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From Hiroshima to Baghdad: Military Hegemony versus Just Military Preparedness

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The political and military leadership of the United States is committed to sustaining its position of global military supremacy. This commitment is visible in the fact that the current U.S. military budget is around $700 billion per year and roughly equals the total military expenditure of all other countries (Hellman and Sharp 2008), allowing for the continuous and unparalleled development of new warfare technologies. It is also reflected in the fact that the United States maintains a network of significant military bases in dozens of countries across the world, served by a highly trained professional military force (Johnson 2004 and 2006). America’s naval fleet adds to its global power projection and its capability to use at short notice overwhelming lethal force across the world. In this essay, I will refer to this position of the United States as supreme conventional military power as a position of “military hegemony.” The current response of governments across the world to this military hegemony ranges from consent to strong opposition with most resistance to be found among citizens in many nations (Lutz 2009).

My main purpose here is to morally question U.S. military hegemony in terms of what constitute the legitimate use of military force and the proper preparation for using such force. I will first discuss in a somewhat synoptic fashion how American hegemonic military force (from its very beginning) has been justified in dishonest ways and wrongly executed. Next, I will show that Just War Theory (JWT) needs to be revised in order to come to a convincing assessment of U.S. military hegemony and its use of military force. This will lead me to propose “just military preparedness,” consisting of five principles of just military preparedness, as a new category of JWT. The failure of the United States to satisfy the
principles puts into question its very capability of justly resorting to military force, of lawfully executing force, and of establishing a just peace after war. The principles also point to a more humane alternative of how the United States could meet security threats and sustain a peaceful international order.

**The Immorality of U.S. Military Hegemony: From Hiroshima to Baghdad**

We may see the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, as the first hegemonic military act of the political and military leadership of the United States. The horrific act showed to the world that the United States had reached global military dominance, while its very execution was at least in part motivated by the idea of sustaining this position in the long run. After all, the annihilation of Hiroshima, followed three days later by the nuclear destruction of Nagasaki, was not merely intended by the United States to force Japan to surrender with the fewest number of American casualties (as the official rationale would have it), but also had the purpose of intimidating the Soviet Union. Moreover, American political leaders had second thoughts about their earlier plea that the Soviet Union should enter the war in the Pacific after the defeat of the Nazis, and the nuclear attacks on Japan were partly meant to cut short or prevent Russian involvement.¹ The beginning of the Cold War, then, was an unimaginable inferno, and, within a month after its occurrence, American strategists had already made an estimate that 240 nuclear bombs would suffice to annihilate all major Russian cities (Walker 2005, 315). The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s meant the end of any real challenge to the global military dominance of the United States.

The most recent global display of American military hegemony was the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, especially in its initial massive bombing campaign, proudly billed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as a “Shock and Awe” campaign. There are some instructive similarities and differences between the bombings of Hiroshima/Nagasaki and Baghdad as acts of U.S. military hegemony. In both cases, the direct aims were to force surrender through the use of highly concentrated overwhelming military force; to limit American casualties; and to display superior American warfare technologies, gratifying American tax payers that the huge military investments made had a purpose and sending a message to those who might think of challenging U.S. military hegemony. Indeed, Harlan Ullman and James Wade, Jr., the American strategists who articulated in the mid 1990s the strategy of achieving “Rapid Dominance”
through “Shock and Awe,” explicitly linked “Shock and Awe” with the nuclear attacks against Japan. They wrote:

Theoretically, the magnitude of Shock and Awe [that] Rapid Dominance seeks to impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese. The Japanese were prepared for suicidal resistance until nuclear bombs were used. The impact of those weapons was sufficient to transform both the mindset of the average Japanese citizen and the outlook of the leadership through this condition of Shock and Awe. The Japanese simply could not comprehend the destructive power carried by a single airplane. The incomprehension produced a state of awe (1996, 15-16).

Ullman and Wade further argued that with current warfare technologies, notably, cruise missiles and precision guided bombing, “Shock and Awe” could be created by totally and rapidly undermining the fighting capabilities of the enemy and disrupting civilian life through the destruction of key infrastructure facilities. Unlike the Japanese case, then, this would enable the achievement of “Rapid Dominance” through “Shock and Awe” with limited civilian casualties. In fact, the bombing of Baghdad resulted in much fewer casualties than the bombing of either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Ullman and Wade (1996, 50-51, 63) anticipated another difference between the two cases by extending the Rapid Dominance strategy beyond “war as a response to aggression” to preventive wars aimed at meeting future WMD threats. This difference, however, must be qualified. For even though the Bush administration presented the war against Iraq primarily as a preventive war, it also deceptively linked Saddam Hussein to al-Qaeda and made 9/11 into casus belli.

In the months leading up to the Iraqi war, Ullman reiterated in a CBS Evening News report that a massive use of U.S. precision weapons could create “Shock and Awe” in the vein of the nuclear bombing impact on Hiroshima and could lead to a quick victory—he boasts that “2, 3, 4, 5 days” might suffice—and, clearly, the Bush administration, at least, viewed Operation Iraqi Freedom as a corroboration of “Rapid Dominance” through “Shock and Awe.” Accordingly, on the assumption that the strategy had helped to create an Iraqi mindset open to American aims (and also counting on the widespread hatred of Saddam Hussein), the Bush administration thought that it could withdraw most troops soon after the fall of Baghdad and leave behind only some forces as part of an extended empire of bases. The delusion of Rapid Dominance left the United States completely unprepared for the emergence of the insurgency.
The whole scenario that an enemy first viewed as bereft of reason can be changed into a willing partner through the eruption of superior American military force is contestable—conceptually, morally, and in terms of historical accuracy. Still, it may seem that the more discriminate attack on Baghdad as compared to the indiscriminate killing at Hiroshima and Nagasaki shows that U.S. hegemonic military force has become less immoral. It may also seem that the United States has made a step forward in its moral thinking about how to use military force. A closer look at the facts, however, shows that these claims need significant qualification. To begin, the very notion that the United States should repeat Hiroshima with “a difference” is morally callous, and the very fact that Ullman states this so publicly reflects that America has never fully publicly examined the extent of its nuclear moral crime. More importantly, even this “difference” is tentative. Ullman and Wade, in accordance with official U.S. policy, do not wish to exclude the possibility of using nuclear weapons in case that precision weapons fall short of their aim. They write: “In most or many cases, this Shock and Awe may not necessitate imposing the full destruction of either nuclear weapons or advanced conventional technologies but must be underwritten by the ability to do so” (Ullman and Wade 1996, 16).

