A New Happiness?: Reading Literature with Deleuze and Guattari in 2020

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Contents

Acknowledgements 3

Introduction 4

Deleuze and Literature: Using Literature as a Productive Object 5

Materials and Method: Posing the Question 11

Answering the Question 15

a. First Work: The Potential of a Captured Line of Flight 15

b. Second Work: False Lines of Flight 22

c. Third Work: The Thrill of De-/Re-Territorialization 28

d. Putting the Machine Together 33

Discussion: What Does the Question Do? 37

Conclusion 41

References 43
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Introduction

What is the potential of happiness? How can a captured line be free? Is there hope in hopelessness? In *A Thousand Plateaus*, radical post-structuralist philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari write, “only a line of flight [is] forever in the process of being drawn, toward a new acceptance, the opposite of renunciation or resignation- a new happiness?” (1987, 207). This “new happiness” is the central theme of this thesis. I will use Deleuze and Guattari to examine three seemingly unrelated literary texts: Fodor Dostoyevsky’s *White Nights*, Lucy Maud Montgomery’s *Anne of Green Gables*, and John Green’s *Paper Towns*. According to Brian Massumi, celebrated translator of Deleuze and Guattari’s works and an accomplished philosopher in his own right, when analyzing texts with a Deleuzian lens, “the reader is invited to lift a dynamism out of the book and incarnate it in a foreign medium” (8). By lifting Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts out of their own writing and applying them to the analysis of these works of literature, I will demonstrate how lines of flight present different ways for the characters to find new happinesses in their territorialized lives, to varying degrees of success, developing a new concept of the line of flight as a path to find hope, freedom, and ultimately happiness in a current world where everything is restricted, regulated, and defined by all manner of social constructs.
To accomplish this, this paper will conduct a sustained engagement with Deleuze and Guattari on their innovative theories for reading literature, first by introducing some of their important philosophical concepts into the texts as a way to think about hope, freedom, and happiness, and then using this analysis to produce new definitions for hope, freedom, and happiness as they function in modern society. By reading these works of literature in the manner that one reads philosophy, putting books and ideas together to create something in their interaction, the books become machines that actively produce new meanings from the context in which they are read. When interpreting literature by this method, “the question is not, Is it true? But, Does it work? What new thoughts does it make possible to feel? What new sensations and perceptions does it open in the body?” (8). Using these questions, the meanings I will construct from my readings of these texts will be more than simply a new interpretation of older literature; the analysis will be the form with which to produce new concepts about the lives of the readers of these works.

**Deleuze and Literature: Using Literature as a Productive Object**

Deleuze is one of the most influential French philosophers of the twentieth century. He produced works on the history of philosophy, including studies on David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, Immanuel Kant, Henri Bergson, Baruch Spinoza, Michel Foucault, and Gottfried Leibniz, as well as analyses on the arts, cinema, and a large collection of essays on literature. At the center of his thought was the simple belief that philosophy is the production of concepts. He collaborated with political
activist and radical psychoanalyst, Guattari, to create many of his major works: *Anti-
Oedipus* (1972), *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980), and *What is Philosophy?* (1991). Deleuze and Guattari are recognized for their unorthodox and heterodox philosophy, and especially for the way they use language to produce new concepts that transform post-structuralist Western philosophy. They became known for such concepts as the line of flight, rhizomes, nomad thought, plateaus, and territorialization/deterritorialization.

Deleuze and Guattari’s work has paved the way for a whole new way of thinking about meaning in society. Their ideas can be applied to anything, from human relationships, works of art, popular culture, to the interstate highway system; the list goes on forever in infinite directions. The multitude of scholarly works of this nature has spurred the creation of Edinburgh University Press’s academic journal, *Deleuze Studies*. Started in 2007 and in continued publication today, *Deleuze Studies* according to Edinburgh Press “is neither a philosophy journal, nor a literature journal, nor a cultural studies journal, but all three and more. Articles explore the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as well as critical reviews of the growing field, new translations and annotated bibliographies” (Deleuze and Guattari Studies).

In addition to this journal, books such as Ian Buchanan and John Marks’ *Deleuze and Literature* analyze the use of a Deleuzian style of thinking in the study of literature. Buchanan and Marks say of this type of analysis, “literature can plunge into the ‘middle’ and exhaust the possibilities of the event, laying them out on a plane of immanence. In doing so, the writer eschews the *ressentiment* and the
tendency towards judgement” (Buchanan and Marks, 2). In other words, Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts allow for the analysis of literature not as a chronological explanation of an event or as a piece of language that is “good” or not, but as a function of language itself, producing meaning through its analysis rather than within the words and events in and of themselves. “For Deleuze, it is a question of bringing into existence rather than judging... it is rather a question of being flexible enough in one’s thinking to allow something new to enter into existence” (2-3).

This is not to say that traditional methods of literary analysis are invalid: “sometimes it is necessary to restore the lost parts, to rediscover everything that cannot be seen in the image, everything that has been removed to make it ‘interesting’” (4). Symbols, motifs, extended metaphors, and other figurative language used by the author to intentionally convey deeper meanings can reveal much about the moral or purpose of the story in a work of fiction, and the execution of these techniques provides a structured way with which to measure a writer’s skill. “But sometimes, on the contrary, it is necessary to make holes, to introduce voids and white spaces, to rarify the image, by suppressing many things that have been added to make us believe that we are seeing everything” (4). Using Deleuze with literature allows meanings to be produced by the reader that were not intentionally left there by the author for the reader to find, but these meanings are no less real and affective for the infinite nature of their interpretation.

Deleuze and Guattari themselves have written extensively on literature. "We will never ask what a book means,” they say, “as signified or signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in
connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities [...] A book exists only through the outside and on the outside. A book itself is a little machine” (Deleuze 1987, 4). Deleuze and Guattari’s analyses of books as machines include writings on Herman Melville’s *Bartleby the Scrivener* and the novella as a form. “Bartleby; Or the Formula” is an essay in Deleuze’s *Critical and Clinical*, a collection of his literary criticisms. Deleuze focuses on Melville’s formula, “I would prefer not to,” the line which the main character Bartleby constantly repeats throughout the story, baffling his employer. Deleuze says “perhaps it is the formula that carves out a kind of foreign language within the language” (1997, 71). This new use of the language to produce the phrase “I would prefer not to,” which is neither grammatically correct nor easy to follow in terms of literal meaning, incapacitates Bartleby’s boss to do anything to contradict Bartleby because he does not know how to respond. The formula creates a different language within the language which takes the language as a whole “into flight, pushing it to its very limit in order to discover its Outside, silence or music” (1997, 71). There is no hidden meaning in that particular phrase, “I would prefer not to.” It is the unconventionality of the form itself that allows for new meaning to be produced outside of the structure and context known to society, and this departure from convention is what prevents the boss from being able to respond in any conventional way.

