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**TITLE: POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT in TRANSITION: WHO PARTICIPATED,
and ELECTORAL DYNAMICS, in CENTRAL and EASTERN EUROPE**

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POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN TRANSITION: WHO PARTICIPATED, AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS, IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?

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ABSTRACT

Using surveys conducted in 1991, this paper examines the sociodemographic, experiential and ideological determinants of nonelectoral and electoral political participation in eight postcommunist states of eastern Europe, with comparisons to Germany and the United States. Comparing the postcommunist states to the capitalist ones, we find the determinants of participation in the former largely conform to the patterns in the west, with education playing an especially large role. In the postcommunist states, we found that youth, political anger and antisocialist ideology were important determinants of political protest and party sympathy, but not of the decision to vote in the initial elections. This may have contributed to the elite-mass divisions in these countries, where the elite promoted market-oriented reforms, and the populations responded with "left turns" in subsequent rounds of elections.¹

INTRODUCTION

The study of who participates in politics and how they do so is a longstanding interest in western social science. In one tradition, who participates is analyzed in the context of normative theories of democracy, with questions about the extent of political participation and the consequences for democracy of the kinds of selective participation that prevail in different societies (Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1971; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979). In a second tradition the question of who participates is raised in the context of the broader study of social movements and social change. Such research attempts to answer questions about how social movements are formed, the conditions that make them powerful (or weak), and the ways in which people are attracted to participate in them. Although the study of

¹For a more detailed analysis of this, perhaps the most important finding for current developments, please see the passages following the "Second" conclusion on pages 20-22. [NCSEER NOTE]

social movements often is approached from a "macro" level perspective, such as resource mobilization theory (Jenkins 1983), social movement theory also poses questions about who participates that can best be addressed by individual level analyses (Opp, 1989). In both traditions, research has focused on participation and political action in western countries, primarily in North America and West Europe.

To date there has been very little empirical analysis by either tradition of participation in the communist or the post-communist states. From the communist era, this lacuna was a result both of skimpy data on political attitudes and behavior and, to the extent that such data was available, its relative insignificance in societies where political participation was both limited and controlled. What little information we did have was often gleaned from unrepresentative groups, e.g. from Soviet emigres (Millar 1987) or from East European travelers in the West (McIntosh 1986). The exception to this was during brief periods of liberalization when surveys became more open and more revealing, for example during the 1968 "Prague Spring" (Piekalkiewicz 1972) or the first Solidarity era in Poland (Mason 1985). In the postcommunist period these problems have disappeared, but despite the widespread attention to democratization, there has been little analysis of political participation. The burgeoning number of representative surveys in these countries tend to focus on attitudes rather than behavior (e.g. Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992; Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1994; Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992; McIntosh et al. 1994), providing little opportunity for "micro" level analysis of participation. The same problems with lack of participation data from eastern Europe also explains the lack of any "east-west" comparative analysis of participation, either during the communist era or afterwards.

As Kaplan (1993) has noted, however, we are now in a position to establish a new broader understanding of political participation in the past and present in eastern Europe. This will also facilitate generalizations about political participation across political systems and allow comparisons of participation and political action between the established democracies of the "west" and the emerging ones in the "east" of Europe. This paper presents research in this vein, based on 1991 survey data taken from the International Social Justice Project (ISJP). Our research focuses on the sociodemographic, experiential and ideological determinants of nonelectoral and electoral political participation in eight post-communist states in eastern Europe, with comparable data from western Germany, and the United States.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Our research is of the type Kohn (1989) calls "nation as context" studies. Such studies seek to test the generality of theory and research findings in a comparative framework, to see if similar processes hold in diverse nations. Our first major interest in this paper, then, is examining whether theoretical perspectives and findings generated in research from Western nations help us understand political participation in central and Eastern Europe.

Opp and colleagues in several publications have explicated a model of participation in political protest, "Value Expectancy Theory," that we call upon in our analyses (Opp 1993). They have examined the merits of their perspective in analyses of protest demonstration involvement in (former) West Germany, the U.S.A, (Opp 1988, 1989; Opp and Roehl 1990) and of direct relevance to this study, in the protest demonstrations in Leipzig in 1989 (Opp and Gern 1993).

In short, Value Expectancy Theory, (Opp 1992: 14) is "a variant of the model of rational action... According to this theory, individuals perform an action if they value the expected consequences to a high extent and if they attribute a relative high degree of certainty to the occurrence of these consequences." This perspective emphasizes the role of incentives to participate in protest movements of three kinds, public goods motivation, moral incentives, and social incentives (Opp and Gern 1993). "Public goods motivation" is produced by dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods. Its influence, according to this theory, is mediated by the perceived efficacy of protest action, such that dissatisfaction will produce political action when people believe that their participation will affect the outcome of a movement. A "moral incentive" is produced by a sense of obligation to take political action, and a "social incentive" results from such things as the encouragement of friends or salient groups to participate. Value Expectancy Theory has been shown to hold in the U.S., in West Germany and one region of East Germany. Does it have broader merit in the postcommunist states?

We also call upon the work of Barnes and Kaase (1979). Like Value Expectancy Theory, they take a "rational actor" approach, seeing participation as the result of a rational means-end calculation that involves both motivation and the cognitive capabilities to make effective choices among the range of political actions. Indeed, at the operational level one finds that Opp and colleagues, and Barnes and Kaase employ the same or quite similar measures of variables in their analyses of political participation data. Barnes and Kaase, however, analyze political participation more broadly than Opp and colleagues, examining both "unconventional" and "conventional" political action. Their category of "unconventional" action includes participation in protest movements as addressed by Value Expectancy Theory. In addition, they apply their

micro model of participation to electoral behavior, i.e. to traditional or "conventional" political action.

We draw from both perspectives in structuring our analysis of participation. Following Barnes and Kaase we examine both non-electoral and electoral political participation. We examine two kinds of electoral participation during the early transition, rudimentary political party attachment and voting during the most recent national elections in each country -- which in the case of the postcommunist states is the initial election following the revolution of 1989. Following Opp and colleagues, we focus most extensively on the determinants of two kinds of collective protest action that are of most interest to students of social movement participation. Specifically, we examine the determinants of participation in protest demonstrations and rallies, and "aggressive" political action. To participate in a demonstration or rally is to clearly send a collective message of protest, as opposed to more individualist actions such as contacting a legislator, signing a petition, joining an economic boycott, or even simply attending a public meeting. As defined by Muller (1979), "aggressive political participation" in addition to being action as part of a collectivity is by law or regime norms seen as illegal, and involves an attempt to disrupt the normal functioning of government.

A second major interest we pursue in this paper is profiling the sociodemographic characteristics and political-economic beliefs and attitudes of political "participants" in the early transition period. In doing so, one aim is to provide a baseline view of political participation useful for understanding political change during the transition era. Such a profile, for example, may help explain the success of market-oriented political parties and candidates in the initial elections of the transition, and the subsequent strong showings by left-wing political parties in the second round of elections.

Of particular interest to understanding political change over the transition era is the social and ideological representativeness of political activists in the early transition years. Studies in both the United States (Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie 1993) and in western Europe (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Barnes and Kaase 1979) have pointed out that more socioeconomically advantaged groups are more likely to participate in politics and "that those who are already well off tend to benefit more from governmental policies because they have greater influence on such policies" (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 5). However, these same studies have found that despite the demographic differences between participants and non-participants, there are inconsequential differences in certain economic attitudes of the active and inactive in western countries, and this somewhat mutes the problem of the socioeconomic differences (Verba et al. 1993). Some analysts of the transition processes in eastern Europe have raised similar questions about the representativeness, both in terms of status and attitudes,

of those in power in the post-communist states (Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1992; Tymowski 1993; Kolarska-Bobinska 1994).

The success of market-oriented politics in the early transition may have in important part been due to the "unrepresentativeness" of political activists during the early transition. If these early transition activists were substantially more supportive of market reforms than those less or not at all politically involved then they likely had a greater influence on selecting political candidates and shaping the agenda of the nascent political parties of the time. The growth in strength of political parties on the left may have resulted from a growing "representativeness" of political activists (at least on political-attitudinal grounds) during the middle transition years -- i.e., from the reentry into the political arena of the non-participants of the early transition period.