Moreover, any claim of moral progress must be tempered in light of the fact that the nuclear bombing of Japan came after a long war with high American military casualties as well as Japanese atrocities against American soldiers that led to an increased American moral numbing and moral sliding. Threats to now use nuclear weapons or in other ways inflict massive civilian casualties lack similar conditions of diminished culpability. At present, we also know better the gruesome results of nuclear weapons, and the modern media make it harder to be fooled (or to deceive ourselves) by such false beliefs as expressed by President Truman in his first announcements of the dropping of the first atomic bomb that it was on “Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base,” and that “we wished … to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians.”

Perhaps most sobering is that too many Americans in the past twenty years have tolerated their government’s involvement in at least hundreds of thousands—and, presumably, as many as over one million—civilian deaths in Iraq, apparently blind to, or in denial of, American culpability. In the 1990s, the deaths resulted from the massive bombing of the infrastructure of Iraq during the Gulf War as well as from the after-effects of the use of cluster munitions and depleted uranium weapons. But, above all, civilian deaths were caused by the very poor health conditions that were first created by the destruction of the infrastructure during the Gulf
War and then kept from improving significantly due to the economic sanctions enforced under American leadership. The second Iraq war caused civilian deaths in similar ways, but the greatest number of civilian deaths has resulted from the widespread violence that soon erupted on all sides in occupied Iraq.

A common defense within the United States of its military hegemony is that it serves the progress of humanity. In the Introduction to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002, George W. Bush states:

Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.

Here President Bush appeals to the idea deeply entrenched in American political culture that America uses its military force only toward the good of humanity (rather than, say, to secure oil or other resources for the nation, maintain its economic dominance, and extend its global political influence). And he links this idea to another currently widely accepted idea within the political establishment that the United States must use its military superiority to play “global cop,” safeguarding the world, including the United States itself, from the enemies of freedom and democracy. In fact, what makes the expression of these ideas in the NSS only noteworthy is that it sets the stage for the doctrine defended in the NSS that the United States can and should be entrusted with the right to use preventive force against terrorists and states with WMD ambitions.

The historical record shows that American resort to force is often motivated by economic interests and power politics rather than a real concern for freedom and democracy abroad. But this does not invalidate the somewhat more plausible view that America in the long run seeks to promote these ideals for defeated countries. Again, the historical record is at best mixed in this regard, but even if we were to assume that U.S. military force is intended to be used for spreading democracy and freedom in the long term, the right of the United States to impose its own political ideals by military intervention needs to be questioned. It is generally acknowledged by scholars of international law and ethics that the promotion of these ideals does not warrant unilateral resort to military force. A war seeking to promote freedom and democracy as such is, in the final instance, no less an act of aggression than a war motivated by “unilateral advantage” alone.
Countries in the South may rightfully refuse these political ideals, even when these ideals are not advanced through military violence. These countries may have good reasons to question their desirability in the first place because the freedom and democracy promoted by the United States involve a model of economic development that is contestable. There is also the misguided understanding of the promoters of the ideals that the countries should submit to American political and economic dominance.

Furthermore, the Bush doctrine of preventive war rightfully has been widely criticized. There is no need to repeat here all the objections that have been raised against this doctrine, but I will later argue for the broader point that maintaining international peace and stability must be seen as a collective task, not as the unilateral task of the military hegemon as “global cop.”

The argument that the United States by playing “global cop” protects the freedom and safety of its own citizens ignores that U.S. military hegemony has a variety of global security costs that leave American citizens less safe and free in the long run. Some of the global security costs are acknowledged in official policy documents, but their analysis seldom reaches the level of public debate. A first cost is nuclear proliferation. The overwhelming military superiority of the United States and its frequent use of this superiority against countries in the South bring these countries, especially in the post-Cold War era, to the conclusion that nuclear weapons are the only effective deterrent against U.S. acts of aggression.

Another global security cost is the spread of asymmetric warfare, including terrorism. Here the worry is less that states will engage in this type of warfare once they are attacked or occupied by the United States; rather, the more serious problem is that states in fear of U.S. hegemonic aggression will lend tacit support to insurgents and terrorists fighting the U.S. elsewhere in the anticipation that this will weaken the threat of the military giant.

A final security cost is a decline of general compliance to international law and norms. The United States in its function as “global cop,” as well as in its endeavor to sustain its military hegemony, often ignores international law and global public opinion, setting a poor model for other countries, thus undermining the rule of law. Some examples are that the United States has routinely violated the sovereignty of other countries by launching missile strikes on their territory in the context of fighting terrorism; refuses to sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and opposes the 2008 Convention on Cluster Bombs; and exempts its own military from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The Bush administration has been particularly egregious in this regard, not only with its preventive
war doctrine, but also with its torture policy, its extraordinary renditions, and its indefinite detention of terrorist suspects.

It is obvious that these global security costs create an environment that is threatening to Americans abroad, but, as recent critics of American hegemony have noted, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have shown that the United States is not immune from what it sows abroad. And since the American public did not recognize 9/11 as a “blowback” (Johnson 2006, 2-5) related to U.S. military hegemony, it embraced the response of a stepped-up U.S. military hegemony and even accepted restrictions on its own civil liberties in the “global war on terrorism.”

We may see the huge public protests outside the United States in response to American plans of war against Iraq in early 2003—February 15, 2003, a day to remember, when as many as ten million protestors filled the streets—as a sign that the global community increasingly questions the moral legitimacy of the American hegemonic project. The pervasiveness of the myths that U.S. military hegemony serves humanity and protects the American people from the enemies of freedom and democracy helps to explain why Americans themselves protested in much smaller (though not insignificant) numbers against the second Iraqi war. Yet, does it mean that the growing opposition in recent years of the American public to the disastrous occupation of Iraq signifies the beginning of the end of U.S. military hegemony and its supportive myths?

This is to be doubted because the public opposition is much less rooted in a concern with the harms done to the Iraqi population and the immorality of forcible regime change than based on a concern that the war has brought few benefits to America and has cost it a great deal economically and in terms of American military casualties. Many citizens seem to prefer that the whole issue of Iraq simply would disappear. It is also questionable that the public opposition signifies the emergence of a widespread pragmatic recognition that the project of U.S. military hegemony has a variety of global security costs that undermine the notion that this hegemony brings security and stability to international relations and the American people. After all, too many Americans still continue to believe that those political leaders who are most in favor of a strong and aggressive U.S. military posture in the world are the best at keeping America safe.