Deleuze breaks down this formula and its use throughout the novella, but contends from the outset that, “Bartleby is neither a metaphor for the writer nor the symbol of anything whatsoever. It is a violently comical text, and the comical is always literal. It is like the novellas of Kleist, Dostoyevsky, Kafka, or Beckett, with
which it forms a subterranean and prestigious lineage. It means only what it says, literally” (1997, 68). Throughout his analysis of this Melville work, Deleuze maintains that the formula Melville uses is not an instrument to explain human nature, but instead a function to produce new meaning in language. It is not arbitrary, but it does not lead us back to reason within the literal. The literal exists only within the story but produces a logic with which to analyze what is outside of the story. The reader is not supposed to look at the story of Bartleby as life advice about how to get out of work, but Melville’s story is also not an allegory with a greater lesson or moral. It is an experiment of language that pushes the boundaries of convention. When analyzed with a Deleuzian lens, the content of the story of Bartleby is important only in the fact that it sets up the form, and the literal events that take place in the story are only important in that they break that form. This use of literature as an object, then becomes the “point” or “deeper meaning” derived from the work of literature.

Deleuze also writes about literature in A Thousand Plateaus in the chapter entitled “1874: Three Novellas, or What Happened.” He uses Henry James’ “In the Cage,” F. Scott Fitzgerald’s “The Crack Up,” and Pierrette Fleutiaux’s “The Story of the Abyss and the Spyglass” to produce meanings from these specific works of literature by using the events of the stories to delineate new concepts of three different types of life lines. The first is segmented and rigid: “everything seems calculable and foreseen […] so are people as elements of an aggregate, as are feelings as relations between people; they are segmented […] to ensure and control the identity of each agency including personal identity” (1987, 195). This
type of life line is of plans and expectations, clearly defined relationships between people, and categorizing identities of oneself and others. The story, “In the Cage,” is about a telegrapher who pieces together bits of information about her clients’ lives through the messages she sends and receives for them. These snippets of information are the first type of life line that Deleuze produces, not as an intentional symbol in the novella but by the use of the literature as a machine to produce this concept. The words and conversations, explanations, and precise knowledge and facts in the telegrams are not representative of the first type of line, but literally constitute it.

With the second line, the line of molecular or supple segmentation, “a present is defined whose very form is the form of something that has already happened [...] traveling at speeds beyond the ordinary thresholds of perception” (1987, 196). The telegraphist finds out more than she wanted to know from her snooping and learns of the existence of a dark secret, but because she only gets the information that is in the telegrams, she has to try to piece together the rest of the story of what happened in her own mind. Whatever happened has already happened; it is absolutely not imaginary, but there are infinite possible segments that could make up this unknown, making this life line itself tangled and deterritorialized, or not able to be defined by any particular set of conventions. The actual information that is kept secret is not important; it’s the existence of a secret that creates Deleuze’s second type of line.

The third line is the line of flight, which explodes through the segmentary nature of the other two lines, “attain[ing] a kind of absolute deterritorialization.”
The telegraphist “ended up knowing so much that she could no longer interpret anything” (1987, 197). Without areas of unknown, there is no framework on which to build what is known, there is no direction, and the life line itself becomes a kind of abstract everywhereness. However, the line of flight is not a final destination; the three lines continually intermingle, and the telegraphist moves on to marry her fiancé and leaves the lives she became a part of as the telegraphist to exist as they are in a variety of types of lines without a single meaning, direction, or end.

Deleuze goes on to use these concepts of different types of lines to interpret what happens in the stories of the other two novellas to translate them into texts which produce meanings about real life as well. His interpretations of these three novellas in *A Thousand Plateaus* and his essay on Bartleby are formal models in this essay; their inclusion is to demonstrate how Deleuze and Guattari use literature to produce concepts about life and use those concepts to produce meanings from literature. If valid, this process could be done over and over again, always producing new affects and creating concepts that explain a constantly modern new form of life.

**Materials and Method: Posing the Question**

The Deleuzian concepts I will apply in the literary analysis are those of de- and re- territorialization, lines of flight, and rhizomes, as defined in the introduction and the section on Nomadology in *A Thousand Plateaus*. All of these concepts are examples of nomadic thought, which functions without linear definitions. Rather than following a preconceived pattern, nomad thought jumps across and between boundaries of structured spaces in society to create a whole new tracing of the map
of societal understanding, in the same way as Nomadic people are always moving to new areas rather than permanently settling down in one location. To use Deleuzian language, nomad thought deterritorializes spaces that had been fixed and offers lines of flight towards new experiences and new ways to create meaning. The pattern, or rather lack thereof, of the line of flight in nomad thought is a rhizome: a shape with no start or end or direction. The rhizome is instead composed entirely of the middle and travels not just within the stratified spaces of societal comprehension but through and beyond them, without points except those of departure, which are motion themselves. “Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees. There is a rupture in the rhizome wherein segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome” (9). Meaning found through nomadic analysis does not already exist under the surface, there to be found through interpretation, but is produced as by a machine in its individual social, historical, or literary context.

The first work of literature I will apply these Deleuzian concepts to is Lucy Maud Montgomery’s *Anne of Green Gables*, a lovely children’s bildungsroman about an optimistic orphaned girl, Anne, as she comes to understand the world of growing up. Set in early 20th century Prince Edward Island and following the long tradition of foundling sentimentalist novels of the time, the novel recounts Anne’s many struggles and wonderful adventures as she settles into normal life at Green Gables, which is the only home she has ever known. Although Montgomery went on to write
eight further novels about Anne and later her children, the analysis in this paper will focus on the first book alone, without considering the plot events to come as fact within the fictional framework. The next work to be analyzed, Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s *White Nights*, is a short story about an unnamed narrator who falls in love with a flighty girl who ends up going back to her first love and leaving the narrator in despair, but the text ends before the reader can conclude whether the narrator has hope for a brighter future. The story takes place in 1848 in Saint Petersburg during the White Nights festival, a time of year in early summer where the sun never sets completely, each chapter or section describing the events of one night. The last novel to be addressed in this analysis is John Green’s *Paper Towns*. This book is a philosophical questioning of the pressures society puts on its subjects to fit into a single predetermined version of success, disguised as a young adult novel about high school. It takes place around fictional Jefferson Park, a suburb outside of Orlando, and was published in 2008. *Paper Towns* tells the story of high school senior Quentin (Q) Jacobsen and the adventures he has with his friends, filled with both silliness and mortality, as they try to find Margo Roth Spiegleman: Q’s childhood friend, lifelong unrequited love, and a classic example of the "Manic Pixie Dreamgirl" trope.

