



1998

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### Recommended Citation

Hanson, Paul R. "Monarchist Clubs and the Pamphlet Debate over Political Legitimacy in the Early Years of the French Revolution," *French Historical Studies*, vol. 21, no. 2 (Spring, 1998), 299-324. Available from: [digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch\\_papers/498/](https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers/498/)

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# **Monarchist Clubs and the Pamphlet Debate over Political Legitimacy in the Early Years of the French Revolution**

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Research for this article was supported by a summer grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities and by assistance from Butler University. Earlier versions were presented at annual meetings of the Society for French Historical Studies. The author would like to thank Gary Kates, Ken Margerison, Colin Jones, Jeremy Popkin, Michael Kennedy, Jack Censer, Jeffrey Ravel, John Burney, and the anonymous readers for the journal for their helpful comments on various drafts of this article. Any shortcomings that remain are entirely his own responsibility.

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On the morning of 14 December 1790, an angry crowd surrounded the royal prison in Aix-en-Provence and forced the release of the marquis de la Roquette and the avocat au parlement Jean Joseph Pascalis. Led by militant members of the Club des anti-politiques, a radical club in Aix composed largely of artisans, the crowd escorted the two men through the streets of Aix to the elegant Cours Mirabeau, where each was hanged by a rope from a street lantern. Later that day the same fate befell Andre-Raymond Guiramand, an elderly chevalier of St. Louis who in recent days had ardently and vocally defended the royalist cause from the steps of the cafe Guion. Thus abruptly ended the brief existence of the Club des amis de la paix in Aix, whose gala opening had been scheduled to occur two days earlier.<sup>1</sup>

This violent episode in the revolutionary history of Aix is but an extreme case among numerous confrontations between radical revolutionaries and the leaders of monarchist clubs that occurred throughout provincial France from December 1790 through late 1791. The appearance of these clubs in provincial towns roughly coincided with the formation of the Club monarchique in Paris and with the publication of a flurry of pamphlets and newspaper articles debating both the legitimacy of political clubs generally and the rights and responsibilities of particular clubs and their members. Yet the activities of monarchist clubs during this period have received scant attention in revolutionary historiography.<sup>2</sup> We thus know very little about these clubs, which, despite their short life, contributed greatly to the polarization of politics in 1790-91.

It would be premature to attempt to write a history of monarchist clubs throughout France. As the case of the Aix club illustrates, most flared into and out of existence quite quickly, and one would need to comb departmental archives and local histories to verify their numbers and fully gauge the scope of their impact. The goals of this article are more modest: to examine on the one hand the attempts to found monarchist clubs in three provincial towns, with an eye to establishing what their common experiences can tell us about the movement in general and what their differences reveal about divisions within the monarchist camp in 1790-91; and to explore on the other hand the pamphlet and newspaper literature that accompanied the creation of these clubs, both as an inspiration and as a response to the confrontations they produced.

My overarching goal will be to bring these two discussions together. The relationship between the monarchist clubs in the provinces and these pamphlets and newspapers, mostly Parisian, is not immediately obvious. The club founders did not write the pamphlets, and the tone of the pamphlets is mostly abstract and theoretical, though there are occasional references to one or more of the provincial clubs and the trouble they attracted. But the founders of these clubs and the authors of these pamphlets were grappling with the same sets of issues: the definition of public opinion and its legitimate expression; the nature and extent of popular sovereignty and its appropriate exercise; the relationship between the government—whether executive or legislative—and the citizenry. All of these issues were debated through-out the early years of the Revolution, both in rhetoric and in action. While it has been fashionable of late to emphasize the primacy of discourse in revolutionary politics, what follows will suggest that actions and events in the

provinces - political experience, that is - often influenced the rhetorical debates that raged in the capital.

Although Emmanuel Vingtrinier probably exaggerated in suggesting that monarchist clubs formed in every department, they were numerous and widespread. Utilizing revolutionary newspapers, as well as other sources, we can document the existence of at least thirty-five monarchist clubs (see fig. 1).<sup>3</sup> They took names such as Amis de la paix, Amis de l'ordre, or, more plainly, Amis de la monarchie. They appeared in major cities, such as Bordeaux, Orleans, Nancy, Toulouse, and Paris; but these clubs also formed in smaller towns such as Cambrai, Tulle, and Agde. They could be found in nearly every region of France but with a somewhat greater concentration in the northeast and southwest.

When and why did these monarchist clubs appear? The Monarchist Club of Paris appears to have had its first manifestation as the Club of Viroflay, which formed at Versailles in response to the 20 June 1789 declaration of the Third Estate placing the nation and the law before the king.<sup>4</sup> Count Stanislas Clermont-Tonnerre (a liberal noble in 1789, close to Mounier in the Constituent Assembly) participated in the meetings of this early club. Another source of membership for the Monarchist Club was the Club des impartiaux, founded in late 1789 by Pierre Victor Malouet (a naval intendant at Toulon at the end of the Old Regime and a vocal advocate of a bicameral legislature in the debates of the Constituent Assembly). The club stated its purpose in the first issue of its newspaper, the *Journal des impartiaux*: "The principal object, in gathering together, was to profess and publicize the principles that its members had adopted. . . , recognizing how important it would be that the publication of their articles should distance the society from any hint of intrigue or cabal, both of which were equally abhorrent to their spirit and their principles." The Club des impartiaux was small, numbering only some forty members, though its meetings were open to the public.<sup>5</sup>

Clermont-Tonnerre and Malouet would collaborate in the 1790 founding of the Monarchist Club. Initial meetings occurred in mid-April, inspired by the refusal of the Constituent Assembly to declare Catholicism the state religion of France. The abolition of hereditary nobility in June 1790, and the Assembly's approval of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in July gave royalists additional cause for concern. Only in late fall, however, did the Monarchist Club formally constitute itself, perhaps goaded into action by the 27 November decree mandating the civil oath of the clergy.

Robert Griffiths argues that whereas the impartiaux had striven to strengthen the royal executive power, the task for the Monarchist Club would be to save the monarchy itself. Griffiths positions this new club squarely in the center of the political spectrum, observing that its membership abandoned the commitment to bicameralism that the Club des impartiaux had emphasized and that the club was fundamentally opposed to any idea of a counterrevolutionary movement, based either among the emigres or in the provinces.<sup>6</sup> Timothy Tackett would place the Monarchist Club on the right rather than in the center, though not on the extreme right. He observes that "while

the Breton Club had operated in an essentially democratic fashion, with relatively loose discipline and public debates in a cafe to which all were invited, the Monarchiens followed their more authoritarian and hierarchical penchant by establishing a small decision-making 'central committee,' which convened in private at one of the member's homes-and some-times in the chateau of Versailles itself- and which then sent out directives through a system of subcommittees to all its potential adherents." <sup>7</sup> That authoritarian penchant is also suggested in an early speech given by Malouet to his constituents in Riom: "Let us not deny, Messieurs, that the people need more to be governed and to be submitted to a protective authority, since they do not have the aptitude to direct it." <sup>8</sup> As we shall see, although the monarchist clubs solicited the support of common people, their role was to be essentially a passive one.