DATA

We employ data from surveys conducted in eight Central and Eastern European countries: Bulgaria (n=1,045), Czechoslovakia (n=1,181), Estonia (n=1,000), (former) East Germany (n=1,019), Hungary (n=1,000), Poland (n=1,542), Russia (n=1,734), and Slovenia (n=1,375). To allow cross-system comparison -- between postcommunist and western democratic countries -- we also analyze data from two Western democracies: (former) West Germany (1,837), and the U.S.A. (1,414).² The same survey was administered in all countries in spring to fall of 1991 (except Estonia where data were collected in the spring of 1992), as part of the International Social Justice Project (ISJP), a broader 13 nation study of public opinion about economic and political justice.³

² Surveys also were conducted in Great Britain, Japan and the Netherlands. We chose West Germany and the U.S.A. because data from these countries are the most frequently analyzed in research on political participation in general, and especially on social movement participation in particular.

³The International Social Justice Project is a collaborative research effort, supported in whole or part by each of the following organizations: The National Council for Soviet and East European Research (USA); the National Science Foundation (USA); the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX); the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan; OTKA [National Scientific Research Fund] (Hungary); the Economic and Social Research Council (UK); the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Germany); Institute of Social Science, Chuo University (Japan); The Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs; the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; the Grant Agency of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences; Saar Poll, Limited (Estonia); the Ministry of Science and Technology, Republic of Slovenia; the State Committee for Scientific Research (Komitet Bada Naukowych, Poland).

The principal investigators in the development of these data were as follows: Galin Gornev (Bulgaria), Petr Mateju (the Czech Republic), Andrus Saar (Estonia); Bernd Wegener (Germany), Gordon Marshall, Adam Swift and Carole Burgoyne (UK) Gyorgy Csepeli, Antal Orkeny, Tamas Kolosi and Maria Nemenyi (Hungary), Masaru Miyano and Akihiro Ishikawa (Japan), Wil Arts and Piet Hermkens (the Netherlands), Bogdan

The original questionnaire was written in English and translated into the principal language of each country. (In Czechoslovakia the questionnaire was translated into both Czech and Slovak, and in Estonia it was translated into both Estonian and Russian.) Iterative back-translation of the questionnaire to English was performed to validate the translation into a non-English language. Samples were drawn to be randomly representative of each countries population. Face to face interviews were conducted in all countries, except the U.S., where interviews were conducted by telephone. Response rates for the ten countries analyzed in this study are 70 percent or higher.

MEASURES

Participation

To measure non-electoral or unconventional political participation we asked respondents to indicate whether or not they had ever done any of a list of ten protest activities. The specific question is worded as follows:

On this card are kinds of actions that people sometimes take to make their own views publicly known and to influence others when they see injustice [emphasis added]. Please tell me if you have ever done any of these things over an issue that was important to you.

1. Signed a petition (PETITION);
2. Joined in a boycott (BOYCOTT);
3. Attended a protest demonstration or rally (RALLY);
4. Attended a public meeting (PUBLIC MEETING);
5. Joined an unofficial strike (STRIKE);
6. Blocked traffic (TRAFFIC);
7. Written to a newspaper (NEWSPAPER);
8. Written to your (Member of the National/Federal Legislature)? (LETTER);
9. Refused to pay rent, rates or taxes (REFUSED);
10. Occupied a building or property in protest (OCCUPIED).

Two things about this question deserve note. First, we asked about political participation in broad categories. Some respondents may have reported activities that conceivably fit within these categories, but are done for no political intent. However, we underscore that in order to specify the scope of activities of interest the question concerns participation "in response to

Chicomski and Witold Morawski (Poland), Ludmilla Khakulina and Svetlana Sydorenko (Russia), Vojko Antoncic (Slovenia).

seeing an injustice." Second, we asked about retrospective political participation, which in some cases is cumulated over a lengthy lifetime. We are limited, accordingly, to examining relationships between respondent characteristics at a given date in 1991 and participation that took place before that date. To make strong inferences about the influence of a factor on participation, we must assume that the value of that factor for a given person in 1991 is strongly correlated with the value of that factor when they engaged in political action. For sociodemographic variables such as education and gender, this assumption is reasonable in analyses of adult respondents. It is more problematic for social psychological variables such as social and political attitudes or personal dissatisfactions. The results we give for the effects of social-psychological variables on nonelectoral participation, then, should be viewed as somewhat less reliable than estimated effects of sociodemographic variables.

Electoral participation is measured by two questions: PARTY SYMPATHY is indicated by responses to the question:

"People sometimes sympathize with one particular party. Do you sympathize with a particular party?" (response format "Yes" or "No" "yes" coded "1" and "no" coded "0" for analyses).

VOTE is indicated by responses to the question:

"Did you vote in the last (National/Federal/Parliamentary) election in (year)? (response format "Yes" or "No" "yes" coded "1" and "no" coded "0" for analyses).

We did not employ the commonly used measure of party identification, because it implies the existence of parties over a period of time in which identification can develop. In the postcommunist states of 1991, most political parties had been newly formed and citizens of these states had little time to develop "identification" with them. Thus we used a question about the more broadly applicable notion of party sympathy to measure if respondents used political parties as a guide to political action.

Our measures of participation are subject to the potential distortions of any self-reports (cf Opp and Gern 1993). Objective measures of non-electoral participation are difficult to obtain, especially, for the postcommunist states.⁴ We can more readily validate self-reported

⁴In their random sample of Leipzig residents, Opp and Gern (1993) found that approximately 39 percent of respondents reported involvement in the demonstrations of the fall of 1989. Highly consistent with this result, we find (Table 1) that roughly 43 percent of East Germans overall report ever having participated in a rally or protest demonstration. These figures compare with an "official" estimate cited by Opp and Gern (1993) of roughly 24 percent participation in Leipzig. They argue that the "official" estimate is no doubt in error and the true percent lies somewhere between these two numbers.

voting. The percents reporting that they voted in the most recent election is quite close to the objective indication in all countries, except for the United States.⁵ Because research indicates that the highly educated are more likely than other groups to incorrectly report that they have voted, it is likely that the strength of relationship between education and voting for the U.S. is somewhat overstated (Silver, Anderson and Abramson 1986). If the tendency to overreport voting in the United States generalizes, then it is likely that the levels of non-electoral political participation reported by U.S. respondents also are exaggerated. On the positive side, if the accurate reporting of voting in the other countries generalizes, then we may be confident as well about the accuracy of reports of non-electoral participation.

Sociodemographic Characteristics

Age is measured in years. To represent possible generational differences in participation, we created four categorical (1,0) variables for respondents 29 years old and younger, 30 to 45 years old, 46 to 59 years old, and ages 60 and older. Gender is a 1,0 variable, with "1" assigned to males. Education is measured in CASMIN levels, i.e. in seven categories from less than primary education to higher tertiary (Konig et al. 1988). We employ two measures of economic status. Income Need is based on the respondent's assessment of whether her or his family income is "much less than that needed" "somewhat less than that needed" "about what is needed" or "somewhat more than needed" or "much more than needed" -- on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating "much more than needed." This measure allows us to assess the effects of income across countries in subjectively comparable terms. Perceived Social Standing is measured on a ten category scale with "1" low and "10" high. We use this item as a measure of status position, because it also is subjectively comparable across countries, and may be used for respondents not currently in the labor force (unlike occupational prestige).

Social Psychological Factors

Personal Grievance: Extant research presents a body of clearly negative findings regarding the influence of simple deprivation or dissatisfactions with income or other aspects of one's personal life on political participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Opp 1989). In order for the

⁵The turnout for the most recent election prior to our surveys in countries other than the U.S.A. is 1) Czechoslovakia, June 1990 federal parliament election, 95% 2) Eastern Germany, June 1990 all-Germany parliament (eastern turnout), 75% 3) Hungary, June 1990 parliament (1st round of 2), 68% 4) Poland, November 12, 1990 presidential election (2nd round), 63% 5) Russia, June 1991 presidential election, 74% 6) West Germany, June 1990 all-German parliament (west turnout) 79%.

experience of deprivation to have consequences for political action it must be seen as illegitimate or unfair (Dahl 1971), i.e. cast in an "injustice frame" (Gamson, 1992).

Accordingly, we employ a question asking about the experience of injustice:

"Sometimes people experience injustice in their lives. How often have you personally experienced injustice because of the following factors? Was it very often, often, sometimes, rarely or never? How about 1) your religious beliefs 2) your sex 3) your social background 4) your age 5) a lack of money 6) the part of the county you are from 7) your political beliefs 8) your race or ethnic group." (For analyses, "very often" is coded "5", "never" is coded "1", and other responses are coded accordingly.)