I have chosen these works not because they have undiscovered meanings or connections under the surface of the text. I chose these specific works because of their variety in genres, audiences, and origins to show the continued relevance of nomadic analysis in a variety of contexts and for their subject matter as they directly and indirectly address the idea of happiness. The analysis of these works will be
both a demonstration of what it means to read through a Deleuzian lens in 2020 and an attempt to reach a greater understanding of how hope, freedom, and happiness are produced through lines of flight. While the construction of these works varies drastically, each author has elements of nomad thought in their writing style and references to concepts derivative of flight lines and the rhizome in their content. 

*Anne of Green Gables* frequently draws on a symbolic idea of the winding path of life itself in a way that reflects Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of the line of flight. *White Nights* ends with an ambiguous question as the last line, inviting nomadic analysis of the text as a machine to produce a meaning for the ending and thereby of the entire story. *Paper Towns* has frequent significant plot points about maps and traveling between places to escape the structure of society, which can be used as an example of Deleuzian deterritorialization. Each of these texts can produce a multitude of other meanings beyond these preliminary examples when looked at through the lens of other philosophical concepts, but with this analysis I will focus specifically on what these meanings come to say about how hope functions in individual lives and what defines freedom and happiness and how or whether any of it is truly possible.


Answering the Question

(a). *Anne of Green Gables* presents a version of life in which the production of true happiness, hope, and freedom is inevitable. The story begins as orphaned Anne Shirley is mistakenly sent to live with brother and sister Mathew and Marilla Cuthbert, who had intended to adopt an orphan boy to help with farm work. Anne’s unashamed wonder at the world and unbridled enthusiasm convince the Cuthberts to keep her anyway as they reluctantly realize the much-needed joy she brings to their lives. She is judged by the adults of the town for her talkativeness and fanciful imagination, and her adventurous spirit gets her into trouble numerous times, as she nearly drowns on a raft while reenacting a play and accidentally gets her friend and neighbor, Diana Barry, drunk on currant wine while hosting a tea party. Anne excels in school, partially spurred on by her hatred for fellow classmate and future love interest, Gilbert Blythe. At age 16, she moves away to the city to get her teaching license at the Queen’s Academy and at the end of the year, is awarded a scholarship to pursue a bachelor’s degree, but her dreamy childhood comes to an abrupt end when Mathew dies of a heart attack. Anne abandons her studies to move back home with Marilla and finally makes peace with Gilbert when he gives up his teaching position there so that Anne can work close to home.
Anne’s boundless imagination is finally reigned in towards reality at the end of the book, but her optimism is not. Throughout the story, the constant hardship Anne experiences as an outcast and an orphan does not change her positive outlook on life, and even with Mathew’s death, she finds a way to hold onto hope. Near the end of the novel, Anne says, “my future seemed to stretch out before me like a straight road. I thought I could see along it for many a milestone. Now there is a bend in it. I don’t know what lies around the bend, but I’m going to believe that the best does. It has a fascination of its own, that bend” (Montgomery, 420-421). This bend in the road represents the first new concept produced: hope, as defined as the moment of deterritorialization, and this is the way Anne is able to find happiness in her constantly re-territorialized life.

As a poor female orphan in rural Avonlea village in Canada in 1908, society does not allow for many potentials for Anne. Even in her childhood, she is constantly taught the proper way to act at home by Marilla, at school by a slew of uninspiring teachers, and at church by both the religious figureheads and all of the judgmental society ladies in attendance. Anne is always being criticized by society for her temper, flighty imagination, and constant wonder at the world that sets her apart from the rest of the proper subjects, which is all symbolized by her red hair. Montgomery writes of Anne’s first introduction to Mrs. Lynde, who represents Avonlea society, “Anne came running in presently, her face sparkling with delight of her orchard rovings; but abashed at finding herself in the unexpected presence of a stranger, she halted confusedly inside the door […] the wind had ruffled her hatless hair into an over-brilliant disorder; it had never looked redder than at that
moment” (89). This example is a literal moment of territorialization for Anne, where her boundless flight potential is suddenly and harshly captured. Yet despite all this persistent re-territorialization, Anne remains her creative, imaginative, and wondrous self; a true line of flight.

Anne’s flight line started out entirely deterritorialized as an orphan, so throughout her life, she always has a surplus of potential happiness within. Even with all of the hardships and suffering she endures, the pure fact of her placelessness at the beginning gives her the ability to move between places for the rest of her life. Anne came to learn that wherever she ends up will not be good, so she found a way to create joy in the traveling between. She says, “I am not going to think about going back to the asylum while we’re having our drive. I’m just going to think about the drive” (52). When the metaphorical and literal drive is over, Anne’s imagination becomes her tool to deal with her reality, but it is not an escape from reality. Not every situation has this potential, what Anne calls “scope for imagination”: “there’s so much scope for imagination in a wind” (106), “there’s no scope for imagination in patchwork. It's just one little seam after another and you never seem to be getting anywhere” (126). Anne can’t imagine her territorialization and repression away, so instead, she uses imagination to live more fully within the boundaries she has. It is an accentuating of reality, a way of making reality more real and more hers, and another way of deterritorializing within the territorialized.

Anne renames many things in her life, which is representative of this accentuating and deterritorializing reality. A patch of flowers in the woods behind Green Gables becomes “Violet Vale.” The stretch of road that runs between a row of
apple trees is “the White Way of Delight.” She calls a small pond by another farmhouse “the Lake of Shining Waters.” She even renames herself Cordelia Fitzgerald or Rosamond Montmorency or other more “romantic” names. While these imaginings are only the fancies of a young girl who has experienced more than her fair share of suffering, they are also her way of finding joy in her life and constantly producing hope for herself for a better version of reality; they are not totally imagined spaces, it is renaming real places and things to match the hopeful way in which Anne views them. Anne says about her “White Way of Delight,” “it’s the first thing I ever saw that couldn’t be improved upon by imagination” (26). Her imagination is not what removes her from her world as the adults around her all believe, but instead is what allows her boundless potential to continue moving within her world.