The election of Barack Obama as the new president of the United States does not invalidate this last point in as much as he was more favored by the voters for economic reasons than out of security concerns. At any rate, it is doubtful that his administration will fundamentally move away from seeking to maintain U.S. military hegemony. To be sure, we
may assume that the Obama administration will seek to fulfill its promise of ending large-scale American military presence in Iraq, but whether it will accept complete withdrawal and a dismantling of all its bases in Iraq is at least an open question. At the same time, the Obama administration is aiming at a greater military presence in Afghanistan and its proposal to withdraw from Iraq is at least partly motivated by making this development feasible in the long run. More importantly, Obama argued even before he became president in support of U.S. military hegemony. In *The Audacity of Hope* (2006), Obama writes that “there will be times when we must…play the role of the world’s reluctant sheriff,” adding that “this will not change—nor should it” (306). He further states that the defense budget in the coming years might need to be raised after the conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan “in order to restore readiness and replace equipment” (Obama 2006, 307). The size of the military should also be significantly raised, partly to end the overburdening of the current troops and eliminate the policy of “stop loss” or involuntary extensions of the enlistment contracts (Shane III 2008; Obama for America 2008, 117-18, 125-26), but more broadly because it is necessary for effectively meeting future asymmetrical threats that require “putting boots on the ground in the ungoverned or hostile regions where terrorists thrive” (Obama 2006, 307).

In short, it is to be expected that the Obama administration will continue the military hegemonic orientation of American foreign affairs since the Second World War. Still, there already is, and will continue to be, a break with the immediate past. The Obama administration has rejected in varying degrees some of the most striking and visible abuses of the Bush administration in its global war on terrorism, such as its torture, extraordinary rendition, and indefinite detention policies. We may also expect that the Obama administration will adhere to his preference for diplomacy and for seeking more international consensus, and especially the support of traditional American allies, in resort-to-force decisions (Obama 2006, 309). This is welcome progress, but it is a far cry from recognizing the fundamental immorality of the American military hegemonic project and seeking to replace it by a more humane military posture in which the United States becomes an equal and cooperative citizen of a peaceful international order.

**Questioning and Revising Just War Theory**

Critics of U.S. military hegemony, such as Noam Chomsky (2002, 198-207; 2006, 55) often are also critics of Just War Theory. This is not
surprising in light of the fact that even though it would be misguided to view JWT as a mere ideology in support of U.S. military hegemony, it must also be said that many JW theorists on a regular basis have justified questionable American wars. This can be partly explained by the fact that there are different versions of JWT, some of which are more pacifistic than others, and that its *jus ad bellum* (justice in the resort to war) principles are somewhat underdetermined so that there is room for ideological distortion.

However, what is also at stake is that JW theorists generally have looked anew at each potential military intervention by the United States and assessed it on its own merits rather than seeing it in a broader context as an aspect of the American project of military hegemony. A credible and critical JWT must make the very fact that we live in a unipolar military world part of the application of *jus ad bellum* principles whenever the issue is one of deciding whether the United States may rightfully resort to force.

To illustrate how taking into account military hegemony should impact the application of *jus ad bellum* principles, consider how it affects the application of the principle of proportionality to U.S. resort-to-force decisions. The general logic is that any successful military intervention by the United States typically will strengthen its position as military hegemon, and thus will escalate its negative consequences, such as adding to the global security costs inherent to U.S. military hegemony (outlined in the previous section) and therefore increasing the likelihood that the intervention will violate the proportionality principle in the first place (i.e., the harms resulting from the use of force will significantly outweigh its anticipated benefits).

The Gulf War presents an important case in point. The UN Security Council concluded that Iraq’s take-over of Kuwait was an act of aggression and the United States became the main military force executing this authorization to war. Even though JW theorists raised some questions about last resort and worried about high casualty numbers, ecological harms, and economic recession, they typically saw the war as legitimate (e.g., Coates 2000, Hartle 2002). What they did not pay attention to were the global security costs of the resort to force by the United States as military hegemon. The total devastation of the Iraqi army, the ability of the United States to bomb Iraqi cities virtually at will, and the low number of American casualties showed to the world that something other than conventional force, such as nuclear weapons or asymmetric warfare, is needed to deter or fight American military force. The permanent American military presence in the heart of the Islamic world also contributed to the rise of Islamic terrorism.
Moreover, the authorization of the Gulf War by the United Nations appears to have been a factor in this international body not gaining more influence and success in the post-Cold War world: The Gulf War emboldened U.S. hegemonic ambitions and greatly increased the preparedness of the American people to support their political leadership in opting unilaterally for war. The “Vietnam syndrome” was left behind and the public regained full pride and trust in the military. The success of the Gulf War also led to the view that America could win without massive troop deployment. Indeed, Ullman and Wade (1996, 30) assert counterfactually that “Rapid Dominance” through “Shock and Awe” might have resulted in success in the Gulf War “in a matter of days (or perhaps hours) and not after the 6 months or the 500,000 troops that were required in 1990 and 1991.” In short, it seems that America’s role in the Gulf War enabled the second Iraq war.

The global security costs of the use of unchecked U.S. military force in the Gulf War, then, at least support the case that the United States should have played a much less central role in the execution and planning of this war. Or, the case could be made that the hegemonic superpower should not at all have been part of the coalition force, using the U.N. mandate, even if this would have meant that Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait could only have been pursued through a much more limited military engagement, sanctions, negotiations, and compromise. Admittedly, these are arguments in hindsight, but the lesson can and should be applied to the future.

Some other *jus ad bellum* principles, such as the principles of legitimate authority, last resort, and reasonable chance of success, might similarly raise the bar on justified resort to U.S. military force once their application takes into account the project of U.S. military hegemony (Van der Linden 2007a, 68-69). Considering the project of U.S. military hegemony in the application of *jus ad bellum* principles, however, is not enough, since this still leaves JWT only questioning U.S. military hegemony when war decisions are at stake, and, even so, in a limited fashion. In the words of antiwar feminists Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick (2004, 407), the problem is that “just war theorists tend to abstract particular wars from the war system on which they rely and which they strengthen.” This “war system” involves:

- arming, training, and organizing for possible wars; allocating the resources these preparations require; creating a culture in which wars are seen as morally legitimate, even alluring; and shaping and fostering the masculinities and femininities that undergird men’s and women’s acquiescence to war” (Cohn and Ruddick 2004, 406).
Just Military Preparedness Principles

What is needed, then, to further improve JWT is that it articulates principles for assessing the hegemonic war system. I will articulate below five principles of “just military preparedness,” which may be viewed as a new addition to JWT addressing the justice of preparing for the possibility of going to war (jus potentia ad bellum).11 The five principles challenge the moral legitimacy of the United States seeking military hegemony and offer a more humane vision of how to meet security threats that would bring us closer to a lasting peaceful international order. In this regard, the principles have a status similar to Immanuel Kant’s preliminary articles of perpetual peace, especially the articles that cover what is to be done when nations are not at war. I will conclude this essay with some brief comments on the connection between jus potentia ad bellum and the three other categories of JWT, jus ad bellum (justice in the resort to war), jus in bello (justice in the execution of war), and jus post bellum (justice in the ending of war).

