2000

Solov'ëv and Schelling's Philosophy of Revelation

Paul Valliere

Butler University, pvallier@butler.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers

Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation


This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences at Digital Commons @ Butler University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more information, please contact omacisa@butler.edu.
SOLOV’EV AND SCHELLING’S PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION

Paul VALLIERE

The connection between Solov’ev’s philosophy of religion and Schelling’s has long been recognized but is difficult to clarify for two reasons. The first is Solov’ev’s nonchalance about citing sources. The paucity of direct references to Schelling in the work of a philosopher who has been called ‘the last and most outstanding Russian Schellingian’ is quite astonishing. The second reason is the ambivalence toward Schelling in Russian religious philosophy. At an early point it became commonplace to associate Schelling with ‘pantheism’, a tendency perceived as dangerous on both theological and humanistic grounds: theologically because of the contradiction to creatio ex nihilo, humanistically because of the threat to human freedom posed by world-process determinism. Solov’ev’s philosophical heirs, eager to save the master from these pitfalls, sought to distance him from Schelling even as they conceded his debt to the great idealist. Evgenij Trubeckoj, whose massive study of 1913 charted the course of Solov’ev studies for years to come, distinguished between ‘the sunlight of the genuine Absolute’ in Solov’ev and the ‘clouds’ that obscured it, namely, the ‘pantheistic tendencies of Russian-Schellingian gnosticism’ and the ‘semi-Schellingian forms of Chtenija o Bogoslovstve’ (Lectures on Godmanhood). More radical critics, such as Lev Šestov, rejected most of Solov’ev’s mature thought as fatally compromised by pantheism and affirmed the Solov’evian legacy only on the basis of an apocalypticist and fideist reading of Tri razgovora. Sergej Bulgakov was something

1 In Krizis zapadnoj filosofii Solov’ev discusses Schelling, but only the Identitätssphilosophie and that merely as a transitional phase of the idealist movement that ends with Hegel. There are only two references to Schelling, both perfunctory, in Solov’ev’s early sophiological sketches (1876), and none at all in Krizis onedetsennhh razl or Chtenija o Bogoslovstve. The characterization of Solov’ev as the ‘last and most outstanding Russian Schellingian’ in Arsenij Gulyga’s in Selling, Žen’ samotnaya tykh ljud’ (Moskva, 1984), p. 302.
of an exception to the rule. In *Filosofija khozajstva* (1912) he worked out a culturology which may be called Neo-Schellingian tout court. In *Svet neveverlij* (1917), on the other hand, he showed sensitivity to anti-Schellingian polemics by taking a more guarded approach.4

Of course there was more than one Schelling, at least as far as the convenient fictions of history of philosophy are concerned. In his doctoral defence of *Kritika orliveennykh nacal*, Solov'ev distinguished between the speculative pantheism of the first Schellingian system (*Identitiitsphilosophie*) and the theosophical constructions of the second Schellingian system (the so-called positive philosophy). He acknowledged the 'affinity of his views' with the second system, 'in which [Schelling] had already freed himself from the false pantheism of his earlier theories'.5 Bulgakov, too, considered *Philosophie der Offenbarung* to be Schelling's 'most accomplished and fully articulated system', although he did not believe that Schelling had distanced himself sufficiently from pantheist rationalism even in that late work.6 Yet the 'two-Schelling hypothesis' clarifies little besides the determination to combat 'pantheism'. To grasp Solov'ev's link to Schelling in substantive terms one must examine the overall structure of his thought.

The issue of Solov'ev's debt to Schelling is critical for situating Solov'ev in the history of modern religious thought. Schelling's 'philosophy of revelation' has been a major force in theology and religious philosophy although its significance has been underestimated, just as Schelling's contribution to philosophy in general has been undervalued. Andrew Bowie writes suggestively of these relationships in his discussion of Schelling's rejection of the ontological proof:

If one takes the ontological proof of God as the classic example of the metaphysics of presence (which is the basic point of Schelling's critique), then it is evident that the rejection of that proof leads to two possibilities. The first is a different approach to theology, of the kind evident in the thesis that Schelling tries to construct a philosophy of revelation rather than a rational theology. This attempt still lives on in theology of the kind developed by Rosenzweig, Paul Tillich and others. The second possibility is that theology itself becomes undermined and takes on the forms we have already been

Besides Tillich and Rosenzweig one could think of Buber, whose dialectical principle relies more on the diadec of spirit and nature than has been noted. The question at hand is whether Solov'ev's thinking is as well. To answer in the affirmative he should be studied not just in its own terms, but in relation to the work of Orthodox thinkers just mentioned; in particular the idea of religious philosophy should be seen as part of the general discourse in modern times.