The Monarchist Club of Paris, then, formed in part in response to failed legislation, with the hope of influencing the future deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. To assist in that effort, members encouraged the creation of similar clubs in the provinces, though the provincial clubs often arose in response to local rather than national concerns. We can speak of a variety of goals and objectives that guided these clubs. Contemporary opponents of the monarchist clubs, and most subsequent writers, accused them of counterrevolutionary intentions despite the protestations to the contrary of the club in Paris. This was clearly the case in Aix, where instances of contact between the monarchist clubs and the emigre princes in Turin have been established.<sup>9</sup> For other provincial clubs, however, there is little evidence of counterrevolutionary intent. Some formed for the purpose of contesting municipal elections by supporting an organized slate of candidates. A third objective of the clubs, perhaps the most widely shared, was the destruction of the Jacobin clubs, which the monarchists denounced as the real counterrevolutionaries. Implicit in this goal, as we shall see, was a denial of the legitimacy of political clubs. This put the monarchists in the curious position of forming a club to secure the abolition of all political clubs.

What did the monarchist clubs themselves declare their objectives to be? This is a difficult question to answer, as few of the clubs left published programs for posterity. Nonetheless, we do have the prospectus of the Limoges Amis de la paix, printed by the Mercure de France in December 1790, and a pamphlet published about the same time by the Monarchist Club of Paris, outlining its principles and objectives.<sup>10</sup> The Limoges club, as suggested by its title, stated as its principal goal the preservation of public order and peace. In its preamble the prospectus called into question all "associations particulieres" and went on to explicitly denounce those groups that resorted to inflammatory rhetoric and exclusionary tactics. The new club pledged its scrupulous adherence to the laws of the nation-far better to obey laws, even if flawed, than to chase after the chimera of legislative perfection and risk anarchy. On this point the Amis de la paix implicitly taunted the Limoges Jacobins, who had formed their club before the Constituent Assembly had declared such associations legal.

The Paris pamphlet took up some of these same themes, making explicit the Limoges club's implied reference to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in its attack on "associations particulieres." The

author of the pamphlet asserted that all clubs and political associations were destructive of the general will. But given the existence of the Jacobin clubs, he continued, it was necessary to form another club that would welcome honest and peaceable men. The Monarchist Club would, of course, dissolve as soon as order was restored and factions abolished. In the meantime three principles would guide the organization: (1) The French government is a monarchy; (2) the person of the king is inviolable and sacred; and (3) the constitution decreed by the national assembly, and accepted by the king, is the law of all Frenchmen, and each one owed it submission. The law, indeed, was the concrete expression of the general will. These three principles directly addressed what had been the chief criticism leveled against the Paris club: Why did this new club, in its full title, style itself the Friends of the Monarchist Constitution, whereas the Jacobins declared themselves simply the Friends of the Constitution? To this challenge the pamphleteer replied very simply: The French government is, after all, a monarchy. But this issue of the club title clearly concerned the Paris monarchists and those of like mind in the provinces, who for the most part avoided including the word "monarchist" in their club titles. The most common alternative was *Amis de la paix*, a title itself soon denounced by the Jacobins as dangerously misleading and inappropriate for clubs that nearly always incited disorder and violence in the towns where they appeared.

Since it is the appearance of these monarchist clubs in so many provincial towns that makes them interesting and significant, it is important that we look away from Paris in order to appraise them fully. I have gathered extensive documentation for three provincial clubs, in Aix, Limoges, and Perpignan. Each club forced a confrontation in December 1790 and each had ceased to formally exist by January 1791. All three formed in opposition to a local Jacobin club, and, while nobles and wealthy bourgeois seemed to dominate, each club made an effort to recruit a popular following. Beyond this there are few similarities. These three examples alone will make clear that broad generalizations about the nature of the monarchist clubs are risky propositions.

The club in Aix was among the earliest of the monarchist clubs to appear and among the earliest to disappear as well. Supporters of the club habitually frequented two cafes located side by side on the Cours Mirabeau. The first, the *café Guion*, known also as the "*café de la noblesse*," was the watering hole of former nobles and of officers from the Lyonnais regiment, stationed in Aix. The clientele next door, at the *café Casati*, was largely artisanal, though the municipal council later called its denizens "*malcontents of various classes*." The chevalier Guiramand appeared daily at the *café Guion*, sporting a white cockade, which he openly proclaimed as a symbol of the counterrevolution. He had reportedly commissioned the manufacture of dozens of these cockades, to be worn by the members of the new club. Guiramand and his comrades recruited those members at the *café Casati*, offering work to some and money to others while asserting that the principal aim of the new club would be to assist the poor. Aix had already experienced considerable emigration, and some claimed that the new club might bring back to town the departed aristocrats, who would, of course, patronize the now unemployed artisans of Aix.

On 11 December Guiramand and four others appeared at the town hall to register the new club, which was to hold its first meeting the following day, a Sunday. Rumors spread quickly through town, and by afternoon messengers were hurrying back and forth between the two revolutionary clubs in Aix, the Jacobins and the *anti-politiques*. Both clubs convened formal meetings the following morning and continued to exchange delegates. The two clubs met on opposite sides of town, and the natural route from one to the other crossed the Cours Mira-beau near the café Guion. It was there that trouble began.

Witnesses later testified that each time delegates from the two clubs passed in front of the café Guion, Lyonnais officers rushed out to taunt them. Guiramand reportedly spent most of the day strutting about in front of the two cafés despite warnings that his confrontational posture might provoke trouble. Late in the afternoon the Jacobin club and the anti-politiques agreed to unite in response to the new monarchist challenge.<sup>11</sup> To seal the agreement, the Jacobins walked en masse to the anti-politiques' meeting hall, and the two clubs returned together to the Jacobin hall, forming a long column as they marched back across town. As they crossed the Cours Mirabeau, they sang "Ca ira," and the Lyonnais officers greeted them with insults: "Where is that rabble going? Look at that rabble amusing themselves: I'll run my sword through their guts. I'll call out one hundred soldiers from the [Lyonnais] Regiment, and we'll wipe them all out."<sup>12</sup> The chevalier Guiramand chose not to wait for the regiment. From the door of the café he fired a pistol shot into the crowd, and the confrontation of words quickly escalated into a riot. More shots were fired, and several citizens were wounded. The radical club members sacked the café Guion, and the Lyonnais officers retreated to the garrison. There they attempted to rally the regiment for a march back into town, but the soldiers refused to follow the officers' orders, thereby averting serious bloodshed.

That night the municipal council ordered the Lyonnais regiment out of town. They left early the following morning and were replaced by the Ernest regiment from Marseilles along with a contingent of the Marseilles national guard. Those two forces, however, could not pre-serve order in Aix. On Monday militants from the two clubs seized the avocat Pascalis at his country estate, as well as the marquis de la Roquette, who had reportedly been at the café Guion when trouble began. Both men had previously antagonized Aix patriots. In September Pascalis had delivered an inflammatory speech at the closing session of the Aix parlement, a speech widely interpreted as counterrevolutionary. Since then he had frequently received visits from Lyonnais officers at his country home just outside Aix, and when he was arrested on 13 December, an incriminating letter from the émigré princes was found in his pocket. La Roquette had offended the people of Aix two years earlier, when his coach had run over and killed a mother and two children. The people guarded that bitter memory. For La Roquette, then, the personal and the political mixed in a fateful fashion that Hugo or Dickens certainly would have appreciated.