A. The First Principle: Force for Basic Human Rights Protection Only

This principle is that military preparedness must fit with its general purpose of protecting human beings from basic human rights violations on a large scale (cf. Luban 1980). With one important qualification, this purpose fits with the traditional understanding that states have a right to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity against acts of aggression by other countries (national self-defense) and that states may assist other nations under unjust attacks (law enforcement). The qualification is that states that fail to protect their own citizens from widespread violations of their basic rights or attack their own citizens in genocidal ways have no just cause against other states seeking to protect the threatened citizens (humanitarian intervention). Only national self-defense as a specific goal of military preparation warrants unilateral military action (at least in the initial stage of self-defense), while the specific goals of law enforcement and humanitarian intervention should be pursued through collective authorization and military action. One reason in support of collective control and execution of military force is that war impacts all nations by threatening the international order of states. Another reason is that individual national communities tend to have distorted perspectives due to considerations of national interests. An international deliberative body is necessary to prevent an abuse of power and to reach more objective
decisions concerning matters of global law enforcement and basic human rights protection, and the execution of military force for these goals is best carried out by a true coalition of multinational forces because great dominance by one force will undermine collective authorization in the long run. We may see the United Nations as based on this insight even though the veto system of the Security Council reflects a bow to the politics of power and national interests of the time.

None of the three goals of just military preparedness requires the United States to have military forces that seek to project power across the globe. Only a small American military force is needed to protect the United States itself from acts of aggression. The notion of a foreign nation attacking the United States is farfetched, while terrorism in general is not a real military problem but rather a criminal problem requiring, foremost, a police response, international crime cooperation, obstructing the financial sources of terrorism, securing of WMD materials, and the like (Cortright and Lopez 2007). In the long run, the elimination of terrorist threats also requires the elimination of social conditions favorable to terrorism (see, further, the third principle of just military preparedness).

Granted, states sponsoring terrorism may constitute a threat to international security, but this falls under the law enforcement goal of just military preparedness. Similarly, American involvement in collective humanitarian rescue efforts would require only a limited U.S. military force. Even on the implausible assumption that in a given instance the world community except for the United States would fail to display a humanitarian conscience and the United States would have to be the central or sole force of some intervention, a U.S. military far smaller and differently composed than the current one would suffice. What is typically required in an intervention is the use of ground forces protecting threatened population groups—and note that this fact alone makes the use of multinational forces preferable in that it involves a fair distribution of sacrifice—rather than high-tech warfare. Indeed, it is the focus on high-tech warfare that might have played a role in the tragic failure of the United States to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. In an op-ed piece defending the Kosovo intervention, and apparently responding to the charge of selectivity, Samuel Berger, the National Security Adviser of the Clinton administration, wrote: “We certainly couldn’t have acted in Rwanda militarily. It is difficult to stop people going after each other with machetes with an F-16.”

With regard to the task of enforcing international security, if the United Nations would function fully effectively as an organization charged with maintaining the peace and authorizing force as a last resort, then, again,
the United States would need only a rather limited military force. Its role would be to contribute to U.N. peacekeeping missions and to participate in multinational forces aimed at countering blatant acts of aggression. Power politics, narrow national interests, and the veto system of the Security Council, among other factors, have, however, obstructed the effective functioning of the United Nations. In transition toward better collective security arrangements and institutions, American military preparedness needs to be temporarily somewhat more extensive, allowing in exceptional circumstances for the possibility of the use of military force—in support of other nations subjected to acts of aggression—that is not fully collectively authorized and executed. But such temporary “concession” does not mean approval of unilateralism or that anything like the current U.S. military presence across the globe is needed.

A first step that the United States should take with regard to maintaining a peaceful international order is to cease to be part of the problem by ending its global power projection. The United States should immediately end its imperial project and division of the world into spheres under its command (USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, etc.) and begin to dismantle its “empire of bases” (Johnson 2004), opting for rapid withdrawal in some cases and a more gradual exit in others. Most nations can take care of their own security needs and regional security alliances can provide additional protection.

A second step is that the United States should change its present political culture of devaluing and even mocking the United Nations and work instead toward improving the organization by supporting, for example, endeavors to make the Security Council more representative of the global community and to eliminate the veto system.

Finally, the United States should not only greatly reduce the quantity of its military hardware, but should also steer away from weapon systems with hegemonic designs or other aims in conflict with the purpose of just military preparedness.

The argument for arms reduction is the easiest to make because it is clear that the current high number of American aircraft carriers and attack submarines (among other weapon systems) are needed only for maintaining military hegemony. Furthermore, some weapons have such an indiscriminate nature, either immediately when used or in their long-term impact, that they are antithetical to the protection of citizens as the overall purpose of just military preparedness. Clear examples of such weapons are landmines, cluster munitions, depleted uranium weapons, and nuclear weapons. It is more difficult to articulate what kind of weapons would be excluded if the United States were to adopt a truly defensive rather than
global dominance posture. Presumably, it would exclude, for example, the increased use and development of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with attack purposes. At any rate, two weapon systems stand out overall as most in violation of just military preparedness: nuclear weapons and weapons in space.

