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Personal and Professional Connections are Premium: An Assessment of Mandatory Waiting Periods in the American States

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**Personal and Professional Connections are Premium: An Assessment of Mandatory
Waiting Periods in the American States**

A Thesis

Presented to the Department of Political Science

College of Liberal Arts and Sciences

and

The Honors Program

of

Butler University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for Graduation Honors

Brittany Nicole Head

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Abstract

The advantages of policy and procedural expertise allow revolving door lobbyists to bypass the costs required of non-revolving door lobbyists. This professional upper hand gives advantages to the special interest groups that these revolvers represent. In a cross-sectional analysis and comparative case study of two American states, I find that a state without a mandatory waiting period for legislators yields a higher number of revolving door lobbyists than a state with a mandatory waiting period. The findings of this research suggest that lobbying laws are effective in addressing the saturated influence and involvement of former legislators in the policy making process.

Introduction

Democrats have been outspoken in their criticism of the Trump administration's practice of appointing lobbyists to advanced and prestigious administrative posts. This practice becomes more ironic in light of one of the lynchpin promises of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential election to "drain the swamp" of political elites and insiders in Washington, D.C. Special interest groups have become increasingly involved in the development of federal and state legislation, making the professional transitions of legislators increasingly significant. Legislators approaching the end of their term can choose to remain embroiled in the realm of politics or pursue other professional opportunities in their local communities. Many legislators choose to pursue opportunities to engage in legislative advocacy by accepting positions in the private sector.

The ongoing involvement of individuals who have left office, including those voted out by their constituents, in the development of public policy raises issues of ethics, transparency, and symmetry in democratic processes. Data on the frequency of transitions between employment in the federal legislative sector and employment for a lobbying firm suggests the concept of a "revolving door" in American politics (Blanes Vidal et. al. 2012). The term "revolving door", as it is used here, refers to the process that occurs as legislators transition into roles as lobbyists; this process is cyclical, meaning that lobbyists also pursue professional opportunities as legislators. The value of legislative expertise and connections makes revolving door lobbyists an asset to special interest groups. This process creates implications for policymaking at the federal and state levels.

The interference of non-elected individuals in the process of policy development presents a threat to public trust in the legislative process. Relatedly, the continued involvement of former

legislators whose renewed service was not confirmed through electoral procedures potentially compromises the legitimacy of the policy making process. Scholars examining the revolving door have found that revolvers transplant their specialized legislative knowledge and connections into the private sector through lobbying (Lazarus et al 2016).

Scholars are particularly concerned with the activity of revolving door lobbyists for several reasons. The expansion of interest group participation in the development of public policy has intensified competition for the time, attention, and loyalty of legislators at the federal and state levels (Baumgartner et al 1998). A recent investigation into the hiring practices of a large energy corporation in Illinois confirmed suspicions that this powerful corporation was recruiting former legislators with access to political capital in the form of political connections and specialized expertise (NPR 2019). These hiring practices are made possible by the absence of clear lobbying laws, and specifically one form of lobbying restriction- a mandatory waiting period. Lobbying laws are intended to create safeguards against corruption and increase the culture of political transparency. One of the most widely adopted forms of lobbying oversight are mandatory waiting period policies. Mandatory waiting periods constitute an attempt to insulate the legislative process from undue and outside influence. Ranging from six months to six years, these laws place restrictions on the types of professional opportunities that legislators can pursue following the completion of their terms (NCSL 2019). According to data from the National Conference of State Legislatures, 39 states currently have a mandatory waiting period prohibiting an immediate transition from legislation to legislative advocacy while 11 states do not have a mandatory waiting period by statute (NCSL 2019).

The following thesis seeks to establish the relationship between mandatory waiting periods and the volume of revolving door lobbyists in Illinois and Wisconsin. This thesis

includes an overview of the existing literature on the features and consequences of the revolving door. I have also provided an outline of the features of the research design that I used to assess the impact of one form of restrictive policy on the process of the revolving door in two American states. I have conducted a comparative case study measuring the impact of the mandatory waiting period in two states. By picking two states with similarities in relevant political characteristics, I have identified that states with a mandatory waiting period in place have less revolving door lobbyists than states without this law. I have identified the methods used to reach these results. This thesis also includes a discussion of my findings and opportunities for future research on this topic.