Pascalis and La Roquette remained secure in prison overnight, but the following morning a crowd gathered once again and forced municipal officials, terrified for their lives, to release the

prisoners. The drama ended, as it had begun, on the Cours Mirabeau, with the execution of Pascalis, La Roquette, and Guiramand.<sup>13</sup>

Several aspects of this failure to establish a monarchist club in Aix stand out. The known leaders of the club were predominantly aristocrats or bourgeois prominent in Old Regime society. But they made an active effort to recruit from the artisanal population of Aix, relying on patron-client ties within the community. Nearly every contemporary source noted the importance of the aristocracy to the local economy and the deleterious effect that recent emigration had had. We have no membership list for the club, but among those who were arrested on 12 December or who visited town hall the previous day to register the club, one finds a fencing master, a glove maker, two joiners, and a wig-maker, all of them from artisanal trades that would have catered to an aristocratic clientele.<sup>14</sup> We should also reemphasize the role in this affair of the Lyonnais regiment, an essential ally for those in Aix who wished to found a monarchist club.

The response of the other two clubs, the Jacobins and the anti-politiques, is also interesting. The union of the two clubs did not survive the following winter, but the effort to meet a perceived challenge to the Revolution with an action stressing patriotic unity and public unanimity is characteristic of the obsession with conspiracy that both Francois Furet and Lynn Hunt have argued was a central feature of revolutionary politics.<sup>15</sup> Also consistent with this notion was a later action of the *anti-politiques*. In January 1791 that club petitioned the municipal council for a prohibition of the wearing of masks at the upcoming carnival celebrations. The implication? Who but an enemy of the Revolution would want to hide behind a mask? Given the tension and suspicion still prevailing in Aix public life, the council willingly granted the request.<sup>16</sup>

Let us consider more briefly the situations in Perpignan and Limoges. As in Aix, the political situation in Perpignan was contentious from the outset of the Revolution. Perpignan had a population in 1789 of around ten thousand, a quarter of whom were employed in agriculture, perhaps half in artisanal trades, with the remaining quarter composed of bourgeois professionals, royal officials, and aristocrats. This last group dominated local politics both at the end of the Old Regime and into the first two years of the Revolution. The Perpignan elite were jealous of local privileges and unsympathetic to the political and administrative reforms initiated in 1789.<sup>17</sup>

Local politics quickly polarized in 1789, with "aristocrats" and "patriots" competing for political control. The Old Regime elite easily carried the municipal elections of January 1790, in which only some 300 out of an active population of 1,664 bothered to vote. Most "patriots" were excluded from voting by the property requirement, and the marquis d'Aguilar was elected mayor almost unanimously. The municipal council was dominated by nobles and moderate bourgeois, a group characterized by Suzanne Bazart and Michele Marce as "liberal royalists."<sup>18</sup>

Adding to the political volatility of the town was an unusually large national guard-some seventeen hundred of Perpignan's ten thousand inhabitants were members of one of the seventeen national guard companies. The companies were themselves composed, and therefore



divided, along social and political lines, which hardly made them a force that could be counted on to preserve public order. On 1 May 1790 public order was indeed disrupted when a Jacobin club meeting was broken up by violence.<sup>19</sup> While that disruption may have hurt the reputation of the Jacobins in Perpignan, it seemed to help them in the department at large, as several club members were elected to the departmental administration in late spring. One thus had the somewhat unusual situation of a municipal council dominated by moderates at odds with a departmental administration sympathetic to the Jacobin club. When the municipal council chose not to celebrate the 1790 anniversary of 14 July, a clear rift developed between the two councils.

A final ingredient in the political ferment was the fact that the royal Touraine regiment, stationed in Perpignan, was commanded by Riquetti *le jeune*, Mirabeau's younger brother. Unlike his more celebrated elder, Riquetti was something of a royalist troublemaker, and his incendiary antics forced him to flee Perpignan in mid-June, later to be arrested in Castelnaudary and charged by the Constituent Assembly in November.<sup>20</sup>

It was in this context that a monarchist club emerged in Perpignan. The Amis de la paix formed in Perpignan in late October 1790, with several municipal officers prominent in its leadership. Immediately, the Perpignan Jacobins wrote to the Constituent Assembly denouncing the new club, which they claimed had attracted priests, former nobles, and former magistrates, all supporters of the Old Regime and demonstrated enemies of the National Assembly.<sup>21</sup> The Civil Constitution of the Clergy had been particularly divisive in Perpignan, and this issue gained many supporters for the new club, whose early meetings reportedly drew up to six hundred people. Whereas in Aix the Lyonnais regiment was seen as an ally by monarchists, in Perpignan the Touraine regiment was viewed as an ally by patriots, perhaps because the departmental administration ostensibly had more influence over its actions than did the municipality. When the Touraine regiment was transferred in late August, in the wake of the Riquetti affair, Perpignan patriots felt vulnerable, since the politically suspect national guard answered to the municipal council. Heartened by this development, local monarchists took a more active public role, one culminating in the creation of the Amis de la paix on 26 October.

Although opponents accused the new club of counterrevolutionary intentions and Vingtrinier asserts that Perpignan was one of the towns that the princes in Turin were counting on, there is no clear evidence in the archives linking the Amis de la paix to the émigré princes or other conspiratorial groups in France.<sup>22</sup> The monarchist club concentrated its efforts in fact on the campaign for municipal elections in November. Monarchist candidates won most of the seats on the municipal council, in most cases winning reelection, but charges of fraud brought a suspension of the results and the battle then shifted to the streets.

The Jacobin club and the Amis de la paix met on the same street, directly opposite one another. On the night of 5 December a shot from an upper window of the Amis de la paix meeting hall wounded a Jacobin as he left his club. The Jacobins sounded the alarm, people poured into the street, more shots were fired, and the enraged crowd broke down the door of the monarchist club

with a cannon blast. Eighty-five people were arrested inside (they claimed to have been playing lotto!), and authorities seized a number of guns. The quick and prudent actions of departmental administrators prevented deaths in this situation, although rumors to the contrary quickly spread throughout France.<sup>23</sup> Reports of the conflict reached Aix, for example, by 12 or 13 December and clearly heightened tensions there. In Perpignan this confrontation brought a rash of resignations from the municipal council, with the vacancies being filled by Jacobins. The political balance of power had shifted in Perpignan, and, of course, the Amis de la paix had ceased to exist.<sup>24</sup>

The founding of a monarchist club in Limoges did not produce a violent confrontation as in Aix and Perpignan. The Amis de la paix in this town formed both to counter the influence of the Jacobin club and to respond to the November 1790 municipal elections, which had seen eight Jacobins elected to the twelve-member council. The founders of the new club proclaimed in a pamphlet their intention to arouse civic responsibility in order to increase voter turnout, making reference to "the crowd scarcely capable of examining the truth," which had allegedly been swayed by Jacobin club propaganda.<sup>25</sup>

The Amis de la paix first met on 11 December 1790. Initially there was widespread skepticism regarding the intent of the new club, but publication of its prospectus quieted doubts somewhat. In this document the Amis professed their desire for open discussion, obedience to the law, and respect for the new constitution. In an obvious challenge to the exclusivity of the Jacobin club and the Société patriotique et littéraire, a club composed of individuals too young to join the Jacobins, the Amis made membership fees low and declared their meetings open to the public. The other two clubs soon followed suit, and all seemed resigned to a period of intense but peaceful competition for members.

The Société patriotique was the first to abandon the status quo of uneasy coexistence. In a 29 December 1790 meeting, the Société patriotique charged the Amis with the instigation of public quarrels, in cafés and on street corners, between its own members and members of the other two clubs. Those present voted to avoid public confrontation but to bring all grievances to the attention of the society.<sup>26</sup> The Jacobin club, too, intensified its campaign against the Amis de la paix. As early as 13 December, the Jacobins had granted the right to all national guardsmen to attend meetings in full uniform, a clear attempt to recruit new members. Pierre Dumas, a club member and captain in the guard, soon led his company to join the Jacobin club en masse.