What is philosophy of revelation? To answer that by Bowie in the passage cited, as a late development in religion as a whole, although strictly speaking it is only one of the project. Schelling's 'positive philosophical ontology' (the three 'potencies' of the world of mythology), and only then to philosophy of revelation. Schelling means philosophical elucidation of Judaism and Christianity. Whether Solov'ev extended beyond itself to an idealist religion of the kind to which I shall return.

The point of philosophy of revelation between traditional dogmatic theology and offering a new way of conceptualization.


4 Unlike Solov'ev, Bulgakov documented his reading in the sources. The text of *Svet neveverlij* makes it clear that this work was guided in part by a careful reading of Schelling's *Philosophie der Offenbarung.* See the well-annotated edition by V.V. Sapov and K.M. Dolgov in the series 'Mysliteli XX veka' (Moskva, 1994).


6 *Svet neveverlij,* ed. Sapov and Dolgov, p. 129.
Philosophija khozjajstva (1912) he worked called Neo-Schellingian tout court. In other hand, he showed sensitivity to anti-a more guarded approach. In one Schelling, at least as far as the philosophy of religion and Schelling\'s distinction between the first Schellingian system (theoretical constructions of the second system called positive philosophy). He acknowledges with the second system, \'in which himself from the false pantheism of his own, considered \'Philosophie der Offenbarung\' accomplished and fully articulated system that Schelling had distanced himself from the false pantheism of his late work. Yet the point thatSolov'ev's link to Schelling in substantive is the basic point of Schelling\'s critique of dogmatic religion. Schelling\'s \'philosophy major force in theology and religious philosophy has been underestimated, just as in general has been undervalued. Relatively of these relationships in his discussion ontological proof:

\'Proof of God as the classic example of the ontological proof of God, a famous in the Schellingian system, is a two possibilities, one to theology, of the kind evident in the fact that Schelling of philosophy of revelation rather than a is still lives on in theology of the kind developed by others. The second possibility is that Schelling distanced himself from the false pantheism of his late work. Yet the point that Solov'ev's link to Schelling in substantive is the basic point of Schelling\'s critique of dogmatic religion. Schelling\'s \'philosophy major force in theology and religious philosophy has been underestimated, just as in general has been undervalued. Relatively of these relationships in his discussion ontological proof:

\'Proof of God as the classic example of the ontological proof of God, a famous in the Schellingian system, is a two possibilities, one to theology, of the kind evident in the fact that Schelling of philosophy of revelation rather than a is still lives on in theology of the kind developed by others. The second possibility is that

Schelling's ontology, or Potenzenlehre, is an elaborate gloss on the idea stated here. God has the power to posit something other than himself within his own being. The crux of this conceptuality is the transition—

theology itself becomes undermined and the rejection of self-presence takes on the forms we have already looked at in Derrida and Heidegger. Besides Tillich and Rosenzweig one could name others, notably Martin Buber, whose dialogical principle relies more heavily on the Schellingian dialectic of spirit and nature than has generally been recognized. The question at hand is whether Solov'ev\'s name should be added to this list as well. To answer in the affirmative means that Solov'ev\'s thought should be studied not just in its own terms, nor in the context of Russian thought alone, but in relation to the work of the non-Russian and non-Orthodox thinkers just mentioned; in other words, that Solov'ev\'s religious philosophy should be seen as part of a larger project of theological discourse in modern times.

What is philosophy of revelation? The phrase is sometimes used, as by Bowie in the passage cited, as a label for Schelling\'s philosophy of religion as a whole, although strictly speaking it refers to only one phase of the project. Schelling\'s \'positive philosophy\' begins with a speculative ontology (the three \'potencies\' of being), moves next to \'philosophy of mythology', and only then to philosophy of revelation, by which Schelling means philosophical elucidation of the theological content of Judaism and Christianity. Whether philosophy of revelation points beyond itself to an idealist religion of the future is a debatable question to which I shall return.