Literature Review

The following literature review includes scholarly commentary on the normative implications of the revolving door as a political process (Gilens & Page 2014; Lapira & Thomas 2017). Scholars have identified the skills and strategies specific to revolving door lobbyists that give them a professional upper hand (e.g. Cain & Drutman 2013; Bumgartner et al 1998). There is developing literature on the phenomenon of the revolving door at the state level (Strickland 2020 A; 2020 B). From this literature, I have identified a gap and corresponding research question and hypothesis.

One area of focus within the body of literature on the revolving door are the ramifications of the revolving door for democratic access and equitable representation. Critics of the revolving door maintain that the consistent and saturated presence of lobbyists can inhibit the access of constituents to their legislators (Gilens & Page 2014). Some scholars raise objections to the higher compensation commanded by revolving door lobbyists. Special interest groups that

cannot offer competitive compensation packages are less likely to be able to recruit talented revolving door lobbyists. A study by Gilens & Page in 2014 can be used to demonstrate that business interests maintain an advantage at the expense of constituent advocacy groups. At the aggregate level, special interest groups and lobbyists represent business entities more frequently than civic organizations (Lapira & Thomas 2017). Data from the federal level suggests that revolving door lobbyists represent a greater number of clients and retain these clients at a higher rate than their colleagues who do not have government experience (Lapira & Thomas 2017). These trends suggest that corporations with greater resources that can employ revolving door lobbyists can acquire a greater level of political capital than smaller special interest groups. How democratic is our legislative process if it only represents the interests of individuals with legislative experience?

A second focus of the literature on the revolving door is the strategies employed by revolving door lobbyists that distinguish them from other lobbyists. The strategies employed by lobbyists have captured the interest of scholars; consequently, the literature on the revolving door at the federal level largely consists of a discussion of these strategies. There are certain costs associated with the practice of lobbying, which create substantial hurdles. One major hurdle for lobbyists and interest groups is the communication of the relevance of their policy issue (Baumgartner et al 1998). The value of lobbyists in the process of policy development derives from their ability to mobilize financial resources and legislative information. Financial contributions and legislative specialization can strengthen the relationship between legislators and lobbyists. The ability of lobbyists to direct the allocation of financial resources makes them particularly powerful in the special interest group landscape. These donations to political action committees yield legislative results, measured by congressional roll call votes (Baumgartner et al

1998). The desire of lobbyists to obtain the loyalty and commitment of legislators motivates their willingness to pursue a variety of strategies to develop their relationship with legislators.

Additional characteristics of lobbyists shape the nature of relationships between lobbyists and legislators. The extent of lobbyists' network and access to resources on policy issues increase the likelihood of their success in lobbying for particular interests. Scholars attribute the advantages experienced by revolving door lobbyists to their professional connections, knowledge and familiarity with public policy, and intimate understanding of the legislative process (Cain & Drutman 2013).

Within the body of existing literature on the revolving door, scholars identify and analyze features of transitions to the private sector at the federal level (Blanes Vidal et al 2012, Gilens & Page 2014, Cain & Drutman 2013). Scholars have underscored the tactics employed by federal and state lobbyists to advance the agendas of special interest groups (i.e. tapping into existing professional connections) (Baumgartner et al 1998, Cain & Drutman 2013). Literature on the revolving door underscores the advantages and professional upper hand experienced by lobbyists with legislative experience (Bertrand et al 2014, Berkman 2001, Strickland 2020A, Strickland 2020B).

The expertise and familiarity with which lobbyists and interest groups approach the development of legislation contributes to their value in the political process. Scholars differ in their perception of how frequently legislators rely on lobbyists for expertise on policy development. Information on forthcoming legislation is subject to the scrutiny of lobbyists and interest groups. Lobbyists with legislative experience often have greater and deeper familiarity with complex pieces of state and federal legislation (Bertrand et al 2014). The practice of

lobbyist messaging requires that lobbyists are particularly knowledgeable about the piece of legislation for which they are advocating (Heberlig 2005). The length of a given legislator's tenure contributes to the extent of their policy expertise (Ozmy 2010). The strength and eloquence with which lobbyists present a particular legislative initiative determines the trajectory of a particular concern within the legislative agenda. While lobbyists may acquire knowledge of a legislator's preference over the course of their tenure, the practice of lobbying remains a calculated risk. This association suggests that lobbyists with legislative experience could bolster their presentation with the additional information and tactics that they acquired through professional experience in the legislative sphere.