Both the municipal and departmental administrations at first refused to consider the squabbles between the Amis and the other two clubs. As Jacobin club membership grew, however, the issue came again before the departmental administration, introduced by the procureur general-syndic Dumas, whom we have just seen leading his guardsmen to join the club! In an undated December letter addressed to the municipal council, the Jacobins expressed their concern over reports of a nationwide conspiracy and rumored Amis de la paix involvement. They noted that clubs with similar names had caused trouble in Nimes, Nancy, Brest, and Lyons.<sup>27</sup> On 28

December Dumas remarked on the coincidence of recent public disruptions in Limoges with the formation of the Amis. He moved that the club be instructed to dissolve and its members to join the Jacobin club to avert serious trouble, and the motion was easily passed by the departmental directory, the district directory, and the municipal council.

The Amis protested this decision. They charged, first, that the local councils were biased, claiming that of the thirty-nine members of the departmental directory, the district directory, and the municipal council, at least twenty-three belonged to the Jacobin club. They also defended their club's attention to legal requirements and noted that the Jacobin club had been founded six months before the Constituent Assembly legalized political associations. They vowed to continue their respect for authority by complying with the dissolution order. Instead of dissolving their club, however, the Amis proposed an affiliation with the Limoges Jacobins in order to retain an element of autonomy. The Jacobin club rejected the proposal, refusing to affiliate with any group not already recognized by the Paris Jacobins. The Amis stood fast and defended their right to assemble by noting the continued existence of the Société patriotique. Faced with an apparently unresolvable conflict, the municipal council ordered the suspension of the Amis de la paix on 30 December 1790. Not wishing to serve as a pretext for the continued resistance of the Amis, the Société patriotique sent delegates to the Jacobin club on 1 January to request a union of the two popular societies. Unification took place two days later. The Amis de la paix was dissolved, and its suspension soon became official.<sup>28</sup>

Perhaps because there had been no violence, however, the influence of the Amis de la paix did not disappear with the club. Its members allied with the royal Navarre regiment stationed in Limoges and even formed their own elite dragoon unit as an adjunct to the national guard, though by late spring 1791 it, too, was abolished. Still, former Amis de la paix remained active informally and in November 1791 succeeded in regaining control of the municipal council. Only in 1792 did Limoges Jacobins finally consolidate their domination of local politics.<sup>29</sup>

It should be clear from these three cases that although one can speak of an effort to create a nationwide network of monarchist clubs (generated in part by the Paris club), there was no consensus among those clubs as to how to achieve their objectives or even what those objectives were. All shared a principled opposition to the Jacobin clubs, but not all embraced the counterrevolution as a means to achieve their elimination. In the latter months of 1790, monarchists throughout France continued to debate whether to combat the Revolution from within or from without, by engaging in revolutionary politics or by opposing them. After the violence in Aix and Perpignan, however, and the aborted royalist uprising in Lyons at the same time, no monarchist club (even those claiming to be "friends of peace") could escape the charge of counterrevolutionary conspiracy.

In addition to these inconsistencies among the clubs' goals and tactics, there were contradictions between the clubs' programs and their published rhetoric. As we have seen, these clubs attempted to recruit a popular following either by appealing to already existing patron-client relations or by

offering food and assistance to the poor. Even as they did so, however, the monarchists questioned the ability of the popular classes to participate intelligently in politics, as in Malouet's 1789 speech and the Limoges pamphlet already cited. An anonymous pamphlet, published in early 1791, offered the following advice to the Paris poor whom the Monarchist Club had assisted with food: "Do not involve yourselves in disputes that do not concern you; work, be quiet, do not riot, and we will do our best to help you."<sup>30</sup> The monarchists sought to secure the acquiescence of the poor, not their support or participation. Jean-Baptiste Gorsas raised this issue in an amusing fashion with an anecdote appearing in a February 1791 issue of his newspaper. A national guardsman of the faubourg St. Marceau reproached a friend of his for accepting bread from the Monarchist Club. "Oh well," replied the friend, "I may have eaten monarchist bread, but when it comes out it is patriot crap!"<sup>31</sup> The monarchist clubs across France may have gained some passive popular support through their appeals and aid, but it quickly dissolved during times of trouble.

It is also worth noting here the contrasting relationship between the monarchist clubs in these three towns and the local military forces. In Aix and Limoges, the Amis de la paix looked toward the royal Lyonnais and Navarre regiments for armed support, whereas patriots looked to the national guard. In Perpignan the situation was reversed. There is no predictable pattern, then, but clearly each of these institutions or organizations -royal regiments, national guards, Jacobin clubs, monarchist clubs -were seen as vehicles for the mobilization (or control) of public sentiment toward the end of securing political power in local elections. Competing groups chose to make use of each of them as opportunities presented themselves, motivated less by ideology than by pragmatism.

Although the monarchist clubs themselves disappeared very quickly, their brief appearance, and the public confrontations they often provoked, generated a pamphlet debate that focused not only on the legitimacy of the Monarchist Club of Paris but on the legitimacy of political clubs more generally or, if that legitimacy was accepted, on what the duties and limitations of political clubs should be. Clubs, not surprisingly, were denounced by their opponents for giving rise to factions, for contributing nothing to political discourse and a great deal to public disorder. Central to all of these pamphlets, whether they defined their topic broadly or narrowly, were questions of sovereignty, representation, and national definition. They flowed logically, I would argue, from concern over the issue of public opinion at the end of the Old Regime, over whether or not public opinion had a legitimate role to play in the political process. If so, how was that public opinion to be expressed and registered, and what was to prevent political contestation from deteriorating into political factionalism?<sup>32</sup> As we have already seen, that political contestation between rival clubs, or between national guard units and royal regiments, often did deteriorate into violence in provincial towns. And I would argue that those violent incidents, well known to the deputies of the National Assembly and widely reported in Paris newspapers, had an influence on the rhetorical debate that took place in the pamphlet literature.<sup>33</sup>

The following discussion focuses on some ten to twelve mostly anonymous pamphlets, though a few have identifiable authors; nearly all are difficult to pinpoint with regard to date of publication. I do not claim to offer here an exhaustive review of such pamphlets, though I did examine every relevant title for this period (late 1790 through spring 1791) listed in the *Catalogue des imprimés* in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. Nor have I surveyed the extensive royalist press from this period, that task having been ably undertaken by William J. Murray. Murray shows that by late 1790 royalist newspapers took as one of their principal themes the denunciation of the Jacobin clubs, often questioning the legitimacy of clubs in general. He cites in particular Mallet du Pan's August diatribe in the *Mercur de France* against "the Clubs, their tyranny and the audacious licence they have introduced in all aspects of government."<sup>34</sup> It seems, indeed, that the royalist press grew apace with the monarchist clubs themselves, though it long out-lived them.

My aim here is not to embark on a sophisticated textual analysis of the pamphlets (which, for the most part, are not terribly sophisticated) but, rather, to demonstrate that issues raised by these clashes between clubs in provincial towns also resonated in the more abstract debates emanating from Paris. The pamphlets can be grouped around three themes, to be considered in sequence. The first group addressed its comments essentially to the existence of the monarchist clubs, either defending or condemning those clubs and their purpose. The second group of pamphlets, written chiefly from the monarchist, or conservative, perspective, leveled a general attack upon all political clubs. A third group, represented by a single pamphlet in this discussion, attempted to define limitations and responsibilities under which the clubs might legitimately operate.

