people see themselves as part of a particular and distinctive national community. They learn the meaning of this type of nationalism in the process of socialization that reinforces their feeling of belonging to a nation and excludes others who are different. From early childhood individuals develop a loyalty to a particular group and, through experience, a sense of differentiation and opposition. This strong feeling frames the lives of most people. Emotions, irrational thinking, and logic become entangled,[15]

For the people of these two EU's member countries, this perception of nationalism is expressed in vague national interests and in the desire to keep their national cultures (specific customs, traditions, a sense of local community, and so on) alive. The following statement by one of my interviewees is typical of this view: "I want to keep alive French culture, you know, our habits and ways of thought that make us French, and I think that the European Community will make everyone the same."

As the large organization of the EU eliminates borders among countries in more and more aspects of life, a sense of the need for local community is growing among large sectors of the EU population. There is a perceived need for local cultural identities that are autonomous and separate from the large political power of the EU, which many people view as an external arrangement that imposes constraints on them that they can do little to change.

Indeed, postmodern society has removed the possibility of a global unified view of the world. Social harmony is disassembled into a new, artificial cosmos, in which cultural traditions tend to be neglected. People experience reality as segregated spheres (e.g., the political, the judicial), independent of any mythical past. Rational scientific knowledge no longer plays the integrative role that it played during the first three quarters of the 20th century; and the family is no longer considered to be an indissoluble institution. A multitude of small groups and individuals are increasingly isolated within a totality that arches over them. The different parts of this totality are connected by a complex maze of institutions and stratified organisms.

Nationalism in this context is expressed as a reaction of the particular (local community, nation) to the universal (the process of European integration). Nationalism is equated with traditions and the nostalgia of small communities. It appears as the strongest pillar before the unknown that the internationalization of economic and cultural exchanges imply. Many people see the EU as an obstacle to their dream of harmony because they believe that harmony can best be reached among people who share a particular territory and speak the same language. Following this logic, they emphasize the cultural aspects that characterize their nationality and that differ from other countries of the EU to justify their view that further European integration is impossible. Typical of this view is this declaration from one of the politicians 1 interviewed: "I want Spanish civilization to continue the way 1 was when 1 was brought up. I want the people of Spain to maintain the habits, customs, ways of thought that make them different, and this will not be possible within the framework of the European Union."

This position causes many people to see the virtues of a given nationality as natural, and the vices of the same nationality as the consequences of admitting foreign influences. People have learned to attribute to their particular nationality a metaphysical configuration-defined as that which produces a particular culture, such as language and customs-that has to be isolated from other configurations to avoid contamination and to be free. Culture is viewed as the essence, the spirit, of a particular nationality. Therefore, to protect a culture many people (38 percent of those I interviewed) believe that they must reject what they label as "foreign ideas and foreign ways of doing things." They even believe that people who share their particular culture are the greatest people in the world.

The declarations of Xabier Arzalluz, president of the Basque Nationalist Party, are a perfect example of this view. Arzalluz stated that if there was a nation in Europe in the ethnic sense, it was Euskadi. He emphasized the "anthropological uniqueness and pure blood of the Basque people," and suggested that those who were not pure Basque should not have the right to decide the political future of the Basque community (El Pais, 1993, p. 23). Others rarely express their views in such a crude manner, but, as my interviews reflected, these assumptions of ethnic purity are widely held by the population at large.

Most politicians, as well as most people in the member countries of the EU, still think and behave according to the assumption that the nation-state is the natural and final political organization of the world.[16] The interest of the nation, as it is understood by most people in the two countries studied here, signifies the interest of a particular nationality over other nationalities or ethnic groups. The glory and interests of the nation one is part of are primary objectives, and it does not matter if these objectives have to be obtained at the expense of another nation. It is in the name of nationalist glory and interests that international politics are conducted[17] and that extremist nationalist terrorists, such as the EusKadi ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Liberty) or the Irish Republican Army, kill people whom they identify as enemies of their nation. National culture and identity are also used to justify discrimination and sometimes aggression, as recent violence against immigrants in Germany and Spain attests.[18]