The United States currently has a nuclear stockpile of around 5,400 warheads, a number that is expected to decrease only modestly in the years ahead (Norris and Kristensen 2008, 50). This number in some sense shows progress as compared to the 30,000 or so warheads in the possession of the United States at the height of the Cold War, but it is a number that boggles the rational mind (a much smaller figure suffices for nuclear omnicide). Recently, former Secretaries of State George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, together with former Defense Secretary William Perry and former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn, have called for a world free of nuclear weapons, first in a widely published statement in 2007 (Schultz et al. 2007) and then again in 2008 (Schulte et al. 2008). They suggest in their statements that nuclear weapons are inhumane, irrational, and a threat to collective security and human survival. But, more specifically, their call for a nuclear-free world is motivated by the fear that terrorist groups might acquire nuclear weapons and that nuclear proliferation will increase the risk of accidents and unauthorized or misjudged nuclear launches as well as force the United States “to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence” (Schultz et al. 2007, par. 4). They further propose a variety of intermediate steps toward a nuclear-free world, appealing especially to the United States and Russia as the possessors of almost 95% of the world’s nuclear warheads to initiate these steps (Schulte et al. 2008, par. 8). The steps include ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); accelerating the securing of nuclear materials across the world; creating launching procedures of nuclear weapons that reduce the risk of hasty decisions and accidental and unauthorized uses; and, eliminating all “forward deployment” short-range nuclear weapons.

Schultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Nunn make in synoptic fashion a strong case for the abolition of nuclear weapons and offer valuable proposals toward its implementation. What is lacking in their statement, though, is the realization that what they see as a serious setback for the United States—having to deal with a much greater number of nuclear powers in the world—might be perceived as a gain by countries opposed to U.S. military hegemony. In other words, what they fail to see (or acknowledge) is that U.S. military hegemony is a cause of nuclear proliferation and that
ending this hegemony might be a necessary condition for halting this proliferation in its tracks. Skeptics may even see their plea for the abolition of nuclear weapons as an attempt to prevent that the spread of nuclear weapons among some countries in the South will restrain U.S. military hegemony. At any rate, what must be added to their proposals of how to move toward a nuclear-free world are proposals concerning how to end U.S. military hegemony.

The weaponization of space is deeply irrational in the same manner as the build-up of nuclear weapons by the United States after Hiroshima and Nagasaki was irrational, leading to the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union and the danger of nuclear omnicide. One nation’s possession of space weapons will inevitably lead others to acquire them, setting the stage for war in space. This scenario is deeply irrational because, as Theresa Hitchens (2007, 2) of the Center for Defense Information puts it, “the specter of warfare in space—especially warfare involving destructive anti-satellite weapons that would produce tons of dangerous and indiscriminate space debris—would endanger all space operations, civil, commercial and military.” She adds: “As the world’s preeminent space power, the United States would have the most to lose in a world bristling with space armaments and thus it is in U.S. national interests that space not be weaponized.” Besides, the weaponizing of space would be a huge expense and have great opportunity costs (and so violate the third and fourth principles of just military preparedness).

Yet, for a decade now the United States has consistently blocked widely supported efforts in the United Nations to negotiate a Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty. For an even longer time the United States has issued military policy documents proclaiming that military domination of space, involving both anti-satellite weapons located in space and on earth as well as weapons in space directed against terrestrial targets, is needed to maintain its dominance of air, land, and sea (Hitchens 2007, 2-13 and 17-18; Grossman 2001). Thus hegemonic ambitions together with the apparent belief that somehow other countries will not challenge the United States as “space cop” might set in motion a disastrous course of events.

The signs of a possible arms race in space are on the wall. In 2007, the Chinese successfully used an anti-satellite missile to destroy one of their own satellites, while the United States did the same in February 2008. And even though Congress is divided about the matter, the United States continues to spend hundreds of millions of dollars for research directly supportive of space weapons, while much larger sums are allocated to programs that are at least indirectly supportive of this goal (Hitchens and
Samson, 2008; Kaufman et al. 2008). What adds to the risk of a space arms race is that there is a lack of transparency. A significant part of military space spending (which includes military satellites, and the like) is classified, and similar uncertainty concerning aims and purposes exists with regard to the expanded military space programs of such countries as China and India (Guiney 2008; Kaufman et al. 2008). Ultimately, it seems that the only secure way to prevent an arms race in space is to end U.S. military hegemony.

B. The Second Principle: Towards a Morally Competent Military

This principle is that military personnel should receive training and education fitting to the basic purpose of just military preparedness and should participate fully in moral decisions concerning the initiation and execution of military force as well as in political life in general. The U.S. military clearly fails to satisfy this principle. Part of the problem is that training and education for hegemonic use of force leaves the military without the appropriate skills for such tasks as peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. An even more serious problem is that U.S. military personnel are not adequately morally reflective concerning their military actions. Timothy L. Challans, who has broad experience teaching at U.S. military academic institutions, writes:

The vast majority of military students I have personally taught in the classroom have many malformed moral beliefs. For example, most justify the exorbitant degree of collateral damage. They also justify harsh and coercive interrogation measures, even after understanding the manifestly illegal nature of such actions. They are more than willing to err on the side of excessive force or unnecessary harm over finding a balance between due risk and due care. [They display] contempt for the United Nations or any other international institution [and have] dismissive attitudes toward customary and international law that would impede the application of their unmatched power (Callans 2007, 24).

Challans adds that it is the “military realism” and “political realism” of his students that lead them to have these immoral convictions. In other words, the students fail to engage in genuine moral reflection and embrace instead without much thought U.S. military hegemony and whatever is required to sustain it and lead it to victory. Apparently, the students are less concerned than their military and political leaders to couch the use of American force in uplifting moral terms (no doubt, often meant only for public purposes).
Challans maintains that current moral education in the military fails to improve the level of moral thinking of soldiers because this education tends to be authoritarian, instrumentalist, rooted in unreflective religious faith, and based on ideological stereotypes and mere military narratives. His solution is to infuse the moral education of the military with philosophical ethics, especially in the tradition of Kant and Rawls. On his account, the ethics centers at the three major military academies in cooperation with philosophy departments elsewhere could play a pivotal role in promoting this education across the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force (Callans 2007, 184). Challans also hints at the need for related institutional changes, arguing that we need “legitimate avenues of public reason and disagreement, dissent, and disobedience within the war machine.” That is, “we need a healthier culture so that people know when and where they can speak out, disobey, walk away, or even resign in protest.” And this is of the greatest urgency because “the price of failure now can be in the trillions of dollars and millions of lives” (Callans 2007, 186). Obviously this urgent task is incompatible with the hegemony-oriented military.