The point of philosophy of revelation is to overcome the polarization between traditional dogmatic theology and modern critical anti-theology by offering a new way of conceptualizing the reality of God:

Der wahre Gott ist der lebendige; lebendig ist, was über sein Sein verfugt; lebendig ist der Gott, der aus eigener Macht aus sich herausgeht, ein Anderes von sich in seinem unvordenklichen Sein wird, verschieden von dem Sein, in dem er a se ist. Gott ohne diese Macht denken, heiss Iih der Möglichkeit jeder Bewegung berauchen. Dann müssten (nach Spinoza) die Dinge aus Gott emanieren (schlechter Pantheismus); oder man müsste mit Voraussetzung eines freien intelligenten Welturhebers versichern: Die Schöpfung sei unbegreiflich! (Schaller Theismus.)

Schelling's ontology, or Potenzenlehre, is an elaborate gloss on the idea stated here. God has the power to posit something other than himself within his own being. The crux of this conceptuality is the transition—


the word is too mild for what could be called a theogonic catastrophe — from the first to the second potency or degree in the life of God. The unfathomable, radically indeterminate ground of being, pure possibility [das an-sich-Seiende, das sein Könnende], admits the necessity of determinate being by positing pure actuality [das ausser-sich-Seiende, das sein Müssende] over against itself. The third potency is the power to overcome the alienation between the first and the second, the harmonization of being in a symphonic whole [das bei-sich-Seiende, das sein Sollende].

As Schelling construes it, the history of religion reflects the dynamics of the potencies. The active principle is always the second, the principle of concreteness or determinate being; but the forms of its activity vary according to the point which has been reached in the revelatory process. Mythological religion is the product of the second potency while still in the shadow of the first; it is the religion of irrational nature struggling for liberation. Revealed religion is this liberation, the self-clarification of the second potency as free personal being, historically realized in Jewish, Islamic and Christian monotheism. In Judaism and Islam, however, the personal God is known in a one-sided, self-enclosed mode, whereas in Christianity the God-concept points beyond itself to the third potency, the Spirit-to-come which reconciles and integrates all the forces of being.

The Potenzenlehre finds the widest possible application in the Schellingian tradition, where it serves as a template for organizing almost any subject matter in theological terms. The pervasiveness of this scheme in the wide-ranging theology of Paul Tillich, for example, has been convincingly demonstrated. The drama of estrangement and reconciliation at the core of Tillich's Systematic Theology as well as the familiar Tillichian triads of love, power and justice, and of heteronomy, autonomy and theonomy, can be traced back to Schelling's potencies.

A good deal of evidence can be marshaled for the assertion that religious philosophy presents an analogy with Schelling's philosophy of mythology along Schelling's lines. One need not go as far as the fundamental themes which will be developed in the next section to see that the general framework of Schelling's philosophy already appear [in this work]: a simple, circular diagram of the experience of the divine in the process of universal history, representing the perfect society of God with human beings living under the transparent symbolism of musical harmony.

The Schellingian potencies appear in the theological concepts of Incarnation / Spirit.

Solov'ev's earliest sophiological writings, although Solov'ev mentions Schelling's potencies in his early pages and never cites a work by Schelling, shows the influence of Schelling's philosophy. La Russie et l'Église Universelle is concerned with universal history and the problem of divine incarnation. This triple idea, interpreted in Christian terms, recapitulates Schelling's potencies: mythology (divinized nature - Church), epistemology in Kritika otvlečených myšleníl, and epistemology with artistic creativity. The knowledge of the unconditional reality of things, discards all the false ideas of things through an act of imagination.


13 Vladimir Soloviev, La Russie et l'Église Universelle (Paris, 1883), pp. 102, 105.
P. Valliere

could be called a theogonic catastrophe — potency or degree in the life of God. The
immanence ground of being, pure possibility (ungenaht), admits the necessity of deter-
minism; the harmonization (das bei-sich-Seiende, das sein Sollende).


Solov'ev's earliest sophiological writings follow the same scheme, although Solov'ev mentions Schelling by name only twice in eighty pages and never cites a work by Schelling.11 The mature sophiology of La Russie et l'Eglise Universelle is comparable. The aim of the cosmogonic and historical processes described there is 'the universal integration of all extradivine existence', which is accomplished through 'the process of universal history' and 'the triple fruit which it bears: the perfect woman, or divinized nature, the perfect man or the God-man, and the perfect society of God with human beings — the definitive incarnation of divine Wisdom'.12 This triple incarnation, while Solov'ev glosses it in Christian terms, recapitulates Schelling's construction of the history of religion: mythology (divinized nature), revelation (God-man), Spirit (Church).