The Deleuzian concept of becoming is what enables Anne’s movement and is also represented by Anne’s renaming of things. “Becoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or genealogical tree. Becoming is certainly not imitating, or identifying with something […] Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, ‘appearing,’ ‘being,’ ‘equaling,’ or ‘producing’” (1987, 239). The “White Way of Delight” is not just a name to Anne, it is a real place that produces real affect for her. A reflection in a mirror and an echo on a hill become Anne’s friends. She doesn’t just enjoy nature and the world; she becomes acquainted with them: “Can I take the apple blossoms with me for company?” (Montgomery, 83). Her imaginings produce the real world she lives in. “Now I’m going to imagine things into this room so they’ll always stay imagined” (84). Anne becomes a seagull,
a bumblebee, the wind. Her life around her becomes what she imagines it to be, not just by pretending things are better than they are, but by creating them in the real world in the way that she perceives them based on the affect they produce for her.

Even when Anne is unhappy, she finds a delight in it too, not because she has no deep emotions but because she enjoys the completeness of her human experience. One of these first moments is when Anne loses her temper with Mrs. Lynde for criticizing her red hair in the moment of literal territorialization mentioned previously. Marilla tells her she must apologize, and at first Anne refuses and shuts herself up in her room, resigning herself to a life of imprisonment and martyrdom, as angry children are wont to do. Partially inspired by Matthew’s encouragement, she has a change of heart and decides to apologize, completely and earnestly, to the best of her performative abilities. “There was no mistaking her sincerity—it breathed in every tone of her voice. Both Marilla and Mrs. Lynde recognized its unmistakable ring. But the former understood in dismay that Anne was actually enjoying her valley of humiliation—was revelling in the thoroughness of her abasement” (101). This scene is intended to be a humorous anecdote about Anne’s childishly over-dramatic way of dealing with problems in her life, but it is actually a demonstration of her maturity in understanding the suffering of her life and her ability to accept it. This is the new happiness Anne is able to find, a happiness within the confines of her subjectivity, which, combined with her hope in the moments of deterritorialization in her territorialized life, allows Anne to experience every part of reality without feeling broken and burdened by it.
She is never a perfect example of the proper subjectivity society lays out for her, so she never has to be just any one kind of subject. She is able to imagine herself into an infinite number of fantasy worlds and subjectivities, so she is always able to hold onto hope for that next moment of deterritorialization and freedom before she is re-territorialized again. Anne can exist in all of these subjectivities more comfortably, too, because she doesn’t fit in any one of them. “There’s such a lot of different Annes in me. If I was just the one Anne it would be ever so much more comfortable, but then it wouldn’t be half so interesting” (224). Her multiplicity of selves better equips her to deal with the constant re-territorialization she faces and eventually teaches her to territorialize herself. “Anne sighed and, dragging her eyes from the witcheries of the spring world, the beckoning day of breeze and blue, and the green things upspringing in the garden, buried herself resolutely in her book. There would be other springs” (355). At this moment, Anne is literally re-territorializing herself while still being acutely aware of what is outside her current subjectivity. She learns to exist both inside and outside her roles in society and so finds a new happiness in all of her subjectivities because of her potential deterritorialization from them. The coming of a new spring is the moment of hope, departure, and growth, literally through the roots of the plants forming rhizomes that allow for expansion by lines of flight; it is still not a symbol, but a physical example of the meta phenomenon that occurs in Anne’s life. She does not get to experience every potential, but she is aware that there will always be new moments of hope in deterritorialization that can only occur in the growth of spring after the re-territorialization of societal responsibilities in winter.
This connects back again to the potential of the bend in the road. “Anne’s horizons had closed in [...] but if the path set before her feet was to be narrow she knew that flowers of quiet happiness would bloom along it [...] nothing could rob her of her birthright of fancy or her ideal world of dreams. And there was always that bend in the road!” (427). Anne sees the bigger picture of the rhizome of her life overall and the many lines of flight that compose it, without imposing a societal construct of the path it is supposed to take. Unlike the rest of the characters in the story, Anne has hope without expectations and enjoys the process of the anticipation itself. Marilla tells her, “you set your heart too much on things [...] I’m afraid there’ll be a great many disappointments in store for you through life.” Anne’s response is, “looking forward to things is half the pleasure of them [...] You mayn’t get the things themselves; but nothing can prevent you from having the fun of looking forward to them” (129). Anne already has experienced many disappointments in her life, and her line of flight has been recaptured again and again by the circumstances of society around her, but the recapture of a line of flight is not hopeless; it is the definition of hope itself. Without obstacles in the way, a line of flight never forms the full rhizome of a new happiness. Those obstacles, or bends in the road, give shape to a life, and Anne sees that despite her imaginative youth and innocence. It is precisely this imagination that gives her the ability to see her life for all that it is and all that it can be simultaneously at the same time, and this is what allows her to find a new happiness and hope, even though she is never free.
(b). The next story, *White Nights*, is productive in a different way, producing a new concept of freedom not by using the characters as a model for how this is achieved, but because none of them ever truly reach the freedom they believe they want. The main character/narrator calls himself a dreamer and describes his reclusive life apart from society, living only through his imagination.

The dreamer—if you want an exact definition—is not a human being, but a creature of an immediate sort. For the most part he settles in some inaccessible corner, as though hiding from the light of day [...]. He is rich now with his own *individual* life; he has suddenly become rich, and it is not for nothing that the fading sunset sheds its farewell gleams so gaily before him, and calls forth a swarm of impressions from his warmed heart [...]. And it is only after the queer fellow has returned to his comfortable den with fresh stores for his mind to work on [...]. It has grown dark in the room; his soul is sad and empty; the whole kingdom of fancies drops to pieces about him (Dostoyevsky, 12-14).

He sees himself as this cosmopolitan subject, wandering the streets alone, imagining connections he makes with the strangers he passes, and living through these imagined connections while hiding from society, but never truly achieving happiness because reality always sets back in. In this way, the Dreamer represents a false line of flight and a false freedom, one that always already captures itself because there was never any potential in the flight to begin with.