The second principle of just military preparedness pushes this proposal further in that it requires the military to become a participatory and open institution with reflective moral agents. The common vision of soldiers as mere instruments of the state who need not concern themselves with *jus ad bellum* issues should be replaced by a view of soldiers as morally responsible agents with rights. Lack of dissent and moral reflection, denial of input from below in institutional decision-making, and gender and sexual-orientation discrimination—as reflected in the exclusion of women from direct combat roles and the current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy—should not be tolerated or imposed in the name of “fighting efficiency” (cf. Solaro 2006). The dignity and moral autonomy of soldiers alone require the U.S. military to improve in these areas, but the case for change can also be made on basis of the benefits that this change would bring to society, the soldiers themselves, and the military itself. To name some benefits, the emergence of morally competent soldiers addressing war-decision issues will reduce the chance of premature or wrong resort to military force. It will also largely avoid the common cost of soldiers finding themselves with moral doubt and guilt about their participation in an unjust war; after all, it is typical that sooner or later their veil of ignorance concerning fighting in an unjust war is torn away.

In the United States, broader involvement by military personnel in political and moral issues related to their profession has become especially urgent with the change from a conscription military force to the volunteer
professional army in that this change has meant that the population at large has become less directly concerned with American military interventions. A more vocal and politically involved military might, for example, have constrained the civilian military hawks in the Bush administration in their rush to war with Iraq (cf. Bacevitch 2005, 63-64). The military itself might also gain from increased moral competency and public debate within its ranks because the likelihood would be reduced of the military finding itself involved in an unjust protracted war with demoralized soldiers, undermining its long term capacity of effectively serving the overall purpose of just military preparedness. Moreover, a more diverse and morally competent military will better perform tasks where police and traditional military work intersect, such as peacekeeping and providing security for nation-building.

It might be objected that increased moral competency among soldiers is generally undesirable because it might lead soldiers to refuse to fight not only in unjust wars but also in just wars. It must be granted, I think, that such moral misjudgments might occur and so we might end up with having to recognize in some cases a misplaced refusal to fight. This seems a small price to pay. It also seems a price that should be paid in the first place because it is almost as morally repugnant in a modern democracy to train soldiers to kill without moral reflection on the justice of their cause as to force them to kill against their conscience.

The United States has a record of training many soldiers from foreign countries, including soldiers from countries with oppressive regimes who end up contributing to gross human rights violations. Just military preparedness would end this tainted record. The adoption of the first principle of just military preparedness would imply a severe reduction of the training programs for foreign soldiers, while the fulfillment of the second principle would mean that the foreign soldiers would be so trained that they end up contributing to just military preparedness of their own countries.

C. The Third Principle: Prioritizing Nonviolent Ways of Preventing Threats and Solving Conflicts

This principle requires that priority is given to nonmilitary means of realizing the basic purpose of military preparedness. The human costs of resort to military force are immense and significantly unpredictable. Priority should therefore be given to the measures that prevent the need to resort to military force through the elimination of contributing factors to wars of aggression and through finding nonviolent ways of solving
conflict. Even after the outbreak of hostilities, soldiers might be able to use at times nonviolent measures of diffusing threats, but the requirement of proper training in this regard falls under the second principle of military preparedness. Following the third principle, all countries should make it their main concern to support the United Nations in its numerous nonmilitary programs and tasks that contribute to international security and stability, including adjudication of emerging conflicts, promotion of human rights, environmental protection, arms control, peace education, and refugee assistance. NGOs with similar aims should also be supported, while high-income countries should make concerted efforts to reduce desperate global poverty and economic inequality as contributing factors of violent conflict. All these measures will also reduce terrorism, and so the need for military counter-terrorism (to the limited extent that it might be justified) would be reduced, as well.

It is difficult to quantify the exact proper proportion of military versus nonmilitary spending in support of security and protection, but this should not prevent us from noting that the current proportion is out of balance, both globally and in the United States. Perhaps most striking is that the American per capita contribution to the U.N. budget is less than two dollars per year, while the contribution per capita to the defense budget is at least two thousand dollars per year. These contributions appear partly so disproportionate due to the huge military budget of the United States, but there is also a clear worldwide misbalance in that the U. N. nonmilitary budget is only about one percent of global military expenditures.

Two other figures illustrate that the United States violates the third principle of just military preparedness and hence should reduce its military spending and greatly increase its spending on nonmilitary security and protection measures. The American ratio of military spending to official development aid in recent years has been around 25 to 1, in sharp contrast to the lowest ratio of 2 to 1 to be found in, among other countries, Holland, Belgium, and Denmark. Almost all donor nations are much closer to the lowest ratio than to the top ratio of the United States (cf. Sachs 2005, 330). The National Priorities Project (NPP) offers a somewhat overlapping illustration of the misbalance of U.S. national security spending. Distinguishing three strategies of providing national security—the military, homeland security, and “preventive measures” such as economic aid and “securing nuclear materials abroad and participating in multi-lateral diplomatic and peacekeeping operations”—the NPP notes that federal spending in the fiscal year 2005 on security in the United States was heavily geared toward the military (89%), while 7% was spent on homeland security and 4% on preventive measures (NPP n.d.).
D. The Fourth Principle: Balancing Security against Other Values

This *jus potentia ad bellum* principle is that governments must carefully balance the value of security promoted by military preparedness against other values they must advance, ranging from health to education and culture. Hegemonic military spending in the United States violates this principle at the outset in that the global security costs of U.S. military hegemony reduce in the long run the safety of its citizens. But abstracting from this point, it is clear that the United States violates the principle in light of the very significant opportunity costs of its current levels of military spending, especially to vulnerable groups in society. A mere 30% cut in its military spending would, for example, provide adequate health care to all uninsured (at least 40 million people), or another 10% cut would pay for 10 million extra tuition scholarships to public universities or for more than one million extra teachers, say in music, art, and elementary education (cf. NPP n.d.).

And, of course, the issue is not merely a monetary one. Considerable human resources are invested in the military as well as in the research and development of weapons. Imagine the impact of 40% of the military’s human resources invested in improving depressed communities. Or consider the impact of the human ingenuity now invested in research and development (R&D) for the military focused instead on promoting alternative energy sources. We can get a sense of this impact by noting that the Department of Defense (DOD), with over $80 billion in R&D in 2009, accounts for more than half of all federal R&D support (Koizumi 2008, 63). Much of this goes to industries for weapons development, but DOD also plays an important role in supporting basic and applied research, especially in some fields. A recent study notes that DOD “supports 31 percent of all federal [funded] research in the computer sciences and a similar proportion of all engineering research, as well as 29 percent of federal oceanography research and 14 percent of mathematics. DOD's impact is even greater in several engineering sub-disciplines such as electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, and materials” (Koizumi 2008, 63).