Scholars have distinguished between lobbyists who provide clients with valuable consultation on political strategy and lobbyists who specialize in providing expertise on pieces of legislation (Lapira & Thomas 2017). Revolving door lobbyists' political experiences makes them qualified to consult on both the technical language inherent in legislation and the strategy required to introduce and advance policies on behalf of special interest groups.

Revolving door lobbyists are uniquely positioned to experience success in their personal relationships because their legislative experience affords them knowledge of campaign strategies and policy expertise. Consequently, revolving door lobbyists can sidestep some of the steps required to propel the agendas of special interest groups through the legislative process. Scholars have concluded that revolving door lobbyists can wield their political strength and experience in particularly competitive and crowded interest group environments (Berkman 2001).

Within the body of literature on revolving door lobbying, scholars are particularly concerned with the tactics employed by lobbyists to advance policies favoring particular special interests. The application of interpersonal tactics characterizes the behavior of individual lobbyists. Interest groups tend to develop strategies based on their acquisition of revolving door lobbyists while revolving door lobbyists leverage tactics. Personal meetings continue to be the most frequent vehicle through which lobbyists interact with legislators (Nownes & DeAlejandro 2009, Baumgartner et al 1998). Scholars insist that, of the advantages experienced by revolving door lobbyists, personal connections remain the most valuable link in relationships between lobbyists and legislators. Personal meetings provide lobbyists with the most direct vehicle for advocacy (Nownes & DeAlejandro 2009, Baumgartner et al 1998). Logic suggests that revolving door lobbyists who maintain connections to practicing legislators would have an upper hand over their colleagues with limited professional networks. These revolving door lobbyists would be more likely to leverage their political connections to schedule personal meetings with current legislators. Their personal connections are contingent on the ongoing service of their legislative colleagues. These personal connections create political leverage, making former legislators particularly valuable capital for lobbying firms.

Studies conducted on the dynamic relationship between lobbyists and legislators demonstrate the parallels in personal and professional recruitment experienced by lobbyists and legislators (Zeigler & Baer 1968). Similar professional experiences create solidarity and strengthen personal relationships between lobbyists and legislators.

The common objective of reelection drives legislators to prioritize consistent support from voters on legislative decisions (Denzau & Munger 1986). The commitment of legislators to maintaining voter support restricts the introduction and discussion of potential legislative

initiatives within conversations between legislators and lobbyists. Lobbyists are limited by the reelection objectives of legislators; they are unlikely to present initiatives that interfere with a legislator's ability to acquire voter support for successive terms in office. The ability to pursue pieces of legislation without concern for constituent feedback can be an attractive incentive for legislators to transition into the private sector.

In his examination of the composition of state legislatures, Todd Maske discovered that specialization and expertise play a significant role in the successful development and evolution of legislation (Maske 2019). Specialization and expertise are particularly valuable in the context of legislative committees. Lobbyists with experience on specific legislative committees have tools to effectively introduce and advocate a legislative agenda in their meetings with members of that committee. The literature evaluating the extent of the revolving door at the federal level has identified several significant strategies. Scholars have observed similar trends at the state level, with significant discrepancies in the extent to which revolving door activity is regulated.

Continuity and Change: Variation in Lobbying Regulation across US States

The literature on the revolving door is largely focused on Congressional transitions to large scale lobbying firms in Washington, DC. The dynamic between lobbyists and legislators at the state level mirrors the dynamic between lobbyists and legislators at the federal level. Established groups with extensive resources experience an advantage over smaller, grassroots organizations (Browne 1985). My work builds on James Strickland's recent research (2020 A, 2020 B) on the impact of lobbying regulations on special interest group activity. Strickland identified and evaluated trends in the number of revolving door lobbyists in American states across a period of about 30 years.