Because of the division between richer and poorer countries Europe, nationalism in the context of the EU is often expressed as a feeling of injustice in the distribution of resources. In this context of economic inequalities, "nationalists find richer neighbors to resent and envy; poorer neighbors to despise and fear; but few equals to respect (Arizpe, 1992: 6). For example, after Spain joined the EU, its economy expanded, and membership in the EU was widely supported (close to 70% until 1991, *Eurobarometre,* 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991). But when the Spanish economy slowed down, large numbers of Spaniards came to believe that their relationship with the rest of the Union was unfair and that other countries had more opportunities. They argued that Spain was not taken into account because it did not have the same weight in the EU as did Germany and France.

Similar perceptions of unfair advantage are widespread in the other countries of the EU. For instance, a French bank employee I interviewed said: "You can see with the negotiations on GATI,[19] to which interest the bureaucrats of Brussels are responding, and it doesn't matter that some of them are French. They reached this settlement with the United States with no opposition from the other countries because only the French were really affected by the agreement, not the Germans. If German or English interests were touched, you would have seen that the agreement would not have been possible."

The EU is creating a social system in which people from different nationalities and regions have to work together, often in situations in which there are competing needs, and neither the cause of European problems nor the consequences of them are in any way homogeneous. Therefore, the interpretation of European events is far from smooth or even coherent among the member countries. For instance, at present, the points of disagreement among the member countries are numerous; certain projects of industrial cooperation, the role of the European parliament, the fund of cohesion, and interest rates are some of the most publicized controversial issues. Most interpretations are based on national and local interests and perceptions.

In other words, the EU is a new arena in which people from different regions and nations have to compete for scarce resources. In this context people join together around their nationality or region, which, in turn, intensifies their sense of nationalism.

Whether they are based on the real unfair distribution of resources or only perceived injustice, nationalistic views structure vague feelings of discontent around a concrete political aim by

offering people apparent explanations of why they are unhappy. People who are experiencing problems, such as lower wages or unemployment, ask themselves why these problems are happening to them. The nationalist answer is simple: "Our nation is suffering from the imposition of rules and commercial norms imposed by the EU that favor other countries." Also, "our nation is suffering from the comparative disadvantages in the distribution of benefits within the European Community," or "immigrants are taking our jobs."[20] These explanations are never the whole truth, and often have nothing to do with the truth. But that does not matter; the defense of the national interest gives people a hopeful direction to follow.

The nationalistic rhetoric of political groups-such as the extreme right National Front in France or the Republican Party in Germany, and the euroskeptics from the more mainstream parties - is that all problems derive from the fact that the nation is oppressed by the bureaucrats of the EU.[21] Large sectors of the European population believe that Brussels controls everything going on in Europe, especially policies that affect them negatively. In fact, this view is often stimulated by the national governments themselves. When a decision made by the EU is perceived as good or advantageous for a particular country, the concerned minister of that country presents that measure as a personal triumph. However, when a decision adverse to the interest of some sectors of the country, the minister blames the bureaucrats of the European Commission. In fact, in all member countries of the EU, politics-regardless of which political parties are involved-are still done within the frame of nationalistic interest.[22] The European elections, for instance, emphasize basically national issues, and their results are discussed mostly within the national context.

The model of the nation-state is so pervasive in European political culture that most French and Spaniards, and, I think, the other Europeans, can see the EU only in terms of their nation-state.[23] Every national government is struggling with the issues of national sovereignty, precisely because political leaders do not want to renounce the powers that inhere in their national political institutions (Wilson, 1993). The membership in the EC does not prevent national rivalries, which continue to encourage the drives of ethnic nationalism. For many people in France and Spain, and probably also in the other EU member states, surrendering some modicum of sovereignty to the institutions of the EU is a capitulation, akin to giving up their national culture and pride.