It would seem appropriate to begin our discussion with Gorsas, whose newspaper made constant reference to the monarchist clubs throughout the winter months of 1790-91. In his issue of 29 December 1790, Gorsas remarked in passing on the recent violent confrontations involving monarchist clubs in Aix and Perpignan as a prelude to a series of questions addressed to the Monarchist Club of Paris. Why, Gorsas asked, when a society of friends of the constitution already existed in Paris, was a new club forming that fashioned itself friends of *the monarchist* constitution? Did this new group believe the Jacobins to be opposed to the monarchy simply because some of its members held republican sentiments? And what motivated the Monarchist Club's offer to subsidize bread, through certain bakers, for the poor of Paris? Would this not necessarily provoke ill feelings among citizens and against those favored bakers? Was this not, Gorsas suggested, related to other secret and suspicious methods employed by the new club in its search for members? In closing, Gorsas returned to his first question, asking whether the Monarchist Club's expressed support for the *monarchist* constitution did not in fact imply support for a *purely* monarchist regime in which the king would exercise absolute power independent of the legislature. In the absence of a satisfactory response to these questions, Gorsas concluded, true patriots would have no choice but to oppose the Monarchist Club as an affront to the law and to the nation, indeed, to the general will.<sup>35</sup>

Gorsas reprinted a portion of this diatribe the following month, and before long an anonymous pamphlet appeared responding to his questions. Shifting scrutiny to the Jacobin club, this pamphlet's author asked whether its members could truly be said to be friends of the constitution. If so, what of their attitude toward the legislature that Gorsas so highly valued? Rather than respectfully honor the decrees of the National Assembly, did Jacobin club members not indeed criticize, even denounce, its decrees and decisions? As for the Monarchist Club's declared support for the *monarchist* constitution, did the constitution not place executive power in the hands of the monarch; was the constitution not in fact a monarchist constitution? The two terms, the pamphlet asserted, were inseparable. This pamphleteer, like Gorsas, closed with an expression of deference to the law and to the nation but also to the king.<sup>36</sup>

Another lengthy anonymous pamphlet, entitled *France, Is She a Monarchy?* took up some of these same themes. This pamphlet, too, appealed to the law but to the fundamental constitutional law of France, not to those laws recently enacted by the National Assembly. The author denounced the restrictions placed on royal power, which limited the king to a suspensive veto and denied him the right to initiate legislation. Under the name of constitutional monarchy, the pamphlet argued, the National Assembly had in fact created a government more democratic than monarchical. Appealing to tradition, the pamphlet's author called for a stronger monarch, one restrained in his power only by an Estates General that would convene periodically to vote on taxes.<sup>37</sup> This plea was echoed in another pamphlet, printed by the Club of 1789, which lamented that Louis XVI had been reduced to "first royal clerk of the kingdom."<sup>38</sup>

The rhetoric of these two pamphlets harkens back to the debates of 1789 and before and is more strident and conservative than that found in most of the other pamphlets published at this time (but no more so than the rhetoric of the right-wing newspapers of the period).<sup>39</sup> More typical were two pamphlets written by Stanislas Clermont-Tonnerre and Pierre Malouet, founders of the Monarchist Club, who wrote in response to Antoine Barnave's denunciation of their organization before the National Assembly. Clermont-Tonnerre clearly was concerned over Louis's diminished role in the government, but instead of appealing to tradition he attacked the growing influence of factions, which threatened to annihilate royal power completely. By factions he meant the Jacobin club, whose control over administrative bodies and the national legislative agenda had prompted the formation of the Monarchist Club. Clermont-Tonnerre described royal power as a national treasure, and pledged the efforts of his club in defense of the general will against factious elements.<sup>40</sup>

Malouet added his signature to Clermont-Tonnerre's work, but also penned a pamphlet of his own. He responded to Barnave's denunciation of the Monarchist Club's efforts to subsidize bread for the Paris poor, dismissing it as a scurrilous attack upon a charitable act. Malouet, like his colleague, decried the growing tyranny of the Jacobin clubs, whose influence he prematurely credited with extending to every town in France. This pamphlet also revealed another of the issues that had prompted the formation of monarchist clubs in recent months, the civil

constitution of the clergy, which Malouet denounced as "an appalling excess committed against religion and its ministers."<sup>41</sup>

Turning again to critics of the Monarchist Club, we might cite a letter from the Jacobin club of Brest (in Brittany) published in the 25 January 1791 issue of the *Journal des Amis de la Constitution* (the unofficial newspaper of the Jacobin Club of Paris). Alarmed not only by reports from Paris but also by recent attempts to form a monarchist club in Brest, the Brest Jacobins contended that no club should be allowed to form that declared its devotion to only a part of the constitution. True friends of the constitution, they argued, would support it in its entirety, whereas the monarchists seemed to be championing the executive power in opposition to the legislative power. It was the monarchists who were factious and divisive, not the Jacobins, and this would surely bring trouble, the Brest Jacobins observed, as it already had in Aix and Perpignan.<sup>42</sup>

Jean René Loiseau also lent his name to the attack on the Monarchist Club. In a pamphlet most likely published in late winter or early spring 1791, Loiseau began by denouncing the Monarchist Club as an anticonstitutional association. The monarchists spoke of their devotion to the law, he argued, but had in fact voted against those elements of the new constitution that most favored the general interest. Loiseau observed that while the monarchists declared their support for the king, they refused to honor the king's acceptance of constitutional limitations. The monarchists wanted not constitutional monarchy but despotism, and Loiseau warned the French people against the folly of exchanging their liberty for a few pounds of bread.<sup>43</sup>

In this first set of pamphlets and newspaper articles, we see some of the same ambivalence that we have seen displayed in the conflict between monarchist clubs and Jacobin clubs in provincial towns. Given the events of 1789, would a constitutional monarchy prove workable, or should those who supported the king work to restore the absolute monarchy? If for the monarchists it was bordering on treason for the Jacobins to criticize and challenge the edicts of the king, for the Jacobins the monarchists' resistance to the decrees of the National Assembly was equally suspect. Both monarchists and Jacobins cautiously sought popular support to bolster their legitimacy, but in these pamphlets both sides questioned the motives of the other in that pursuit. Where did political legitimacy lie, and how were politics to be practiced? These questions lay at the heart of this debate.

Our second group of pamphleteers, perhaps aware that in a debate pitting the Monarchist Club against the Jacobin Club the monarchists were doomed to lose, instead leveled their attack against clubs in general. The earliest of these pamphlets, titled *Political Clubs and Libels*, addressed the claim that clubs had been established to convey to legislators the influence of public opinion. But first, the author insisted, we must define "public opinion" (a task that historians are still struggling with today). Our pamphleteer had an easier time establishing what "public opinion" was not. It was not, he argued, expressed by political clubs, which, rather, represented particular interests deliberating in particular arenas. Legislators, by contrast, should

be concerned only with the public good in a National Assembly independent of clubs. To rely on clubs would lead France toward democracy, in which direction lay a despotism worse than the ministerial despotism of the Old Regime. The author did not call for the abolition of clubs but, rather, exhorted all honest citizens to desert the clubs in the interest of public spirit and liberty.<sup>44</sup>

Another pamphlet, titled *What Do These Clubs Do? They Flaunt Foolishness and Rebellion*, did go so far as to call for the abolition of all existing clubs. All citizens had the right to assemble, the author agreed, but in these clubs otherwise responsible citizens seemed to lose all sense of duty and accountability. Why should club members, who individually possessed no particular authority, suddenly acquire political authority as a group? Yet no one could deny that the radical clubs exercised considerable influence over the National Assembly and, indeed, aspired to be more powerful than the king. This pamphleteer saw the clubs leading not to democracy but to anarchy and for that reason urged their abolition.<sup>45</sup>

The other three pamphlets condemning all clubs focused principally on the issue of factions, as suggested by the title of the first, *In Each of These Clubs There Are Many Different Opinions*. The anonymous author described clubs as a cancer in the bosom of the state. The Jacobins wanted to conquer the National Assembly; the monarchists wanted to conquer the Jacobins; and the Cordeliers wanted to conquer the municipality of Paris.<sup>46</sup> A second pamphlet contained a plea within its title, *No More Clubs, Is the General Cry*. The first two paragraphs are worth quoting:

What is a club? It is a society of men who regularly assemble to discuss the affairs of state, to deliberate upon them, to act in consequence of their deliberation, to influence the public by their opinion, to hold at bay the National Assembly, the King, and all those agents of authority that appear misguided in the eyes of the club.

