The State as a Person: The Social and Biological

Indianapolis, IN

In Alexander Wendt's work "The State as Person in International Theory" Wendt explores the analysis and comparison of the classic unit of international relations to a human subject. In an unprecedented manner Wendt takes his comparison to the limit, finding connections between the biological aspects of personhood as well as the social. In this essay I use a structure similar to Wendt's, but come to different conclusions. Using the work of Searle, the social category of state personhood is determined as not only helpful in the understanding of IR theory but also accurate. At this point I make a departure from Wendt's argument, seeing the biological connection to state personhood as detrimental. By adding in a Bourdieuian perspective on state personhood, it can be determined that the restricting nature of biology cannot handle the dynamic presence of the state. The further addition of Oprisko's concept of "honor" and Lomas' anthropomorphic nature of the state provides evidence the social reality of statehood cannot be pinned down by the organismic categorization of Wendt's argument. Finally, I will provide a "case study" using some of the most active international states, P5 United Nations members, to show real world examples of how modern states do not meet the qualifications of Wendt's analysis. Thus, this argument concludes that making connections between the state and the person outside of a broad social framework proves inaccurate and problematic.