Social and Political Beliefs: We use three measures that correspond to the concepts of social and moral incentives from Value Expectancy Theory (Opp and Gern 1983) and fit within the concept of "political dissatisfaction" as defined by Barnes and Kaase (1979).

The first, EGALITARIAN STATISM, averages scores on four items indicating support for egalitarian principles of distribution and support for government intervention to reduce inequality. Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate support for strict equality and need as general principles of a fair distribution, and support for government intervention to place an upper limit on income and to guarantee jobs.⁶ We constructed this measure to gauge support for important policies and values associated with state socialist regimes. These items were used in all ISJP countries, and we therefore can compare effects in both postcommunist and western countries.

The second, is an item indicating support for socialism per se (FAVOR SOCIALISM). Respondents in only the postcommunist countries were asked:

"People have different views about socialism. Based on your experience in (COUNTRY NAME) of socialism, would you say that you are very much in favor, somewhat in favor, neither for nor against, somewhat against, or totally against socialism?" [Very much in favor is given a score of "5" and other responses scored accordingly.]

⁶An average for each respondents was calculated for responses to four questions: (1)The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares. (2)The most important thing is that people get what they need, even if this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need. (3)The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any one person can make. (4)The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one. A five point response format--strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree--was used for each of these questions. A high score on this scale indicates strong support for egalitarianism and government intervention to implement it.

The third is a measure of Inglehart's (1979) concept of POST-MATERIALISM. Based on respondents' rankings of four political goals we constructed a measure indicating support for the values of giving people more say in government and protecting freedom of speech over maintaining order in the country and fighting rising prices.⁷ A high score on this measure indicates stronger support for the values of giving people more say and protecting freedom of speech.

We take these three measures as indicators of personal values along three critical social and moral dimensions affecting the desire for social change, i.e. of the value assigned to equality vs. inequality, the legitimacy granted to a form of government, and to freedom vs. order. One's position on these dimensions, then, may be seen as providing important incentives to political action. In the postcommunist states, antiegalitarianism (opposition to Egalitarian Statism) provided a strong social incentive to seek change under the (at least officially) egalitarian ideology of Soviet communism. Opposition to socialism may be based on antiegalitarianism, but also may stem from other sources. Persons in postcommunist states holding egalitarian values may have come to oppose socialism as a form of government alone - because of its association with corruption and repression, or on other such grounds not involving issues of distributive justice. Attaching high value to freedom of speech and democratic participation in government decision-making in the Communist era should provide a strong sense of obligation to participate in democratic activities when opportunities to do so became available.

Perceived Effectiveness of Political Action: We use a single item measure that corresponds most closely to the perceived efficacy of political action emphasized by Value Expectancy Theory and the perceived responsiveness of the political system emphasized by Barnes and Kaase (1979). SOCIAL JUSTICE IS POSSIBLE is measured by responses to the question:

⁷The following question is used to measure Post-Materialism: "I will read a list of political goals. Suppose you had to choose among them. Which would be most important to you? ... And which would be the second most important? ... And what would be your third choice? 1. Maintain order in the country, 2. Give people more say in the decisions of government, 3. Fight rising prices, 4. Protect freedom of speech." "Pure post-materialists," those selecting both post-materialist political goals (goals "2" and "4") are assigned a score of "4." "Pure materialists," those selecting both materialist political goals (goals "1" and "3") are assigned scores of "1." Correspondingly, "mixed materialists" are given scores of "3" (mixed post-materialist ranking a post-materialist goal higher than a materialist goal) or "2" (mixed materialist ranking a materialist goal higher than a post-materialist goal).

"There is no point arguing about social justice since it is impossible to change things. (Response format: (1) strongly agree (2) agree (3) neither agree nor disagree (4) disagree (5) strongly disagree; the higher the score the more a respondent disagrees that social justice is not possible, or agrees that it is possible.)"

COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Non-Electoral Participation

The top panel of Table 1 (page 25) presents the distribution by country of the percent who have ever participated in each of six individual types of non-electoral participation, and of a combination of three of them we label AGGRESSIVE participation. Following Muller's (1979) definition (see above) we consider someone to have participated in Aggressive participation if she or he has ever joined an unofficial strike or blocked traffic or occupied a building or property in protest. Two summary measures of non-electoral participation are presented in the far right-hand columns of Table 1. The ANY column gives the percent who have participated in any one of nine political activities (the item REFUSED was excluded from analyses due to a factor analysis suggesting it was inconsistently interpreted across countries). The MEAN TOTAL PARTICIPATION column gives the average number of political activities (out of nine total) in which people ever participated.

One striking aspect of this table is the low level of political activity in five of the post-communist states. In Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovenia, the large majority of the population had participated in none of the nine forms of non-electoral political activity we consider here ("ANY" in the table). It should be re-emphasized that these questions asked about such activity over the lifetime, so it is apparent that these people were politically inactive both in the communist era, when the regimes encouraged formal political participation, and in the revolutionary one, when thousands of people took to the streets in demonstrations, protests, and rallies. Despite the fact that these countries had just been through revolutionary overthrows of their governments, the overall level of political activity was much less than that in the three western countries in our sample: on average 30% or fewer of the citizens of these five postcommunist states had participated in any of the nine forms of non-electoral political activity, compared to 69% in (former) West Germany and 90% in the U.S. The average person in these postcommunist countries had participated in less than one activity, while the average in West Germany is nearly two and nearly three in the U.S.

The level of non-electoral political action in East Germany and Czechoslovakia (and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria) is much higher than the other eastern countries, and approaches the levels of the western countries. The higher levels of participation in these countries prevail for

both overall political activity (ANY and MEAN TOTAL PARTICIPATION) and for individual types of participation. It was these three countries where the communist governments were brought down by mass demonstrations and "people power" (especially in East Germany and Czechoslovakia) whereas in the other countries the transition was more evolutionary (e.g. Poland) or was managed by the political elite (Hungary). Thus, there were more opportunities for people to participate in the large organized protests in 1989, and these show up in the table.

The bottom panel of Table 1 gives the figures for electoral participation. In most of the postcommunist states, less than a third of the respondents "sympathized with a particular [political] party." Only in eastern Germany, which had by this time been integrated into the fully formed political structure of the west, did a majority of respondents express such affiliation. In part, this reluctance to identify with political parties was due to the weak structure and development of party systems throughout the region at this early stage of the transition. In both Poland and Hungary, for example, there were dozens of political parties and groups vying for parliamentary office. This may have been bewildering to many potential voters, but the lack of effective party organizations effectively excluded much of the population from political participation and influence.

Only with voting do we see widespread democratic participation, with the overwhelming majority of the population in each country voting in the first free or semi-free parliamentary elections in 1989-1991. But self-reported electoral turnout in Poland and Hungary was not much higher than that in the United States and in other postcommunist states it was near that of West Germany -- even with the excitement of the first stab at democracy. And in all of these countries, voter turnout dropped sharply in succeeding elections, at both national and regional/local levels.⁸

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND PARTICIPATION

Table 2 (pages 26-27) reports regression results for two types each of non-electoral and electoral participation on sociodemographic characteristics. Because our participation measures

⁸In Poland's first semi-democratic elections in June 1989, voter turnout was 63%, but dropped off sharply to 42% in local elections the next year and in subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections was never higher than 53%. In Czechoslovakia, turnout dropped from 95% in the June 1990 parliamentary elections to 85% in the June 1992 elections. In Russia, 74% voted in the presidential elections in June 1991; 55% did in the parliamentary elections of December 1993. In Hungary, 68% voted in the first round of the parliamentary elections in March 1990; only 46% in the second round. In the local elections later that year, the 36% turnout was below the legal requirement, leading to a second round when the turnout was only 28%.

are all categorical variables (0,1), logistic regression procedures are employed. The coefficients given in Tables 2 and 4 are "odds multipliers," indicating here the multiplicative change in the odds of having participated in a given kind of political activity for a one unit change in a specific determinant, net of the influence of the other determinants in the regression equations (Demaris 1992).⁹

Regression results for participation in protest demonstrations or rallies, or in AGGRESSIVE participation are given in the top two panels (A and B) of Table 2. As noted above, these two types of participation are of most interest to students of social movements. It also may be assumed that participation in these two types of activities took place within a few year period before the 1991 date of our survey -- primarily in the period from 1989-91. This increases the likelihood that the sociodemographic characteristics and social psychological states measured in 1991 were those that held at the time our respondents participated in a political activity. and strengthens our ability to make inferences about causal effects.