The work of some scholars in the body of literature on the revolving door addresses the dynamic between legislators and lobbyists in state legislatures. The literature on the revolving door at the state level delineates the variation across lobbying regulations (Brinig 1993, Strickland 2020A). Specifically, there is variation in the existence and implementation of mandatory waiting periods for legislators attempting to transition into the private sector upon completing their legislative term (NCSL 2019). This variation potentially creates windows for special interest groups to exploit. Over the past thirty years, all fifty states have experienced an increase in the number of lobbyists employed by special interest groups (Strickland 2020A). The stringency and extent of lobbying regulation varies significantly across the fifty states (Brinig 1993). The basic standard of regulation consists of a registration requirement and a threshold for financial transparency (Ozymy 2013). Within the scope of lobbying regulations, states differ in their classification of lobbying and the limitations that they place on lobbyist activity outside of the legislature. States also differ on disclosure requirements for lobbyists.

Scholars have hypothesized that as regulations increase, the likelihood of favorable legislative outcomes for lobbyists decreases (Brinig 1993). One common lobbying regulation is a mandatory waiting period, sometimes referred to as a cooling off period, requiring legislators to wait for a set number of months prior to accepting a position with a lobbying firm and registering as a lobbyist. Scholars underscore that regulations increase the cost of lobbying. Data from studies on state-level lobbying regulation suggests that the stringency and extent of lobbying regulations can deter the registration of lobbyists and interest groups (Gray & Lowery 1998).

The body of literature on the revolving door largely consists of analysis on the recruitment and acquisition of former legislators by interest groups. Research on the revolving door at the federal level indicates that lobbyists with legislative experience are particularly

attractive to lobbying firms. Legislators' professional connections and expertise on policy and procedure make them particularly attractive candidates for recruitment to lobbying firms. Evidence collected from previous studies confirms the existence of a relationship between regulations on interest group representatives and the extent of interest group influence in state legislatures (Ozmy 2010). The implementation of mandatory waiting periods as a response to the growing influence of the revolving door creates consequences for the development and outcomes of public policy. Lobbyists with legislative experience solicit higher rates of compensation at the federal and state levels. Mandatory waiting periods constitute a barrier to a direct transition from legislation to lobbying in the private sector. I hypothesize that the existence of a mandatory waiting period will reduce the number of revolving door lobbyists in a state. Relatedly, I hypothesize that the absence of a mandatory waiting period will yield a greater number of revolving door lobbyists in a state.

Methods

To analyze the impact of mandatory waiting periods on the volume of revolving door lobbyists, I will be implementing John Stuart Mill's method of comparison. I will be implementing Mill's method of difference, a process through which I will identify two states that share similar characteristics among most of the theoretically-relevant explanations but differ in my primary area of examination. If these two states have different levels of revolving door lobbyists, I can attribute this to the one policy characteristic where these states differ.

To measure my primary independent variable, I rely upon the National Conference of State Legislature's data on revolving door prohibitions in each of the fifty states to determine which states currently enforce a mandatory waiting period prohibiting legislators from pursuing a

position with a lobbying firm within a defined number of months following the end of their term. I will not be assessing the stringency of mandatory waiting periods, but rather the existence of a mandatory waiting period. So I need two states- one with a mandatory waiting period and one without this statute in place. To ensure that the mandatory waiting period is driving changes in the number of revolving door lobbyists, I need to exclude the possibility of other variables shaping these results.

To ensure that it is the presence of a mandatory waiting period that shapes the number of revolving door lobbyists, I also need to identify several other variables that might account for the variation in volume of legislators transitioning into the private sector. Moreover, I need to ensure that the two states have similar characteristics on these variables to ensure that differences in mandatory waiting periods account for differences in the number of revolving door lobbyists. The first variable I considered is the existence of legislative term limits. Literature on term limits in state legislatures suggests that these limits shape the strength and efficiency of policy making. The absence of term limits allows legislators to continue to acquire expertise of legislation and familiarity with legislative procedure (Ozmy 2010). In their survey of lobbyists, Gary Moncrief and Joel Thompson (2001) observed that most lobbyists perceive term limits as a catalyst for changing the structure of policy making for both the executive and legislative branches (Moncrief & Thompson 2001). Term limits accelerate the process of legislative turnover which can result in a political climate that is rapidly changing in its partisan orientation. Term limits also impact the likelihood that legislators will pursue different legislative offices (Lazarus 2006). Term limits could catalyze legislators' transition into the private sector. Therefore, I hypothesize that states with term limits will have greater numbers of revolving door lobbyists while states without term limits will have lesser numbers of revolving door lobbyists.