Environmental protection contributes to such human values as health and culture; arguably, it is also valuable for the sake of nature itself. War generally has a serious negative impact on the environment, leaving behind a trail of toxic waste created by spent weapons and destroyed industries; air and water pollution; land degradation and unexploded ordnance; countless killed animals; and deforestation. Accordingly, the
environmental impact of war should play a significant role in both the
decision to go war and how to execute war, but it is in fact an issue much
neglected or underplayed by JW theorists, environmental ethicists, and the
military itself (Woods 2007, 19, 23-27). The defoliation programs of the
United States during the Vietnam War led in the 1970s to the creation of
some treaties that make it a war crime to engage deliberately in severe
environmental destruction or use the environment as a weapon of war, but
the treaties have never been used for their intended purpose (Woods 2007,
22). It is even more urgent for the sake of safeguarding the environment
that the value of military preparedness be balanced against the value of
environmental protection.

The greatest military environmental damage and destruction happen
during training exercises, the production of weapons—and here radioactive
waste is a great concern—and the testing of weapons (cf. Woods 2007, 29-
30). The Pentagon does not seem to follow this guideline. For example,
without offering much supportive data, the Pentagon continues to seek
more exemptions to environmental laws for its training exercises than it
was already granted during President Bush’s first term (U.S. GAO 2008).
The Pentagon also fails to take responsibility for the fact that its expanding
empire of bases is an empire of severely polluted lands. As Chalmers
Johnson (2006, 149) notes, the United States typically seeks agreements
with host countries which “exempt the United States from cleaning up or
paying for the environmental damage it causes.” More broadly, for the
sake of environmental protection alone, it is necessary that the U.S.
military severely limits its production, development, and testing of
weapons as well as its large-scale training exercises, artillery practices,
etc., whereby then some of the freed financial resources could be used to
clean up the more than twenty thousand polluted DOD sites in the United
States.

E. The Fifth Principle: Legitimate Authority and Right Intention

The final principle of “just military preparedness” is that there should
be a “right or legitimate authority” for settling military preparedness
policies, and this authority should be guided by the “right intention” of
seeking military readiness for the overall purpose of protecting citizens. In
a democracy, the people and their representatives should subject the scope
and specific goals of military preparedness to collective control and public
debate.

Again, the United States violates this principle. The American defense
budget is not transparent, even to members of Congress; mismanagement,
fraud, and waste are common; and the choices of politicians concerning
the development and purchase of military hardware are highly influenced by lobbyists, the financial interests of weapons manufacturers, and the aim of maintaining employment opportunities in their home states. For the weapons manufacturers, the continuation of the status quo is indeed very attractive: they are guaranteed a very large local market with high profit margins, while their R&D costs are heavily subsidized by DOD (Lutz forthcoming). The American government further strengthens the global competitiveness of American weapons manufacturers by way of its military assistance programs to allied countries, making it not surprising that the United States is by far the largest arms dealer in the world.

Accordingly, legitimate authority with right intention in just military preparedness requires the elimination of the “military-industrial complex.” It also requires that politicians set aside the myth of America’s unique goodness and greatness on the world stage and cease their incessant praise of the heroes who fight and sacrifice for democracy and freedom. Instead, politicians with legitimate just military preparedness authority would tell a story of a nation that is an equal citizen of the community of nations and has heroes of great restraint in the use of force.

**Just Military Preparedness and Its Impact on Other Just War Theory Categories**

The basic connection between “just military preparedness” and the three other JWT categories—“jus ad bellum,” “jus in bello,” and “jus post bellum”—is that once the institutions and cultural practices that must enable the execution of just wars are flawed in terms of just military preparedness, there is bound to be a reduced justice (or increased injustice) in the actual resort to force, the manner of the execution of military force, and in the ending of war. I will briefly illustrate this general point on basis of how American hegemonic military preparedness is bound to impact the other three JWT categories, beginning with *jus ad bellum*.

The discussion in the section “Questioning and Revising Just War Theory,” above, suggests how the principle of proportionality is affected. Since the U.S. hegemonic military preparedness aims to project power across the globe (and even into space) with its huge expenditures, large professional army, offensive weaponry, and military presence in dozens of countries, any U.S. intervention—even if there is a just cause and a fairly limited scale of resort to force—will increase the global security costs connected to the U.S. military hegemonic project. Accordingly, hegemonic military preparedness makes it more difficult for the United States to satisfy the proportionality principle. Similarly, unilateral interventions
(except in the case of reactive self-defense) always violate the principle of legitimate authority, but hegemonic military preparedness further adds to the wrongness of unilateralism.

Since hegemonic wars are more disruptive of the international order than non-hegemonic wars (other things being equal), there should be a greater concern in the application of the principle of legitimate authority when the United States is considering resort to force than is true of other countries. Moreover, since the United States projects itself as “global cop” and unsupervised cops might turn into rogue cops abusing power, the logic of this projection is that the global community should be the supervisor. It should be further noted that the lack of transparency and democratic will-formation regarding military preparedness issues in the United States spills over into its resort-to-force decisions. Limited military force is often used against other nations without any democratic oversight, and even in the case of full-scale military conflict Congress has not taken seriously its responsibility as the institution that should declare war. In addition, the military-industrial complex that pushes for the acquisition of hegemonic military hardware and so weakens legitimate authority in just military preparedness also weakens *jus ad bellum* legitimate authority. The reason is that the military-industrial complex favors war as an instrument of solving political conflict because it is profitable, since war, unlike nonmilitary conflict resolution, legitimates the replacement of this hardware and its continuous development.

This reason also illustrates that lack of justice in military preparedness is bound to weaken the claim that a given resort to force decision has satisfied the last resort principle, while the principle of right intention is similarly put in question. But the problem goes beyond the distorting impact of war profiteering. Once a country fails to invest adequate resources in war prevention and nonviolent conflict resolution strategies and instead places all or most of its resources under the rubric of military conflict preparation, any claim that a war was a last resort has at the outset greatly diminished credibility. And, clearly, most wars of recent memory must be censured from this angle.

With regard to the link between just military preparedness and *jus in bello*, we have noted that the United States continues to have a variety of weapons in its arsenal, such as cluster bombs, landmines, and depleted uranium weapons, the very use of which violates the *jus in bello* principle of discrimination or noncombatant immunity, at least on the fairly strict interpretation of this principle that requires that “due care” is taken to avoid civilian casualties (Walzer 1977, 155-56). Moreover, high-tech hegemonic weapons are bound to often make the execution of war
indiscriminate and in violation of the *jus in bello* principle of proportionality, especially when war is waged against insurgents in civilian settings. Lastly, military training in a culture that celebrates hegemonic warfare is, to say the least, not an antidote to the commitment of war crimes. War and atrocity are deeply linked, a fact that constitutes a strong indictment of—and challenge to—resort to force, but moral competency and critical-reflective moral education are barriers to atrocity. So just military preparedness might not completely sever the link between war and atrocity, but (unlike hegemonic military preparedness) it would at least drive a wedge between the two.