Social Standing and Income Need have little to no statistically significant effects on non-electoral participation in the postcommunist states. On the other hand, education does have statistically significant and strong effects on rally or protest demonstration participation in all countries, east and west (Table 2) Although coefficients for the effects of education are smaller for the post-communist states than for the western democratic states, they nevertheless indicate substantial differences across the range of education.¹⁰ This is consistent with other studies in both the United States (Kinder and Sears 1985) and western Europe (Barnes and Kaase, 1979) which have also found education to be a better determinant of participation than income, occupation or class. Our data suggest that in all industrialized countries. education has more of an effect on political activity than do economic resources per se.¹¹

⁹An odds multiplier of greater than one indicates that the odds of participating increase with increases in the value of a given independent variable. An odds multiplier of less than one indicates that the odds of participating decrease with increases in the value of a given independent variable

¹⁰For example, the odds multiplier coefficient for East Germany indicates that the odds of having participated in a rally or protest demonstration increase by 35% $((1 - \text{the odds multiplier}) \times 100)$; Demaris 1992) with each unit change in education. Compounded across the six unit range of the measure of education, a 35% increase from unit to unit results in a quite large difference between the least and most highly educated strata in the predicted odds of having ever participated in a rally or protest demonstration.

¹¹We also have run regression models including actual income (in deciles) and occupational prestige, with the same results. We find little to no statistically significant effects of actual income or occupational prestige on non-electoral or electoral participation.

Education has a statistically insignificant effect on aggressive political participation in five of the eight post-communist states, and overall countries it is best characterized as having little to no effect on aggressive participation. As noted earlier, almost certainly the reports of aggressive political acts refer primarily to the demonstrations of the 1989-91 period. One would have expected, given both the role of education in other forms of participation and the prevalent role of intellectuals in the 1989 events, that education would also have been a factor here. These findings may reflect, however, that there were many different kinds of aggressive protest practiced in the years leading up to 1989--including, for example, strikes by (less educated) blue collar workers.

This leads to another significant factor in these tables, the role of age. In all the postcommunist states, the elderly (those over 60) are less likely to participate than other age groups, though in some countries the dividing line is age 45. As expected from prior research (Muller 1979; Opp 1989), aggressive participation is very much a function of age, with those under 30 most likely to engage in such behavior. The only exception to this in the post-communist states is Poland, where the 30-45 age group was more likely to engage in aggressive protest than their younger colleagues. This makes sense in that this is the "Solidarity" generation--those who were the younger and activist generation in 1980-81 who forged Solidarity, kept it alive underground during the 1980s, and re-emerged to confront the regime again in 1988-89. For all other countries, though, it was young people who were more likely to have engaged in the disruptive strikes and demonstrations of 1989.

While young people were more likely to have participated in non- electoral political action, it is older people who are more likely to sympathize with political parties and who are more likely to vote (Panels C and D of Table 2). This pattern holds for virtually every country in both east and west. As is the case for non-electoral participation, electoral participation increases with education in postcommunist and western countries alike.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

In Eastern Europe, a steep economic decline beginning in the 1970s, combined with the increased openness of the media in the late 1980s, fueled widespread personal dissatisfaction.¹² As we previously noted, however, in order for personal dissatisfaction to be

¹²We did not attempt to measure personal dissatisfaction retrospectively, but a question asked in 1991 is likely indicative in the aggregate sense of how widespread it was. On a scale ranging from "1," indicating complete dissatisfaction with one's income, to "7", indicating complete satisfaction, 46 percent of respondents from postcommunist countries chose scores of 1 or 2. The corresponding percent for our western respondents is 14.

consequential it must be cast in an "injustice" frame. Table 3 (page 28) gives an indication of how collective economic and political troubles translated into the perceived personal experience of injustice in six realms that are comparable across the ten countries (excluding perceived injustice due to region or race).

We see in Table 3 that, with the exception of perceived injustice due to "lack of money," the economic and political troubles of the communist period did not straightforwardly translate into perceived injustice in the domains we measured. In general, the substantial majority of respondents from the postcommunist states reported that they "never" experienced an injustice due to political beliefs, gender, social background, age or religion in each of these areas considered individually.¹³

The dimension of perceived injustice due to political beliefs is of particular interest. Barnes and Kaase (1979) propose that in addition to being seen in injustice terms, a deprivation must be attributed to the actions of political authorities if heightened political action is to result. Also, this dimension relates to the experience of political repression, which has been shown to motivate increased participation (Opp and Roehl 1990; Opp and Gern 1993).

The three postcommunist countries with the highest rates of non-electoral political participation -- Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany (Table 1) -- also are the three countries with the highest levels of perceived injustice due to political beliefs. These same three countries, however, do not differ systematically from other postcommunist nations in perceived injustice due to other causes. On a simple correlational level, this seems to support the proposition that perceived injustice must be attributed to the action of political authorities to encourage political action.

We tested this proposition by regressing participation on the set of perceived experiences in Table 3. For space reasons, we do not present the results here. They show, however, that perceived injustice due to political beliefs has consistent effects across countries on non-electoral participation. Of the other dimensions of experienced injustice, only perceived injustice due to one's sex has statistically significant partial effects. Correspondingly, we include only perceived injustice due to political beliefs (Political Injustice) and due to one's sex (Gender Injustice) in our subsequent regression models.

Before interpreting the regression model results (Table 4, pages 29-30), we need to comment on the issue of causal ordering. It well may be argued that political participation

¹³Taken collectively, 33 percent of postcommunist respondents report "never" having experienced an injustice in any of the six areas, and 23 percent report experiencing an injustice in only one area.

shapes beliefs and values, as well as being shaped by them (cf. Ferree 1992). Lacking longitudinal data, we cannot reliably estimate reciprocal effects involving participation and our social psychological factors. No one has argued, however, that the relationship is strictly from participation to social psychological traits. Moreover, longitudinal evidence from other research supports assuming that the preponderant direction of influence is from social psychological factors to participation (Opp 1988; Opp and Gern 1993: p. 670). Logical considerations as well favor this assumption in postcommunist countries. Political grievances, and social and moral dissatisfaction with the communist regimes, of course, were forged over decades of communist rule. However, the major opportunities to act on these grievances and dissatisfactions were not presented until the middle to late 1980s.

Table 4 presents logistic regression results for the effects of social psychological factors on non-electoral and electoral participation, net of the effects of sociodemographic variables. Preliminary tests of linearity and additivity were run before concluding that the models in Table 4 are the best representation of how social psychological factors shape participation.

Opp (1989) calls attention to a possible influence of ideological extremism, such that those on both the extreme left and extreme right of the ideological spectrum will be more strongly motivated to participate in collective action, especially so in "rebellious" action. This implies a possible nonlinear, "U-shaped" effect of Egalitarian Statism, Favor Socialism and Post-Materialism on participation. One also may speculate that the effect of personal grievances is nonlinear, e.g. following a "threshold" pattern such that political action only results when people report experiencing extensive injustice. Our tests of non-linearity (not presented here), however, showed that in all countries a linear relationship well summarizes the relationship of each of our social psychological tests to political participation.¹⁴

Value Expectancy Theory proposes that the perceived effectiveness of political action has a multiplicative influence, such that the effect of grievances and norms on participation increases as the perceived effectiveness of political action increases. We tested for this possible multiplicative relationship by including interaction terms for Social Justice is Possible with Gender Injustice, Political Injustice, Egalitarian Statism, Favor Socialism and Post-Materialism in models that also included sociodemographic variables and main effect terms for the social

¹⁴To test for nonlinearity, logistic regressions were run with sets of categorical variables representing the social psychological variables and coefficients examined for patterns indicating non-trivial departures from linearity (Demaris 1992). We also ran such tests for the effects of Education, Income Need, and Social Standing reported in Table 2. These tests showed that the effects of these sociodemographic variables likewise are each well summarized by a linear relationship.

psychological factors. Results of these tests for interaction were uniformly negative in postcommunist countries. We found significant interaction effects in the U.S. and West Germany for Social Justice is Possible and Egalitarian Statism only -- on Aggressive Participation and on participation in a Rally or Protest Demonstration. These were in the direction predicted by Value Expectancy Theory, such that the effect of Egalitarian Statism on non-electoral participation is stronger when someone indicates a belief that it is possible to change things to realize social justice.¹⁵

The first (left hand) column of Table 4 gives coefficients for the effects of education on participation net of social psychological factors. By comparing it to coefficients in Table 2 we get an estimate of how much of the effect of education is mediated through social psychological factors. This comparison shows that in postcommunist countries the effects of education on non-electoral participation and on Party Sympathy arrayed in Table 4 are substantially smaller than parallel effects in Table 2.