At the beginning of the story, the Dreamer describes his solitary wanderings throughout the city. He knows no one but feels connected to the people he passes
every day and is comforted by the familiarity of the streets and buildings, even though he feels as though his life has no purpose or meaning. These wandering form a rhizome, a pattern without a pattern, an assemblage of lines of flight that have been captured and then deterritorialized again. He believes that living this life makes him free, and he believes he wants this freedom, if only he had someone to share it with. However, when he gets that opportunity and makes a real human connection, he bases his happiness not on the ability of the flight lines of two people to form this cosmopolitan rhizome side by side, but by his ability to capture another line of flight.

That other line of flight is Nastenka, who will become the love interest for the story. He meets her on the first night by saving her from the unwanted advances of a drunk man who is also wandering the streets at night. The Dreamer confesses that he has always dreamed of speaking to a beautiful woman like her but never has before and feels quite timid, which Nastenka finds appealing in contrast to the brashness of other men, but she makes him promise that he won’t fall in love with her. On the second night, Nastenka asks the Dreamer to tell her about himself, but he contends that he has no history since he has spent his whole life alone and instead explains who he is as the Dreamer. Nastenka then tells her story: how she grew up with her strict grandmother, never being able to see the world until the handsome new lodger in their spare room takes her out to the theatre and she falls in love. The lodger tells Nastenka that he can’t marry her because he doesn’t have enough money but promises to return in a year, but the year has now gone by without any
word from the lodger, and Nastenka has fallen into despair until she meets the
Dreamer.

Nastenka is a line of flight in the story. She is constantly re-territorialized as a
woman but never loses hope in her ability to find happiness within that life anyway.
She believes that she has found a friend in the Dreamer, someone she can be herself
with and someone who will not territorialize her as a woman, only seeing her for
her value as a sexual object. The Dreamer believes at first that this is what he wants
too. He tells her, “in two minutes you have made me happy forever. Yes, happy; who
knows, perhaps, you have reconciled me with myself, solved my doubts!” (10). In
reality, however, he is not in the subjectivity in which he sees himself, as a helpless
line of flight being captured by society; he represents the society that constantly
captures the flight lines of women. It isn’t until the second night that he even asks
her name because “it never entered my head, I felt quite happy as it was...” (12).
This shows that he clearly does not see her as a person but just as an ideal. By the
third night, despite his promise, the Dreamer has fallen in love with Nastenka, or
who she is in his head, but in order to preserve his first connection with another
human, or in order to maintain his control over her, he hides his feelings and helps
Nastenka write a letter to the lodger. Nastenka tells the Dreamer that she loves him
because he hasn’t fallen in love with her, because he is the first man to treat her like
a human and not just an object, which then begins to make the Dreamer feel
alienated from her after all, since he does truly see her as an object to capture and
possess. At the end of the night, Nastenka “flew like an arrow down her side street.
[The Dreamer] stood still for a long time following her with [his] eyes” (25). Only
Nastenka is a line in flight; The Dreamer is not going anywhere, despite his constant rovings, and has set his future on a material goal of attainment by territorialization rather than the motion made possible in deterritorialization.

The fourth night is when the story comes to its climax. Nastenka is heartbroken again that the lodger has not contacted her, and the Dreamer tries to comfort her, eventually giving in and confessing his feelings for her. He says his unrequited love is too painful to remain friends, but Nastenka convinces him to stay, “if you do not want to leave me alone to my fate, without hope, without consolation—if you are ready to love me always as you do now” (33). She still believes in the potentialities of her own line of flight and sees the Dreamer for the deterritorialized subject he believes himself to be, so there is still a hope for Nastenka for a new kind of freedom with the Dreamer. Nastenka is ready to give up on the lodger, but when he suddenly shows up on the street where they are walking. Nastenka runs back to him, leaving the Dreamer alone again at last.

The final section of the story describes the morning after. The Dreamer reads a letter Nastenka sent him, apologizing for hurting him and inviting him to her wedding with the lodger. The Dreamer doesn’t want to resent her for her happiness but begins to see the world in grey as he resigns himself to be alone forever. His life seems much bleaker without his imagination to take him out of the real world or his ability to participate in the real world by using his masculine power to capture another subject in marriage, but the story ends with a question: “a whole moment of happiness! Is that too little for the whole of a man’s life?” (37).
This question refers to the fates of both Nastenka and the Dreamer and whether either of them attained true happiness, hope, or freedom. Nastenka has only ever existed as a trapped female subject in bourgeois society. She experienced one moment of deterritorialization with the Dreamer in the middle of the story, but she ends recaptured, although perhaps with the possibility for a new happiness again. As a true line of flight, she does not have a direction or autonomy for herself; returning to the lodger rather than staying with the Dreamer was just one of many possible ways she could be re-territorialized, but it does not matter who she ends up with because as a true line of flight she will always hold onto that hope for a moment of deterritorialization and live within the new happiness of that potential, even though she is not free.

The Dreamer, on the other hand, has never been territorialized, but the freedom he experiences is not truly free. He bases his real happiness on his masculine power to get married and participate in society to the full extent of his subjectivity, not on the potentialities of his flight lines to move between and outside of subjectivities. The Dreamer is not free at all, because the freedom he believes he is living is all within his comfortable bourgeois subjectivity. It is briefly mentioned that he does have some sort of job, but he spends most of his time wandering the streets of St. Petersburg. He imagines he connects with the people he passes in his wanderings, but those connections are only about himself in his own imagination and not about relating to and understanding the other subjects of society, so he is not a true cosmopolitan like he believes either. He owns a house and has a maid who cooks and cleans for him, so he has all the financial freedom to go anywhere and
escape it all, but instead, he continues along with his life as usual because he does actually enjoy the comfort of material things.