At the same time, the need for European-scale economic and political entities is felt by a large number of leaders. These leaders explicitly state in their declarations that no European country by itself has enough weight to ensure the safety of its own interests, which are tied to solidarity with the vast entity of the EU. However, they never question the idea of a strong independent state as the base for an European integration (see for example Griotteray, 1992, Chevenement, 1992).

CONCLUSION

Identification with a particular nationality provides a context of meaning for otherwise isolated individuals in contemporary societies. The supportive mutuality implied in the notion of "living together" grows within the womb of local institutions. People meet the world as members of communities, and their identity and self-esteem are derived, in a large part, from the communities to which they belong. However, the emphasis on a particular national identity has usually served to separate people from each other.

This separation occurs because people have a static view of cultural identity. As I have shown, the prevailing assumption among the French and Spanish population at large and among many politicians is that the EU is a collection of fixed identities, each with inherent prejudices, stereotypes and misunderstandings of the "others." The parts do not interact or influence each other; they simply stand side by side. This static view of culture implies that the different nations of the EU could perhaps bargain and negotiate, but they cannot really understand each other.

The historical evidence shows that neither group identities nor national identities are static. People from a given country or region do speak a specific language, share some basic beliefs, and have a particular way of life, but these cultural characteristics come, to a large extent, from an interchange among people from different national backgrounds, and between people and the changing environment. Europe is not a mosaic or quilt of cultures that stand side by side without interacting. In other words, there is no specific period in history that can be considered the real and essential culture of a given nation. Any cultural expression at a particular moment in a nation's history is a result of the continuous process of change, and national cultures influence each other in a complex relationship.

However, the awareness of this interlinking of European cultures implies a new kind of accountability that still needs to be developed among European citizens themselves. The integration of Europe is a major process of transition from an exacerbated nationalism along ethnic lines to a more global culture, which is confronting the old images and rivalries that have constituted European history-including the need to redefine the symbolic boundaries that divide "us" from "them."[24] Most people find it difficult to perceive of or to assume a European identity because there are not enough mirrors in everyday life to reflect that identity. It is easier to feel Spanish, French, British, German or Italian than European because people know what it is, or at least they have a representation that they learned at school, through the media, and in their everyday relationships.[25]

Conflicting perceptions of nation-state versus European Union can be overcome. Most people possess more than one identity, and can identify with all of them without necessarily opposing one against the other. For example, people in France and Spain identify with the region and with the nation at the same time. A similar process can happen at the European level. The point is not that a European culture will replace Spanish or French culture, but that people can identify with both national and supranational culture to a large extent.

However, since the EU is creating a social system in which contradictory interests of regions and national states must be coordinated, it is vain to expect a linear and untroubled tendency toward acceptance of a supranational culture. Indeed, the integration of Europe is a process of interaction, interchange, and mutual influence that will require a continuous negotiation, adaptation, and partial agreements by the different ethnic, national and regional populations, as in the social interaction model outlined by Lyotard (1984).

In summary, until recently, the EU was relatively successful in facilitating the economic flow among its member countries and in avoiding the violent resolution of conflicts. However, Europe cannot be limited to a common market, a place of competition and economic agreements. The

discussions provoked by the Maastricht Treaty and its implementation suggest that further integration will require the member states of the EU to develop a deeper sense of community and obligation to one another than is reflected in economic agreements, international law, or the traditional sources of international compliance. The new EU will have to be rooted in a sense of common culture (or at least complementary culture) that is based on interactions among all levels of the member states, and European affairs and symbols must acquire a positive importance in the lives of individuals. People from each member state need to feel that their interests are compatible with those of an integrated Europe and, above all, that the EU will not eradicate their national cultures. European identity can be imagined only as a differentiated and heterogeneous network of correlated particularities.