If this definition is fair, the question is already decided: Every sort of club is useless and dangerous; what need have we of men who assemble in every town to deliberate on affairs of state? Do we not have a National Assembly, or do we need several?

It is said, the author continued, that clubs help to form public opinion, but in fact they deformed public opinion. Calm and tranquillity are required for public opinion to form. Clubs aroused passions and produced parties and factions.<sup>47</sup>

Mallet du Pan took this discussion of factions to a more abstract level in a pamphlet titled *On the Principle of Factions in General, and Especially on Those That Divide France*. His text, replete with allusions to classical Rome, made critical reference to both the Jacobin Club and the Monarchist Club. He argued that the National Assembly had exceeded the mandate constituted by the grievance lists of 1789, and he was offended particularly by the legislation directed against the nobility and the clergy. He traced the tragic divisions in France to the ideal of social equality. Too many diverse political opinions had emerged in a country that, unfortunately, lacked a tradition of loyal opposition such as that of England. Quoting from John Adams, Mallet



concluded by suggesting that the majority within the National Assembly must itself be viewed as a faction, because it refused to tolerate the views of the minority.<sup>48</sup>

One of the pamphlets in this last group, though calling for the abolition of all existing clubs, allowed that legitimate clubs might form thereafter. These clubs should limit themselves, the pamphlet argued, to discussion of affairs of state and study of the laws and avoid taking action or voicing opinion.<sup>49</sup>

In these pamphlets too, we see ambivalence. All citizens have the right to assemble, but assembly in clubs tended either toward despotism or toward anarchy. Whereas one pamphleteer sees democracy as positive though not likely to be achieved by the formation of clubs, another sees democracy as despotic. One sees expressed here the fear of factions, a fear that would plague each of the National Assemblies up until the proscription of the Girondin deputies from the National Convention. Quelled temporarily by the Jacobin ascendancy, that fear of factions, and the refusal to accept the legitimacy of political parties, would reemerge under the Directoire.<sup>50</sup> But if the only way to prevent factions was to deny people the right to organize politically, then how were ordinary citizens to express their views in an efficacious manner? A prohibition of political clubs, far from enhancing the free expression of public opinion, would seem like a prescription for the continued dominance of the social elite.<sup>51</sup>

Only one pamphlet among those I have found, written by Dessaignes de l'Oratoire, explicitly set out to define the rights and duties of clubs rather than to attack them. The destruction of clubs, Dessaignes argued, would be detrimental to the state. Clubs acted as safeguards for the nation's liberty. All the same, he went on, clubs should be subject to all the laws and constitutional limitations imposed upon citizens. Every club member should be responsible for his own actions, and clubs should be viewed and treated as nothing more than collections of individual citizens. In other words, the clubs should not be recognized as corporate bodies, nor could they legitimately act as such.

The Jacobin club network from this perspective was unconstitutional, since the Jacobins acted as a corporate body in their efforts to influence the National Assembly and in their efforts to influence elections. This corporate spirit was contrary to the general interest, and it was against this corporate spirit that the Le Chapelier legislation of September 1791 was directed. Dessaignes viewed electoral assemblies as the only legitimate intermediaries between the people and their elected representatives. Echoing other pamphlets, he argued that clubs should discuss public affairs but did not have the power to deliberate. If clubs operated within these limitations, he concluded, they would be beneficial to society. Alone among these pamphleteers, Dessaignes offered a few final words regarding the place of women in political clubs. Their spirit, dependent as it was upon a delicate physique, was more suited to domestic than to public affairs, being incapable of dealing with weighty matters. Clearly, women had no place in political clubs.<sup>52</sup>

What are we to make, then, of this debate over political clubs? There are several themes that emerge in this collection of pamphlets. We find numerous references to public opinion, for example, and several assertions that the Jacobin clubs did not in fact represent it. Keith Baker has observed that the increasingly contestatory politics of the last decades of the Old Regime had induced all sides to appeal to public opinion, thus making "the public" into an "abstract category of authority." But if by 1789 the public had indeed become sovereign, as Baker puts it, it remained an ill-defined entity.<sup>53</sup> The clubs represented an effort to give public opinion a concrete form, but it was one that the monarchists clearly could not accept (except for those monarchists who formed their own clubs!).

Mona Ozouf has written provocatively about the problem of giving public opinion a legitimate means of expression in revolutionary politics. The Jacobins in fact preferred the term "public spirit" (*esprit public*) to "public opinion," reflecting the predominant view that opinions were particular to individuals and must thus be overcome in pursuit of the Rousseauian ideal of the general will. To illustrate this point, Ozouf quotes a Directoire official reporting to his superiors that "there can be no public spirit where there are only opinions," and we have seen a similar sentiment expressed above in the pamphlet entitled *Political Clubs and Libels*, which urged people to abandon the clubs in the interest of public spirit. But educated Frenchmen of the eighteenth century also distinguished between "public opinion" and "common opinion." The pamphlet debate we have been examining reflects the prevailing view, in the midst of increasingly frequent appeals to "public opinion" in support of one position or another, that not all opinions were equally valid and not all French citizens should have the right to participate in revolutionary politics.<sup>54</sup> This is also a view that we have seen explicitly expressed by supporters or members of monarchist clubs in Paris, Aix, and Limoges.

A number of the pamphlets made appeals to constitutional legitimacy: They demanded respect for the constitutional power of the king; respect for the constitutional authority of the legislature; respect for the constitutional right to assemble; respect for the constitutional responsibilities of citizens. Yet the constitution had not yet been completed, and no revolutionary constitution succeeded in achieving enduring legitimacy. The pamphlet responding to Gorsas's questions aimed at the monarchists suggested that *constitution* and *monarchique* were inseparable, that one could not respect the one and not the other. But this was clearly not true. There had long been a monarch in France, but only now was a written constitution being drafted. Indeed, there was certainly nothing long-standing, let alone sacred or organic, about the constitutional monarchy. Far from being inextricably linked, as this pamphlet suggested, the constitution and the monarchy were in fact quite distinct.<sup>55</sup>

The denunciation of factions constitutes another theme of these pamphlets, but at the heart of the debate lay the issue of sovereignty and political participation, not factions. As Timothy Tackett has argued, it was the monarchists, the right, who first organized effectively within the Constituent Assembly in an effort to control the legislative agenda.<sup>56</sup> It was only when the Jacobins began to use their clubs to influence public opinion and to mobilize electoral support

that the monarchists first tried to organize their own clubs and then moved to denounce all clubs as factions. We return here to the paradox of the monarchists forming clubs in order to secure the abolition of all clubs. They sought, in a sense, to marshal public opinion briefly with an eye to restricting what would be viewed as legitimate public opinion in the political arena.