The Dreamer wants to be territorialized, only imagining that his flight lines bring him hope and freedom, when it is really this imagination that is preventing him from feeling real hope or being truly free. “His imagination is again stirred and at work, and again a new world, a new fascinating life opens vistas before him. A fresh dream—fresh happiness!” (15), but this fresh happiness is not real or lasting because it is entirely contrary to reality, rather than built upon it, and it prevents the Dreamer from taking action in his life, instead of being the tool that opens up his potentialities. He imagines himself out of reality entirely which means he can’t have hope—the moment of deterritorialization—if he’s never been territorialized in the first place. Furthermore, the version of freedom that he thinks he is living doesn’t bring him happiness anyway. It is the possibility of territorialization that does this, as represented by his love for Nastenka and his ability to territorialize her, because you need to have territorialization to have hope, and that is where freedom can arise. Because the Dreamer believes he is a free line of flight when he is actually comfortable in his bourgeoisie subjectivity, because he believes he wants deterritorialization instead of finding the moments of hope within a territorialized society, and because he bases his happiness on this territorialization of another line of flight instead of the rhizomatic movements of both lines, he does not have real hope, he does not recognize his potentials for real freedom, and he does not experience a new happiness, even in that one moment of connection with Nastenka.
The last story, *Paper Towns*, is somewhat of a combination of both works discussed thus far. There are two main characters in the book, Margo and Q: childhood friends who have grown up and grown apart in high school. The story begins when Margo suddenly jumps back into Q’s life, literally jumping into his bedroom window at night to rope him into her elaborate revenge plan against those she feels has wronged her throughout their high school experience. Margo starts out as a captured line of flight, fed up with the typical suburban life she’s trapped in. She tells Q, “It’s a paper town [. . .] all those cul-de-sacs, those streets that turn in on themselves, all the houses that were built to fall apart. All those people living in their paper houses, burning the future to stay warm” (Green, 57). This night was Margo’s attempt to break away from that, to do something that really matters, even if that something is only breaking into SeaWorld just to say you’ve done it. Margo admits that the pleasure isn’t really in doing anything, but in planning it; the planning is where the actual moment of deterritorialization—hope—takes place, the moment of departure of a line of flight from its captured course.

Q, on the other hand, likes the routine and simplicity of his life, although he admits that he wished he didn’t. He is not only accepting but actively willing to buy into what Margo calls a paper life, where “every moment of your life is lived for the future—you go to high school so you can go to college so you can get a good job so you can get a nice house so you can afford to send your kids to college so they can get a good job so they can get a nice house so they can afford to send their kids to college” (33-34), but Margo shows him a different version of life that he is drawn to as well in that night of shenanigans. Margo doesn’t just show Q how to have fun like
in a typical high school narrative; she shows Q the outside, and from that moment on, Q has the potential to become a line of flight himself. Even so, at the end of the night, he comes to the conclusion that “the pleasure for me wasn’t planning or doing or leaving; the pleasure was in seeing our strings cross and separate and then come back together” (78). Q wonders if everything will go back to normal the next morning, or if Margo will leave her clique of the popular people to hang out with Q and the band geeks. He saw their lines come back together that night and wants them to stay that way. Instead, Margo disappears. Q is confused and infuriated that even the police blow off her disappearance as just another unhappy legal adult finally going off on her own, so when Q finds a clue that she left for him, he decides to find her himself.

Q’s search leads him to derelict strip malls and subdivisions that were abandoned before they even began, dubbed “paper towns.” The clues he finds are abstract, references to Walt Whitman poetry and song lyrics. He begins to believe that she committed suicide and the clues she left are just leading him to her body, or that she didn’t really want to be found at all. “I had my hopes: maybe Margo needed to see my confidence, maybe this time she wanted to be found, and to be found by me” (115). He realizes in his search that he had only ever seen the version of Margo that he had idealized in his mind, and he realizes that she is a real person living her life and not just a prize to be won. Q’s dedication to his search makes him skip events that ought to be defining moments of his high school life because his search for Margo has shown him the futility of those societal markers of progress, and he
ends up spending prom night in the abandoned strip mall where Margo used to write her plans, trying to understand who she is or was.

It made me think about all the ways I’d mis-seen Margo. There was no shortage of ways to see her. I’d been focused on what had become of her, but now with my head trying to understand the multiplicity of grass [...] I realized that the most important question was who I was looking for. If “What is the grass?” has such a complicated answer, I thought, so, too, must “Who is Margo Roth Spiegelman?” Like a metaphor rendered incomprehensible by its ubiquity, there was room enough in what she had left me for an infinite set of Margos. (173).

Q finally sees Margo as this infinite line of flight, running away not just so she can be found again but because she has unlimited potential for where she can go, but this realization does not make Q any less determined to find her anyway.

With his new view of Margo as a line, rather than just one point, Q sets out to find the points where she has been to try to trace a line on a map of where she is going. Q and his friends plan out possible routes she could be taking based on a handful of brochures for tourist destinations that they believe belonged to her, but none of these touristy road trips seem to fit the Margo they know. This is because “the rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing” (1987, 12). There is no line they can trace to find Margo, metaphorically or literally: they can find the points where she is territorialized, but they can’t draw a map of all of her because she is a constantly escaping line of flight forming the map in the process. Q realizes then that he will never be able to understand who she is, only who she was, because he can
follow her lines, but he is always behind, and she is always already somewhere else, and the tracing of the map produces an entirely different meaning than that of the map itself. Yet “do not even lines of flight, due to their eventual divergence, reproduce the very formations their function was to dismantle or outflank?” (1987, 13). Q’s search for Margo through constant directionless lines of flight rarely brings him any closer to finding the current Margo either physically or emotionally, but it does open up his potentials to live the same kind of uncaptured life of his own after becoming so aware of the outside to the life of territorialization he has always been content with.

Q gets as close to understanding Margo as he ever will on his last day of high school, cleaning out his locker and experiencing for the first time what it feels like to really leave without ever coming back: “and as paralyzing and upsetting as all the never agains were, the final leaving felt perfect. Pure. The most distilled possible form of liberation” (Green, 228). Q finally experiences complete deterritorialization and finally understands that Margo did not just set up a wild treasure hunt for him to follow because the leaving feels too good to be looking back and setting up tracks the whole time. Most of the clues they found were not left for them on purpose, and so these accidental trails give the most accurate glimpse into who Margo is when she isn’t being anyone for anyone else, and these moments are their best chance at finding her.

On graduation day, after finding one last definite clue that Margo had never intended to be seen, Q and his friends go on a spontaneous road trip to Agloe, New York, a town created by mapmakers as a copyright trap that became real when
developers built a general store at that location: a different kind of “paper town.” This paper town had become real, and Margo hopes that this is where her paper life can become real too. “The derelict space is a zone of indeterminacy that bodies-in-becoming may make their own” (Massumi, 104). Margo’s abandoned strip mall and this abandoned general store become the places where she can be herself and reach her potential to escape, and Margo becomes more real when she is in these places and moving between them, rather than being lost and in need of rescue to rejoin the real world.