A second variable that I analyzed is the existence of campaign contribution limits. Campaign contributions constitute an important form of special interest group participation in state politics. Financial contributions can enhance or reinforce lobbying efforts. Campaign contributions are often contingent on a legislator's commitment to a particular legislative outcome (Powell 2012). The implementation of contribution limits on state legislative campaigns constitute one form of addressing the influence of prominent donors on the legislative process. Some scholars suggest that it is difficult to establish a direct correlation between campaign contributions and political outcomes. Studying these contributions in tandem with an analysis of lobbying efforts can more fully contextualize and explain legislative outcomes. What matters here is that there are contribution limits-the literature has identified that campaign contributions play a role in shaping outcomes, so I took this variable into consideration when selecting my states, but I will be looking at whether or not a contribution limit exists- the size of the limit is not relevant to the findings of this study .

Recent literature underscores the relationship between state policies on campaign financing and the culture of lobbying and interest groups. Campaign contribution regulations tend to be more stringent than regulations of lobbying practices (Briffault 2008). James Strickland observed that campaign finance regulations adversely impact the registration of lobbyists (Strickland 2019b). I hypothesize that the existence of campaign contribution limits could deter the registration of lobbyists, thereby decreasing the total number of registered lobbyists in a given state. This would consequently reduce the number of revolving door lobbyists by extension.

A third variable that I researched is the size of a state's legislature. I hypothesize that a larger state legislature would produce a higher number of registered lobbyists. The logic here

interest groups will need to employ more lobbyists to meet the needs of more legislators. A state legislature with a greater number of legislators will produce a larger pool of individuals who might be interested in transitioning into positions in the private sector. Data on state legislative trends suggests that as the size of state legislatures increases, they become more professionalized. (Malhotra 2006).

An additional variable that I will include in my consideration of states for analysis is the professionalism of state legislatures. The term “professionalism” in this context encompasses the extent of professional resources available to state legislators. The term also refers to the seriousness and expertise with which political actors approach the state legislative process (Mooney 1995). Within the body of literature on state legislatures, scholars underscore the growing trend of professionalization across state legislatures (Mooney 1995). Professional legislatures tend to consist of legislators with specialized knowledge and expertise. The process of professionalization encourages legislators to match their expertise to the growing demands of the public sector (Malhotra 2006). I anticipate that the characteristics of professional legislatures produce several dynamics. Some scholars maintain that the professionalization of legislatures has lengthened the career terms of legislators, potentially curbing transitions into the private sector (Woods & Baranowski 2006). The demand for specialization and expertise in the lobbying industry suggests that professional legislators would be highly valuable capital for lobbying firms. Some scholars observe that the professionalization of legislatures complicates interest group influence (Berkman 2001). Legislators become increasingly knowledgeable of policy developments in professional legislatures and typically build stronger connections with their constituents (Berkman 2001). The systematic and streamlined characteristics of professional legislatures make legislators less reliant on outside information (Berkman 2001). Because there

is a demand from lobbying firms for specialized legislative expertise, I predict that professional legislatures will produce more revolving door lobbyists.

There is a natural relationship between the professionalization of a state legislature and compensation for legislators (Fiorina 1999). I anticipate that legislatures with higher salaries could yield fewer revolving door lobbyists than state legislatures with lower salaries.

Compensation shapes the likelihood that legislators will accept non-monetary benefits from lobbyists (Ozmy 2010).

Using Mill's method, I compared a number of variables across all fifty states. I determined that Illinois and Wisconsin are most compatible in several areas of political activity. As demonstrated in Table A, neither Illinois nor Wisconsin has legislative term limits. In both states, Senators serve in four-year terms while representatives serve in two-year terms. Both states place limits on contributions to legislative campaigns. Illinois and Wisconsin have comparably sized legislative chambers. Both the Illinois legislature and the Wisconsin legislature are full-time, professional legislatures. The salaries for legislators in Illinois and Wisconsin are relatively similar. Significantly, Illinois and Wisconsin differ on the policy of mandatory waiting periods for legislators attempting to enter the private sector. Wisconsin has a twelve-month mandatory waiting period for legislators transitioning into the private sector while Illinois does not have a mandatory waiting period (NCSL 2019). I have accounted for other variables that could explain the variation in volume of revolving door lobbyists, allowing me to trace the discrepancies to the differing policies on waiting periods.