Moshalskij's observations on the Schellingian 'echoes' of Solov'ev's epistemology in Kritika orvlećennych nalčel are à propos here. Like Schelling, Solov'ev construed the production of knowledge on the analogy with artistic creativity. The knowledge seeker begins with faith in the unconditional reality of things, discovers the determinate forms or ideas of things through an act of imagination and puts flesh on these

12 Maxime Herman, Vie et œuvre de Vladimir Soloviev (Fribourg, 1995), p. 24. See also the discussion of 'The Mythological Process in Ancient Paganism' in Jonathan Sum-
ton, The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Soloviev: Towards a Reassessment (New

13 See La Sophia el les autres écrits français, ed. François Rouleau (Lausanne, 1978), pp. 380.

forms through creative activity. The three-fold scheme of unconditional being, determinate being, and reconciliation through creative spirit appears once again. Močul’skij goes on to allege that Solov'ev preserves human freedom more effectively than Schelling, because Solov'ev confines the scheme to epistemology rather than extending it to the cosmogonic arena, where the human person is in danger of being swallowed up by the world-process. Whether this distinction is fair to Schelling need not detain us here. Močul’skij inadvertently reveals another similarity between Solov'ev and Schilling in his discussion of Solov'ev’s theory of ideas. Močul’skij construes Solov'ev’s theory as an inverted Platonism:

In Plato the appearance of the object produces the recollection of its idea; in Solov'ev it is the other way around: the idea living in the soul makes possible the perception of the object. In [Plato] the movement is from below to above, de re alius re ad realis, while in [Solov'ev] the movement is from above to below, de realibus ad realia. The human being responds to the condescension of the idea through his own creative activity. Thus, the process of cognition in Solov'ev is shown to be a divine-human process.

Solov'ev’s view as described by Močul’skij could be characterized as a ‘kenotic’ theory of ideas. This, in turn, connects Solov'ev to Schelling because the latter was a major source of the kenosis-theology which came to play a significant role in nineteenth and twentieth-century European theology, including Russian Orthodox theology. In the theogonic process as described in Philosophie der Offenbarung, the second potency — the Idea, the Son — sets itself off from the first by assuming what Schelling calls the ‘servitude’ of determinate being, the ‘necessity’ of logical forms. Schelling lends this theory biblical authority through an argumentation 184/142, Preis. The concept of ‘revelation’ is used in the specifically Schellingian sense to mean what Schelling calls the ‘servitude’ of determinate being, the ‘necessity’ of logical forms. Schelling deprived his linear process of the dynamic being leading into the philosophical imagination seems to have been special moments which excited his curiosity — Solov'ev's philosophy of religion in Russia, 1826-1854', ed. Scholten, vol. 6, pp. 422-42.

16 Sutton probably speaks for most scholars of the subject when he notes (par Močul’skij) that the problem of freedom and world-process ‘deeply concerned’ Schelling, and that Russian thinkers such as Solov'ev and Benjerav simply followed him in this respect. See The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solov'ev, p. 68.


that which remains as the ground of religious knowledge after the classical proofs of God have fallen away. The scheme of religious evolution is as expected: mythological religion ("natural revelation") followed by the vindication of freedom, first through the "negative revelation" of Buddhism and other Indian religions, then through the "positive revelation" mediated by Platonism and biblical religion culminating in Christianity, the religion of bогоцеловечества (Gedmanhood). Bogoцеловечество itself is a version of the Schellinian proposition that the living God, as opposed to abstract divinity, must contain otherness within himself. The notion of the eternal humanity of God, which is what bогоцеловечество is about, supplies this alterity.

One of the critical issues in Schellinian philosophy of revelation concerns the destiny of the world-process. What can be expected from the status of Christian revelation in Schelling's philosophy of religion. As Thomas F. O'Meara puts it: "If Christianity was the future of mythology, is not idealism the future of Christianity?" This question is not easily settled, for the following reason:

the final stage of the theogonic process, the activity of the third potency in cosmic resolution, is not described at length [in Philosophie der Offenbarung]. What is missing is an idealist ontology of resolution which would correspond to the first part of the positive philosophy, the lectures on the one primal Being leading into the philosophy of religion. Schelling's philosophical imagination seems to have been spent. Distracted by two material segments which excited his curiosity — Satanicology and an ecumenical ecclesiology — Schelling deprived his linear process of a worthy conclusion.