The mediation of education effects in postcommunist countries reflects two sets of relationships. First, it is due to the consistent effects across postcommunist countries of education on the social psychological factors we consider here. Regression results (not shown here) show that in all postcommunist countries the highly educated felt they experienced the most injustice due to their political beliefs, expressed the highest level of inegalitarian opposition to socialism, are the most "postmaterialist," and have the highest levels of perceived effectiveness of political action (identifying reference).

Second, it reflects that social psychological factors do have statistically significant effects on non-electoral participation and Party Sympathy in postcommunist and western countries alike. Perceived Political Injustice has a strong and consistent effect on both Aggressive Participation and participation in a Rally or Protest Demonstration. Overall, Aggressive Participation is less strongly shaped by other social psychological factors than is Rally or Protest Demonstration Participation. Social Justice is Possible and Post-Materialism have little to no statistically significant influence. In both West Germany and the U.S. people who endorse Egalitarian Statism, i.e. egalitarians, have higher rates of participation in aggressive political activities. In Hungary, Poland and Russia, Egalitarian Statism also has a statistically significant effect on Aggressive Participation, but opposite the effect in the west. Consistent with the economic inegalitarian nature of the Revolutions of 1989, it is the anti-egalitarians in

¹⁵Because the estimates of coefficients for the effects of other social psychological factors are the same in models for W. Germany and the U.S.A. that include or do not include interaction terms, for ease of presentation, in Table 4 we give terms for the main effects only of Justice is Possible and Socialist Principles.

these countries who were involved in aggressive activities. Net of Egalitarian Statism (and other factors), persons who Favor Socialism were significantly less involved in Aggressive activities in Bulgaria and Poland.

Participation in rallies or protest demonstrations is substantially more a function of social psychological factors than Aggressive Participation. In the West, all of the social psychological factors have statistically significant and substantial effects on participation in protest demonstrations or rallies. Although the significant effects of Social Justice is Possible, Post-Materialism, and Egalitarian Statism are less consistent across postcommunist countries, the overall pattern is much the same. In most postcommunist countries, participants in rallies and protest demonstrations were motivated by the experience of political injustice, the sense that political action is efficacious, a higher value given to political freedom than to order, opposition to socialism and inegalitarianism.¹⁶

Two contrasts involving electoral participation are notable. First, in West Germany and the U.S.A, Party Sympathy was little affected by any of the social psychological traits, but each of the traits has statistically significant effects in postcommunist countries. Political Injustice, and Postmaterialism have effects across the board, and Gender Injustice, Social Justice Possible, and Egalitarian Statism have statistically significant effects in three, five and four of the postcommunist countries respectively. Second, in contrast to Party Sympathy, social psychological factors essentially have no effect on voting in any of our countries.

ACTIVIST PROFILE

To address the question of the representativeness of political activists during the early transition, we created a variable, Type of Participation, with three categories: (1) "Non-Participants" -- those reporting no participation in any of the nine types of non-electoral participation, (2) "Participants" -- those with a participation level greater than zero but less than the level of Activists, and (3) "Activists" -- those with a participation level in the top 15 percent of total non-electoral participation in each country. Fifteen percent is a rough cutoff for identifying an "Activist." We chose it because it provides a convenient whole number cutoff

¹⁶East Germany and Slovenia are notable exceptions for the lack of significant effects of Favor Socialism and Egalitarian Statism on participation in rallies or protest demonstrations, and non-electoral participation in general. This may be due to a strong influence of nationalism on the desire for political change in each of these countries.

point in each country, and because we feel that it at the least quite likely "surrounds" the true population of political activists in each country.¹⁷

Table 5 (page 31) gives mean sociodemographic characteristics by Type of Participation and Table 6 (pages 32-33) gives mean values for social psychological factors by Type of Participation. The sociodemographic profile of activists (Table 5) in all postcommunist countries is one of a younger person, much more highly educated, somewhat more likely to be male, and someone with slightly higher social standing than others. It is much the same for West Germany, and the U.S.A; although the profile in the U.S. is a bit more representative, with a roughly equal mean age for Activists and others, and a nearly equal gender composition among Activists.

The social psychological profile of the activist is one of the aggrieved. In postcommunist countries it is largely the politically aggrieved; there are statistically significant differences indicating higher gender grievance among activists in Poland and Russia only. In the west it is both. In West Germany and the United States women activists report substantially higher levels of experience of injustice due to their sex, and activists in general report a higher level of experience of injustice due to their political beliefs. The activist also tends to be more convinced of the efficacy of action to promote social change than the nonactivist. This contrast is especially pronounced in West Germany and the U.S.

Activists in postcommunist countries were more opposed to socialism -- both in principle (Egalitarian Statism) and in name (Favor Socialism). Opposition in name, however, varies among postcommunist nations. There are no statistically significant differences between activists and nonactivists in opposition to socialism in East Germany and Estonia, and stronger differences in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria than in Russia or Slovenia.

In the U.S., activists are more inegalitarian (more opposed to Egalitarian Statism) than non-participants, but not more so than the participants. In West Germany there are no significant differences in egalitarianism. These results are consistent with the argument of Verba et al. (1987), at least on this central dimension of inequality-policy relevant attitudes. In all countries but Hungary, activists are more postmaterialist.

The profile for electoral participation again contrasts Party Sympathy and voting in postcommunist states. Activists in all postcommunist countries have a higher percentage who sympathize with a political party than both participants and non-participants. With the

¹⁷We also examined means for sociodemographic and social psychological variables across the entire 10 value range (0 through 9) of the total participation measure. We found that these means "flattened out" at the fifteen percent cutoff -- i.e., there are little to no differences among the means of these variables for total participation categories equal to or greater than the fifteen percent cutoff value.

exception of the U.S., where the difference in reported voting is pronounced, self-reported Vote does not differ either significantly or non-trivially by Type of Participation.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of our analyses have implications in two broad areas. First, they speak to the generality of models of political participation developed in the west to the postcommunist states. Nonelectoral and electoral participation are affected in much the same way by sociodemographic factors in the postcommunist and western regions. Perhaps surprisingly, this extends to the choice of whether or not to vote. Postcommunist youth are following in the footsteps of their western counterparts by having significantly lower odds of voting than older generations, even in light of the hard battles fought to win the right to vote.

Consistent with a rational actor assumption, nonelectoral participation is shaped in much the same way by social psychological factors in all countries. We have seen that in all countries experienced injustice is consequential for participation, but only when it is given an explicitly political attribution.

Consistent with Value Expectancy Theory and the arguments of Barnes and Kaase, normative beliefs influence non-electoral participation in both the western and postcommunist regions. However, we have found limited support for the importance Value Expectancy Theory ascribes to the perceived efficacy of political action. Perceived efficacy consistently adds to other factors shaping non-electoral participation and sympathy with a political party in the west. We have found evidence for the proposed mediating influence of the perceived efficacy of political action only in western countries, and only for the effect of Egalitarian Statism. Our failure to find stronger support for this key proposition of Value Expectancy theory may be due to our use of a single item measure that concerns the efficacy of action for change in general -- rather than of the perceived efficacy of specific political actions, as does Opp. However, Opp's own research (1988) has shown little to no mediating effect for perceived efficacy of action in the case of political grievance. A finding we clearly confirm.

Social psychological factors have a substantial effect on sympathy with political parties among respondents in the postcommunist countries, but not in the west. This may reflect the stability and relative simplicity of party structures in the west, compared to the fluidity and complexity of party structures in the newly democratized postcommunist countries.

Second, our findings have implications for understanding political change during the transition era. Within postcommunist countries, a strong contrast exists in the determinants of political protest, on the one hand, and voting on the other. While youth, political anger, and

socio-political ideology seem to have been the primary determinants of the former, they are not factors in the latter. So in all of the post-communist states, there seem to be two different constituencies: those who sparked the protests that led to the collapse of the communist regimes; and those who elected their successors.