The victor in a military conflict typically sets the terms of the peace settlement. Following Brian Orend, who has in recent years proposed the new JWT category of *jus post bellum* (2000 and 2006), a just peace requires a public and measured peace settlement; the restoration to long-term security of the basic rights violated by the aggressor; punishment of the initiators of the war of aggression; punishment of soldiers on both sides who have committed war crimes; compensation; and rehabilitation of the aggressor nation, including the transformation of its political and military institutions so that the aggressor nation becomes a good global citizen of the community of nations (Orend 2006, 180-81).

Even when the United States is a righteous victor, reasonable doubts may be raised about its ability and credibility to establish a just peace along these lines. Temporary military bases might be justified to supervise a transition toward a rehabilitated society. However, the United States has a historical record of establishing permanent military bases in foreign countries, often against the popular will and serving its hegemonic military interests (Lutz 2009). It also imposes its own vision of the good society, including privatizing state enterprises and services and opening up local markets to its corporations, while pushing its military hardware to newly installed regimes. America’s efforts to exempt its military from any prosecution outside its own jurisdiction will increasingly raise questions about its capacity to justly punish enemy soldiers (or insurgents).

Add to this that American interventions have been frequent since it strived to become a hegemonic military force in 1945 and often have been morally questionable or clear acts of aggression—and, of course, aggressor victors cannot bring about a just peace—and we must conclude that the United States has thoroughly undermined its credibility as a nation that is able to impose rehabilitation measures on other nations. Instead, it is high time that the United States engages in self-rehabilitation, and moves toward just military preparedness as a step toward lasting just peace.
Works Cited


Notes

1 Most historians currently accept that the atomic bomb was dropped with the aims of intimidating Russia and curtailing its influence in East Asia; the controversy concerns the centrality of these motives. See Bess 2006, 239-42.

2 On January 24, 2003, Ullman expressed the applicability of “Shock and Awe” to Iraq in the followings words: “You're sitting in Baghdad and all of a sudden you're the general and 30 of your division headquarters have been wiped out. You also take the city down. By that I mean you get rid of their power, water. In 2,3,4,5 days they are physically, emotionally and psychologically exhausted” (CBS News 2003). Thus Ullman even suggests that an American ground war might not be needed at all. His proposal to destroy the water and electricity facilities of Baghdad violates the jus in bello principle of discrimination and so is morally to be rejected. It is debatable whether bombing such facilities is a (legal) war crime in that the facilities may be described as dual purpose targets.

3 In the month after the bombing of Baghdad, Ullman (2003) expressed some doubts about whether his strategy was properly followed – and it is still a matter of debate among military strategists – but he confirms the appropriateness of the characterization in the Introduction to the Pavilion Press edition of Ullman and Wade (1996).

4 See Lifton and Mitchell 1995, 4 and 170. Truman made these claims on August 6 and 9, 1945, respectively.

5 UNICEF estimated in 1998 that a half million children under the age of five alone had died as a result of the sanctions (Arnove 2000, 161). My claim here about the general American silence about this tragedy is not meant to deny that some American peace groups, unions, city councils, etc., admirably protested
against this tragedy as well as this silence. For their voices, see Clark 1998. Nor do I seek to deny the culpability of the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein.

6 The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated in early 2008 (on basis of a survey of around 10,000 households) that 151,000 Iraqi civilians had died violently during the first three years of the occupation (Kukis 2008). Iraq Body Count offers an estimate of up to 98,000 civilians killed (through November 2008). See http://www.iraqbodycount.org.

7 In just war theory, there is a longstanding tradition that resort to force is only justified in response to some wrong or harm, not in order to promote a good, such as “civilizing people” or “spreading democracy.” Accordingly, Francisco de Vitoria already protested the colonial conquest of the Americas in his time in the name of promoting Christianity. The principle of non-intervention of the U.N. Charter precludes resort to force for the sake of democracy.

8 There are many critical discussions of unilateral preventive war, but few critics have addressed the morality of collective preventive war. I contest the moral permissibility of U.N. authorized preventive war in Van der Linden 2007b.

9 Obama seems to echo here Recommendations 47-49 of the bipartisan The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward – a New Approach (Baker et al. 2006). In my view, this study group of eminent Republicans and Democrats proposed to withdraw from Iraq not in order to end U.S. military hegemony but to save it from further threats or dissolution. Plausibly, Obama may share this motivation. The Report proposes in Recommendation 47: “As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that have returned to the continental United States in order to ‘reset’ the force and restore the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for global contingencies.” For the same reason, Recommendation 48 states: “As the equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate funds to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next five years.” And the Report calls likewise in Recommendation 49 for a budgetary adjustment aimed at future recruitment and personnel retention.

10 I am partly drawing here from a more expanded discussion in Van der Linden 2009.

11 The term is coined in Woods 2007, 29. I suggested the need for the principles in Van der Linden (2007a, 69) and offer a first brief discussion of them in Van der Linden (2009, 44-46).

12 See Berger 1999, 6. Of course, the main reason for American inaction was Rwanda’s marginal political and economic role in the world. The failure to commit ground troops in Kosovo was both a strategic and moral error and so the limited success of the Kosovo intervention cannot be taken as an argument for claiming that interventions require large high-tech armies. Cf. Walzer 2004, chapter 7.

13 Wallerstein (2004) argues that American display of its military dominance makes nuclear proliferation inevitable and “not necessarily bad.” It is his hope that the more widespread possession of nuclear weapons among states (in combination with other failures of hegemony and unilateralism) may lead the United States to become a better global citizen. For a similar view, see Greider (2006). In my view,
this estimation might be correct; yet, we should oppose hegemony and proliferation at the same time.

14 President Obama has expressed his support of the Schultz proposal for a nuclear free world (Obama for America 2008, 131), and so may be criticized along the same lines.

15 The Obama administration plans to double the spending on such preventive measures by 2012 (Obama for America 2008, 138). This would be a small but still significant step in the right direction, but the current financial crisis (among other factors) might prevent its realization.