For the purposes of this research, I identified the number of revolving door lobbyists as my dependent variable. Measuring the number of registered lobbyists with legislative experience

(“revolvers”) in Illinois and Wisconsin provides a quantitative indication of the extent to which former legislators are serving as lobbyists in their respective states. I recognize that there may be former legislators working for special interest groups in an unofficial capacity. This thesis does not attempt to capture the entirety of former legislators’ involvement with special interest groups but rather seeks to identify the relationship between one particular policy by statute and the volume of revolving door lobbyists.

To measure the impact of mandatory waiting periods on the lobbyist population, I conducted a cross sectional study of lobbyists registered in Illinois and Wisconsin in 2017. I used lobbyist databases to create two lists of registered lobbyists in Illinois and Wisconsin using data from the National Institute on Money in Politics, an organization that compiles data on a variety of political practices, including relationships between lobbyists and clients. I used data from the Wisconsin Elections Commission and Illinois State Board of Elections compiled to compile lists of data on biennial election results in both Illinois and Wisconsin for the years 1998-2014. The literature on the revolving door motivated my selection of data for these years. Scholars suggest that revolving door lobbyists employ their most salient political connections formed with contemporary legislative colleagues as they advocate for special interest groups (Bertrand et al 2014, Ainsworth 1997).

I compared the list of registered lobbyists to the election results in both Illinois and Wisconsin to determine the number of registered lobbyists with legislative experience. For each state, I compiled a list of the lobbyists with legislative experience and subsequently calculated the number of revolving door lobbyists as a proportion of the overall number of lobbyists. I only considered individual entries and sorted the registered lobbyist lists by lobbyists and lobbying

firms. I looked at each entry on the list of registered lobbyists from 2017 to determine whether there was a match with the legislator data from 1998-2014.

In summary, using a comparative case study- I have selected Illinois and Wisconsin- two states that differ in the presence of mandatory waiting periods but that display similarities on all other theoretically relevant variables. I anticipate that the absence of a mandatory waiting period will result in more revolving door lobbyists in Illinois than in Wisconsin.

Discussion of Results

From the data I examined, I determined that in the state of Illinois there were 41 former legislators registered to lobby in 2017. I determined that in the state of Wisconsin there were 13 former legislators registered to lobby in 2017. Of the 377 legislators who served in the Illinois state legislature between 1998 and 2014, 10.6% transitioned into positions as lobbyists. Of the 281 legislators who served in the Wisconsin state legislature between 1998 and 2014, 4.6% transitioned into positions as lobbyists. This data reveals a significant discrepancy in the volume of revolving door lobbyists in a state with a statute restricting transitions to lobbying and a state without such a statute.

The chamber breakdown of the revolving door lobbyists signals important trends in the nature of the revolving door. 31 of the 41 (76%) revolving door lobbyists served in the Illinois House of Representatives while 10 (24%) of the revolving door lobbyists served in the Illinois Senate. 10 of the 13 (77%) revolvers served in the Wisconsin House of Representatives with 3 of the 13 (23%) revolvers serving in the Wisconsin Senate. This data is consistent with the respective sizes of the House of Representatives and Senate in each state. There are more members in the Illinois and Wisconsin Houses of Representatives than in the Senates.

Furthermore, the length of the term in the House of Representatives is two years while the length of the term in the Senate is four years. The volume of legislators serving in the House of Representatives, coupled with the length of the term in the House explains the greater number of revolvers transitioning out of the House of Representatives.

Using 2017 data, 26 of the 41 (63%) registered lobbyists with legislative experience in Illinois were Democrats while 15 of the 41 (37%) lobbyists with legislative experience were Republicans (See Figure A). The partisan composition of the population of revolving door lobbyists looked quite different in Wisconsin. 2 of the 13 (15%) registered lobbyists with legislative experience in Wisconsin were Democrats while 11 of the 13 (85%) lobbyists with legislative experience were Republican. The partisan breakdown of these groups of revolvers likely reflects the partisan landscapes of Illinois and Wisconsin. Recent electoral results suggest that Wisconsin is a Republican state while Illinois is a Democratic state. These results signal that being a former member of the majority party in the state legislature increases the likelihood of transitioning to the private sector. The literature on the revolving door maintains that these revolvers have intimate knowledge of the types of legislation that will pass through the respective state legislatures.