Political clubs, as the Jacobins used them, were a concrete manifestation of the desire, at least by some, to define sovereignty broadly and to tend toward participatory politics. By the time those on the right made a move to utilize the vehicle of clubs, it was clear that they were in principle traditionalists, opposed to the redefinition of politics then under way, and that their goal in fact was not to create an organized opposition but, rather, to undermine clubs as legitimate political institutions.<sup>57</sup> It is striking that the appearance of monarchist clubs corresponded in timing to a burst of Jacobin club affiliations in pro-vincial towns. Affiliated societies numbered only 22 at the end of 1789. In June 1790 there were still only 91 provincial Jacobin clubs, but by September there were 152 and by year's end 276. The monarchist club response to that growth was too little and too late.<sup>58</sup>

Ultimately, what was at stake was the definition of the nation. Was it to be restricted to the deputies of the National Assembly, the representatives of the people, or was it to include the public as well? On the monarchist side the answer to this question was quite clear. They might appeal to public opinion in the abstract but only to exclude from political participation the more tangible, and muscular, entity "the people."

As we have seen, this abstract and theoretical debate carried on in the pamphlets and newspapers of Paris had its practical manifestations as well, not only in Paris but also, and first, in the provinces. At the level of local politics, the practical problem of defining both sovereignty and public opinion became more viscerally apparent earlier than in Paris, and most of the deputies who would debate those issues at a later date in Paris had had some experience in local politics in the provincial towns that they had left behind. In some of those provincial towns, the debate over monarchist clubs had been of urgent, practical importance.

What, then, was the impact of the monarchist clubs? I would argue that they served to polarize local politics in 1790 and 1791. One might argue that the Civil Constitution of the Clergy or the abolition of hereditary nobility, legislative measures that appear to have prompted the formation of monarchist clubs, were more important in polarizing local politics than the monarchist clubs themselves. It is difficult to separate cause and effect or to assign relative weight to each variable, but in emphasizing the role of the monarchist clubs, we might cite the situation in Caen. There a monarchist club never took shape, although the embryo of such a group did exist and in late 1791 produced what came to be known as the Affair of Eighty-four, an effort on the part of aristocrats to influence municipal elections. But this effort never progressed beyond the level of clandestine meetings in homes and cafés. No club ever formed. The effort remained, thus, at the periphery of Caen's political arena. Similarly, although the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was a contentious issue in Caen, it never became the explicit focus of competition between opposing

clubs. Because of this and other factors, politics in Caen did not polarize to the extent they did in towns such as Limoges and Perpignan. The formation of monarchist clubs, in other words, institutionalized and perpetuated political conflict that might otherwise have remained amorphous.<sup>59</sup>

Might the monarchist clubs have constituted a basis for a two-party political system in revolutionary France? That seems doubtful, given the clubs' own lack of consensus and the obsession among both monarchists and Jacobins with the threat of conspiracy and the ideal of political unanimity. Had the monarchist clubs survived until September 1791, they would have seen a part of their program realized in legislation sponsored by the deputy Le Chapelier (himself a founding member of the Paris Jacobin club) that "stated that no society or association of citizens could have an 'existence politique' and precluded clubs from interfering in the activities of government authorities, petitioning collectively, or appearing as a unit in public ceremonies."<sup>60</sup> Surely the tur-moil caused by the monarchist clubs in Paris and the provinces was responsible in part for this law passed by the Constituent Assembly aimed at curtailing Jacobin influence. By that time, however, the jacobin clubs were so firmly entrenched that the law scarcely restrained their activities, and the monarchist clubs, of course, had long since ceased to exist.

1 Archives Communales (hereafter AC) Aix-en-Provence LL75, report of the municipal council, contained in the register of council minutes, 240-54b.

2 Jacques Godechot barely mentioned monarchist clubs in his study of the counterrevolution; Augustin Challamel, who wrote at length about the Club monarchique in Paris, made only passing reference to provincial clubs; and Emmanuel Vingtrinier, although asserting the existence of monarchist clubs in every departmental seat, enumerated only six and discussed them not at all. See Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution: Doctrine and Action, 1789-1804* (Princeton, 1981); Challamel, *Les Clubs contre-révolutionnaires* (Paris, 1895); Vingtrinier, *La Contre-Révolution: Première Période, 1789-1791*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1924); and Robert Griffiths, *Le Centre perdu: Malouet et les "monarchiens" dans la Révolution française* (Grenoble, 1988).

3 J.-B. Gorsas, ed., *Le Courrier de Paris dans les 83 Départemens XVIII-XXI* (Nov. 1790-Mar. 1791); *Journal des Amis de la Constitution* 1, 2 (Dec. 1790-Apr. 1791); Marie de Roux, *La Révolution à Poitiers et dans la Vienne* (Paris, 1911), 424; Vingtrinier, *La Contre-Révolution*, 2:273.

4 Challamel, *Les Clubs contre-révolutionnaires*, 129.

5 Griffiths, *Le Centre perdu*, 85-87.

6 Ibid., 97-98.

7 Timothy Tackett, "Nobles and Third Estate in the Revolutionary Dynamic of the National Assembly, 1789-1790," *American Historical Review* 94 (Apr. 1989): 287; idem, *Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790)* (Princeton, NJ., 1996).

8 Griffiths, *Le Centre perdu*, 40.

9 Vingtrinier, *La Contre-Révolution*, 2:163.

10 *Mercur de France*, no. 51 (18 Dec. 1790): 222-25; *Extrait des registres de la Société des amis de la Constitution Monarchique: Discours prononcé par un membre, dans la séance du 17 décembre 1790, et dont la Société a décidé l'impression dans son Journal* (Paris, 1790), collection of the Lilly Library, Bloomington, Ind.

11 Minutes from the *anti-politiques* meetings suggest that a union of the two clubs was proposed, and favorably received, as early as 28 November 1790. These minutes also give the sense of having been written some time later, which raises some doubt as to the reliability of dates. See Archives départementales (hereafter AD) Bouches-du-Rhône L2026, deliberations of the Société des anti-politiques d'Aix, 10 Nov. 1790-3 Feb. 1792.

12 AC Aix-en-Provence LL75.

13 I have relied on three principal sources for my account of these events: AC Aix-en-Provence LL75, report of the municipal council; Archives nationales (hereafter AN) F736591 Bouches-du-Rhône, report of the commissioners sent to Aix by the king; and Bibliothèque Nationale de France (hereafter BNF) Lb39 4432, an analysis of the measures taken in Aix.

14 AC Aix-en-Provence LL75; BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4432.

15 François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1981), 53-72; Lynn A. Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, Calif., 1985), 38-44.

16 AC Aix-en-Provence LL74, deliberations of the Conseil général d'Aix, minutes of 10 Jan. 1791.

17 Philippe Wolff, ed., *Histoire de Perpignan* (Toulouse, 1985), 161-65.

18 Suzanne Bazart and Michele Marcé, "La Révolution à Perpignan d'après les registres des délibérations de la commune, 1790-95" (master's thesis, Université de Montpellier, 1970), 9-11.

19 *Ibid.*, 14.

20 *Ibid.*, 15-16.

21 AD Pyrénées-Orientales L1447, letter sent by the Société des amis de la Constitution de Perpignan, of 27 Oct. 1790.

22 Vingtrinier, *La Contre-Révolution*, 2:47, 136, 229. Vingtrinier claims the existence of a more organized plot in Perpignan than I have found evidence for, but his documentation for that claim is negligible.