As we have seen in Table 1, large majorities of the populations participated in the first free elections in every one of the postcommunist states. It is clear from our data in Table 4 that the decision to vote was made largely irrespective of grievances and social and political beliefs. These first votes, then were largely non-ideological, and more a reflection of patriotism, rejection of the communist order, and support for democracy.

Sympathy with a political party, however, was in important part ideological -- motivated in most postcommunist countries by personal grievance, the perceived efficacy of political change, and social and political beliefs. In the early transition period, there was both high selectivity on ideological grounds and an overall low level of party sympathy per se due to the rather chaotic structure of political party organization in all of these countries in 1991.

In the early years of the transition, this worked to the great advantage of the transitional governments in eastern Europe. These governments were uniformly committed to a rapid transition to capitalism, although some favored a somewhat slower pace than others. But the people that were most likely to oppose the extent or pace of such reforms were not yet politically organized. In the absence of strong political parties on the left at that time, and the discredited nature of the former communist parties, there was no real political counterweight to the neo-conservative parties and leaders that were in charge at that time. Thus, it was almost inevitable that once these constituencies were organized, and political parties formed to voice their concerns, that the political environment would be transformed. The steady rise of leftist political parties, and their strong electoral showings in the second round of elections in many of these countries, seems to bear out this conclusion.

We have seen that at least in the early transition era political activists in the postcommunist states were equally as "unrepresentative" of the populations of their respective countries as their western counterparts on many dimensions. They are more unrepresentative than western counterparts, however, on two important dimensions, Egalitarian Statism and Party Sympathy. This strongly implies that antiegalitarians in the early transition were the most influential group in determining the political agenda.

As we have seen from our data, economic circumstances did not significantly affect political participation in this transitional period, though attitudes towards the economy did. Those who were most likely to participate -- the highly educated, politically aggrieved, and pro-market -- would, of course, be most likely to take advantage of and benefit from the new

system of political and economic liberalization. In most countries in the region, it is this group that seems to have dominated and directed the transition process, at least in its first years.

Indeed, as some analysts of the transition process have argued (e.g. Kolarska-Bobinska 1994; Milor 1994) the new political elites in some of these countries (especially Poland) adopted a "shock therapy" approach in order to accomplish the market transition before the opponents of such reform could organize themselves into political parties and interest groups. Studies of earlier economic adjustment programs in other parts of the world (e.g. Chile, Jamaica, Philippines) found that success in such efforts was usually associated with a "disabled opposition" in the political sphere (Nelson 1989; Haggard and Kaufman 1989).

Our findings suggest that this was indeed the case in the early years of the transition process in the post-communist states, where the likely opponents or skeptics of the market-oriented reforms were largely politically inactive. As we pointed out earlier, this was due in part to the lack of any effective political parties or interest groups to represent this constituency early on in the process of democratization. As studies of political participation in the west have pointed out, upper class citizens can become politically active and effective on their own, but lower-status groups "need a group-based process of political mobilization" and need organization as a resource to compete with the higher-status groups (Verba, Kim and Nie 1987: 14-15).

In eastern Europe, these upper status groups and individuals, including the intellectuals and professionals who played such a big role in the revolutions and the post-communist governments, were able to accomplish a great deal without having permanent political organizations to back them up. The rest of the population, less educated, less enthusiastic about the changes, and more vulnerable to them, needed organization as a resource. In most of the post-communist states, they did not have such organization, in terms of either political parties or interest groups, through at least the first three or four years of the transition process. By the time such organizations did emerge, with the revival of the former communist parties and the development of European-style social democratic parties, many of the major changes in the economies of these countries had already taken place.

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Table 1. Non-Electoral and Electoral Political Participation by Country. ISJP, 1991.

	Non-Electoral Participation								
	(% Ever Participated)								
	LETTER	NEWSPAPER	PETITION	PUBLIC MEETING	RALLY	BOYCOTT	AGGRESIVE	ANY	MEAN TOTAL PARTICIPATION
Bulgaria	5.0	7.4	20.8	43.1	20.1	7.4	7.0	51.3	1.10
Czechoslovakia	5.9	10.0	40.4	51.4	30.5	10.9	17.9	65.6	1.66
East Germany	11.1	13.7	62.1	66.7	43.4	4.5	4.4	82.3	2.04
Estonia	2.5	4.8	16.5	16.1	8.4	1.8	3.0	29.6	0.54
Hungary	0.7	2.3	7.0	6.9	6.6	3.7	2.4	15.1	0.28
Poland	3.2	4.3	13.8	11.6	8.8	5.9	9.7	26.5	0.56
Russia	5.8	9.1	15.4	5.0	9.9	4.8	8.0	30.1	0.58
Slovenia	1.1	3.6	19.1	16.3	13.2	8.9	5.6	32.4	0.68
West Germany	9.7	19.2	55.3	48.3	27.2	11.5	7.6	68.9	1.79
USA	48.0	28.7	80.1	71.1	22.0	21.1	8.5	90.3	2.83

	Electoral Participation		
	PARTY SYMPATHY	VOTE	Sample Size
	(% Yes)	(% Yes)	
Bulgaria	—	—	1,405
Czechoslovakia	33.0	93.5	1,181
East Germany	53.4	84.4	1,019
Estonia	14.8	—	1,000
Hungary	37.9	76.2	1,000
Poland	12.9	76.5	1,542
Russia	7.8	84.6	1,734
Slovenia	20.4	—	1,375
West Germany	69.7	88.6	1,837
USA	88.6	70.3	1,414

Notes: ANY is defined such that "1" indicates participation in any form of nonelectoral political activity and "0" indicates no participation in any such forms of participation. AGGRESIVE is a variable indicating participation in any one of three activities disrupting traffic, occupying a building, or an unofficial strike. Individual forms of participation are as defined in the text. MEAN TOTAL PARTICIPATION is the average number of non-electoral activities out of nine total activities. Data on PARTY SYMPATHY and VOTE were not available for Bulgaria, and for VOTE in Slovenia.

Table 2. Odds Multipliers from Logistic Regressions for the Effects of Sociodemographic Characteristics on Non-Electoral (A and B) and Electoral (C and D) Political Participation -- Separately by Country, ISJP, 1991

	(A) AGGRESSIVE PARTICIPATION							Chi Square (df = 7)
	Age <30	Age 30-45	Age 46-59	Education	Male	Income Need	Social Standing	
Bulgaria	3.59 **	2.74 *	2.26 *	1.43 **	1.71 **	0.86	0.95	32.36 **
Czechoslovakia	4.60 **	3.62 **	2.84 **	1.16 **	1.58 **	1.01	1.06	62.19 **
East Germany	1.67	0.34 *	0.72	0.90	4.53 **	1.30	0.84	36.25 **
Estonia	7.24 *	5.57	8.66 *	1.16	1.87	0.93	0.98	13.06 *
Hungary	2.62	1.79	0.75	1.24	1.44	1.32	1.14	15.90 *
Poland	1.27	3.02 **	2.08 *	1.13 *	2.38 **	0.88	1.05	60.75 **
Russia	7.72 **	6.75 **	3.90 *	1.11	1.15	0.94	1.16 **	45.42 **
Slovenia	15.87 **	9.69 *	5.06	0.93	1.72 *	0.92	0.95	27.46 **
West Germany	2.46 **	2.43 **	2.02 *	1.31 **	1.40 *	0.85	0.83 **	43.69 **
USA	1.03	1.21	1.25	1.00	2.14 **	1.09	0.96	17.22 **

	(B) RALLY OR PROTEST DEMONSTRATION							Chi Square (df = 7)
	Age <30	Age 30-45	Age 46-59	Education	Male	Income Need	Social Standing	
Bulgaria	4.37 **	2.45 **	1.49	1.41 **	1.43 **	1.01	1.02	92.98 **
Czechoslovakia	5.36 **	2.98 **	2.54 **	1.22 **	1.60 **	0.98	1.05	113.82 **
East Germany	2.68 **	2.80 **	2.99 **	1.35 **	1.58 **	0.96	0.95	92.39 **
Estonia	0.70	1.26	1.25	1.37 **	1.51 *	1.01	1.05	29.81 **
Hungary	3.18 **	1.19	1.04	1.55 **	2.15 **	1.30 *	1.03	65.29 **
Poland	1.41	2.06 **	1.59	1.30 **	2.37 **	0.97	1.10	67.40 **
Russia	3.77 **	3.70 **	1.84	1.36 **	1.42 *	1.24 *	1.11 *	81.62 **
Slovenia	2.96 **	2.07 *	1.23	1.48 **	1.95 **	0.85	1.02	84.56 **
West Germany	5.08 **	3.13 **	2.14 **	1.66 **	1.32 *	0.89	0.93	273.63 **
USA	2.27 **	3.11 **	2.29 **	1.63 **	1.23	1.04	0.98	128.64 **