Some anecdotal examples of political actions taken by revolving door lobbyists help demonstrate the consequences of revolving door transitions in Illinois. Not all revolvers are pushing for the agendas of a select group of corporations. For example, John Bradley, a former Democratic member of the Illinois House of Representatives, lobbies on behalf of a Chicago Theater group. Relevant to the purposes of this research, however, is the fact that Bradley registered to lobby the day after the swearing in of his successor. Some other former legislators leverage their expertise and relationships to benefit larger corporations.

The following examples relate to one corporation in Illinois that has been particularly successful in recruiting legislators to serve as lobbyists. Denny Jacobs held a seat in the Illinois Senate until his son Mike took over the seat. Denny began a career as a lobbyist shortly after exiting public office; one of his clients was Commonwealth Edison, or ComEd, the largest electric company in Illinois (Timmons 2015). During his time in office, Mike served on the Illinois Senate's energy committee creating a point of intersection between his legislative service and his father's lobbying career (Timmons 2015).

Additional evidence suggests that recruiting legislators with familiarity with relevant committees and key legislators is important for utility companies like ComEd. ComEd successfully recruited Anazette Collins, former chair of the House Public Utilities Committee. Collins' familiarity with developing energy legislation coupled with her connections to individuals serving on the Utilities Committee and related committees likely made her an attractive candidate for a lobbying position with ComEd.

Dave Sullivan, a former Republican Senator accepted a lobbying position at the end of his time in office and his clients include large corporations like AT & T and AbbVie. Given the evidence in the literature on the use of compensation as a recruiting tool, large corporations with greater access are able to pay legislators for their expertise and relationships. The preceding examples confirm the fears of scholars who have cautioned against the saturation of interest group lobbyists with legislative and procedural expertise.

Between 1989 and 2011, the number of revolving door lobbyists in Illinois increased from 32 to 38. Within that same span of twenty-two years, the number of revolving door lobbyists in Wisconsin decreased from 18 to 11 (Strickland 2020B). These trends are consistent

with my findings that the absence of a mandatory waiting period increases a state's volume of revolving door lobbyists. Relatedly, this research suggests that the use of a mandatory waiting period serves as an effective deterrent of an immediate transition from legislation to lobbying. The decreased number of revolving door lobbyists in a state like Wisconsin with a policy directly addressing the influence of lobbyists with legislative experience indicates that this policy contributes to the political culture surrounding the revolving door. The quantitative data and anecdotal examples suggest that interest groups in Illinois are incorporating former legislators into the fold of lobbying and advocacy. Large corporations are able to employ several former legislators at a time, giving them a substantial resource advantage over smaller interest groups.

If given the opportunity to research this topic further in the future, I would be interested in coding the stringency of mandatory waiting periods to determine whether longer and more restrictive mandatory waiting periods decrease the number of revolving door lobbyists in a given state. I would like to expand this research to include more states. In doing so, I could generalize these findings and further measure the effectiveness of mandatory waiting periods. I anticipate that effective policies developing at the state level could inform the development of additional policies related to the revolving door at the federal level. The issue of "shadow interests" in local and national interests is growing in relevance in the sphere of political science literature and I hope to contribute to this expanding sector of study.

Tables & Figures

Table A: Legislature Characteristics, Illinois and Wisconsin

Variable	Illinois	Wisconsin
Legislative Term Limits	No	No
Term Length	Senate: 4 years, Assembly: 2 years	Senate: 4 years, House: 2 years
Campaign Contribution Limits	Yes	Yes
Legislature Size	59 Senate, 118 House	33 Senate, 99 Assembly
Legislative Professionalism	Professional Legislature	Professional Legislature
Full-Time/Part-Time Legislature	Full-Time	Full-Time
Salary	\$67,836/year	\$50,950/year
Mandatory Waiting Period by Statute	No	Yes

Sources: Ballotpedia, NCSL

Figure A: Illinois: Revolving Door Lobbyists' Partisanship

■ Democrats ■ Republicans






Figure B: Illinois: Revolving Door Lobbyists' Congressional Chamber

■ Senate ■ House




**Figure C: Wisconsin:
Revolving Door Lobbyists'
Partisanship**

■ Democrats ■ Republicans



**Figure D: Wisconsin:
Revolving Door
Lobbyists' Congressional
Chamber**

■ Senate ■ House



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