23 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 3434, *Détail du combat qui a eu lieu à Perpignan, entre le club des aristocrates, et le peuple* (1790). This anonymous pamphlet claimed that thirteen had died and twenty-two had been seriously wounded in the confrontation.

24 For this account of events in Perpignan, I have relied on the following sources: AD Pyrénées-Orientales L1447; Bibliothèque municipale Perpignan R327, *Rapport des événements arrivés le 5 décembre à Perpignan, fait au nom du Comité des Rapports en la séance du mardi 21 décembre*, by Muquet, a representative from the Haute-Saône; BNF Lb<sup>40</sup> 1055, *Précis historique de ce qui s'est passé à Perpignan, la nuit du 5 au 6 décembre 1790*, by the Société des amis de la Constitution; Bazart and Marcé, "La Révolution à Perpignan"; Philippe Torreilles, *Perpignan pendant la Révolution, 1789- 1800* (Perpignan, 1896), vol. 1.

25 AD Haute-Vienne L812, *Exposition de la conduite et des principes de la Société des Amis de la Paix* (Jan. 1791).

26 AD Haute-Vienne L811, minutes of the Société patriotique et littéraire.

27 Alfred Fray-Fournier, *Le Club des Jacobins de Limoges, 1790-95* (Limoges, 1903), 20.

28 AD Haute-Vienne L811, L812, documents pertaining to the Amis de la paix.

29 For a more detailed discussion of the Limoges club, see Paul R. Hanson, *Provincial Politics in the French Revolution: Caen and Limoges, 1789-1794* (Baton Rouge, La., 1989), chap. 2.

30 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4750, *Les Crimes du Club monarchique*.

31 Gorsas, *Le Courrier de Paris* 21 (22 Feb. 1791): 348.

32 See Mona Ozouf, "Public Spirit," in *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution*, ed. Francois Furet and Ozouf (Cambridge, 1989), 771-80, for an interesting discussion of this issue.

33 Tackett makes clear in *Becoming a Revolutionary* the influence of contact between deputies in Paris and their constituents back home on the evolution of the political attitudes of the deputies. My own work on Caen and Limoges also emphasizes the significance of ongoing communication between deputies in Paris and provincial towns throughout the early years of the Revolution, and one finds a similar emphasis in W. D. Edmonds, *Jacobinism and the Revolt of Lyon, 1789-1793* (Oxford, 1990). It should also be noted that Gorsas's newspaper, *Le Courrier de Paris*, reported regularly on events in provincial towns. Thus, while it is virtually impossible to demonstrate that a particular pamphlet writer was aware of these events in Aix, Perpignan, and Limoges, it seems undeniable that deputies and journalists in Paris were generally cognizant of events in the provinces.

34 William J. Murray, *The Right-Wing Press in the French Revolution, 1789-92* (Suffolk, 1986), 113-16.

35 Gorsas, *Le Courrier de Paris* 19 (29 Dec. 1790): 439-41.

36 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 9672, *Reponse aux questions du sieur Gorsas, insérées dans son journal du 21 janvier* (s.l., n.d.).

37 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4136, *La France est-elle une Monarchie?* (1790).

38 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 3835, *Catéchisme national, par demandes et par reponses, à l'usage des patriotes démocrates. Par un citoyen monarchicrate* (Paris, 1790).

39 See Jean-Paul Bertaud, *Les Amis du Roi: Journaux et journalistes royalistes en France de 1789 à 1792* (Paris, 1984).

40 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4510, *Lettre de M. Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre à M. Duval Desprémenil* (s.l., n.d.).

41 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4532, *Reponse de M. Malouet à la denunciation du club de la constitution monarchique, par M. Barnave* (s.l., n.d.).

42 *Journal des Amis de la Constitution* 1, no. 9 (25 Jan. 1791): 394-95.

43 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 9680, *Réflexions sommaires sur l'existence du Club Monarchique, et sur les circonstances qui nous environnent; par M. Loiseau* (s.l., n.d.).

44 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4291, *Des Clubs politiques et des libelles* (s.i., n.d.).

45 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4558, *Que font ces clubs? Ils affichent la sotise et la rébellion* (s.i., n.d.).

46 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4802, *Dans tous ces clubs, ils ont de l'esprit comme quatre* (s.i., n.d.).

47 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 9772, *Point de Club, c'est le cri général* (s.i., n.d.).

48 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4808, *Du Principe des factions en général, et de celles qui divisent la France, par Mallet du Pan* (Paris, 1791).

49 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4558.

50 See Lynn Hunt, David Lansky, and Paul Hanson, "The Failure of the Liberal Republic in France, 1795-1799: The Road to Brumaire," in *The Rise and Fall of the French Revolution*, ed. T. C. W. Blanning (Chicago, 1996), 466-93.

51 Jacques Monbrion, a Marseilles Jacobin club member, would make an eloquent appeal along these lines, asserting the importance of popular societies as a vehicle for the expression of public opinion, in a pamphlet published in February 1792. See Monbrion, *Adresse au Peuple*, AN AD XVI 26.

52 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 4621, *Des Droits et des devoirs des Clubs, par M. Dessaignes de l'Oratoire* (Paris, 1791). See also Suzanne Desan, "'Constitutional Amazons': Jacobin Women's Clubs in the French Revolution," in *Re-creating Authority in Revolutionary France*, ed. Bryant T. Ragan and Elizabeth A. Williams (New Brunswick, N.J., 1992), 11-35.

53 Keith M. Baker, "Politics and Public Opinion under the Old Regime: Some Reflections," in *Press and Politics in Pre-revolutionary France*, ed. Jack Censer and Jeremy Popkin (Berkeley, Calif., 1987), 204-46. A revised version of this essay appears as "Public Opinion as Political Invention" in Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1990), 167-99.

54 Ozouf, "Public Spirit," 773-74, 778.

55 BNF Lb<sup>39</sup> 9672.

56 Tackett, "Nobles and Third Estate," 285; see also idem, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, esp. chap. 6.

57 Harriet B. Applewhite, "Political Legitimacy in Revolutionary France, 1788-1791," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 9 (autumn 1978): 245-73, for an interesting discussion of the failure of the deputies of the Constituent Assembly to establish political legitimacy.

58 Patrice Gueniffey and Ran Halevi, "Clubs and Popular Societies," in Furet and Ozouf, *Critical Dictionary*, 462; Michael L. Kennedy, *The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution: The First Years* (Princeton, N.J., 1982), esp. appendix B, p. 362, which charts almost month by month the growth in the Jacobin network of clubs. Between September 1790 and January 1791, their numbers virtually doubled.

59 For a fuller discussion of the Affair of Eighty-four in Caen, see Hanson, *Provincial Politics*, 39-46.

60 Michael L. Kennedy, "The Best and the Worst of Times: The Jacobin Club Network from October 1791 to June 2, 1793," *Journal of Modern History* 56 (Dec. 1984): 641. See also Gueniffey and Halévi, "Clubs and Popular Societies," 458-73, for a discussion of this legislation and its impact.




Figure 1 Towns in which monarchist clubs appeared: Agde, Aire, Aix-en-Provence, Alençon, Alès, Amiens, Angoulême, Auch, Aurillac, Avignon, Bayonne, Bordeaux, Brest, Cambrai, Châteauroux, Clermont, Commercy, La Rochelle, Limoges, Metz, Nancy, Orléans, Paris, Pau, Perpignan, Poitiers, Provins, Sallies, Souillac, Strasbourg, Toulon, Toulouse, Tulle, Valenciennes, and Versailles. Sources: See note 3.