What is it for an individual thing in the natural world—a rock, a mouse, a family or a planet—to be made of other things—crystals, organs, animals, soil, water, or dirt? Rocks, mice, families and planets are composites, but how are we to understand the relation that holds between these composites and their component parts? My aim is to offer a new account of this relation, which I shall call corporeal composition. A central claim of my account is that corporeal composition is grounded in causal relations between components. I will show how this claim, combined with a minimalist approach to causation—that causation is not one thing, but many—entails a position I call compositional minimalism—that composition is not one thing, but many
Glennan, Stuart, "Corporeal composition" Synthese / (2020): -.
Available at https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers/1226