ENDNOTES

1. Aristides Briand's address to the League of Nations in September 1929.
2. The sponsors of the European Economic Community, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, proposed as its basic criteria the integration of the states and the establishment of peaceful methods for resolving conflicts among them.
3. The treaty has been ratified in France and Denmark by national referendum, in the rest of the countries by the national parliaments.
4. The terms *many* and *most* convey the idea that a large proportion of interviewees (usually above SO percent) expressed a specific view. However, since this research deals with feelings and perceptions, I had to use different sources of evidence besides surveys: in-depth interviews, printed documents, and informal conversations, which could not be accurately quantified. When possible I presented quantified information in the text.
5. For instance, the Genscher-Colombo plan in 1981 (NeVille-Jones, 1983) reflected the political will to create a European union based on European identity, and proposed close cultural cooperation between the member countries. Also, the section on cultural cooperation issued by the European Council meeting at Stuttart, in June 1983, testified to an intent to expand the realm of European cooperation in the cultural sphere. Cultural co-operation was to be undertaken "in order to affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity" *(Bulletin EC,* 1983). Likewise, the European Parliament's draft Treaty establishing the European Union (1984), which was inspired largely by the federalist A1tiero Spinelli, recognized the need for further cultural integration. Most recently, the European Union Treaty formalized at Maastricht (1991) specifically stated the need to enhance cultures of states and regions of the European community. The importance of cultural representations in the building of the European Union was also recognized by Jean Monnet (one of its founders) by the end of his life: "If Europe needs to be made, we should perhaps start with the culture; the Rome Treaty had made the mistake of not considering culture as one of the European construction's essential elements" (cited in *Par/amenlo Europeo, 1983)*
6. The concept of culture used here is defined by Rocher (1978), Williams (1981), and particularly Vitanyi (1986). Culture comprises language, art, scientific knowledge, ethics, religion, political views, norms, values, and the human faculties and activities aimed at the production and consumption of goods.
7. I use the concept "structuralism" in a sense closer to Bourdieu's use (1984), which means that within the social world there exist objective structures, historically produced and independent of the consciousness and will of agents, that are able to shepherd the daily activity of these agents as well as their social and individual representations. "Phenomenology" is based here on Schutz's (1962) interpretation: that social reality has a specific meaning and relevant structure for human beings living, acting, and thinking within it, and that it is therefore possible to discover meanings and explanations for social tendencies through our connection to the person who is part of the analyzed phenomenon.

8. Recent research on culture within the European Community provides some insights for this study: particularly the work of Connor (1991), and Peyronnet (1989) on nationalism. Also the research of Auge (1988), Smith (1990), Kreutz (1989), Lipiansky (1991), and Schlesinger (1988, 1991) on collective and national identity, and of Justel (1986) on attitudes and perceptions of people from one nation toward those of other nations. Other general works on European culture, such as Vitanyi (1986), Mosse (1988), Chevallaz (1988), and Braudel (1982), are also relevant for this research.

9. Reblochon is a kind of Camembert that usually uses unpasteurized milk. The interviewee is referring to regulations concerning the pasteurization of cheese suggested by the European Commission. Actually, those regulations do not apply to some products, such as Reblochon.

10. In 1989 the support for the EC was overwhelming among the population at large *(Eurobarometre,* 33 1989) and among regional elites (Leonardi and Garmise, 1993).

11. Whether French or Spanish, the positions of peasants were very similar. They still see their villages and the sociocultural environment of the farm as the center of the universe. They tend to think in terms of region more than nation, therefore they tend strongly to reject an overarching organization such as the European Union, especially if because of this organization they have to adapt to certain rules.

12. The most popular criterion to express the national culture is very often the language. This occurs because language is the most visible and explicit popular recognition of cultural particularities, but also because the culture of the twentieth century has been strongly marked by an emphasis on language. Numerous scholars have stressed the influence of language on our beliefs (e.g. Kluckhohn, 1964; Sapir, 1929, 1949; Whorf, 1956). People argue that without a national language they lose their personality. Some nationalists such as Catalans, Irish, and Basques are trying to promote their original language and create new words when necessary (for instance, scientific language), even if this obviously carries expensive capital investment in human resources, textbooks, publishing equipment, and so on. They fear to give up the uniqueness on which they base their demand for a special place in Europe. It is commonly believed that someone who abandons his/her language destroys his/herself. He/she loses contact with his/her reality and identity, and becomes a mere imitation of foreign models. A nation that speaks a foreign language seems therefore to have surrendered its unique understanding of the world to its cultural conquerors. However, although language is an important element of a national culture, evidence suggests that it is not essential. Indeed, language is not enough to define a national culture, since the Swiss nation speaks four languages, Latin American nations speak Spanish without having been part of Spain, and the United States constitute an independent country although English is the dominant language. Furthermore, as Gellner (1983) points out, the belief that a language expresses the culture and values of a nation is true only in part. The language is a vehicle for expressing ideas and thoughts and the vehicle itself limits to a certain extent how one can use it, but at the same time a Spanish dramatist can produce a play in French and still express a Spanish view of the world. The opposite is also true. In other words, the writer, will express a character on his own, even if he is using a foreign language.