This is why when they find Margo here, it is not the heartfelt reunion Q was still secretly hoping for. He no longer can pretend that any of the version of Margo he had in his head was real, but she realizes that her actions do have real impacts on people too, no matter how far she goes to disappear. “Even though autonomous zones are derelict spaces that become sites of escape, they should not be thought of as ‘outside’ the existing structures in any straightforward sense. Escape always takes place in the World As We Know It” (105). Q convinces Margo to keep in touch with her family even while she runs away for the rest of her life, and Margo invites Q to join her as an outcast, but both realize that it would never work: Q likes to plant roots, and Margo likes to rip them up. “Leaving feels good and pure only when you leave something important, something that mattered to you. Pulling life out by the roots. But you can’t do that until your life has grown roots” (Green, 234). Q believes in planting those roots for the future and existing within his territorialized life because it is simple, and Margo only grows her roots and allows herself to be territorialized so she can deterritorialize herself again.
Ultimately, Q and his friends return home to continue on their socially approved life paths to college and careers, and Margo continues in her attempt to avoid all of that, constantly living within the thrill of leaving. Both learn that life is not a book or movie to romanticize into an adventure story and that people are not who they are in your head, but both learn, too, that the only escape is to keep going, and that human connections can be made when you least expect it and will always have an impact on individual lives. “I can almost imagine a happiness without her, the ability to let her go, to feel our roots are connected even if I never see that leaf of grass again” (274). Q and Margo both find their new happinesses in the end, separate but connected through the past and traveling forever in their own directionless rhizomes, without relying on a false hope for their lines to cross again one day.

(d). Margo is the truest line of flight in any of the works discussed. Like Anne, she is constantly re-territorialized, but unlike Anne, the power of the system is not enough to discipline her, and her flight line actually reaches its full potential of a total escape. In some sense, she will always be re-territorialized again even after her escape, because “bodies in flight do not leave the world behind. If the circumstances are right, they take the world with them—into the future” (Massumi, 105). Margo does need to get a job here and there to survive and she remains in contact with her younger sister, but Margo’s line of flight will always have unlimited potential, and she can leave at any time, flying through her life in a constant state of deterritorialization by constantly deterritorializing her world as she goes. Unlike
Anne, Margo does not find joy in the moment of recapture because of hope for the moment of escape again. Instead, her happiness is entirely within this moment of deterritorialization, and she cannot find freedom in any part of territorialized life.

Nastenka is essentially the opposite: she knows her life only has the potential for more capture, so she finds her freedom by choosing between the few un-free choices she has. Unlike Anne, she was not free from the beginning and therefore did not have the same infinite potential to be deterritorialized again, but like Anne, Nastenka experiences much more severe sexism in her society and knows that ultimate escape as a true infinite line of flight is impossible. Margo has this potential because her society does not as strictly require every woman to become an object belonging to a man in marriage, but instead, Margo’s suburban capitalist subjectivity is the apparatus that confines her. These three female characters in the works represent lines of flight under varying degrees of confinement with varying degrees of potential, and because of this, the methods of finding hope, the levels of freedom discovered, and the versions of a new happiness achieved are different for each.

For the male characters, Q and the Dreamer, territorialization means something different. It is still the lack of freedom, but it is also the source of their power. Q and the Dreamer both desire territorialization and fetishize their love interests as the manic pixie dream-girl to capture; “it can happen in love that one person’s creative line is the other’s imprisonment” (1987, 205). Unlike the Dreamer, however, Q realizes this and comes to accept Margo as a real, complete, uncapturable human because he came to understand true deterritorialization through her. He realizes that he does not truly want to capture her line of flight but,
rather, wants to capture his own. He is entirely aware of the choice he makes to re-territorialize himself at the end because he does not feel an entrapment in that life, but instead a freedom within the captured potential itself. This is because as middle-class, male, bourgeoisie subjects, Q and the Dreamer are not trapped in that life. They represent the state apparatus itself in direct conflict with the nomad subject that the females in these stories are, the Dreamer believes himself to be, and Q chooses not to be.

The Dreamer is an imaginer like Anne, but he does not use imagination to make hope out of reality like Anne. This is because he does not need to: his hope and happiness are within the system, so his imaginings of dreams outside the system can only be false and reproductive of the system, not productive of the outside. The Dreamer imagines that he is a nomad subject like Margo, but he never actually leaves the subjectivity that gives him his power, so he does not reach any deterritorialized potential. As for Nastenka, she is never more than an object to him, so he does not even notice the potential she has for escape, let alone notice that he is the one capturing her, not the one captured by his own subjectivity. Q is like Nastenka in some ways, too, both characters buying into the system in order to move within it, but Nastenka never actually has the potential to choose to be territorialized or not, whereas Q makes that choice even after discovering the outside. Like Anne, Q finds happiness within territorialized parts of life because of the knowledge of the completeness of it all, but unlike Anne, his main pleasure in deterritorialization is not because of the deterritorialization itself but in the potential for re-territorialization again. He plants roots to rip them up to be able to
plant more roots again, while Anne plants roots because of her appreciation for the roots themselves and rips them up when she has the chance to experience that thrill too.

Q is the manifestation of every version of hope, freedom, and happiness, both real and false, and he is exposed to all of the potentials both inside territorialization and in deterritorializing itself, but his life is not a model for the right way to experience any of it; he just happened to be born into a subjectivity with the freedom to choose not to be unlimitedly free. This does not make him the villain in his story, nor is the Dreamer the villain in his, nor are the female characters automatically heroes in theirs. Gender politics is not what determines good and bad, but the genders of these characters do determine their individual subjectivities, and the potentials of their subjectivities determine the ability of each to become a line of flight. Each character is only an effect of their context that can produce affect and serve as examples in the production of the new concepts of hope, freedom, and happiness.
Discussion: What Does the Question Do?

The purpose of this analysis has not been to interpret these works of literature, to emphasize this point again. The purpose is to produce new concepts that can be applied in the current world to produce new meanings in real, current, human lives. The totalizing system of capitalism that defines those real, current, human lives, traps those who are impoverished or in any minority without any opportunities to escape. “Modern power [...] implies processes of normalization, modulation, modeling, and information that bear on language, perception, desire, movement, etc., and which proceed by way of microassemblages” (1987, 458). In other words, modern power enforces and reproduces itself without the subject even knowing it is doing so, let alone knowing how to escape it. In “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser describes this entrapment with his concept of interpellation. Through this process, a subject is hailed into their subjectivity, believing it is by their choice that they identify themselves in that way, and therefore acting out their own entrapment in that subjectivity. “Ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects,” but “the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection” (Althusser, 302-303). Ideological State Apparatuses, such as the education system, cause subjects to interpellate themselves into captured subjectivities and territorialize our world to the point that it appears totally
inescapable, and hope, happiness, and freedom, by the general definitions, seem impossible. However, the new definitions of these concepts are produced by the analysis of literature and are also directly produced by the context of their production, which is this current territorialized world; therefore, the new concepts are not impossible at all, but in fact an exact condition of the current world.

