Causality in the Sciences
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My aim in this paper is to make a case for the singularist view from the perspective of a mechanical theory of causation (Glennan 1996, 1997, 2010, forthcoming), and to explain what, from this perspective, causal generalizations mean, and what role they play within the mechanical theory.
This is a post-print version of a book chapter published in: In Causality in the Sciences, edited by Phyllis McKay Illari, Renee Russo and Jon Williamson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 789-817.Archived with permission from Oxford University Press, all rights reserved.
Singular and General Causal Relations: A Mechanist Perspective (2011). In Causality in the Sciences, edited by Phyllis McKay Illari, Renee Russo and Jon Williamson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 789-817.
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