13. Several surveys *(Eurobarometre,* 1992, 1993, 1994), newspapers, and research (Douglas 1993, George, 1992) show that British people are are still firmly attached to their symbols of distinctiveness and cultural identity, such as their currency and royalist symbols. Consequently they tend to resist the transposability that, in their views, the EU implies. The opposition to giving up some sovereignty to Brussels, is particularly strong within the conservative circles. For example, in December 1992 in the House of Commons, a conservative member labeled the May 1 celebration (Workers' Day) as "socialist and continental" and suggested that it be replaced by a more "British celebration" such as a day to honor the Battle of Waterloo (in which the British army defeated the French). This suggestion was applauded by many members of the House *(El Pais,* 1992). This ambiguous posture of the United Kingdom goes back to the time of Winston Churchill, who supported the idea of a United Europe but did not view the United Kingdom as a full associate. For instance, in his Zurich address in September 1946, Churchill called for a United States of Europe but without the United Kingdom: "Great Britain, the British

Commonwealth, the mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia-for then indeed all would be well-must be friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its rights to live and shine" (Churchill, 1974: 7382). Germany has continually reaffirmed its support of the EU. In December 1992, the Bundestag ratified the Maastricht Treaty almost unanimously. However, according to the economic magazine *Capital* (1993), around 70 percent of German politicians are against the monetary union, and around 80 percent of Germans reject the idea of abandoning the mark as their currency. In other words, the Germans-both the general public and the political elite - still want a united Europe, but not with all the consequences, and not immediately. Denmark is a fairly well-organized and prosperous country that has difficulties in accepting the institutional disorganization and economic shortage of countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy. Also, a large majority of the Danes believe that to accept the integration of Europe as established in the Maastricht Treaty is to submit the Crown, their independence, to the Bundesbank. Behind the Maastricht Treaty, they see German expansionism. For example, it is not uncommon to hear Danish people categorize German purchases of land or houses in Denmark as the "German silent invasion." As Hedetoft suggests, quite a number of Danes have "transferred hostile images of Germany to the Community" (1993, p. 293).

14. These new divisions were established by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which attempted to separate all the nationalities that were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Austrians, Czechs, Croats, Serbs, Hungarians, and so on). The consequences of this treaty only showed the impossibility in modern Europe of equating state with the sense of belonging to a particular nationality and culture-unless perhaps Europe was divided into tiny states. With the exception of Germany and Italy, which were relatively homogeneous at the beginning of the twentieth century, most people in Europe were mixed (in languages, group origins and so on). Even after the Treaty, millions of people were living as minorities within a nationalist state. Many of them thought of themselves as being oppressed by another dominant ethnic group or nationality.

15. People do not become nationalist because of genuine, objective, practical necessity as Gellner (1983) suggests. They may sometimes have these reasons, but empirical evidence (as reflected in my interviews and the reports on ethnic confrontations) shows that even in situations where no identifiable practical matters are present, people still feel a need for what they perceive as a differentiated national identity.