Table 2. (continued)

(C) PARTY SYMPATHY

	Age <30	Age 30-45	Age 46-59	Education	Male	Income Need	Social Standing	Chi Square (df = 7)
Bulgaria								
Czechoslovakia	0.49 **	0.61 **	0.72 *	1.10 *	1.44 **	1.11	0.95	26.79 **
East Germany	0.47 **	0.55 **	1.09	1.36 **	1.32 *	1.09	0.98	56.59 **
Estonia	0.64	0.59 *	1.34	1.11 *	1.15	1.04	1.26	30.49 **
Hungary	0.87	0.99	0.65 *	1.26 **	1.08	1.33 **	1.08	80.21 **
Poland	0.33 **	0.61 **	0.80	1.37 **	1.23	1.00	1.10 **	74.97 **
Russia	0.33 **	0.58 *	0.67	1.42 **	2.00 **	1.26	1.02	53.80 **
Slovenia	0.35 **	0.43 **	0.56 **	1.36 **	1.45 **	1.10	0.98	67.60 **
West Germany	0.48 **	0.55 **	0.80	1.28 **	1.15	1.05	1.11 **	70.36 **
USA	0.88	0.79	0.86	1.21 **	0.73 *	1.04	1.11 **	18.82 **

(D) VOTE

	Age <30	Age 30-45	Age 46-59	Education	Male	Income Need	Social Standing	Chi Square (df = 7)
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia	0.24 **	0.97	1.47	1.30 **	0.83	1.23	0.82 *	43.17 **
East Germany	0.20 **	0.37 **	0.86	1.22 **	0.94	1.08	1.08	47.74 **
Estonia
Hungary	0.56 *	0.48 **	0.72	1.35 **	0.85	1.12	1.04	44.16 **
Poland	0.40 **	0.73 *	1.18	1.22 **	1.09	1.22 *	1.02	58.78 **
Russia	0.15 **	0.42 **	1.01	1.15 **	1.13	0.98	1.05	85.90 **
Slovenia
West Germany	0.35 **	0.42 **	0.49 **	1.30 **	0.98	1.21 *	1.06	41.74 **
USA	0.08 **	0.24 **	0.59 *	1.59 **	1.09	1.18 *	1.07 *	261.19 **

* = p < .05 ** = p < .01 one-tailed tests

Notes: Age 60+ is the excluded (reference) category. See text for definitions of variables.

Table 3. Perceived Experience of Injustice – ISJP, 1991

	Experienced Injustice Due to...					
	POLITICAL BELIEFS		ONES SEX (women only)		SOCIAL BACKGROUND	
	% "ever"	mean	% "ever"	mean	% "ever"	mean
Bulgaria	34.6	1.86	31.0	1.58	36.1	1.81
Czechoslovakia	43.6	1.95	52.5	1.99	39.1	1.78
East Germany	46.2	1.93	32.5	1.52	26.4	1.46
Estonia	25.2	1.47	24.3	1.37	29.2	1.52
Hungary	16.8	1.35	22.2	1.40	11.7	1.22
Poland	24.4	1.47	18.7	1.30	24.0	1.40
Russia	17.8	1.20	26.0	1.48	18.8	1.34
Slovenia	19.8	1.36	32.5	1.58	33.6	1.60
West Germany	25.8	1.45	46.0	1.85	30.2	1.52
USA	32.1	1.47	57.9	2.09	45.0	1.72
	ONES AGE		LACK OF MONEY		RELIGION	
	% "ever"	mean	% "ever"	mean	% "ever"	mean
Bulgaria	32.3	1.65	43.0	2.05	17.4	1.40
Czechoslovakia	35.0	1.60	51.2	2.01	25.5	1.52
East Germany	25.9	1.45	30.8	1.51	19.3	1.34
Estonia	28.1	1.47	60.1	2.39	11.1	1.21
Hungary	16.5	1.28	31.6	1.63	13.7	1.27
Poland	17.1	1.29	47.6	2.00	18.0	1.33
Russia	24.1	1.44	52.7	2.25	7.1	1.14
Slovenia	23.8	1.40	55.1	2.16	17.4	1.30
West Germany	31.9	1.55	41.6	1.70	17.0	1.28
USA	47.3	1.79	59.5	2.13	31.2	1.46

Notes: Perceived Experience of Injustice has a response format from (1) "never" to (5) "very often." "% ever" indicates a response from (2) "rarely" to (5) "very often."

Table 4. Odds Multipliers from Logistic Regressions for the Effects of Social-Psychological Factors on Non-Electoral (A and B) and Electoral (C and D) Political Participation -- Separately by Country, ISJP, 1991

(A) AGGRESSIVE PARTICIPATION													
	Education	Gender Injustice	Political Injustice	Justice is Possible	Favor Socialism	Post-Materialism	Egalitarian Statism	Chi Square (df = 12)	Pseudo R Square				
Bulgaria	1.22	1.09	1.45	** 1.02	0.77	1.22	0.88	70.95	** 0.12				
Czechoslovakia	1.11 *	0.99	1.24	** 0.99	0.88	1.04	0.89	75.35	** 0.08				
East Germany	0.79	1.56	1.06	0.87	0.89	1.21	0.68	45.30	** 0.14				
Estonia	1.15	1.16	1.61	** 0.69	1.48	0.85	1.07	30.43	* 0.13				
Hungary	1.09	0.85	1.78	** 0.80	-----	1.17	0.48	29.02	** 0.13				
Poland	0.95	1.19	1.56	** 1.14	0.77	1.27	0.77	111.14	** 0.12				
Russia	1.02	0.80	1.37	** 1.05	0.85	1.10	0.79	53.02	** 0.08				
Slovenia	0.90	1.12	1.06	1.03	0.98	1.23	1.19	27.77	** 0.06				
West Germany	1.19	* 1.13	1.45	** 1.09	-----	1.28	1.48	82.45	** 0.11				
USA	1.00	1.18	1.29	** 1.25	-----	1.08	1.48	50.41	** 0.07				
(B) FULLY OR PROTEST DEMONSTRATION													
	Education	Gender Injustice	Political Injustice	Justice is Possible	Favor Socialism	Post-Materialism	Egalitarian Statism	Chi Square (df = 12)	Pseudo R Square				
Bulgaria	1.15	* 1.12	1.28	** 1.13	0.67	1.29	0.73	182.70	** 0.20				
Czechoslovakia	1.10	* 0.94	1.31	** 1.17	0.75	1.18	0.85	181.24	** 0.14				
East Germany	1.28	** 1.00	1.21	** 1.02	0.94	1.15	0.91	98.60	** 0.09				
Estonia	1.23	** 1.18	1.43	** 1.31	1.08	1.15	0.53	58.31	** 0.12				
Hungary	1.26	* 1.35	1.53	** 1.05	-----	1.06	0.6	87.83	** 0.19				
Poland	1.06	1.18	1.54	** 1.29	0.60	1.32	0.78	137.24	** 0.16				
Russia	1.23	1.24	1.47	** 1.12	0.83	1.05	0.79	87.98	** 0.12				
Slovenia	1.38	** 1.28	1.22	1.11	1.02	1.19	1.01	88.15	** 0.10				
West Germany	1.47	** 1.12	1.35	** 1.23	-----	1.57	1.25	372.79	** 0.20				
USA	1.58	** 1.15	1.43	** 1.26	-----	1.31	1.22	196.31	** 0.14				

Table 4. (continued)