It is illuminating to apply O'Meara's observations to Solov'ëv's oeuvre. Would it be true to say that "idealism is the future of Christianity" for Solov'ëv? The concept of bогоцеловечество often appears to be directed to such an end, not just in the early Solov'ëv, but in his late works as
well. In *Tri razgovora*, for example, Mr. Z. is introduced as the protagonist of an 'unconditional-religious' point of view, transcending the 'conventional-religious' and 'cultured-progressive' views of the General and the Statesman. It is tempting to construe the trio of interlocutors in terms of the three-fold schema of the philosophy of revelation: the irrational absolute (the General’s piety), the irreducibly human (the Statesman’s humanitarianism) and the reconciliation prophesied by Mr. Z. (idealist religion), the last fulfilling Schelling’s dream of ‘vollkommene Verschmelzung des Christentums mit der allgemeinen Wissenschaft und Erkenntnis’.24

Yet the case is not so neat. In his assessment of the denouement of Schelling’s *Philosophie der Offenbarung*, O’Meara seems to assume that Schelling would have done well to steer clear of such ‘distractions’ as ecumenism and the problem of evil. If an absolute idealist synthesis were the aim of philosophy of revelation, O’Meara’s criticism would probably be just. But is this the aim? Or, on the contrary, is it possible to imagine an outcome to which Schelling’s interests in ecumenism and the problem of evil would not be seen as irrelevant?

The same question may be asked about Solov’ëv’s career. After *Čtenija o Bogocelovecestve* Solov’ëv could be said to have allowed himself to be ‘distracted’ by theocratic and ecumenical concerns. But were these concerns distractions, or were they a continuation of the philosophy of revelation by another path, namely the path of actual religious life? If, as philosophy of revelation holds, the living God is revealed through the history of religion, does the philosopher of revelation not have to get his hands into the stuff of religion in practice, not just in theory, in order to accomplish his task? If so, one can read Solov’ëv’s prophetic activism of the 1880s as nothing less than a second philosophy of revelation. What the second added to the first was precisely seriousness about the claims of historic religion embodied in scripts, dogmas and churches. The necessarily fragmentary character of philosophy of revelation in this mode turns out to be a virtue in that it reflects the unfinished character of the historical-revelatory process. A philosophy of revelation that was too determinate about the third ‘potency’ would in fact undermine itself.25

25 Another way of putting it is to say that faith does not wither away as philosophy of revelation advances but remains indispensable to the end. As Walicki has noted, an ambivalence about faith in philosophy of revelation was noted early in the Russian reception of Schelling: ‘Although the Slavophiles considered the philosophy of revelation for continuing rationalism. The dilemma, as he saw it, was that a religious faith, whereas Western Christianity was Schelling was aware of this, and had attempted to rationalization, it was “incomprehensibility task to invent a History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Russeck (Stanford, California, 1979), p. 103.
In Solov'ev's issue of closure comes to a head in Tri razgovora. As is well known, the assessment of this work is a vexed issue in Solov'ev studies. For the purposes of this paper it suffices to note the parallels between Tri razgovora and the conclusion of Schelling's Philosophie der Offenbarung. Both works end with 'satanology' (to use O'Meara's phrase) and ecumenist prophecy. The parallels with respect to ecumenism are close enough to suggest a direct influence of Schelling on Solov'ev. The ecumenist vision at the end of Philosophie der Offenbarung is based on the theory of the tri-apostolicity of the church.

According to Schelling, the Universal Church is composed of the churches of Peter, Paul and John — churches which are distinct in the world-historical oikonomia of revelation but destined for unity in the end. Peter's is the church of stability, antiquity, continuity, the Real. Paul's is the church of freedom, movement, criticism, the Ideal. John's is the church of the future, of reconciliation and unity, of 'the spirit of humanity'. Obviously the Potenzlenke lies the ecumenism, but there is a practical dimension to it as well. Schelling designed the scheme to justify the ecumenical project of reconciling Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, a project of world-historical importance which he believed was destined to be accomplished in Germany. As a Protestant idealist working in Roman Catholic Bavaria, Schelling had personal and professional reasons for being drawn to this rendition of the ecumenical ideal. A spiritually tinged German patriotism was also a factor:

In Deutschland werden sich die Schicksale des Christentums entscheiden; das deutsche Volk ist anerkannt als das universellste; lange Zeit auch galt es für das wahrheitsliebendeste, das der Wahrheit alles, selbst seine politische e receptLon of Schelling. Although the Slavophiles approved of Schelling, Kireyevsky criticized the philosophy of revelation for confining itself to a merely negative critique of rationalism. The dilemma, as he saw it, was that a new, positive philosophy required true religious faith, whereas Western Christianity was itself infected by rationalism. Although Schelling was aware of this, and had attempted to cleanse Christianity of the deposits of rationalism, it was "lamentable task to invent a faith for oneself": 26 Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism, trans. Hilda Andrews-Ruszczyńska (Stanford, California, 1979), p. 103.