The new hope produced in this work is not about ignoring our reality or wishing for the impossible; it’s about the moment of deterritorialization where a line of flight can take you to a new moment of territorialized reality. Hope is not a resignation to entrapment, it is a necessary condition of becoming captured, and capture is a necessary condition of hope. It is thinking about the drive, no matter where the drive is taking you. Constant territorialization of a flight line with potential produces constant hope; and the fetishization of a deterritorialized line as an object to hope for only produces a false hope for hope itself. Hope is different in this way for each individual person because the rhizome of a path of life is never repeatable by any other life, but the process as the moment of deterritorialization, the instant a line takes flight, produces hope no matter how or when it is recaptured again. "A path is always between two points, but the in-between has taken on all the consistency and enjoys both an autonomy and a direction of its own" (1987, 380). It is because of this that for one to feel hope, one must first be territorialized, and without territorialization, there can be no hope. This is not to say that without pain, there can be no joy because pain and entrapment are not synonymous, nor is joy the equivalent of freedom.
Freedom, in its general sense, is the primary myth of wage labor and capitalism. The new freedom is about freedom within the system. Althusser’s interpellation, while also an apparatus of the system to maintain itself, also presents a method of movement within this system: subjects can de-interpellate themselves as one subject and re-interpellate themselves into a different, more “free” subjectivity. To make this escape of de-interpellation as a line of flight, a subject must be able to recognize themselves as a subject, and to do this they must recognize an outside of their subjectivity. Therefore, while individuals cannot remove themselves from the system itself, there are gaps in the framework of control through which subjects can find a path to a new subjectivity, and a new freedom. The new freedom is about this movement between and within territorialization and the lines of flight that produce this movement. It is not about escaping to somewhere outside of the system, because that place does not exist. Instead it is the motion itself that produces freedom.

The new freedom is individual, not universal. While deterritorialization as a concept has the potential to dismantle power structures, the individual deterritorialization of one person alone does not. Even when subjects think they are pursuing freedom in their own lives, they are just reinforcing the system that confines them—interpellation. In order to subvert the system, the typical process of escape must be subverted, because that process was given by the state, and therefore can never overcome the state, while simultaneously making the individual think they have found a potential path to freedom from the state on their own. The false freedom given by the state is in the hope of getting outside of the system to
destroy it, but that is a futile conquest because the Repressive State Apparatuses of
the military and prison system are too strong for the individual to destroy, and there
is no complete outside from the state because of the Ideological State Apparatuses
anyway. It can only be cracked from within by infinite individual flight lines through
the structure. That is why I define a new freedom for individuals in the world today,
one that does not require subjects to abandon every part of the life they knew or
sacrifice their personal peace and happiness for the greater cause of overthrowing
oppression. There is a freedom that exists in finding the loopholes within the
oppression and living a free life unnoticed by those in power. That alone does not
destabilize anything, even though it does not necessarily reinforce it either, but the
hope for a more universal degree of freedom comes in only when many subjects
have begun to pursue their own personal freedom. Only then could the system be
dissolved by the sheer number of loopholes poked in it. Deterritorialization happens
through lines and motion, and the directions of motion for individuals always has
more potential than that of the group. This is due to the fact that not every
individual has the same potential for freedom, but if enough bourgeoisie subjects do
and enough pursue that potential, in that way the structure can be revolutionized in
its entirety. It’s a kind of hope within the hopelessness, achieving freedom only
when the direct fight for it is discontinued. This new freedom only creates the
potential for deterritorialization and therefore the possibility of a new hope, but it
does not create happiness in itself.

A new happiness isn’t about attaining things that typically mark success:
money, power, material possessions, freedom from society, dreams, or ambitions. It
is about living within the rhizomatic path of de- and re-territorialization, finding the fascination and freedom in the shape of the whole as it goes, and enjoying each moment of hope by reimagining the present as the possibility for a new happiness. Finding it is not a destination; there are no correct versions; each person’s individual life line is always already “correct” because it is the one that is. The system of power relations determining subjectivity is not the evil entity preventing happiness, but rather the machine that produces it. It serves as a direct contrast to the new free, hopeful, and happy subject, but in this way gives these concepts their meanings. Outside of the state apparatus there is nothing; only inside is there potential for a meaningful new hope, freedom, or happiness because only inside the machine of an existing context can meaning be produced at all.

**Conclusion**

A new happiness is not a lens, but it is a way of viewing. It is entirely external but is entirely produced from the recognition of the outside by the inside. “The State gives thought a form of interiority, and thought gives that interiority a form of universality” (1987, 375), but the only thing universal about a new happiness is that it is universally not universal. It is distinctly limited in its form but unlimited in its affect. It is not a resignation to fate but an appreciation of the entirety of the past and potential futures and the process of becoming them. It does not hide reality or glorify/fetishize it, but it does not place expectations on what anything should be. “Dream about it all, expect nothing, and enjoy the surprises” (Jessie Buckley). The new happiness is an immanent path and an infinite moment. It happens all at once
but goes on forever because it is the process that brings happiness, but like a
rhizome, the process has no beginning, end, or points in the middle. Hope,
happiness, and freedom are all interconnected, but none of them spell out the exact
procedure to achieve any of the others because there is no direction of movement
between these concepts. It is all movement—freedom—which cannot exist without
the moment of deterritorialization—hope—to go in the direction of a new
happiness, which is the process of all of this itself, but there are no steps in the
process because it is always already in action anyway.

This analysis does not teach anything. “[She] who is writing these lines and
the reader who reads them are themselves subjects” (Althusser, 299). There are no
outsider-perspective secrets to life here, because none of it can ever occur outside. It
has nothing to do with the discipline of psychology; the philosophy has no pretense
of advice. It is merely productive: of meanings in literature, concepts based on these
meanings, and the new meanings that these concepts produce again. It is like a cycle
in that it has no beginning or end, but it is a rhizome in that it departs in the middle
without any points of departure. This is not a metaphor, but a directly literal
observation. Hope, happiness, and freedom, too, are not metaphors, either in the
literature or in real life. They are machines produced by machines, producing more
machines. Their ability to produce affect does not stop when they are out of the
context of the literature, just as this essay does not end when there are no more
words on the page, which is going to happen now.
References