(C) PARTY SYMPATHY

	Education	Gender Injustice	Political Injustice	Justice is Possible	Favor Socialism	Post-Materialism	Egalitarian Statism	Chi Square (df = 12)	Pseudo R Square
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia	1.05	1.06	1.22	** 1.07	0.88	1.10	1.00	54.78	** 0.04
East Germany	1.23	0.82	1.30	** 1.17	1.00	1.32	0.86	101.75	** 0.08
Estonia	1.01	1.06	1.38	** 1.13	0.72	1.29	0.74	68.42	** 0.11
Hungary	1.19	** 1.07	1.22	* 1.27	1.26	** 0.95	112.02	** 0.09
Poland	1.19	** 0.91	1.30	** 1.06	0.76	1.31	** 0.79	107.24	** 0.10
Russia	1.36	** 0.87	1.59	** 1.18	0.98	1.36	** 0.77	89.16	** 0.13
Slovenia	1.21	** 1.35	1.24	** 1.18	1.07	1.17	* 0.83	101.81	** 0.09
West Germany	1.19	** 1.04	1.07	1.14	1.08	0.97	80.76	** 0.04
USA	1.19	** 1.02	1.09	1.12	0.92	0.99	22.29	* 0.02

(D) VOTE

	Education	Gender Injustice	Political Injustice	Justice is Possible	Favor Socialism	Post-Materialism	Egalitarian Statism	Chi Square (df = 12)	Pseudo R Square
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia	1.27	* 0.96	0.86	1.08	0.85	1.09	0.90	44.82	** 0.09
East Germany	1.19	* 0.94	0.95	1.16	0.69	0.99	1.02	58.26	** 0.08
Estonia
Hungary	1.34	** 0.92	0.99	1.20	0.94	0.96	54.65	** 0.06
Poland	1.22	** 1.01	1.05	1.02	0.93	0.94	1.10	59.49	** 0.04
Russia	1.18	** 0.82	1.09	1.06	1.02	0.90	1.04	81.72	** 0.10
Slovenia
West Germany	1.23	** 0.96	0.97	1.06	1.12	0.97	40.46	** 0.04
USA	1.52	** 1.19	0.97	1.08	0.96	0.89	268.62	** 0.17

* = p < .05 ** = p < .01

one-tailed tests

Notes: Age 60+ is the excluded (reference) category. See text for definitions of variables. The results presented in this table are from logistic regressions including the social psychological variables arrayed here and all of the sociodemographic variables in Table 2.

Table 5. Mean Sociodemographic Characteristics by Level of Total Participation -- ISJP, 1991

AGE										
	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	49.03	52.01	49.56	47.16	48.94	47.45	43.46	42.9	50.93	44.54
Participant	40.76	42.36	44.95	44.48	—	42.66	41.36	40.85	44.64	44.48
Activist	39.41	38.99	41.60	42.15	41.06	42.87	37.43	35.43	39.28	42.74
Significance	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	N.S.
Eta	0.29	0.30	0.14	0.11	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.19	0.23	0.04
EDUCATION										
	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	4.49	3.39	3.46	4.04	3.24	3.15	3.96	3.01	3.23	3.67
Participant	5.32	4.12	3.96	4.36	—	3.94	4.67	3.38	4.05	4.56
Activist	5.70	4.49	4.56	5.13	4.72	4.29	5.32	4.17	4.91	5.48
Significance	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01
Eta	0.36	0.26	0.24	0.22	0.29	0.26	0.27	0.29	0.39	0.33
GENDER (proportion male)										
	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	0.42	0.39	0.36	0.39	0.46	0.40	0.45	0.40	0.43	0.33
Participant	0.52	0.47	0.45	0.39	—	0.54	0.47	0.44	0.52	0.44
Activist	0.56	0.65	0.59	0.50	0.58	0.65	0.48	0.56	0.58	0.52
Significance	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .05	p < .01	p < .01	N.S.	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01
Eta	0.12	0.17	0.14	0.08	0.08	0.19	0.02	0.12	0.11	0.09
SOCIAL STANDING										
	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	3.66	4.44	4.79	4.73	4.14	4.37	3.88	4.19	5.45	5.49
Participant	4.10	4.67	4.77	4.90	—	4.82	4.10	4.26	5.89	5.79
Activist	4.28	5.08	4.96	5.07	4.77	4.88	4.58	4.66	5.92	6.04
Significance	p < .01	p < .01	N.S.	N.S.	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01
Eta	0.16	0.13	0.04	0.07	0.15	0.12	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.08

Notes: N.S. indicates that the differences among means are not statistically significant. A "Non-Participant" reported no participation in any of the nine kinds of non-electoral participation. An "Activist" reported a level placing her or him in the top fifteen percent of the distribution of total non-electoral participation. A "Participant" has a level of total non-electoral participation greater than zero but not in the upper 15 percent.

Table 6. Mean Social Psychological Characteristics by Type of Participation – ISJP, 1991

GENDER GREIVANCE
(women only)

	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	1.49	1.90	1.46	1.33	1.37	1.25	1.35	1.49	1.60	1.75
Participant	1.71	2.03	1.48	1.44	—	1.42	1.59	1.74	1.81	2.00
Activist	1.72	2.08	1.87	1.55	1.71	1.60	1.86	1.81	2.48	2.73
Significance	p < .05	N.S.	p < .01	p < .05	N.S.	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01
Eta	0.11	0.06	0.15	0.11	0.06	0.15	0.20	0.13	0.26	0.24

POLITICAL GREIVANCE

	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	1.58	1.75	1.60	1.36	1.30	1.30	1.11	1.30	1.31	1.50
Participant	1.91	1.91	1.91	1.50	—	1.64	1.25	1.44	1.40	1.39
Activist	2.50	2.51	2.42	1.96	1.63	2.18	1.52	1.50	1.89	1.78
Significance	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01
Eta	0.24	0.19	0.20	0.22	0.13	0.33	0.23	0.10	0.23	0.17

SOCIAL JUSTICE IS POSSIBLE

	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	2.67	2.64	2.87	2.00	2.57	2.51	2.67	2.97	2.69	2.98
Participant	2.97	3.16	3.29	2.04	—	2.69	2.94	3.14	3.29	3.63
Activist	3.14	3.25	3.60	2.29	3.17	2.88	3.10	3.69	3.76	4.40
Significance	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .05	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01
Eta	0.11	0.18	0.15	0.08	0.15	0.11	0.12	0.17	0.26	0.26

EGALITARIAN STATISM

	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	3.38	3.32	3.78	3.07	3.66	3.43	3.36	3.41	3.24	2.86
Participant	2.93	3.00	3.71	3.03	—	3.06	3.05	3.29	3.13	2.42
Activist	2.71	2.68	3.52	2.65	3.10	2.99	2.91	3.03	3.18	2.45
Significance	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .05	p < .01
Eta	0.27	0.25	0.11	0.17	0.23	0.21	0.20	0.16	0.06	0.14

FAVOR SOCIALISM

	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	2.81	2.62	2.61	2.33	—	2.53	2.75	2.86	—	—
Participant	2.37	2.40	2.60	2.50	—	2.30	2.67	2.60	—	—
Activist	1.85	1.95	2.70	2.24	—	1.96	2.41	2.49	—	—
Significance	p < .01	p < .01	N.S.	N.S.		p < .01	p < .01	p < .01		
Eta	0.26	0.20	0.03	0.07		0.20	0.10	0.15		

Table 6 (continued)

POST-MATERIALISM

	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	1.8	2.05	2.02	1.79	1.51	1.65	1.78	2.14	2.35	2.48
Participant	2.09	2.38	2.40	1.92	—	1.72	1.97	2.48	2.75	2.49
Activist	2.33	2.65	2.69	2.08	1.57	2.04	2.06	2.51	3.33	2.95
Significance	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .05	N.S.	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01
Eta	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.13	0.03	0.17	0.12	0.17	0.31	0.17

PARTY SYMPATHY

	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	—	0.30	0.41	0.11	0.34	0.09	0.04	0.15	0.63	0.84
Participant	—	0.31	0.53	0.19	—	0.14	0.11	0.23	0.70	0.88
Activist	—	0.44	0.64	0.31	0.62	0.31	0.18	0.36	0.70	0.92
Significance		p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	p < .01	N.S.
Eta		0.11	0.13	0.20	0.20	0.23	0.19	0.19	0.11	0.06

VOTE

	Bulgaria	Czech.	E. Germany	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovenia	W. Germany	USA
<u>Type of Participation</u>										
Non-Participant	—	0.93	0.81	—	0.74	0.75	0.84	—	0.85	0.41
Participant	—	0.93	0.84	—	—	0.80	0.86	—	0.90	0.71
Activist	—	0.95	0.89	—	0.86	0.83	0.87	—	0.90	0.86
Significance		N.S.	N.S.		p < .01	p < .01	N.S.		p < .05	p < .01
Eta		0.02	0.02		0.10	0.07	0.04		0.06	0.24