Bedeutung zum Opfer gebracht hat. Im deutschen Reich hatten die alte Kirche und das neue Bekenntnis neben einander mit gleichen politischen Rechten existiert. Eine spätere Veränderung hat sie nicht bloß im Ganzen, sondern auch in jedem einzelnen Teil Deutschlands mit völlig gleichen Rechten nebeneinander gestellt. Dies ist nicht umsonst geschehen, sondern an sich selbst das Vorzeichen einer neuen, höheren Entwicklung.\(^{29}\)

The Orthodox Church has no place in Schelling’s scheme. He mentions it only long enough to deny Orthodoxy any independent testimony to bring to the altar of the Universal Church.\(^{30}\) The effect of this is to leave the Johannine church without a link to history or the present-day world, to construe it as pure futurity. Solov’ëv’s version of Schelling’s scheme rectifies this problem by identifying Orthodoxy as the bearer of the Johannine principle, although the prophetic, future-oriented vocation of Orthodoxy is affirmed at the same time. That is to say, Solov’ëv has ideal, not empirical Orthodoxy in mind in ‘Kratkaja povest’ ob antichriste’. In Solov’ëv as in Schelling, however, the church of the future is realized through the Johannine principle. In ‘Kratkaja povest’ it is starets Ioann who initiates the reunion of the churches in the Judean desert. Solov’ëv’s vision of the fraternization and co-rule of Christians and Jews in the end-time following the fall of Antichrist also follows Schelling. Schelling maintained that the apostle John, unlike Peter and Paul, pastored (in Ephesus) a mixed Jewish and Gentile church, a token of the Universal Church of the future until the Jewish and Christian elements of the church are reconciled.\(^{31}\)

Solov’ëv’s rendition of Schelling’s scheme in *Tri razgovora* steers it away from purely idealist religion, an outcome that could not be accepted by the bearers of historic Christianity or Judaism. Among Solov’ëv’s heirs, too, one sees an effort to steer clear of such result. This is especially clear in Bulgakov, who remained a Solov’ëvian idealist to the end of his days but devoted his energies in the last two decades of his life to dogmatic theology. Bulgakov’s dogmatics should be appreciated not just as an interest resulting from his ordination to the priesthood, but as the natural continuation of a philosophy of revelation. A philosophy of revelation that left no place for dogmatics, in effect subordinating dogmatics to idealism, would be unsatisfactory because it would steer positive philosophy back in the direction of


In the German Reich, the old and new lived side by side with identical political changes, but they are not only in the whole, but also in each part of Germany with completely identical parts. This has not happened, but rather, a new, higher development.

In Schelling’s scheme, he mentions Orthodoxy as any independent testimony to the Church. The effect of this is to leave a link to history or the present-day world. Solov’ev’s version of Schelling’s scheme identifies Orthodoxy as the bearer of the the prophetic, future-oriented vocation at the same time. That is to say, Solov’ev hadows Orthodoxy in mind in ‘Kratkaja povest’ ob in Schelling, however, the church of the Johannine principle. In ‘Kratkaja povest’ the reunion of the churches in the Judean principle and co-rule of Christians following the fall of Antichrist also follows that the apostle John, unlike Peter and mixed Jewish and Gentile church, a token of a new church in Schelling’s scheme in Tri razgovora steers it religion, an outcome that could not be historic Christianity or Judaism. Among s an effort to steer clear of such result, Bulgakov, who remained a Solov’evian ide- out devoted his energies in the last two theology. Bulgakov’s dogmatics should terest resulting from his ordination to the continuation of a philosophy of revelation that left no place for dogmatics, in s to idealism, would be unsatisfactory re philosophy back in the direction of

vol. 6, p. 712; cf. Philosophie der Offenbarung.

P. Valliere

Hegelian intellectualism and so destroy it. In other words, there is philosophic as well as poetic truth in Solov’ev’s decision to give the last word in his philosophy of revelation to three churchmen in the desert and an army of unassimilated Jews.