16. The belief in the nation-state as the natural organization of a particular nationality is so strong in people's minds that they are deeply moved by the sounding of the national anthem, or when, on a holiday, a regiment of soldiers parades with military music and banners waving in the wind (war has traditionally played a central role in the shaping of national identities), or when a public speaker refers to the glories of important national figures (in arts, sciences and so on). All national anthems of the countries of the EU encourage patriots to fight against foreign enemies. At the time those anthems were composed, the enemies were other European countries that are today part of the EU. Therefore, symbolically speaking, most of these anthems are anti-EU. It will be appropriate to give new words to those old tunes in order to connect them to the present reality of peace-building among EU's countries.

17. The lobbying of different national and regional groups representing farmers or industrial areas in Brussels shows that each is trying to get as big piece of the pie as possible with no regard for other regions or national areas.

18. German Neo-Nazis have claimed that their opposition to the presence of too many foreigners is only part of a drive for national identity *(The Economist,* April 28, 1990). Germany witnessed more than one thousand attacks on immigrants, mostly Turks in 1991 alone *(Nightline,* 1992). Extreme-right groups in Spain killed three immigrants in 1993.

19. He is referring to an agreement between the United States and the European Union concerning farm subsidies. This agreement was reached in 1992 and 1993 within the ongoing General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) negotiations.

20. This explains why extreme right-wing politicians such as Le Pen in France enjoy considerable support, solely on xenophobic grounds, among the population, including

people from the working class, who find in the European Union and in the immigrants scapegoats for their frustrations.

21. See, for instance, the book edited by Philippe de Saint Robert, *L 'Europe Deraisonable* (1992), in which 18 politicians and intellectuals argue against the technocrats of the EU.

22. Throughout recent history, nationalism has been an ambivalent ideology. It was at the beginning of the nineteenth century a revolutionary ideology that carried hope for national liberation that would bring freedom and peace (e.g. Mazzini, 1907) but later it was more often than not a conservative force. However, nationalism is not limited to these political positions. Originally leftist parties, at least those political parties inspired by Marx, tended to be internationalists in their rhetoric and considered nationalism a creation of the bourgeoisie, but today most leftist parties place more emphasis on the national working class (see, for example, the positions of the French and Spanish Communist Party). Today, left-wing nationalists tend to identify the bourgeoisie and the middle class as consumptionist and utilitarian, and as always prone to accept foreign ideas and ways of life. The working class is endowed with heroic virtues of the real culture of the nation, which is often defined as popular culture. Besides, for some people on the political left, the European Union appears as an irrational conglomerate of bureaucrats in the service of large multinational firms. However, the parties of the political left do not include nationalism among their basic issues and are rarely xenophobes in their explicit policies. That is perhaps one of the reasons that in the last ten years or so the ranks of nationalists from the right (such as the Front National in France or the Republican Party in Germany) have been augmented by masses of people from the working class who prefer nationalism to socialism as the vehicle of their political struggle.

23. The attachment to the nation-state was clearly reflected in my in-depth interviews; a brief analysis of newspapers and other media also shows that the issue is almost exclusively debated in terms of nation-state versus the institutions of the EU. Furthermore, most people equate national identity, nationality, and citizenry, as well as cultural identity and the nation.

24. On national holidays, all member nations of the EU still celebrate the heroes of WWI and WWII. Even though "the myth of the fallen soldier" has undergone a weakening among younger generarations (Mosse, 1990, p. 224), politicians still use martial imagery, and heroic discourse to gather the interest and support of citizens.

25. Identity is above all memory, and the school system in these two countries (France and Spain) promotes a culture whose basic environment is always the nation. Geography is taught with the assumption that the national territory constitutes the fundamental space, while the European continent is presented as a vague environment. In other words, from elementary school on the national entity is proposed as the legitimate frame of culture and knowledge, and as the principal model of cultural identification.

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Table 1. The French Public's Position on the Maastricht Treaty, by Socioeconomic and Educational Status

Persons Voting Yes	Percentage	Persons Voting No	Percentage
Superior managers	80	Agriculturists	63
Medium managers	61	Blue-collar workers and low level employees	60
University graduates	70	Those with four years of high school and a vocational diploma	61
High school graduates (Baccalauréat)	53	Those with no diploma at all	54