European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Advocates of the New Mechanicism in philosophy of science argue that scientific explanation often consists in describing mechanisms responsible for natural phenomena. Despite its successes, one might think that this approach does not square with the ontological strictures of quantum mechanics. New Mechanists suppose that mechanisms are composed of objects with definite properties, which are interconnected via local causal interactions. Quantum mechanics calls these suppositions into question. Since mechanisms are hierarchical it appears that even macroscopic mechanisms must supervene on a set of “objects” that behave non- classically. In this paper we argue, in part by appeal to the theory of quantum decoherence, that the universal validity of quantum mechanics does not undermine neo-mechanistic ontological and explanatory claims as they occur within in classical domains. Additionally, we argue that by relaxation of certain classical assumptions, mechanistic explanatory strategies can sometimes be carried over into the quantum domain.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13194-014-0088-3.
Kuhlmann M & Glennan S. (2014). On the Relation between Quantum Mechanical and Neo-Mechanistic Ontologies and Explanatory Strategies. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 4(2). http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13194-014-0088-3. Available from: http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers/379